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THE CHINA QUARTERLY

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Published by
Information Bulletin, Ltd.,
133 Oxford Street, London, W.1,
on behalf of the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Printed in Great Britain by
The Eastern Press, Ltd., London and Reading.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

October-December 1961

No. 8

Editor: Roderick MacFarquhar

Advisory Editor: G. F. Hudson

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Editorial and Business Offices:
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev's Attack on Albania and Sino-Soviet Relations

By DONALD S. ZAGORIA

ALBANIA'S defiance of the Kremlin, which goes back to 1956, but became "especially distinct" in the middle of 1960 according to Khrushchev himself,¹ could scarcely have endured so long if China had not given the Balkan country considerable political and economic support. Khrushchev's open attack on the Albanian Party leadership at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961 was, of course, an attack on the Chinese Communist leadership as well. Khrushchev made his principal target plain enough when he said in his opening speech that the course laid down by the Russians at the 20th Congress in 1956 would not be changed because they could not yield on a question of principle "either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else." No one in the Communist world could have any doubts about who the "anyone else" was after Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had failed to applaud Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians, implicitly condemned it two days later,² and abruptly returned home before the Congress had concluded. Moreover, less than twenty-four hours after the Soviet leader's attack on Albania, the Chinese Communists made public a speech delivered several days earlier by a Chinese delegate to the fifth congress of the Women's Union of Albania in Tirana; she pointedly noted that "the friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is unbreakable and no force can destroy it."³ Finally, Mao's meeting of Chou En-lai at the airport on his return was an unprecedented endorsement of Chou's statement since Mao did not meet Chu Teh or Chou on their return from the previous two congresses.

¹ The text of Khrushchev's Central Committee report was broadcast by the Moscow Radio Home Service on October 18, 1961.

² The text of Chou En-lai's speech was released by NCNA on October 19, 1961. He said: "We hold that if a dispute or difference unfortunately arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity through consultation. Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems."

³ *New York Times*, October 19, 1961.

When and why did Khrushchev decide to launch this unexpected open attack on the Albanian Party and, by implication, on China? What is the significance of this renewed pressure on Peking, and what are its likely consequences?

It seems quite probable that Khrushchev's attack on the Albanians was a surprise to Peking, as Hoxha, quoted by Tirana Radio on November 7, referred to Khrushchev's "putschist" methods and "surprise tactics" at the 22nd Congress. This is suggested principally by Chou En-lai's sudden departure, which must be considered a walkout. The Soviet news agency gave us the reason for Chou's departure "the coming session of the National People's Congress,"⁴ but the Chinese news agency offered no reason at all.⁵ Indeed, Peking has nowhere mentioned a forthcoming NPC meeting.

If Peking had previously been aware of Khrushchev's intentions, it is unlikely that it would have sent the kind of delegation it did. The very composition of that delegation indicated that Peking was not girding for a showdown. In addition to the moderate Chou, who is probably more inclined to conciliation than Liu Shao-ch'i and other Chinese militants, the delegation included T'ao Chu, the influential Kwangtung Province First Secretary, who had previously made clear his views on the need for patching up the Sino-Soviet dispute because of overriding economic necessity. In the spring of 1960, shortly before Peking launched a major polemical assault against the Russians, T'ao indicated his disapproval of the impending assault in a speech which argued that "the condition essential to the smooth progress of socialist construction" was to "make our utterances and action beneficial to international solidarity."⁶ This unprecedented statement, in effect calling upon the Chinese Party to swallow its pride and to patch up its quarrel with the Russians as the only way out of its worsening domestic economic crisis, probably represented the views of a considerable number of the Chinese moderates.

On the other hand, the remaining two members of the Chinese delegation, P'eng Chen and K'ang Sheng, had in the past identified themselves with the more militant wing of the CCP. P'eng reportedly launched a bitter attack in the summer of 1960 both on the Soviet Party and on Khrushchev personally.⁷ K'ang delivered the polemical assault on Soviet

⁴ Moscow Radio Home Service, October 24, 1961.

⁵ NCNA, October 24, 1961.

⁶ Speech of T'ao Chu at the political economy class of the Kwangtung CCP Provincial Committee on March 30, 1960, as published in the Canton *Nan-fang Jih-pao* on May 13, 1960, *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 2287, June 29, 1960, p. 16.

⁷ Edward Crankshaw, "The Moscow-Peking Clash Exposed," *Observer*, London, February 12, 1961.

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policy at the Warsaw Pact meeting early in 1960. It seems likely that the Chinese delegation was deliberately balanced between the "conciliators" and the "militants," a common Communist practice when there is a division of opinion at the top.⁸ If this is accepted as a fact, the mixed Chinese delegation must have come to Moscow prepared neither for pressing the initiative nor for making a substantial retreat. A mounting domestic economic crisis and an apparent division of opinion within the Chinese Party on how far it would be wise to flout Moscow were among the factors which ruled out an aggressive attitude. Yet too much was at stake to accept a humiliating surrender.

Such a balance of conflicting influences was evident in Chinese public statements from the time of the Moscow Conference in the autumn of 1960 right up to the eve of the 22nd Party Congress. But there were a number of indications that the conflict continued to smoulder. There were visible differences between Moscow and Peking over Laos,⁹ Yugoslavia,¹⁰ Albania,¹¹ and the new U.S. administration,¹² and strategy and tactics in the underdeveloped areas.¹³ The Chinese continued implicitly to

⁸ When Khrushchev and Malenkov flew to Warsaw in the hectic days after Gomulka came to power in 1956, for example, they took with them Molotov and Kaganovich, who represented a hard line on intra-bloc relations.

⁹ In the early stages of the Laotian crisis, there were indications of differences over the relative priorities to be assigned to negotiations and a cease-fire. The Russians did, but the Chinese did not seem willing to accede to the Western demand that a cease-fire precede negotiations. More recently, there have been indications of a Chinese reluctance to agree to an integration of Pathet Lao with Laotian Government troops.

¹⁰ For Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia which were quite inconsonant with the relatively softer Soviet line, see "Yugoslav Agriculture on the Capitalist Road," *Peking Review*, No. 23, June 9, 1961, pp. 10-13, and "The Tito Clique's 'Self-Management of Enterprises'," *Peking Review*, No. 29, July 21, 1961, pp. 11-14.

¹¹ Almost immediately after the 1960 Moscow Conference, at which there was a violent argument between Albanian Party leader Hoxha and Khrushchev, the Chinese moved to strengthen political, economic, and cultural ties with the Albanians. For an excellent account of the Peking-Tirana-Moscow tug-of-war, see William E. Griffith, "An International Communism?" *East Europe*, July 1961.

¹² Even Khrushchev's militant speech on the twentieth anniversary of the German invasion of the USSR, widely broadcast by Moscow Radio on June 21, was not enough for Peking. A *People's Daily* editorial on June 28 praised that speech and then went on to add criticism of the U.S. administration that went far beyond Khrushchev. At the Twenty-second Congress itself, Khrushchev and other Soviet speakers suggested that the West was now coming to its senses on Berlin while Chou warned against the "deceptive" Kennedy administration which was "decorating itself with olive branches." *NCNA*, October 19, 1961.

¹³ It is true that the Russians began to stiffen their line toward the national bourgeoisie immediately following the Moscow conference. There were direct attacks in Soviet journals on the governments of India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, the UAR, the Sudan, and other countries for pursuing domestic policies that retarded social progress. The accusation was made that the national bourgeoisie in some countries had saved the landowning class from liquidation from below, that it sought to isolate the workers from the peasant movement, and that its attitude towards foreign capital was inconsistent. For a good round-up of this material, see "Renewed Attacks on the National Bourgeoisie," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, VIII (August 1961), pp. 3-9. Nevertheless, throughout 1961 Peking published long theoretical articles on the "democratic" revolution in China whose purpose was manifestly to suggest (1) that the Chinese revolutionary model, and not Khrushchev's

challenge Soviet authority by building up the cult of Mao Tse-tung and calling for the Sinification of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁴ They published a collection of ancient Chinese stories about ghosts in which the preface warned against those "ghost-fearing men of the 20th century" who are "frightened out of their wits by imperialism and reaction."¹⁵ On the very eve of the 22nd Congress, a high-ranking Chinese spokesman went so far as to reject in unmistakable, if still veiled, language the Soviet concept of a "national democracy" for the underdeveloped countries.¹⁶ The concept had been endorsed by the Moscow Conference and subsequently hailed by the Russians, but not by the Chinese, as a "creative" contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

Moreover, one month before the Soviet Draft Party Programme was released, and presumably after the Chinese had seen it, Peking made it quite clear that while the programme was valid for the Soviet Union it had no binding effect on the Chinese Communists. *Red Flag* said:

In analysing a social problem, the absolute demand of Marxist theory is to place the problem within a definite historical limit. In addition, if

imaginary one, was valid for revolution in the underdeveloped areas, (2) that the Communist Party and the proletariat must engage in armed struggle as a means of forcing the national bourgeoisie into a "patriotic" front, (3) that prolonged co-operation with the weak and vacillating national bourgeoisie would prove to be disastrous, and (4) that only the Communist Party could lead the "democratic" revolution, i.e., the stage before the socialist revolution, to a successful conclusion. See, for example, "The Distinction and Link-up Between the Two Stages of the Chinese Revolution," *Red Flag*, January 1, in *Peking Review*, January 20, 1961, pp. 9-18; "The Peasant Question in the Democratic Revolution," *Red Flag*, March 1, in *Peking Review*, March 31, 1961, pp. 5-13; "The Role of the United Front in the Chinese Revolution," *Red Flag*, June 1, 1961, published serially in *Peking Review*, June 9, 1961, pp. 13-16 and June 16, 1961, pp. 17-21; "The Chinese People's Democratic United Front," *Red Flag*, published serially in *Peking Review*, August 18, 1961, pp. 11-15, August 25, 1961, pp. 12-18, and September 1, 1961, pp. 10-14. The Russians, for all the toughening of their line, continued to take the view, expressed in the Party programme, that the national bourgeoisie could make further progress.

¹⁴ See particularly "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung Opens the Way for the Development of China's Science of History," by Teng T'o, *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 264, June 5, 1961, pp. 1-14, in which Chinese historians are urged to abolish European-centred historiography and put more emphasis on the "several thousand year old" history of China. Historians were also told in this article that blind observance of foreign rules must be abolished, that Marxism-Leninism must be made to assume Chinese features, and that the thought of Mao represents "the key to the gate of the science of history."

¹⁵ "Preface to 'Stories About not being Afraid of Ghosts,'" *Peking Review*, March 10, 1961, p. 7.

¹⁶ Vice-Chairman Tung Pi-wu, speaking at a meeting held to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 1911 revolution, suggested that this revolution failed because it was led by the Chinese national bourgeoisie and went on to say: "As everyone knows, in the epoch of imperialism, there is no country in which the national and democratic revolution can achieve complete victory under the leadership of the bourgeoisie; neither the plan for a bourgeois republic nor that for any other form of bourgeois-state can enable these countries to embark on the road of completely independent development. In the present epoch, only under the leadership of the proletariat, and by obtaining the help of the socialist countries, will it be possible for any country to win complete victory in its national and democratic revolution. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)

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a certain country (or, for example, the national programme of this country) is referred to, the concrete characteristics of this country that distinguish it from other countries in the same historical era must be taken into account.¹⁷

The clear implication was that the Soviet programme could be valid for other Communist states only within certain limits. The same point was made in effect by Teng Hsiao-p'ing who, in a speech to the North Korean Party Congress, made the first mention of the Soviet programme by any Chinese leader. Referring to it in a rather offhand manner, he said that the Soviet space ships and the draft programme, "which outlines the gigantic plan of the *Soviet* people," were "strong proof" of the superiority of the socialist system.¹⁸ Although the *People's Daily* published the full text of the CPSU programme on August 5, there was no comment whatever, an unusual omission for a document of such importance.

The Chinese effort before the Congress to delimit the applicability of the Soviet programme was in marked contrast to the Russian and East European effort to universalise it. An unsigned editorial article in *Pravda* on August 2 noted that the programme testified to the "leading role" of the CPSU in the further development of Marxism-Leninism and bluntly stated: "The CPSU Central Committee is the true centre of theoretical thought." This marked contrast between Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward the Draft Programme continued at the Congress itself. Chou En-lai told the Congress that the new programme "set forth for the *Soviet people* a grand plan for building communism . . ." (emphasis added). Khrushchev himself called the programme "a new stage in the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin," and he noted pointedly: "We can proudly say to those who want to know what communism is, 'Read our Party programme.'"

In spite of these and other indications that the Sino-Soviet conflict had by no means been bridged, there were no signs that either party was prepared to force matters to a head. The "compromise" worked out at Moscow in 1960 showed an ambiguity that perhaps reflected the awareness of both sides that an impasse was preferable to a break-up of the world Communist movement. The fact that the Chinese had modified many aspects of their ambitious "leap-forward" and commune programme, even if this were for domestic reasons and not owing to Soviet pressure, could only help to improve matters. While the Chinese continued their veiled polemics against the Russians, they did so somewhat less clamorously than in 1960. The Russians, for their part, gave no signs that they were preparing a major offensive against Peking. It is true that the Draft Party Programme released in late July warned against

¹⁷ *Red Flag*, July 1, 1961.

¹⁸ NCNA, September 12, 1961, emphasis added.

"national narrowmindedness" and the "reactionary and politically dangerous" course of socialist construction "in isolation,"¹⁹ but these warnings had been made earlier and the Draft Programme, on the whole, went easy on the Chinese.

Viewed in this perspective, what may have been the calculations behind Khrushchev's surprise attack on Albania? First of all, it is necessary to point out an obvious but significant fact—that Khrushchev has not directly attacked the Chinese themselves, despite the fact that they are the real source of his problem. The Albanians could not hope to defy a united Sino-Soviet axis. Khrushchev has not been willing to engage the Chinese frontally, and thus to force a complete break. In other words, he is not willing to pose the manifold differences between Moscow and Peking in such a way that Peking would have no alternative but to surrender or to leave the *bloc*. He prefers to launch an indirect assault on the Chinese through their Albanian proxies, perhaps the weakest link in their chain, because Albania is so far away from China and because there is undoubtedly much less sympathy in the international Communist movement for Albania than for China. The similarity in this respect between Khrushchev's pressure on China through Albania and his pressure on the West in Berlin is worth noting. In both cases, he has skilfully found an exposed and vulnerable point in the opponent's position and has begun to apply the scalpel rather than the axe.

It is in this context that Khrushchev's ironic remark at the end of the Congress must be viewed:

We share the anxiety expressed by our Chinese friends and appreciate their concern for greater unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to make efforts towards normalising the relations between the Albanian Workers' Party and the fraternal parties, there is hardly anyone who can contribute to the solution of this problem more than the Communist Party of China.²⁰

If Khrushchev was counting on a Chinese retreat, there is little indication at this writing that Peking is preparing to back down. Since the Soviet attack on Albania, the Chinese have begun to negotiate new economic agreements with that country²¹ and republished Albanian statements accusing Khrushchev of "anti-Marxist" conduct, of resorting to "lies, pressure and threats, slanders and inventions," of "opportunism," "revisionism," and "treachery." They have gone so far as to republish the slashing attack on Khrushchev made by Hoxha on the November 7

¹⁹ For text of the Draft Programme, see *New York Times*, August 1, 1961.

²⁰ *Tass*, October 27, 1961.

²¹ According to NCNA of November 17, an Albanian economic and trade delegation arrived in Peking on that date to hold talks on economic co-operation for 1962.

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anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.²² Moreover, on the 20th anniversary of the Albanian party on November 8, the Chinese party sent it a message saying that it was under the "correct guidance" of its "tested leader" Enver Hoxha, and that the unity between the two countries would be "strengthened and further developed." In sharp contrast to Soviet and East European *bloc* statements which now exclude Albania from the socialist family of nations, the Chinese continue pointedly to refer to the "twelve socialist countries."

The Russians, for their part, have apparently ordered the withdrawal of all European *bloc* ambassadors from Albania and are reported to be considering the expulsion of Albania from the Warsaw Pact. Given Khrushchev's capacity for vindictiveness, it seems unlikely that he will take Hoxha's blistering personal attack without a response in kind. Thus, the Soviet-Albanian schism is assuming a momentum of its own and if the Chinese continue to support the Albanians, it is hard to see how a public and complete split between Moscow and Peking over this issue can be avoided.

On the other hand, the Chinese have not, as of this writing, more than one month after the Congress, issued any direct statements on the Soviet-Albanian controversy. They are clearly just as reluctant as the Russians to take steps which would by their very nature lead to or constitute a complete break. Both sides are reluctant to be branded as "splitters."

In some respects, Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Albanians may have been more an admission of weakness rather than an indication of strength. During the year-and-a-half preceding the 22nd Congress, the Russians had imposed economic sanctions on Albania,²³ and may even have attempted a coup.²⁴ They had withdrawn (or been forced to withdraw) part or all of their submarine fleet. The Albanian Party continued to side with the Chinese on most outstanding issues of intra-*bloc* and global policy, evidently fearing above all that Khrushchev's *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia might ultimately lead to political annexation by

²² *People's Daily* of November 16 carried on three and a half pages the full text of Hoxha's speech of November 7. The delay suggests some deliberation within the Chinese party prior to publication. The fact that the speech, unpublished elsewhere in the Communist *bloc*, was published in Peking represents a significant step and is about the most provocative action Peking could take short of openly attacking Moscow itself.

²³ The Russians and the other East European *bloc* countries apparently pulled out their technicians from Albania in 1961. An AP correspondent who made a three-week tour of Albania reported that the deported *bloc* experts were being replaced by Chinese. The East Germans were reported to have received an order to leave by August 31 even if it meant breaking contracts. The same report said that not one tourist from any Soviet-*bloc* nation had come to spend a vacation on the Adriatic coast since mid-June. Security restrictions were at a maximum and the Albanians apparently fearful of a Soviet attack or a Soviet staged uprising. See *New York Times*, October 22, 1961.

²⁴ See Griffith, *op. cit.*

Tito. In February, at the 4th Congress of the Albanian Party, there were defiant attacks on the "revisionists" who were trying to turn Albania's geographic encirclement "into an economic blockade and make effective the political isolation of our Socialist country." They would not succeed in this attempt, however, because "Socialist Albania is not alone."²⁵

In April, China and Albania signed three economic protocols, one of which provided for complete sets of Chinese equipment and technical assistance for building twenty-five chemical, metallurgical, electrical, and other plants. At the same time, it was revealed that the agreements signed in February had included one for a Chinese loan to Albania worth 112.5 million rubles, bring Chinese aid to Albania since 1956 over the Soviet figure. Albania was not represented by her Party First Secretary either at the March or the August Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow. She was not represented at all at the meeting in May in Prague of most European *bloc* leaders for the fortieth anniversary of the Czech Communist Party. Whether this absence was self-imposed or forced upon them by Moscow, the fact remains that the Albanians in effect had partially severed Party and military relations with the European *bloc* and had as yet been able to get away with it.²⁶

The serious problem with which the Albanians faced Moscow was the visible demonstration to the Communist world that the tiniest of all *bloc* countries, if supported by Peking, could defy the Russians with impunity. For all of Khrushchev's insistence that no Party could dictate to another, it must have become clear to him that if he allowed the Peking-Tirana axis to continue without an open attack upon it, it might soon become the basis of a much larger group of dissidents within the international Communist movement—a group that Peking clearly sought to form and to head. In launching an open attack, therefore, Khrushchev was in effect saying that all else had failed in his attempt to bring Albania to heel and that the only way left was an open threat of expulsion from the Communist *bloc*.

It is important to note in this connection that the Resolution adopted at the conclusion of the 22nd Congress was notably milder on the Albanians than Khrushchev in his speech of October 27. In that speech, Khrushchev in effect called for the resignation of Shehu, Hoxha "and others . . . in the commanding posts in the party and the state." The Resolution, on the other hand, merely "expresses the hope that the Albanian leaders . . . will renounce their erroneous views and return to the road of unity and cooperation with all socialist countries. . . ." ²⁷

²⁵ See *East Europe*, April 1961, p. 3.

²⁶ At the Twenty-second Congress, Ulbricht suggested that Albania had taken unspecified actions not in keeping with its Warsaw Pact obligations.

²⁷ Moscow Radio Home Service, November 1, 1961.

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This restraint could stem from a division of opinion within the Soviet leadership over how far to go in pushing the matter²⁸ or it could reflect the fact that about one-third of the parties represented at the Congress refused to go along with the Russians. The extent to which the Sino-Soviet conflict widens in the immediate future is, of course, greatly dependent on how much pressure the Russians bring to bear on Albania.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the 22nd Congress was the revival of the attacks on the anti-Party group and particularly on Molotov. Although it is quite likely that there were internal compulsions for such attacks, their relation to the Sino-Soviet conflict has been made quite explicit by Soviet spokesmen. Kuusinen accused Molotov of "fishing in foreign waters,"²⁹ and Mikoyan said that Molotov's rejection of peaceful coexistence "was close to that of the foreign opponents of peaceful coexistence, treating it as a variant of the cold war, as a state of armed peace."³⁰ Mikoyan also referred to Molotov's opposition to Khrushchev's personal diplomacy. Pospelov accused Molotov of "slandorously alleging" that the Party line laid down at the 20th Congress was "in complete contradiction to the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism,"³¹ a position also taken by Peking. Khrushchev himself, in his concluding speech, said that "only the hopeless dogmatists," Molotov and "his like," did not understand the changes that had taken place in the world situation.³²

Did the anti-Party group in general, and Molotov in particular, seek at some time between 1957 and 1960 to make common cause with the Chinese in an effort to unseat Khrushchev? On the basis of available evidence, this seems unlikely. It is apparent, however, that as early as June 1957, when Khrushchev defeated the anti-Party group, Peking had serious reservations about the purge. Its comment on the removals from the Presidium was the least enthusiastic of the entire *bloc*. It is likely, but again undemonstrable, that Peking had earlier supported Khrushchev against Malenkov, for Malenkov's emphasis on light industry would have meant fewer Soviet capital goods for China. If Peking did in fact support Khrushchev against Malenkov, it must have been bitterly disappointed when Khrushchev stole some of Malenkov's thunder by adopting a semi-moderate position towards the West and towards the relative priorities

²⁸ The Albanian issue was not mentioned in the Congress speeches of Furtseva, Podgorniy, Shvernik and Voronov. Moreover, some of the speakers' criticisms of the Albanians were weaker in tone than those of others.

²⁹ Moscow Radio Home Service, October 27, 1961.

³⁰ Moscow Radio Home Service, October 21, 1961.

³¹ *Tass*, October 26, 1961.

³² *Tass*, October 27, 1961. In the same context, Khrushchev referred to "some people" who accuse us of contradicting Lenin's appraisal of imperialism.

to be accorded heavy and light industry. After the autumn of 1957, there can be little doubt that the views of the Peking left, both on foreign and domestic policy, were much closer to those of the fallen Molotov than to those of Khrushchev. That Peking would have preferred a change in Soviet leadership is a fairly safe inference; but what precisely it did to bring this change about must remain a matter for speculation. It is noteworthy that Soviet leaders, after the Bucharest confrontation in June 1960, began placing heavy stress on the collective leadership of the USSR, as if to demonstrate to Peking that there was no possibility of splitting it.

Khrushchev's unexpected attack on Stalin at the Congress, considering all the obvious liabilities for the Communist world that such an attack carries with it, raises another crucial question: what was the motivation for it? Hoxha, in his very revealing speech on the October Revolution anniversary, broadcast by Tirana Radio on November 7, suggests that the Stalin question was in part being "used as a bogey for putting pressure on the other parties and for liquidating the leaders who do not please N. Khrushchev." Although Hoxha is obviously not a disinterested observer in this matter, it does in fact seem likely that—whatever the internal compulsions for the move against Stalin—Khrushchev is also consciously using the "personality cult" issue to blacken those leaders in the Communist movement such as Mao and Hoxha who have refused in recent years to accept his dictates. Khrushchev would much prefer to deal with collective leaderships in some parties so that he could play one faction off against another and thus minimise the ability of one powerful leader to defy him. While Stalin was alive, the existence of "little Stalins" throughout the Communist world did not hinder the exercise of Soviet authority because none of the little Stalins would have dared to defy the *vozhd*. But now that authority in the international Communist world has become more diffuse and the means of control become more subtle, Communist leaders with unlimited power in their own parties do represent a severe limitation on Khrushchev's freedom of manoeuvre.

Although the Party programme approved by the 22nd Congress provided no indication of Khrushchev's impending attack on China, its contents did provide a number of clues as to the numerous and complex substantive issues that continue to divide the two Communist powers. With regard to strategy and tactics in the national liberation movement, the programme asserted that the "progressive" role of the national bourgeoisie was "not yet spent," an indication that Khrushchev is not yet ready to sanction the kinds of pressure on the new nationalist governments that Peking believes is essential. The Russians also continue to uphold their emphasis on "democratic" rather than "socialist" goals

in the advanced capitalist countries; the Party programme implicitly rejects the Chinese analysis by saying that "general democratic struggles against the monopolies do not delay the socialist revolution but bring it nearer." There is also a warning that revolutions "are not made to order" and that the proletariat "cannot impose any 'felicity' on another people. . . ."

The Party programme also makes it apparent that there has as yet been no satisfactory resolution of Khrushchev's aspirations to achieve interdependence for the Communist *bloc* with the Chinese insistence on economic independence. The Programme pointedly warns that "the line of socialist construction in isolation . . ." is both politically dangerous and "harmful economically because it causes waste of social labour, retards the rates of growth of production and makes the country dependent upon the capitalist world." There have been numerous indications in recent years of Chinese resistance to *bloc* economic specialisation, long-term plan co-ordination and division of labour.

Finally, the Party programme warns against inciting to Leftist adventurist actions, "national narrow-mindedness" and dogmatism which "can become the chief danger" to any individual party, all of which are clearly directed at Peking and could conceivably serve as the basis for future public charges of Chinese "deviation."

The Sino-Soviet struggle over Albania implies and illustrates the rivalry over power and authority in the Communist world that has been at the heart of the Sino-Soviet conflict since 1956. Had Sino-Soviet differences been limited to mere matters of policy, one might have supposed that the hardening of Soviet foreign policy since the summer of 1960, combined with the radical domestic retreat of the Chinese, would have gone some way towards removing or decreasing the causes of conflict. After all, the enthusiasm with which Peking seconded the Soviet Government decision to resume nuclear testing⁸³ and its prompt support of the Soviet stand on Berlin⁸⁴ revealed a satisfaction with Soviet foreign policy that was missing in 1959 and 1960. At the very time, however, when there was this slight narrowing of the political gulf between the two powers, the yawning gap over authority and power was shown to be unresolved.

The Albanian Party has not been the only cat's-paw in what is essentially a struggle for power and for spheres of influence within the international Communist movement. In July 1961, Moscow demonstrated a rare benevolence to all three of the Asian satellite countries, extending massive aid to run through 1965. There were new credits as well as debt

⁸³ "A Timely Warning to War Plotters," *Peking Review*, September 8, 1961

⁸⁴ "China Fully Supports the Warsaw Treaty Countries' Stand on the German Question," *Peking Review*, August 18, 1961.

cancellations. In the same month, the Russians sent no less a person than Suslov to the Mongolian Party Congress, where he made a curious reference to the "firm security" of the Outer Mongolia borders on both the Chinese and Soviet sides. In this he may have been reassuring the Outer Mongolian Party that Moscow would not tolerate Chinese attempts at border adjustments.⁸⁵ (Chinese Communist maps, unlike Soviet ones, have persistently shown the Sino-Mongolian border as undelimited.)

There were also clear signs of a Sino-Soviet tug-of-war in North Korea. In early July, Kim Il-song made brief visits both to Moscow and to Peking. In a joint communiqué signed in Moscow, Kim came out against "deviations from the principles of socialist internationalism,"⁸⁶ phraseology which in this context could only have been aimed at Peking. In a communiqué issued a few days later (July 15), following his visit to Peking, there was no reference to such "deviations" but instead there was a vigorous attack on "Yugoslav revisionism," the euphemism that Peking has employed since 1958 to denote "soft" Soviet policies.⁸⁷ In both Moscow and Peking, Kim got formal assurances of support in case of trouble with the West. In sum, Kim was dexterously reaping the advantages of being wooed by rival suitors. This was safe ground for him as it was for both Moscow and Peking, each of which would prefer to keep the Asian parties in the middle rather than see them openly allied with the other.

If Albania, too, had decided to play the middle, it is quite likely that Khrushchev would not have launched his frontal assault. For what the Russians must seek to avoid at all costs is the creation of an Asian Cominform led by Peking and supported by other parties throughout the Communist movement. The Chinese, on the other hand, must seek at all costs to avoid isolation within the Communist world.

In this connection, it is important to consider the reaction of the various delegations at the 22nd Congress to the Soviet attack on Albania. This was the first issue between Moscow and Peking that was put to a vote, as it were, in the international Communist movement. The reaction of the eighty-odd parties obviously indicates a great deal about the relative strength of Moscow and Peking in world Communism. The Russians carried with them nearly all the parties in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, most of whom joined in the condemnation of Albania. The Chinese were tacitly supported by most of the Asian parties, which refrained from mentioning Albania.⁸⁸ It is difficult to

⁸⁵ Moscow Radio Home Service, July 4, 1961.

⁸⁶ *Tass*, July 10, 1961.

⁸⁷ *Peking Review*, July 21, 1961, p. 7.

⁸⁸ A spot check of the foreign delegates' speeches in *Pravda* as of October 28 shows that all the European parties attacked Albania; of the representatives from the Middle East and North Africa, the Algerian delegate was the only one noted who did not

say to what extent this line-up disappointed either Moscow or Peking. It has long been apparent that most of the European parties would support the Russians right up to the brink of an open schism, despite the fact that there are elements sympathetic to Chinese positions in many of those European parties. It has also been apparent for some time that most of the Asian parties have been very careful to stay in the middle of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Before the Congress met, there had been some question about the Latin American and Middle Eastern parties, many of which might have been expected to favour the more militant Chinese tactics for gaining power, but which, on the other hand, were disinclined to defy the Russians because of geographical propinquity, financial dependence, or Moscow-trained leaderships. Some of these parties, moreover, desire to continue a hitherto successful non-violent policy.

It is extremely important, also, to qualify the Asian parties' "support" for Peking. Abstention is after all a middle-of-the-road position. None of the Asian parties followed Chou En-lai's example by criticising the Russians implicitly for their attack on Albania. The Congress, therefore, made it plain that the depth of commitment of the European, Middle Eastern and Latin American parties to the Russians is for the most part greater than the depth of commitment of the Asian parties to Peking. This suggests that, were an open break between Moscow and Peking to occur, Moscow could probably count on the support of all those parties which joined it in condemning Albania; while it is not at all certain that Peking could count on the support of all those parties who refrained from mentioning Albania. The results of this Soviet-sponsored "poll" of the international Communist movement will undoubtedly be pondered by the Chinese, who are manifestly fearful of isolation.⁹⁹

On the other hand, it is an impressive fact that *all* but one of the Asian parties refused to attack Albania. This is a fact that will undoubtedly be pondered well by the Russians. It certainly suggests that geography plays an unexpectedly large role in Communist *bloc* politics. And it brings somewhat closer to reality the nightmare that must haunt

mention Albania, but even he declared "our full and unconditional agreement" with the policy of the CPSU; in Asia, all the Party spokesmen whose speeches were available, with the exception of the Ceylonese, refrained from mentioning Albania; in Latin America, all nine parties whose speeches were available, including Cuba, condemned the Albanians. There were varying degrees of intensity in the attacks against Albania and some delegates tempered their remarks with strong pleas for unity.

⁹⁹ In the autumn of 1960, shortly before the Moscow conference, Chinese Communist articles warned that efforts to isolate them would not prove successful. This seemed to indicate serious concern over Khrushchev's attempts to line up the Asian bloc parties on his side. Shortly before the conference, Khrushchev announced his intention to fly to North Korea but subsequently he abandoned the trip. One likely explanation is that it became clear to him that he had no chance of getting North Korean support for a final showdown with Peking.

Moscow—the possibility of a breakup of the Communist world into Eastern and Western empires.

The crucial question remains: will Khrushchev's attack on Albania lead to a complete and public break with China, thus bringing out into the open a conflict that has become increasingly intense over the past several years? Such a development could occur. In the first place, the Albanian leaders by intensifying their attacks on Khrushchev as they have done, are fast making a compromise solution impossible even if it is assumed that the Russians are interested in such a compromise. If the Russians begin to take disciplinary actions against the Albanians, such as expelling them from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, or if Khrushchev steps up his verbal onslaught against the Albanian leaders, it is difficult to see how the Chinese can avoid one of two extreme courses, either supporting the Albanians formally and thus completing the break, or of backing down. Even if some kind of a Chinese middle road position is possible, it may well be that Khrushchev is not prepared to accept it and is determined to exact a surrender. Khrushchev and Mao may miscalculate about each other's intentions, each believing that the other is bluffing and not prepared to be the first to go to the brink beyond which lies a bitter schism. Mao may believe that if he gives in to Khrushchev on Albania, other demands will follow. Finally, there is the unpredictable role of irrationality in a conflict where the prestige of two powerful leaders is heavily engaged.

The situation is not yet irretrievable, however, and it must be assumed that both sides are extremely anxious to avoid a complete rupture that would prove disastrous to both, but particularly to China. Peking is in the midst of an economic crisis that is expected to last for three years at least. Without Soviet military, economic and diplomatic support it is a third-rate power. The voices of the "conciliators" in the Chinese party must surely be arguing that now is not the time to force the issue with Moscow, that the "balance of forces" at this time is patently on the Soviet side, that the matter of overriding importance is to build up the Chinese economy so that it can enter the ranks of the great powers, and that only then will China be in a position to challenge Soviet leadership of the *bloc*.

On the Soviet side, there must be many within the Party who believe that Khrushchev is taking too great a risk of splitting the *bloc* by his provocative public attack and that the only way to continue to deal with Albania and China is, as Chou En-lai suggested, in private, "comradely" discussions. Khrushchev himself may not be prepared to press the issue against the Albanians much further now that the Chinese have indicated they would not back down. There is thus some chance of a compromise that will satisfy neither Moscow nor Peking, that will strain even more

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the anomalous Sino-Soviet relationship, but will at least avoid an irreparable schism between the two great communist powers.

When all is said and done, however, a split of a kind has already taken place, one which creates considerable opportunity for a flexible and imaginative Western policy. One question that remains to be answered is whether both sides will seek to avoid compounding it or whether events have already moved too far. Another is whether or not the split can be confined to the immediate issue of Albania, or whether it will spread out into the much broader issues that have divided Russia and China for several years.

Documentation: 1. Khrushchev's Attack on Albania

I must say, however, that our Party's policy aimed at eliminating the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual did not, as became obvious afterwards, meet with due understanding from the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour. Indeed, they began to oppose that policy.

Everyone knows that, until recently, the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Albania, and between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Albanian Party of Labour, were good and friendly. The peoples of our country were giving Albania all-round disinterested help to enable her to develop the economy and carry on Socialist construction. It has always been our sincere desire, as it is now, that Albania should be a prosperous Socialist republic, and her people happy and enjoying all the benefits of a new life.

For many years the Albanian leaders signified their complete agreement with the Central Committee of our Party and the Soviet Government on all matters pertaining to the world Communist movement. They repeatedly voiced support for the course adopted by the 20th Congress. Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the C.C. of the Albanian Party of Labour, mentioned this in his speeches at the 20th and 21st Congresses of our Party. The Third Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour, held shortly after the 20th Congress, fully approved of the criticism levelled at the cult of the individual, as well as of the steps taken to eliminate the harmful consequences of that cult.

We Soviet people believed the Albanian leaders and held that there was mutual understanding and unity of views between our Party and the Albanian Party of Labour.

The facts show, however, that the Albanian leaders have lately reversed their policy for no apparent reason, despite their previous assurances, and contrary to the decisions of the congress of their own Party, and have set out to seriously worsen their relations with our Party, with our country. They have begun to depart from the common agreed line of the Communist movement of the whole world on major issues of today—something which became particularly noticeable in the middle of last year.

The Albanian leaders no longer conceal their disapproval of the course adopted by our Party with a view to eliminating completely the harmful consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, severely condemning abuses of power and re-establishing the Leninist standards of Party and government activity.

It would appear that, in their hearts, the Albanian leaders disagreed with the conclusions of the 1957 and 1960 meetings of the fraternal Parties, which, as we all know, approved of the decisions of the 20th Congress and our Party's policy directed toward eliminating the harmful consequences of the cult of the individual. This stand of the Albanian leaders is due to the fact that, to our deep regret, they are themselves using the same methods as were current in our country at the time of the cult of the individual.

It is with concern for the destinies of the heroic Albanian people that we are watching events in Albania. We are pained to see that rank-and-file Communists in Albania, and the Albanian people as a whole, who have a vital interest in friendship and co-operation with all the Socialist countries, have to pay for the erroneous policy of the Albanian leaders. We are deeply concerned about the situation and have never stopped our earnest search for ways and means of overcoming the divergences that have arisen.

The policy elaborated by the 20th Congress of our Party is a Leninist policy, and we cannot make a concession on this fundamental point either to the Albanian leaders or to anyone else. To depart from the course adopted by the 20th Congress would amount to ignoring the wise directions of Lenin, who discerned the danger of a cult of Stalin's person when it was still in embryo. It would amount to disregarding the costly lessons of history and forgetting the price which our Party had to pay because it had not acted in good time on the warning given by its great leader.

The Albanian leaders, who oppose the course adopted by the 20th Congress, are now trying to pull our Party back to practices which they like but which will never recur in our country. Our Party will press forward with determination the policy of its 20th Congress, a policy which has withstood the test of time. No one can divert us from the Leninist road.

If the Albanian leaders hold dear the interests of their own people and of Socialist construction in Albania, and if they really want friendship with the CPSU and the other fraternal Parties, they must renounce their erroneous views and revert to the path of unity and close co-operation within the fraternal family of the Socialist community: they must revert to the path of unity with the world Communist movement as a whole.

As regards our Party, it will continue, in keeping with its internationalist duty, to do all in its power for Albania to march shoulder to shoulder with all the Socialist countries. . . .

[From *Soviet Weekly* (London) Supplement containing text of Khrushchev's Oct. 17 report of the Central Committee.]

2. Chinese Delegation Leader greets Albanian Women

The leader of the Chinese Women's Delegation, Yang Yun-yu, extended warm greetings to Albanian women at the second day's session of the Fifth Congress of the Women's Union of Albania at Tirana on October 16.

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Albanian women, she declared, together with all other heroic Albanians, following the correct leadership of the Albanian Labour Party headed by their long-tested leader Comrade Enver Hoxha, holding aloft the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism and working in the spirit of holding "the pick in one hand and the rifle in the other," had completed the democratic and Socialist revolutions. Thanks to the creative labour of the Albanian people in the past sixteen years, Albania had achieved great economic and cultural successes and the people's material and cultural life had been greatly improved, she noted. . . .

Yang Yun-yu paid tribute to the role played by Albanian women in Socialist construction. The Albanian people carried on their Socialist revolution and Socialist construction under difficult conditions, as Albania was surrounded by capitalist countries, she pointed out.

"We heartily admire your revolutionary heroism," she said. "We assure you that we will be always with you, even in sorrow and stress. . . ."

Yang Yun-yu said in conclusion that the friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was unbreakable and no force could destroy it. The common goal of struggle had closely united them together, she said.

Her speech of greetings was warmly welcomed by all delegates and repeatedly interrupted by long applause. During her speech, the delegates stood up on several occasions, cheering: "People's China" and "Hoxha-Mao Tse-tung. . . ."

[NCNA, October 16, 1961.]

3. Chou En-lai's Speech at Soviet Party Congress

U.S. imperialism is the most vicious enemy of peace. It is the bulwark of modern colonialism and international reaction, the main force of aggression and war at the present time. The whole world now perceives that the Kennedy administration is more deceptive and adventurist. Outwardly it is decorating itself with olive branches and is indulging in talk of "peace," "progress" and "human welfare," but in fact, behind the cover of "peace," it is pressing ahead ever more frantically with arms expansion and war preparation. . . .

This unity of ours is cemented by common ideals and a common cause; it has been strengthened and developed in joint struggles against our common enemy and it is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This unity of ours has stood the test of time; no force can destroy it. Our Socialist camp comprising twelve fraternal countries is a single entity, from the Korean Democratic People's Republic to the German Democratic Republic, from the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam to the Albanian People's Republic. We Socialist countries and we Communist Parties of all countries support and co-operate with each other in a brotherly way, on the basis of independence and full equality. We must unite very well and cherish our unity like the apple of the eye and there should absolutely not be any words or deeds that harm this unity (applause).

We hold that if a dispute or difference unfortunately arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and

unanimity through consultation. Any public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful to resolving problems. To lay bare a dispute between fraternal Parties or fraternal countries openly in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude will only grieve those near and dear to us and gladden our enemies. The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that fraternal Parties which have disputes or differences will unite afresh on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and on the basis of mutual respect, independence and equality. This, in my opinion, is the position which we Communists ought to take on this question (applause). . . .

[Speech delivered Oct. 19; text according to NCNA on same day.]

4. The Albanian Reply

Nikita Khrushchev attacked the Albanian Workers' Party at the 22nd CPSU Congress before the whole world. The anti-Marxist lies and attacks of Nikita Khrushchev serve only the enemies of Communism and of the Albanian People's Republic—the various imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists.

Nikita Khrushchev, disclosing to the enemies the misunderstandings which have long existed between the leadership of the CPSU and the Albanian Workers' Party, brutally violated the 1960 Moscow Declaration, which stresses that misunderstandings arising between sister Parties must be settled patiently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual consultation.

By attacking the Albanian Workers' Party before the whole world, Nikita Khrushchev effectively started an open attack against the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement, against the unity of the Socialist camp. Nikita Khrushchev is fully responsible for this anti-Marxist act and for all the consequences which may flow from it.

Guided by the interests of the unity of the international Communist movement and the Socialist camp, the Albanian Workers' Party has tried very patiently, since misunderstandings with the Soviet leadership first arose, to settle them in the correct Marxist-Leninist way—the way stressed by the Moscow Declaration. Nikita Khrushchev, however, chose the anti-Marxist way of aggravating these differences—the way of attacks and lies, the way of pressure and threats, and the way of publicly denouncing our misunderstandings.

The Albanian Workers' Party sympathetically received the statement of comrade Chou En-lai, head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China at the 22nd CPSU Congress, which pointed out that unilateral criticism and public ventilation of misunderstandings between the sister Parties in front of our enemies cannot be considered a serious and Marxist-Leninist attitude. Yet even after this statement of principle by the representative of the Communist Party of China, the most virulent attacks and slanders against the Albanian Workers' Party and the Albanian People's Republic have been launched from the rostrum of the 22nd CPSU Congress by certain members of the Soviet leadership and by certain leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the other countries. They, too, are taking a heavy historic responsibility upon themselves as the splitters of the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement.

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In this situation—faced with the organised anti-Marxist attack of Nikita Khrushchev and those who support it; with the slanders and inventions designed to discredit our Party; and with the serious danger to the future destiny of the unity of the international Communist and workers' movement and the Socialist camp—the Albanian Workers' Party cannot remain silent. The Albanian Workers' Party will, by means of facts and documents, inform the whole international Communist and workers' movement and world public opinion of the whole truth about the relations between the Albanian Workers' Party and the leadership of the CPSU [so that it may be seen] on which side stands truth, and will unmask the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian activities of Nikita Khrushchev and his group. The unity of the Socialist camp and the international Communist and workers' movement is being seriously endangered by the anti-Marxist activities of Nikita Khrushchev and his followers. In this situation, for the protection of the high interests of the people and the fatherland and their Socialist victories; for the protection of the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the unity of the ranks of the Communist movement and the Socialist camp, the Albanian Workers' Party has accepted, and will accept with a clear conscience the entire responsibility for all its actions before the Albanian people and the international Communist and workers' movement.

The struggle which is being imposed on our Party and people will be a long and difficult one. But difficulties have never frightened our Party and people. Our Party and people, trained in the struggle against the slanders, attacks, and the numerous and continual plots of the various imperialists and Yugoslav revisionists, will not bow or fall on their knees before the slanderous attacks, blackmail and pressure of Nikita Khrushchev and his followers either.

The Party and the people, with their steel-like unity as always, will resolutely march forward and will conquer on their just road—the road of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of Socialism and Communism. We shall win because we are not alone. With us and with the great cause of Marxism-Leninism are the Communists and the peoples of the Soviet Union, who are linked with us by an invincible friendship and love, which will always live in our hearts regardless of storm and tempest; with us are the Communists and the people of China; all the Communists of the world; and the peoples of the other Socialist countries. The victorious banner of the Party, the invincible banner of Marxism-Leninism, will always fly victoriously in new Socialist Albania.

(Signed): The Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party.
Tirana, October 20, 1961.

[B.B.C., *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 2 EE/775/C/1-2.]

Postscript: The Soviet diplomatic break with Albania removes any chance of a papering over of the dispute. Although Peking has not yet commented directly on this development or indeed made any formal statement on Albania, it has stepped up its indirect attacks on Soviet policies and stressed the equality of all parties. The Russians, for their part, have, in a *Pravda* article of December 14, warned that there are no exceptions for any Party, "large or small," each of which must show fidelity to Marxism-Leninism or "break" with it.

D. Z.

*The Chinese Food Purchases **

By ALLAN J. BARRY

AFTER three years of agricultural calamities, both natural and man-made, China has begun the importation on a substantial scale of foodstuffs — a dramatic departure from previous policy. The chief beneficiaries abroad are the grain producers of Canada and Australia.

Actual quantities involved may be regarded as small from the standpoint of total Chinese food consumption, but remarkably significant when considered in terms of the actual addition to domestic supplies of wheat and barley, the probable consumption of grain in the seaboard cities, the amount of foreign exchange required, the concomitant decline in other imports (including machinery and raw materials), and the enormous demands usually made upon transportation facilities by agricultural shipments from the interior to the coast. These food purchases are also significant from the standpoint of both Canada and Australia.

In 1961 Chinese food purchases abroad may reach nearly 6.5 million tons (Table I), of which some 6 million tons will be for home consumption. Excluding barter payments, the actual cost in foreign exchange (including transportation charges) will be approximately U.S. \$360 million, of which \$230 million is to be paid in the current calendar year and \$130 million in 1962 (Table II).

Wheat imports in 1961 will be about 4 million tons (Table I) which, if compared with a probable Chinese wheat crop of 21.2 million (long) tons (Table III), is about 19 per cent. of the domestic crop. Even though a portion of the imports may have been consumed in the 1960-61 crop year and therefore calendar year imports may not be strictly comparable with crop year production, the comparison is still a valuable one if we assume the relationship may be extended over an identical twelve-month period. Even if the total food grain crop (including potatoes) were as high as 200 million (metric) tons, wheat production would probably not exceed 22.8 million (long) tons and imports would still be 17.5 per cent. of the crop.

Do the motivations for these large purchases of foodstuffs lie entirely in the crop failures of these three "bitter years" ? Natural disasters alone

* The author wishes to thank Dr. E. F. Szczepanik of the University of Hong Kong for his helpful comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article.

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have been substantial enough, although Western and even some Eastern European observers believe that the Chinese have overstressed the effects of drought and flood to cover up defects in the organisation of crop collection and distribution and in the introduction of new techniques. There is much evidence to suggest that the commune system introduced

TABLE I

CHINA'S FOOD PURCHASES IN 1961

Country	Wheat	Barley	Flour	Oats	Maize	Rice	Milk Powder	Sugar	Total
	(thousand long tons)								
Argentina					45				45-00
Australia	2,285 ^a	360	40	60			0-03		2,745-03
Burma						300 ^b			300-00
Canada	1,720 ^c	620	^d						2,340-00
France		260	25						285-00
Germany, West			250						250-00
New Zealand							0-60		0-60
United Kingdom							1-00		1-00
U.S.S.R.								500	500-00
TOTAL TONS	4,005	1,240	315	60	45	300	1-63	500	6,466-63
	(thousand U.S. dollars)								
Argentina					2,890				2,890
Australia	125,977 ^a	17,090	2,793	2,513			5 ^e		148,373
Burma						^b			—
Canada	113,364 ^c	26,981	^d						140,345
France		10,891	1,204						12,095
Germany, West			13,439						13,439
New Zealand							108 ^e		108
United Kingdom							180 ^e		180
U.S.S.R.								50,000 ^f	50,000
TOTAL DOLLARS	239,341	54,962	17,436	2,513	2,890	^b	293	50,000	367,430

^a Including one option of 75,000 tons expected to be taken up before the end of the year, and a further 250,000 tons, probably part of the year-end option of 250-450,000 tons, reported by Reuters and AP on September 21.

^b Believed destined for Ceylon in exchange for rubber under a three-way barter arrangement, and thus not involving the expenditure of foreign exchange.

^c At date of writing there existed a possibility that China might purchase additional grain under the long-term agreement, as shipping out of Vancouver was proceeding ahead of schedule, and the month of December was expected to be available for additional shipments.

^d A sale of 32,500 tons of flour, valued at U.S. \$2,513,000 and on terms of 25 per cent. down and balance in 270 days was reported by the Minister of Agriculture in the House of Commons on May 2, but at date of writing some doubt existed as to whether or not this sale would actually be taken up by the Chinese and it has accordingly not been included.

^e Prices for these transactions have not been released, and as milk powder varies a good deal in value, the figure of \$180 per ton used here should be considered to yield only a rough order of magnitude.

^f Provided on an interest-free loan basis repayable in five years. For estimated value vide W.K.'s article in *The China Quarterly*, No. 6 (April-June, 1961), p. 70.

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in 1958 brought chaos to the rural areas in that year and even recent efforts to decentralise authority through the much smaller production brigades (formerly the collectives) and production teams have probably not entirely repaired the damage done to organisation and incentives. Over-enthusiastic party cadres had introduced changes in agricultural technique which were actually harmful under local conditions. Lu Li in

TABLE II

PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS FOR CHINA'S 1961 FOOD PURCHASES ^a

Country	Grain	Payment in 1961 (thousand U.S. dollars)	Payment in 1962	1961-62 Totals
Argentina	maize	2,890	2,890	2,890
Australia	wheat	67,579 ^b 5,840 ^{cd}	52,558 ^{cd}	
	barley	17,090		
	flour	2,793		
	oats	2,513	52,558	148,373
Canada	wheat	52,728 ^b 15,159 ^e	45,477 ^e	
	barley	11,420 ^b 3,890 ^e	11,671 ^e	
	flour	†	†	
		83,197	57,148	140,345
France	barley	2,723 ^g 301 ^e	8,168 ^g 903 ^e	9,071
		3,024		12,095
West Germany	flour		13,439 ^h	13,439
TOTAL PAYMENTS FOR GRAIN IMPORTS		184,926	132,216	317,142
ESTIMATED FREIGHT COSTS		45,000		
PROBABLE COST OF MILK POWDER		293		
		TOTAL IN 1961 \$230,219	TOTAL IN 1962 \$132,216	

^a As of September 22, 1961.

^b Cash sales.

^c On terms of 10 per cent. down, 40 per cent. after 6 months, 50 per cent. after 12 months.

^d Assuming that the 75,000-ton option expected to be taken up, and the 250,000-ton sale announced on September 21 were sold on terms identical to those for the original credit agreement. The Reuters figure of £4 million sterling for the 250,000-ton sale has been used instead of the AP figure of £3,750,000. The earlier cash option is included at 110,000 tons.

^e On terms of 25 per cent. down and balance in 9 months.

^f The sale of 32,500 tons of flour announced on May 2 is not included because of doubts that it was actually taken up. If concluded it would add \$628,000 to 1961 payments and \$1,885,000 to those in 1962.

^g On terms of 25 per cent. down and balance in 12 months.

^h On terms of 9 months and no down payment.

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the *People's Daily* of November 1960 referred to cases where "the nature of the soil was disregarded. Systems and methods of cultivation which did not suit the nature and condition of the place were adopted."¹

TABLE III

CHINESE WHEAT PRODUCTION

(Based on figures in Table A-I in the Appendix)

	million metric tons		million long tons ^a	
	Based on Official Statistics	Based on Western Estimates ^b	Based on Official Statistics	Based on Western Estimates ^b
1957	23.6	23.6	23.2	23.2
1958	29.0	25.5 ^c	28.5	25.1
1959	31.3 ^c	23.2 ^c	30.8	22.8
1960	21.5-29.0 ^c	21.5 ^c	21.2-28.5	21.2
1961	—	21.5 ^c	—	21.2

^a Using equivalent of 1 metric ton = 0.984 long tons.

^b As indicated in Table A-I. Note that these are reasonably generous estimates, and in fact many commentators would reduce them considerably.

^c Estimated by using the same percentage of total food grain production as the official statistics for 1958 yield.

Wheat production may have suffered most of all, as the area particularly heavily hit by nature seems to have been that of the drought-stricken "wheat belt" provinces of Honan, Hopei, Shantung, Shansi and Shensi where two-thirds of the all-important winter wheat crop is grown. Thus wheat imports of the magnitude indicated would probably make a great deal of difference to the diet in the bread-consuming cities of the north. Indeed, normal urban wheat markets can probably absorb all of the imports, without leaving any to be used to shift consumption patterns elsewhere from rice to wheat, one explanation the Chinese themselves have suggested.

Another explanation which has been offered, by the Chinese themselves as well as by some observers abroad, is that the heavily overburdened transportation system can be more economically turned to other purposes than carrying grain overland to the coastal cities. After all, the precedent exists as the same cities did import substantial quantities of foodstuffs before the war. Obviously, there can be no disagreement as to the difficulty Chinese rail facilities face in serving the needs of both agriculture and industry at the same time, but large-scale grain

¹ Cited in Colin Garratt, "After the Deluge," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), XXXII, 4 (April 27, 1961), p. 161.

imports could hardly be a long-term solution to China's transport problem, crippling as they do China's ability to purchase capital equipment and industrial raw materials abroad. After all, the largest part of China's foreign exchange has previously come from *exports* of agricultural commodities.

Domestic consumption, naturally enough, would seem to be claiming most of this year's food purchases, but in spite of food shortages and reduced rations China has still not hesitated to send some of the Canadian grain elsewhere, and the Burmese rice, of course, is intended for Ceylon. Two cargoes of wheat totalling some 60,000 tons were shipped directly to Albania from Canadian East Coast ports during March, April and May, and, according to the Canadian *Winnipeg Free Press* (August 29, 1961), a further 160,000 tons was to be shipped to East Germany in the latter part of the year. The shipment to Albania in particular is significant politically as it represents a very substantial amount of grain for only 1.4 million people; it may provide as much as one-fifth of domestic requirements.

Foreign Exchange Position

In 1961, the first year of large-scale grain imports, China's foreign exchange requirements for this purpose will be around U.S. \$230 million (Table II), but in 1962 payments totalling more than \$130 million will still have to be made for the 1961 purchases. If, in addition, China takes one-half of the grain reported to be covered by the long-term Canadian agreement for 1962-63 and the same quantity again from Australia and receives the same credit terms, her foreign exchange requirements for 1962 will rise to more than \$360 million. However, Canada has agreed to extend credit terms on all her sales, and if Australia does the same, then 1962 cash commitments might be kept to not much more than \$250 million, but then payments due in 1963 would be more than \$250 million before considering any additional grain whatsoever for that year, and the Canadian agreement suggests that China's grain import plans extend at least until 1963. China may hope to be no longer in need of large-scale shipment of grain from abroad; for could she hope to support foreign exchange payments of up to \$500 million for Western grain in 1963? The answer may well be only at enormous expense to other programmes and perhaps only with some form of additional assistance from her Soviet *bloc* allies.

In a recent article in *The China Quarterly*,² W. K. suggested that "An intensified export drive in South-East Asia and elsewhere, increased sales

² April-June, 1961, p. 70.

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of silver, and renewed appeals for remittances of Chinese savings overseas are likely to yield the foreign exchange required to pay for the food imports of the next three years." The figures presented here would suggest that the magnitudes involved are likely to be somewhat greater than what he had in mind, and that other adjustments of a very substantial nature will be required.

TABLE IV

NON-COMMUNIST TRADE WITH CHINA

January-June period unless otherwise noted: selected countries only

Country	Imports from China			Exports to China		
	1960	1961	Change %	1960	1961	Change %
(million U.S. dollars)						
Western Europe ^a						
Austria (Jan.-Mar.)	2.6	1.1	- 57%	4.0	1.0	- 75%
Belgium-Luxembourg	5.8	1.3	- 77%	33.8	5.6	- 83%
France	10.8	7.8	- 28%	25.1	20.5	- 18%
Germany, West	47.7	19.6	- 58%	60.9	13.9	- 79%
Netherlands (Jan.-Mar.)	9.6	4.4	- 54%	1.4	1.8	+ 28%
Norway (Jan.-Apr.)	2.0	0.8	- 60%	2.4	2.8	+ 16%
Sweden (Jan.-May)	2.9	1.8	- 37%	6.4	3.2	- 50%
Switzerland (Jan.-July)	6.0	4.9	- 18%	5.8	3.1	- 46%
U.K.	39.0	36.7	- 5%	53.7	19.9	- 62%
Asia ^b						
Burma	6.3	2.4	- 61%	2.7	0.2	- 92%
Ceylon	13.2	4.4	- 66%	14.3	4.0	- 72%
Hong Kong (Jan.-July)	114.4	99.4	- 13%	1.8 ^c	0.8	- 55%
India (Jan.-Mar.)	2.5	0.9	- 64%	0.8	0.1	- 87%
Japan	11.2	10.5	- 6%	1.6	0.9	- 43%
Malaya-Singapore	31.6	24.9	- 21%	22.2	3.5	- 84%

^a The figures presented would suggest that China's trade deficit with Western Europe is being cut by more than half. For the countries and periods presented, the 1960 deficit of \$67 million has been turned into a small surplus of \$6 million.

^b For Asia the statistics presented would suggest that China's favourable trade balance with these countries is remaining at about the same figure as for 1960.

^c Statistics for Hong Kong's re-exports to China show the same trend, e.g., a decline of 38 per cent. for the first six months of 1961 over the same period in 1960.

Sources: Statistics of countries concerned, diplomatic sources in Hong Kong, and a similar table in FEER, XXXIII, 13 (September 28, 1961), p. 646.

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TABLE V

THE CANADIAN LONG-TERM AGREEMENT

	Grain	Long Tons	Bushels (thousands)	Can. Dollars
June 1/61 to Dec. 31/63	wheat & flour	5,000 ^a	186,700 ^a	
	barley	1,000 ^a	46,700 ^a	362,000
<i>Sales:</i>				
June 1/61 to Nov. 30/61	wheat	750	28,000	
	flour	33 ^b	1,500	
	barley	360	17,000	66,000
Nov. 30/61 to Dec. 31/61(?)	wheat	160	6,000	11,180
(from East Coast ports)				
<i>Remainder:</i>				
Nov. 30/61 to Dec. 31/63	wheat & flour	4,057	151,200	
	barley	640	29,700	284,800
<i>Terms:</i> 25 per cent. cash and balance in 270 days, guaranteed to the Canadian Wheat Board by the Canadian Government on the basis of a \$100 million revolving fund which should set the maximum of credit outstanding at any time.				

^a These figures are those given in the House of Commons by the Canadian Minister of Agriculture. The author has reason to believe, however, that these are the maximum quantities under the agreement and that the minima are substantially lower, a fact which may be of considerable importance if there is a poor or only moderately good harvest in 1962.

^b As this table is based upon the Minister's statements (see *House of Commons Debates*, May 2, 1961, p. 4205), the flour sale is included, although it had not been finalised at date of writing and remained in the doubtful if not unlikely category unofficially.

Dr. E. F. Szczepanik has suggested³ that China may have had a balance of foreign exchange holdings of about \$330 million at the end of 1960, on which she could draw to cover her grain commitments for 1961 and 1962, assuming that her trade surplus of some \$40-\$60 million with non-Communist countries in the past two years is maintained. The figures presented in Table IV would suggest that the situation has become difficult much more rapidly than balances of that magnitude might suggest. In the first six months of 1961, exports of most Western countries to China have dropped by some 50 per cent. (75 per cent. in the case of West Germany) while imports from China have either remained about the same or declined by a lesser amount. There are also some indications that trade with the Soviet Union has declined in a comparable pattern.

³ In the preliminary draft of his paper on China's Balance of Payments presented to the University of Hong Kong's Golden Jubilee Congress Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East, September, 1961.

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Deliveries of complete sets of equipment for new plants, for example, are said to have been cut back.

It would appear that China's imports of capital goods and industrial raw materials have *already* been drastically reduced, and Western firms interested in the China market are being told that no foreign exchange is available for purchases of new machinery. This is in spite of whatever improvement may have resulted from increased overseas sales of silver, overseas remittances, and additional convertible currency earned through the trade in Hong Kong food parcels. All this would seem to indicate that China is desperately trying to increase her trade surplus with non-Communist countries this year, to perhaps \$200 million.

The chief conclusion to be drawn, and one in agreement with both W.K. and Dr. Szczepanik, except for a slightly increased emphasis, is that capital construction in industry will suffer drastically until agriculture is put on a more self-sufficient basis. And with foreign exchange commitments for agricultural imports seemingly likely to extend at least into 1964, the industrial "pause" may not be a short one.⁴

Canadian Supplies

✕ China's food purchases are extremely important for both Canada and Australia, the two major exporting countries.

Two considerations dominate the Canadian position. First is the domestic political importance of large new wheat sales coming at a time when Western Canadian wheat farmers had become increasingly discouraged at the Wheat Board's inability to reduce substantially Canada's huge stock of grain, and when the incumbent government was becoming decidedly concerned about its electoral position. Closely related to these political considerations was the negotiation of a 2½-year agreement from mid-1961 to the end of 1963 for the supply of some 6 million tons (230 million bushels) of wheat and barley to China, to be provided on credit terms guaranteed by a special \$100 million revolving fund set up by the Canadian Government (Table V). ✕

Canada's sales of wheat to China in the calendar year 1961 will reach at least 1.7 million tons (64.2 million bushels), making China Canada's second largest wheat customer, next only to the U.K. Both 1962 and 1963 should be even better years with up to 4 million tons (150 million bushels) remaining to be sold under the agreement. With Canadian exports for the 1960-61 crop year estimated at 354 million bushels, sales to China will be some 18 per cent. of the total.

Understandably enough, news of the wheat sales to China were greeted with rejoicing by the Wheat Pools, farmers' associations, and

⁴ The observer who remembers what "mass movements" can achieve will realise, of course, that such conclusions can be drawn only tentatively.

others,⁵ for the long-term agreement promised to reduce stocks to a manageable level for the first time in years. As a proportion of the stocks held (carry over) at the beginning of the 1961-62 crop year, 1961 sales to China would be 12.3 per cent., a most substantial figure (Table A-III).

Nonetheless, there are a number of uncertainties associated with the Canadian position. First of all, in spite of repeated requests from the Opposition in the House of Commons, the Canadian Government has refused to table the long-term agreement. Basically, it would seem that this document is very far from being a firm contract, and is rather an "agreement of intent" on the part of Canada to supply, and on the part of China to buy, a certain quantity of grain over a 2½-year period, with the actual prices and the rate of delivery to be decided by a number of separately negotiated agreements. The price was presumably left open at Canada's request, to avoid any possibility of a repetition of the losses suffered under the British Wheat Agreement of 1946, but as it stands the Chinese are not really committed to buy any wheat at all if a "mutually agreeable" price cannot be arrived at. It is, of course, assumed that China will want to buy the grain badly enough to pay the going world price, and at the moment this would seem to be a reasonable assumption. It can be pointed out, for example, that the Chinese indicated an interest in even larger amounts of grain, but that the Canadians were unwilling to raise the ceiling by guaranteeing a larger amount of credit, and then secondly, that, unlike the case of Japan in 1958 when a diplomatic incident brought the abrupt termination of trade with China, there is no alternative supplier. Australia already expects to sell all the wheat she can make available next year, and the Argentine is unlikely to prove a serious competitor, with that country's wheat production dropping substantially each year, and exceedingly low stocks at the present time. The world's largest stock of wheat, that in the United States, is, of course, not available to China. Nonetheless, the Chinese are perfectly aware of the political significance of the sale for the Canadian Government, and unless Canadian supply conditions change drastically (a possibility considered below), they can be expected to strike a hard bargain.

The credit risk involved is another interesting consideration, but this does not seem to have caused much concern, on the assumption that the Chinese value their reputation as world traders too much to destroy it by refusing payment when due. From the Canadian point of view there are two further uncertainties. The first arises from the rather curious provision for the Wheat Board to accept payment in sterling for the

⁵ The agreement was praised, somewhat over-exuberantly, by a newspaper favourable to the Government, the *Ottawa Journal*, as "a piece of business for Canada that transcends in significance anything in the history of Canada's wheat trade and anything in the whole scene of our present economy."

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first time in its history, thus itself assuming whatever exchange risk is involved. The second is of broader significance and involves the long-debated role of the United States surplus disposal programme in reducing normal commercial markets. Canada's Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Lester Pearson, raised the possibility⁶ that American officials might no longer feel under the same obligation to co-operate with Canada by restricting use of the Public Law 480 disposal programme, with the result that Canada might stand to lose some of her normal commercial markets and thus become dangerously dependent upon the uncertain prospect of further Chinese sales.

The most serious uncertainty of all, however, is connected with the drastic change in Canadian supply conditions in recent months. Sustained drought throughout most of the Prairie wheat belt reduced the 1961 crop to not much more than half that of the previous year (262 million bushels compared to 490 million bushels—see Table A-II in the Appendix), and considering minimum probable exports and domestic requirements in the current (1961-62) crop year, there will be a net drawing on carryover stocks of about 220 million bushels. (See Table A-III.) Should there be another small crop in 1962,⁷ Canada would be in the rather remarkable position of being unable to supply anticipated quantities of wheat to both China and her other customers in 1962-63. Indeed, any attempt to maintain some sort of minimum carryover might mean that any contractual minimum which had to be supplied to China could be met only at the expense of normal markets, a circumstance which might well reduce permanently those other markets and raise again the possibility of dependence upon continued sales to China.

Even normally good crops would not restore the situation where sales to China of the magnitude announced by the Minister on May 2 were expected to be just sufficient to reduce the annual carryover to some sort of "optimum" range of 215-225 million bushels by the end of the 1963-64 crop year.⁸ Unless the next two crops are both exceptionally good, any attempt to export the anticipated quantities to China and at the same time maintain normal exports would reduce the carry-over to not much more than the undesirably low figure of 100 million bushels, suggesting that if the undisclosed terms of the 2½-year agreement were by any chance binding on Canada, normal exports might still suffer. The phrase "anticipated" exports, however, refers to the quantities given by the Minister of Agriculture in announcing the long-term agreement,⁹ and these may well be the *maximum* set by the

⁶ *House of Commons Debates*, Tuesday, May 2, 1961, p. 4206.

⁷ A highly likely possibility in view of poor rainfall in the late summer, according to the *Canadian Grain Journal* (Winnipeg, Vol. 17, No. 8, August, 1961), p. 5.

⁸ *Vide*, for example, *The Financial Post*, Toronto, June 17, 1961, p. 15.

⁹ *House of Commons Debates*, Tuesday, May 2, 1961, p. 4205.

credit which Canada was prepared to extend, and not the *minimum* which she is contractually bound to provide. This would seem a not altogether unreasonable conjecture, although the Minister's refusal to reveal the terms of the agreement will not permit its confirmation. If the higher figures are binding, Canada may indeed be in difficulty, but even if they are not it will certainly depend upon the size of the 1962 crop whether or not exports to China can be maintained at the same level.

The situation with regard to barley is a little different. Here the total supply (this year's carryover plus production) amounts to only 230 million bushels in contrast to 350 million or so in the last three or four years (Tables A-II and A-III). With domestic requirements at about 160 million bushels annually, exports will have to continue their decline of the past year or two from previous levels of 80 to 100 million bushels. Thus Canada will be in a tight supply position in the current crop year, and another bad crop would leave her without enough to meet even domestic requirements. An exceptionally good crop in 1962 would be required to place Canada in a position to supply the total amount required by China before the end of the master contract period in 1963.

Australian Supplies

Australia occupies a distinctive position amongst major world wheat producers in that, for the last four or five years, she has been steadily increasing wheat acreage, and is likely to continue doing so. Her sales to China of 76.2 million bushels of wheat in the 1960-61 crop year¹⁰ will be more than equal to the amount by which the bumper 1960-61 crop exceeded that of the previous year (although total exports rose by only 67,400,000 bushels). Thus the large additional supply of wheat which would otherwise have been added to the Australian carryover was completely absorbed by the windfall sales to China. Australia's ability to make sales of this magnitude again, however, will depend entirely upon her achieving another bumper crop in 1962, as stocks alone would not be large enough. An average crop would mean, of course, that her sales to China, or those to other customers, would have to be reduced substantially. Early plans for the seeding of a record (since 1930-31) 15 million acres have not materialised due to the dry conditions¹¹ which have been persistent enough to reduce expected yields, and the new crop may very well be of the order of 200 million bushels. Thus only a small

¹⁰ The author's estimate, obtained by adding the bushel equivalents for each contract given by Canada's Dominion Bureau of Statistics (*The Wheat Review*, May, 1961, p. 30) with additions for the two options of 110,000 and 75,000 tons, although a deduction might be made for December shipments, which will fall in the next crop year. A similar total for wheat and flour was given by Australia's Commonwealth Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. (*The Wheat Situation*, Canberra, August 1961, p. 2.)

¹¹ *The Wheat Situation*, loc. cit.

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amount of wheat at best may be available for exports to China unless other sales are reduced.

Total Australian wheat exports for the 1960-61 crop year (December-November) rose to a record 183.5 million bushels, of which a full 40 per cent. went to Communist China, making her Australia's largest customer. It would seem justifiable to conclude that any continued expansion of Australian wheat acreage (as, for example to the originally planned 1961-62 level of 15 million acres) must be dependent upon continued access to the China market. In different words, Australia may be relying upon continued sales of this year's magnitude to China, although this must not be stressed too much as the nature of wheat farming in Australia permits acreage to be transferred to other crops more readily than in Canada. There even the exuberant and optimistic federal agriculture minister, Alvin Hamilton, has described the long-term agreement with China merely as giving the Canadian Government a "three-year reprieve" during which it can press its programme of reducing acreage devoted to wheat growing.¹²

Australia's problem, of course, is that the outlook for her wool exports is uncertain, and she may indeed be making the decision to shift some of her production capabilities from wool to wheat.

General expectations for 1962 seem to be both that China will want, and Australia will be able to supply, grain in about the same quantity as in 1961.¹³ although the possibility has become stronger that the Australian wheat crop may be less than expected, and this may indeed be one reason why the Australians seem not to have been interested in negotiating a long-term agreement similar to the one made by Canada.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

TABLE A-I

CHINESE FOOD GRAIN PRODUCTION

(Including grain equivalent of potatoes)

	<i>Official Estimates</i>	<i>Western Estimates</i>
	<i>—million metric tons</i>	
1957	185	185
1958	250 ^a	220
1959	270	200
1960	185-250 ^b	185
1961	—	185

^a Revised figure.

^b Range suggested by Chou En-lai in an interview with the correspondent Edgar Snow.

¹² Canadian Press dispatch in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 6, 1961.

¹³ *Vide*, for example, Colina MacDougall, "Oats from the Aussies," *FEER*, XXXII, 8 (May 25, 1961), p. 347, where she makes this suggestion, even venturing the figure of 600,000 tons for barley.

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TABLE A-II

PRODUCTION OF WHEAT AND BARLEY, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA

Crop years^a 1957-58—1960-61

		<i>Wheat</i>	
		<i>Canada</i>	<i>Australia</i>
		<i>(thousand bushels)</i>	
1957-58	385,508	97,566
1958-59	371,730	215,121
1959-60	413,520	198,501
1960-61	489,624	268,500
1961-62	261,679	N/A
		<i>Barley</i>	
		<i>(thousand bushels)</i>	
1957-58	215,993	31,733
1958-59	244,764	65,613
1959-60	225,550	35,513
1960-61	207,036	69,813
1961-62	123,167	N/A

^a Canadian crop year August-July.

Australian crop year December-November.

TABLE A-III

STOCKS OF WHEAT AND BARLEY, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA, 1957-61

		<i>Wheat</i>	
		<i>Canada (July 31)</i>	<i>Australia (December 1)</i>
		<i>(thousand bushels)</i>	
1957	733,546	41,500
1958	639,454	16,600
1959	549,001	65,200
1960	537,588	60,700
1961	523,153	20,000 ^a
		<i>Barley</i>	
		<i>(thousand bushels)</i>	
1957	142,779	—
1958	118,165	4,667
1959	128,153	—
1960	121,470	—
1961	106,371	N/A

^a Preliminary estimate, *The Wheat Situation*, August 1961, p. 2.

THE CHINESE FOOD PURCHASES

Note: In Tables A-II and A-III, the quantity of wheat available for export and carryover can be obtained by adding the stocks (*i.e.*, carryover) at the beginning of the crop year to the new crop, and then subtracting estimated domestic requirements for the crop year (150 million bushels of wheat in the case of Canada and 77 million bushels of wheat in the case of Australia), *e.g.*, for 1960-61:

<i>Canada</i>		<i>Australia</i>
537.6	carryover	60.7
489.6	new crop	270.9
<hr/>		<hr/>
1,027.2	total supplies	331.6
150.0	domestic requirements	77.0
<hr/>		<hr/>
877.2	available for export and carryover	254.6

The Revival of the "Hundred Flowers" Campaign: 1961 *

By DENNIS DOOLIN

FOR the past year (especially since last March), the Chinese Communist leadership has attempted to revive the "Hundred Flowers" campaign which, Party statements notwithstanding, ended in June of 1957.¹ Yet this revival, and the "blooming and contending" which has issued from it, is basically different from the fierce, unabashed criticism heard briefly four years ago. In 1961, the Party is seeking what it had expected in 1957: academic contention and the gratitude of non-Party intellectuals for a small, measured relaxation—not political criticism. Party leaders have long been aware of the need to secure the co-operation of China's disenchanted intellectuals if industrialisation is to go forward at a rapid pace.² However, current overtures are more studied and conservative than was the case in 1957 and, as such, reflect a more realistic Party assessment of its popular support.³ The differences between the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" and the revival are further shown by: 1. Party emphasis on ground-rules for the present campaign; 2. The strict separation of academic discussion from political discussion and ideological contention; 3. The response of the intellectuals.

I. GROUND-RULES

In 1957, the criteria for "correct words and actions" were not laid down until June 19, ten days after the withering of "Hundred Flowers"⁴; in the current revival, the same criteria have been quoted at every turn:

1. help the people to unite, and not divide them;
2. be beneficial to Socialist transformation and construction;
3. consolidate the People's Democratic Dictatorship;

* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance received from A.C. in the preparation of this article.

¹ "Party," as used below, will denote the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

² See, for example, the two speeches of Premier Chou En-lai in the *People's Daily*, (*Jen-min Jih-pao*), January 30 and February 1, 1956. (*People's Daily* hereafter cited as JMJP).

³ The January 20 communiqué of the CCP Central Committee's Ninth Plenum stated that nearly 10 per cent. of the population did not support the Party line. See *Peking Review*, No. 4, January 27, 1961.

⁴ Date of publication of the admittedly revised text of Mao's *On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People*. However, the six criteria listed therein were not in the speech as originally delivered on February 27, 1957. See Dennis Doolin, "Hundred Flowers": *Mao's Miscalculation* (Stanford University Studies in International Conflict and Integration, March 17, 1961).

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4. consolidate democratic centralism;
5. strengthen the leadership of the Communist Party;
6. be beneficial to Socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.⁵

One of the first indicators of a new "Hundred Flowers" appeared in an address by Li Wei-han, head of the Party's United Front Work Department, at the plenary session of the central committees of the six "democratic" parties on August 14, 1960.⁶ However, Li cautioned his audience to "remember the lesson of 1957 and stand firm in any storm that may be unleashed. . . . Heeding the words of Chairman Mao, following the Party, and taking the socialist road constitute the only truth. . . ." In the new "Hundred Flowers," Li said, "Advice and criticism exchanged between the Party and the democratic parties will be a positive factor in mutual supervision only when there is adherence to the six political criteria [of Chairman Mao]." ⁷

The democratic parties were quick to recognise the new line.

Chairman Mao, facts prove that only when we are led by you and the Party can we continually raise our political consciousness and professional abilities, play our role, and have a bright future.⁸

One can say anything one likes and express any opinion, provided they are in accordance with the six criteria of Chairman Mao. One must not say anything or express any opinion contrary to these criteria.⁹

Provided we act in accordance with the six criteria clearly laid down by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, following the common aim of serving Socialism, we are at liberty to publish all manner of *academic* opinions.¹⁰

As would be expected, no opinions substantially antithetical to the six criteria have appeared during the revival.

II. THE SEPARATION OF ACADEMIC FROM POLITICAL DISCUSSION

In addition to debate over whether or not criteria existed, the 1957 campaign was distinguished by spirited discussions in regard to the subject-matter of "blooming and contending." Some were of the opinion that certain topics (Marxism, Party leadership, etc.) should be excluded,

⁵ Mao, *op. cit.*

⁶ JMJP, September 25, 1960.

⁷ *Ibid.* Compare this with Li's stand in 1957: "To enable the democratic parties to play their fullest role, they must enjoy independence, freedom and equality" (JMJP, May 7, 1957). "We desire uninhibited contending, frank criticism, and criticism without reserve" (JMJP, May 15, 1957).

⁸ Joint message of greetings to Chairman Mao from the six democratic parties, New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, September 17, 1960. See also Miss Ho Hsiang-ning, Chairman of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in the Peking *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (KMJP), August 16, 1960.

⁹ Wu Han, historian and university professor, KMJP, February 25, 1961.

¹⁰ Wu Fu-heng, Vice-President of Shantung University, KMJP, March 29, 1961. (Emphasis added.)

but others maintained that there should be no restrictions whatsoever. The Party chose to back the latter opinion:

It is necessary to trust the democratic parties politically and permit them to contend and express themselves both ideologically and academically.¹¹

The emphasis, albeit short-lived, was on openly discussing problems and airing grievances:

Though the Socialist revolution has been basically completed, those with bourgeois or petty-bourgeois ideas still number several hundred million. They will not keep quiet, so what should we do? We must reason with them, through free discussion and analysis, and on an equal plane. . . . This appears to be troublesome, but it can settle our problems.¹²

Non-Marxist writers were encouraged to present their views,¹³ and those who thought that free discussion would lead to great confusion "underestimated the immense wisdom of the people."¹⁴

From the outset of the "Hundred Flowers" revival, there has been a strict dividing line between academic matters and political problems,¹⁵ and political views at odds with the Party line are not tolerated.¹⁶ The editorial in *Red Flag* (*Hung-ch'i*) on March 1 stated that the "Hundred Flowers" policy applied only to contention in academic matters, literature and the arts. The editorial continued:

It can therefore be seen that, for us, the policy of letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend is a *positive* policy for furthering the cause of science in a Socialist society. It is a policy for constantly consolidating and strengthening the paramount position of Marxism-Leninism in academic circles, a policy that fully displays the militant spirit of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁷

A representative non-Party opinion on the current line is the following by physicist Chang Kuo-fan:

[From the March 1 *Red Flag* editorial] . . . it is clear that contentions among a hundred schools of thought, as governed by the Party's

¹¹ Li Wei-han, JMJP, May 7, 1957.

¹² Hsiao Teh, "Why We Should Boldly Bloom," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (*Chinese Youth Newspaper*), May 1, 1957.

¹³ K'e Ping, "Flowers From the Greenhouse Can Be Pretty But Delicate," *Hsueh-hsi (Study)*, No. 102, December 2, 1956.

¹⁴ NCNA, Peking, April 27, 1957; also, Li Wei-han, *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Wu Fu-heng, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ KMJP coverage of recent activities of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, January 12, 1961.

¹⁷ "Firmly Uphold the Policy of Letting a Hundred Flowers Bloom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend in Academic Research," *Red Flag*, No. 5, 1961. (Emphasis added.) The word "positive" is intended to make it clear that criticism of the Party and Marxism—a "negative" aspect of the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" campaign—is forbidden.

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directives, are contentions among different schools of thought in scientific research, and these are different from contentions among different opinions aired at random.¹⁸

Thus, political-ideological contention is not (and cannot become) the focal point of the new "Hundred Flowers." That is, there are no hundred schools of thought regarding political matters; there is only Marxism-Leninism and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung."

It is at this point that the Party has introduced a new technique to safeguard itself from such spirited attacks as were mounted in 1957. Dissident ideological views are allowed, but not within the "Hundred Flowers" and solely for the purpose of rectifying the dissidents. This is to be accomplished through the so-called "meetings of immortals" (*shen-hsien hui*).

Ostensibly introduced at a 1959 joint congress of the China Democratic National Construction Association and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce,¹⁹ "meetings of immortals" have been attended by nearly one million "non-Party intellectuals and democrats." Academic discussion is not within the province of these gatherings; "all the problems . . . are political or ideological ones."²⁰ As one participant stated:

They are a method of ideological struggle ensuing necessarily from the deepening of the Chinese Revolution and the inclusion of the transformation of the bourgeois world outlook as an item in the current phase of the Revolution.²¹

After the participants have "realised the incorrectness of their views, they are enabled to feel very happy and to heartily love and support Socialism and the leadership of the Party."²²

However, there are criteria even at the "meetings of immortals."

There must be a standard by which to determine right or wrong, and the standards are the six criteria enunciated by Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Without them, it would be impossible to remold our thoughts or raise our understanding, [and] short of the aim of self-remoulding, "meetings of immortals" are meaningless.²³

Also, such meetings will be able to advance on the right course " . . . only if the leadership of the Party is actively secured."²⁴ Even with this

¹⁸ KMJP, April 1, 1961. Chang has been a prolific eulogist of Mao and the Party during the revival of "Hundred Flowers."

¹⁹ NCNA, May 15, 1961.

²⁰ KMJP editorial, March 15, 1961; also, see Wu Fu-heng, *op. cit.*

²¹ Wu Ta-k'un, "On 'Meetings of Immortals' and 'Contentions Among A Hundred Schools of Thought,'" KMJP, March 18, 1961.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Chang Kuo-fan, "Party Leadership is the Basic Guarantee for Successful 'Meetings of Immortals,'" KMJP, May 16, 1961.

²⁴ KMJP, March 15, 1961; also Chang Kuo-fan, *op. cit.*

leadership, however, the process is to be basically one of self-transformation, and the following three techniques are the tools for effecting the conversion: (1) the "three willings" (willing to follow the Party, the road of Socialism, and to progress in reforming one's thought); (2) the "three selfs" (raise one's own questions, analyse them, and resolve them); and (3) the "three aids" (the Party, the masses, and the democratic party organisations).²⁵

The Party, realising that past attempts to remould the bourgeois intellectuals through lectures, study groups, etc., were not successful, is forcing the intellectuals to take the initiative in joining small ideological struggle groups.

The régime apparently believes that by using this "gentle" method of indoctrination, the non-Communist intellectual will (1) change his "bourgeois" world-view and (2) become more willing to assist the régime in carrying out its scientific and technical programmes. Rather than demand that the intellectual be *entirely* "Red"—a 100 per cent. adherent of Marxism—the emphasis has been shifted slightly to permit the non-Communist "expert" a role in planning and implementing economic policy. This would be a small role, of course, but it would at least permit the régime to draw upon the ideas and expertise of the non-Communist intellectual.

Whether this tactic will be any more successful than those used heretofore remains to be seen; thus far, the intellectuals have generally limited their contention to parroting the Party line, accompanied by fervent promises to work harder and study more diligently. There is no room for anything else—the criteria and the Party's expectations are crystal-clear. "If something is harmful to Socialism and therefore false, it must be vigorously opposed no matter how many people may approve of it."²⁶ The "meetings of immortals" do not (and cannot) engender any great debates.

III. THE RESPONSE OF THE INTELLECTUALS

With the previous "Hundred Flowers" still vivid in his mind, the intellectual's attitude is "Once bitten, twice shy." The suffocating limitations imposed on academic contention have predetermined the result; discussions have been dull and seem unlikely to give any great impetus to literary or scientific work. Seminars have been held on a

²⁵ Yu Chin and Chiao Ch'i, "Concerning 'Meetings of Immortals,'" JMJP, May 16, 1961.

²⁶ n.a., "Promote and Foster the Marxist-Leninist Academic Style," Shanghai *Chieh-fang Yueh-k'an* (Liberation Monthly), No. 5, May 1961. A critical, well-researched analysis of the "meetings of immortals" is T'ang Ming-chieh, "An Examination of the Communist 'Meetings of Immortals' Brain-Washing Technique," Taipei *Fei-ch'ing Yueh-pao* (Bandit Intelligence Monthly), June 20, 1961.

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wide range of subjects (shipbuilding, chemical fertiliser research, architectural styles, water conservation, etc.),²⁷ but the concluding note is invariably that "... the thought of Mao Tse-tung must be applied, [as] ... only then can science and technology prosper."²⁸ The ludicrous results of the Party's construction of a Marx-Lenin-Mao trinity can be seen from the following remarks:

A geo-physicist: In the past, I thought that policies and principles should be left to the Party while the practical research should be done by those like myself. ... Later, when I accepted the Party's leadership in practical work, I promptly reached the advanced level in geo-physical research.²⁹

A pathologist: I used to think that all I had to do was study *The Medical Annals* and *On Typhoid*. Now I realise that, separated from the Party's policies, I am unable to make any progress whatsoever.³⁰ Guided by the principles embodied in *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, scientific research has been successfully carried out at Tsinghua University.³¹

As for the "meetings of immortals" and political-ideological discussion, reports give a general idea of what is supposedly discussed, but there have been no direct quotations of the views presented there. According to NCNA:

The participants talk freely about the domestic situation and the international situation, the guidelines and policies of the Party during various periods; politics, economics, culture and education, and their experiences, feelings, opinions and demands relevant to their studies and other aspects of their life.³²

Reports of these meetings, however, do indicate a noticeable reticence on the part of the participants to reveal their opinions. One academician stated:

Some people had their own views which they would not or dared not express, for fear that others might confuse academic problems with political ones and deal with them accordingly. [Thus], ... they thought it wise to remain silent.³³

Even Chang Kuo-fan wrote that "everyone has his own opinions and feelings on these questions, so there is plenty to talk about. But the question (and this is the main question) is still, 'Does one dare to speak out?'"³⁴

Thus far, they have not. The current Party line is that those who attacked the CCP in 1957 were "rightists" and, in Maoist jargon, the

²⁷ See, for example, KMJP, May 15, 1961; also *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 26, 1961.

²⁸ KMJP, January 3, 1961.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, February 10, 1961.

³¹ *Ibid.*, January 3, 1961.

³² NCNA, May 15, 1961.

³³ Wu Han, *op. cit.*

³⁴ KMJP, April 1, 1961.

contradiction was an antagonistic one between the enemy and the people. The present contradiction, however, is a non-antagonistic one *among* the people, caused by "the inability of the bourgeois elements to keep up with the Revolution, even though they desire to do so." In view of this distinction, the intellectuals are understandably confining their political remarks to *mea culpas* for past error or vigorous approval of all Party activities. "I must exert myself and transform myself," one intellectual remarked, "If I waste my time during the calm, I will surely fall during the storm."³⁵ Change or be changed—this is the choice, and "it is better to change one's bourgeois intellectual point of view voluntarily than to be forced to do so."³⁶ While criticism has been levelled at those who merely "... commit pertinent passages by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Chairman Mao to memory and recite them flawlessly,"³⁷ it is the safest path and will undoubtedly be followed by all save the very brave or the very naïve.

IV. CONCLUSION

Faced with many grave problems in 1961 and in need of all possible assistance if China is to attain true great-power status, the Party is seeking two things from the intellectuals: their talents (through the "Hundred Flowers" revival) and their political loyalty (through the "meetings of immortals"). Yet, with Mao's six criteria to be followed in both political-ideological *and* academic matters, it seems unlikely that the Party will gain more than feigned political loyalty. As the vocal opposition was crushed during 1957, it can be concluded that the main goal is to stimulate scientific and technical work. However, the publication of Volume IV of Mao's *Selected Works* last year was followed by such a torrent of panegyric (including claims that the solution to all difficulties, even in scientific research, could be found therein) that the prospect for real theoretical and academic discussion was dimmed. Also, there has been no diminution in the quantity or scope of these claims, and even a relatively free academic milieu cannot exist until this happens.

The revival of a limited "Hundred Flowers" campaign mirrors the régime's apparent belief that the previous policy of demanding completely "Red" experts is unfeasible. The policy had created dissatisfaction among the non-Party intellectuals and had taken up too much of their time, preventing them from becoming completely "expert." Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi is reported to have said in a

³⁵ *Ibid.*, February 7, 1961.

³⁶ Yu Chin and Chiao Ch'i, *op. cit.*

³⁷ Wu Han, *op. cit.*

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recent speech that China needs specialists and technicians and that it is not necessary for them to be completely "Red."⁸⁸ Thus, the prospect for the near future seems to be continued relaxation but with the criteria and controls which were absent in the 1957 campaign.

⁸⁸ *Reuter*, Peking, September 11, 1961.

Pham Van Dong's Tour

By P. J. HONEY

THE reasons for the visit to Russia, Eastern Europe, and China last summer of a DRV (Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam) mission led by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Chairman of the National Planning Board Le Thanh Nghi gave rise to some speculation in the West. The inclusion of Le Thanh Nghi suggested that it was connected with economic aid to the DRV, more particularly with aid for the carrying out of the extremely ambitious five-year plan, which was first announced during the third Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in September, 1960.

However, there were two puzzling features about the trip. In the first place, it covered much the same ground as the mission of Nguyen Duy Trinh, who had returned to Hanoi only a matter of weeks before the departure of Pham Van Dong, and the proclaimed object of Trinh's mission was to negotiate economic agreements—in other words to beg for more aid. Secondly, it was considered surprising that either mission should be thought necessary only a few months after the launching of the five-year plan, especially since the Communist countries had already promised such large sums of aid for the new plan. 299,500,000 new roubles had been promised to the DRV, the contributions from the different Communist countries being these:

U.S.S.R.	101,250,000	new roubles
China	141,750,000	" "
Rumania	33,750,000	" "
Poland	7,000,000	" "
Hungary	6,750,000	" "
Czechoslovakia	6,750,000	" "
Bulgaria	2,250,000	" "

<i>Total</i>	299,500,000	" "	¹
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After preliminary visits to China, North Korea, and Mongolia, Pham Van Dong's mission arrived in Moscow on June 26, 1961, and left for

¹ There is no contribution from Eastern Germany. The experience of East German technicians and advisers in the DRV has been so traumatic that it has led to the virtual writing off of North Vietnam by Eastern Germany as a hopeless case. It appears that Eastern Germany will undertake projects in the DRV only on a strictly business basis and insists that detailed contracts be drawn up in advance. The unconcealed contempt of the East Germans for the (in)capacity of the North Vietnamese has led to a number of clashes between these two Communist states.

Czechoslovakia on July 5. After a twelve-day stay, it moved to Poland on July 17. The mission was due to complete its tour on July 23 and to return from Poland to the DRV, but instead it extended its itinerary. Pham Van Dong flew to Moscow, and then to Sochi, on the Black Sea, to confer with Khrushchev, while Le Thanh Nghi proceeded to Bulgaria "to study the experience of the Bulgarians in building and developing industry."² After Le Thanh Nghi's return, the whole mission remained in Russia until mid-August, and then moved to China, where it spent a further week. Pham Van Dong returned to Hanoi on August 21 and held a press conference about his trip on August 30.

Pham Van Dong spoke at great length but said little. His audience was obliged to sit through long passages concerning the excellence of the DRV's relations with other Communist countries, the admiration of every Communist country for the outstanding achievements of the others, the correctness of the Communists' attitude on Berlin and Laos, the great social and cultural progress in the Communist countries, and much else in the same vein. At last he spoke of the past accomplishments and future prospects of the DRV, and he declared that he had been assured of the full support of the Communist *bloc* for DRV objectives, particularly for her struggle to reunify Vietnam.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the press conference was its deliberate avoidance of specific pronouncements on economic matters. Pham Van Dong made only a few allusions to economic aid, and these were couched in terms which were calculatedly vague. What, then, were the reasons for his trip, and what measure of success did it achieve?

First, one is forced to conclude that the earlier trip, made by Nguyen Duy Trinh, was a failure. This comes as no surprise, for Nguyen Duy Trinh has long shown himself to be hostile to Moscow and well disposed towards Peking, so that he was hardly the ideal person to send on such a mission. Moreover, in the course of his trip, he represented the DRV at the Albanian Party Congress, where his speech was uncompromisingly pro-Chinese and must have antagonised both Russia and all the Eastern European countries save Albania. At all events, Nguyen Duy Trinh returned to Hanoi with empty, or nearly empty, hands.

That Pham Van Dong's mission should have been necessary six months after the launching of the DRV's ambitious five-year plan, and so very soon after the promises of the economic aid already mentioned, indicates that the plan is already in difficulties. It would seem that, without further large infusions of aid, the plan cannot be fulfilled. Naturally, the ineptitude of North Vietnam's planners was not

² Communists would appear to detect a close similarity between conditions in Bulgaria and North Vietnam. Trade between the two countries is encouraged even when it can have no economic justification.

mentioned at the press conference, for this would have been too embarrassing, but it was implied by the sending of the mission. East Germany's contention that the DRV is not capable of running her own affairs efficiently, and therefore is not worth aiding, appears to have received some confirmation.

Nevertheless, Pham Van Dong's mission did achieve a great measure of success. It secured military aid to the value of 220,000,000 new roubles for the DRV's struggle to reunify Vietnam. The principal donor was Russia, but some of this aid was also given by Czechoslovakia, Poland and China. Now under the terms of the Geneva agreements of 1954, the DRV is not allowed to import new armaments or military equipment, and, furthermore, Poland is one of the three countries with the task of ensuring that she does not do so. The DRV's acceptance of this military aid suggests that she may be contemplating tearing up these agreements, refusing to admit the International Truce Supervisory Commission, and increasing the military attacks on South Vietnam.

The mission also secured the cancellation of the DRV's outstanding debts which were incurred under her earlier three-year plan. These debts were enormous and had been causing very considerable embarrassment to the North Vietnamese authorities. At the beginning of 1961, they amounted to 430,000,000 new roubles, so that Pham Van Dong's success in negotiating their cancellation was of very great importance for the DRV.

Thus, Pham Van Dong's mission received a grand total of 650,000,000 new roubles in aid, and possibly promises of more aid in the future. It won approval for the DRV's objective of reunifying Vietnam, possibly at the risk of a major war, and Ho Chi Minh appears to have been given the green light to step up his attacks on the South. From the point of view of the Vietnamese Communists, the mission must be considered most successful, but the implications of the military aid and the approval of DRV plans for reunification are extremely ominous.

A further indication that the DRV is about to increase her military operations in South Vietnam was supplied by Chang Han-fu, deputy Foreign Minister in the Peking Government who is acting head of the Chinese delegation to the fourteen-nation conference on Laos at Geneva. Speaking on November 1, he said that the situation in South East Asia was on the verge of a flare-up.

THE INTELLECTUALS (II)

This is the third article in our series surveying the impact of the Communist revolution on the work and personal fortunes of leading Chinese intellectuals.

Lao She: The Humourist in his Humour

By CYRIL BIRCH

APPENDED to this article are two excerpts from Lao She's writings. The first comprises most of a chapter from his first novel; the second is a brief sequence from one of his latest plays. Each is concerned to establish a character, a man who has found his niche in society. Each of these men is quite peripheral to the piece in which he appears, each is a humble creature anxious only to do right by his fellows. On Chao Number Four are lavished all the colourful touches which leap from the brush of a young writer glorying in invention; Wang Jen-te is sketched with the master's economy of line. But the greater contrast appears in the resolution of the two men's respective fates: Chao, pressed down by his own ingenuousness and the cupidity of others into the trough of the "old society" as a beast of burden; Wang Jen-te, proud recipient of a new dignity as *chef de cuisine* to a People's Commune!

From the young satirist of 1926 to the established master turning out his paean for the People's Commune and the People's Police: thirty-odd years, many volumes, a writer's progress with few setbacks and fewer silences. Lacking access to Lao She's innermost thoughts we can reveal no soul-searchings, no dramatic conflicts with conscience or authority. We must stay on the surface of Lao She's prolific output, but we can at least take soundings from time to time as we chart his course from lonely obscurity in the London of the mid-1920s, via best-selling novelist status in pre-war Nationalist China, to the Vice-Chairmanship of the Union of Chinese Writers in the 1950s and a row of recent successes as premier dramatist of the city of Peking.

*Lao Chang's Philosophy*¹ was Lao She's apprentice exercise. He

¹ *Lao Chang-ti Che-hsieh* (First edition—Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928; third post-war printing—Shanghai: Ch'en-kuang Press, 1949). Like the other early novels, *Lao Chang* was serialised in *Hsiao-shuo Yüeh-pao* (Fiction Monthly) before publication in book form.

had come to London, Shu Ch'ing-ch'un,² a twenty-six year old teacher of Chinese from Nankai Middle School, in 1924. He was no man of letters. He taught for a living and nourished vague ambitions of becoming a man of affairs. To teach in the then School of Oriental Studies of London University was an exciting opportunity for observations of English life—and of the life of London's Chinese community—which delight the reader in the novel *Erh Ma*, "The Two Mas."³ But to live in London was also to endure the loneliness of the big city, and in that peculiarly intense form moreover which afflicted at that time a Chinese who felt called on to explain why he was neither cook nor laundryman. Loneliness as well as the desire to improve his English drove Lao She to read Dickens; nostalgia more than the lust for literary fame impelled him to set Peking on paper as Dickens had London.

One cannot disagree with C. T. Hsia's verdict on *Lao Chang*, that it represents a marriage which failed because the partners, comedy and indignation, were incompatible.⁴ Lao She was writing, as he himself describes it, "like a boy with his first camera, taking snapshots in all directions."⁵ The *Pickwick Papers* had offered a precious precedent for formlessness, and the early Dickens is rather heavily present in the caricatured villainy of Old Chang himself, in the hilarious slapstick of a rickshaw accident on a bridge (ch. 9), in young Wang's disillusionment with the "scissors and paste" plagiarism practised by his fellow journalists, and in the general waggishness of the major part of the book. And yet, if Lao She had written nothing else, *Lao Chang's Philosophy* would still be worth reading now—and especially against the background of the Creation Society's brand of fictional introspection—for its wealth of invention and for the lively fun, for instance, of ch. 19 where Old Chang meets his first foreigners and is stuck for a subscription to the Salvation Army. As a guide to Lao She's later development *Lao Chang* is invaluable. In ch. 29 (appended below) he already reveals his lifelong sympathy for the underdog, whose predicament is interpreted not through the Marxist simplification of exploited versus oppressor, but through a more

² An anagram of the character of the surname gave the name Shu She-yü; the familiar *lao* is then added to the first syllable of the personal name to give the *nom-de-plume* Lao She.

³ First edition—Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935; second post-war printing—Shanghai: Ch'en-kuang Press, 1949.

⁴ *A History of Modern Chinese Fiction, 1917-57* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). The present article should be supplemented by reference to Mr. Hsia's excellent accounts of Lao She's novels.

⁵ *Lao niu p'o ch'e* (*The Rickety Ox-cart*), p. 4. This book, published (no date) in the *Ch'en-kuang wen-hsieh ts'ung-shu*, comprises fourteen essays, mostly on "How I Wrote . . .", first published in the periodical *Yü-chou feng* in 1935. The essays contain much valuable information on his early writing career.

broadly humane concept of innocence overcome by the moral corruption all about it. Here is *Camel Happy Boy* in embryo.

Lao She is indeed acutely conscious of the clash of old and new, of the stultifying effects of the old morality. Aunt Chao wishes her niece to relinquish her beloved Wang Te and marry instead the horrible Old Chang in order to free her uncle from debt:

Were our own Confucius still with us, he would undoubtedly have a word for Aunt Chao: "Indeed a worthy woman!" . . . Were Miss Li to elope with Wang Te, on the other hand, neither she nor he should expect to survive in our ritualistic society. To go down to the Hell of the Changs (which is in the southwestern corner of the eighteenth hell down), to endure the peculiar torments Old Chang alone could inflict, even this was to be preferred to the obloquy of every member of society.⁶

But the representatives of the new, the young people, are no rebels. Sacrifice or compromise are their paths rather than revolt. They have no burning creed of anarchism or Communism, they are not members of the simmering student movements. Though the story is set in "the years before 1920," Lao She later explains that he has been something of a specialist in missing revolutions.⁷ In 1919 at the time of the May Fourth Movement he had been a mere onlooker; the events of the Kuomintang Revolution of 1926-27, which fill the pages of Mao Tun's early novels, were followed by Lao She only from the insuperable distance of London. Even the last great upheaval of the Communist conquest of the mainland between 1947 and 1949 had subsided by the time Lao She returned from a two-year visit to the United States.

The students of the post-May Fourth years had left the patterns of behaviour Lao She was himself familiar with. He was dissatisfied with his student portraits in his second novel, *Chao Tzu yüeh*, "Master Chao Says."⁸ In other early novels he portrayed the people he did know, schoolteachers, petty functionaries, Chinese residents in London (in *Erh Ma*) either inured with age to humiliation or, as young men, seeking to give definition to a new national consciousness. His five years' residence in London, his visit thereafter to Paris and the protracted journey back via Singapore where he taught school for six months to earn the rest of his passage: these experiences gave him that distant view of his countrymen which lent, if not enchantment, at least clarity of focus. He envied the English their civic pride and sense of responsibility; irresponsibility and self-interest became indeed his favourite targets of satire. Witness

⁶ *Lao Chang*, p. 188.

⁷ *Lao nlu p'o ch'e*, p. 20.

⁸ First edition—Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1928; first post-war edition—Shanghai: Ch'en-kuang Press, 1948.

the short story *Huo-ch'e*, "The Last Train"⁹: careless drunken passengers cause an outbreak of fire in a train on New Year's Eve, guards hesitate to report it for fear of spoiling the festivities, the attendant's wife is more distressed by the burning of her cabbage than by the deaths of sixty-three passengers. Yet against what he saw as peculiarly Chinese faults Lao She was able to set new promises of strength. Among Chinese middle-school pupils in Singapore he found more concern for the world and its problems and a greater eagerness to learn than among the students of the University of London. He became "persuaded that new ideas were to be found in the East, not in the West . . . to live at the present time and to wish to understand what is meant by 'revolution,' you have to come to the Orient, for it is the Oriental nations who suffer all the forms of oppression known to man: look at it how you may, they must revolt."¹⁰

Though on this rare occasion he is probably speaking of political revolution, it was the social revolution which occupied his mind and his pen. With the clash of old and new manners and morals as his material and with humour (*yu-mo*) as his instrument he was well advanced on his writing career at the time of his return to China in 1930. The years that led up to the outbreak of war with Japan were the most prolific of his life. But they were years of national peril. At first he was embarrassed by the conviction that there was no place now for humour, or at least for his own characteristic humour of warmth and gentleness, the wry observation of incongruity. And so he tried stark realism in a treatment of the city poor. So at least we must judge, from his own account of his novel *Ta-ming Hu*, "Ta-ming Lake,"¹¹ and from that section of it which, salvaged, served as material for the short story *Yueh-ya-erh*, "Horns of the Moon"¹²; for the only manuscript of the novel burned in the printing house when the Japanese bombed Shanghai in January 1932.

Mao-ch'eng chi, "Cat City,"¹³ followed, but again real success eluded Lao She. The structure of this satirical fantasy involves a sojourn in a Martian city inhabited by cats who show to a marked degree all those weaknesses of the "national character" castigated by a line of Chinese writers which leads from Wu Ching-tzu through Lu Hsün.¹⁴ It

⁹ *Huo-ch'e*, in the collection *Huo-ch'e chi* (Shanghai Magazine Co., 1939; fifth printing, 1941), translated in Robert Payne and Yuan Chia-hua, *Chinese Short Stories* (New York: Transatlantic Arts, 1946).

¹⁰ *Lao shu p'o ch'e*, p. 32.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 33 et seq.

¹² In the collection *Ying hai chi* (Shanghai: Jen-chien shu-wu, 1935; second printing 1936).

¹³ Third post-war printing—Shanghai: Ch'en-kuang Press, 1949.

¹⁴ Wu Ching-tzu's eighteenth-century satire *Ju-lin wai-shih* has been translated under the title *The Scholars* by Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang (Peking: Foreign Languages Press); Lu Hsün's *Ah Q cheng-chuan* (*True Story of Ah Q*) is in C. C. Wang's *Ah Q and Others* (New York: Columbia University Press).

is a sound enough structure and Lao She has certainly the wit and ingenuity to keep the fun from flagging. But the book is very uneven. It is as though the author never did decide what he should cover with invective and what he should treat to light-hearted whimsy; in other words, whether Swift or Lewis Carroll should provide his model. The bitterness of the former underscores, among other sections, the dreadful story told by the Official's First Wife as she gloats over eight dead concubines. But when the narrator visits a school, Alice takes over: the lugubrious teacher hasn't been paid for twenty-five years, the students who graduate on the first day of school all come out top in a kind of academic caucus race.

Lao She finds targets wherever he looks in the China of the day. He satirises conservatives and radicals, old scholars and emancipated young women, the adherence to a decaying culture coupled with the failure to conserve (the museum is empty, having sold all its objects to foreigners; the library is empty, having sold all its books to students). The obsequious deference to foreigners is a recurring theme; other peccadilloes are as vaguely-defined as a readiness to profit from the troubles of others (the kind souls who, when a neighbour's house collapses, rescue victims by the simple expedient of making off with all the bricks).

This diffuseness of the book has had the fortunate effect of diminishing the force of Lao She's denunciation of Communism ("Everybodyevskyism"). The terms of this are most general, and it is coupled with a totally negative attitude to every other political creed. Moreover, the attack is not against Communism as such—on the contrary, "It worked all right in Russia" is the theme. The object of criticism is the mechanical application of an imported theory, without reference to China's special needs. Mao Tse-tung himself would have been entirely in agreement:

I got up very early in order to catch Young Scorpion.

In my total bewilderment I said, "Tell me, what is 'Everybodyevskyism'?"

"It's the political doctrine of everybody living for everybody else," he replied, his mouth full of reverie leaves.¹⁵ "Under such a political system, everybody works, everybody is happy, everybody is secure; society is like a huge machine and each person is a little working screw or cogwheel, a happily, securely working screw or cogwheel in it. It's really very fine."

"Is there any country on Mars where this system is practised?"

"Oh yes, it's been going for over two hundred years."

"What about this country?"

Young Scorpion turned up his eyes and my heart began to thump.

¹⁵ "Reverie leaves" (*mi-yeh*) are much prized as an opiate by the cat people.

After a long long pause he said, "We've messed about with it, yes indeed, I remember quite clearly, we messed about with it. There is no system that we have ever actually 'practised'."

"Why 'messed about'?"

"Supposing the children in your family are naughty and you spank them a few times, then I find out about it, so I go ahead and give my children a spanking, not because they've been naughty but because you've spanked yours so I want to do the same: in family matters we would call this 'messaging about,' and politics is just the same."

"You seem to be saying that you never think out your own ways of dealing with your own affairs, but are always 'messaging about' with the ideas of others, just pick up a hint and you're off to the races? You never build a house for yourselves, so to say, you're always renting someone else's?"

"Yes—or you might say, you have no need whatever to wear trousers, but you determine to wear them because you've seen them on someone else; so then you don't have them tailored to suit your own leg-measurements, but just go and buy a pair of old ones."

I gave Young Scorpion a short breathing-space, then: "But you still haven't told me about Everybodyevskyism?"

"The longer we went on Bunching the poorer the people became, because all anyone wanted to do was Bunch and no one took any notice of economic problems. Until at last along came Everybodyevsky, which started up among the people and on the basis of economic problems. They had a revolution for years and years but from start to finish the Emperor stayed on his throne. Whatever Bunch came up, the Emperor would at once issue a proclamation that he was wholeheartedly in favour of the Bunch's proposals and moreover was willing to offer himself as their leader. Money would change hands behind the scenes and he really would emerge as their leader, so much so that he was once extolled by one of our poets as 'Lord of Ten Thousand Bunches.' It was only when Everybodyevsky arrived on the scene that an Emperor was actually executed. With the Emperor executed political power really did pass into the hands of a Bunch—the Everybodyevsky Bunch; they killed off quite a few people, because this Bunch is committed to exterminating everybody else so as to leave only genuine peasants and industrial workers. There's nothing particularly odd about killing people off, of course; in Cat Country people have always been killed quite indiscriminately. If they really had killed all the people who didn't matter and just left the peasants and workers there's a perfectly good chance it might have worked. But Cat people are Cat people when all is said and done, when it came to the time for killing they had to find a fancy way to go about it. If you paid enough you didn't get killed; if you had someone to plead on your behalf you didn't get killed. And so those who should have been killed weren't, whilst those who shouldn't have been killed were wiped out. Those who should have been killed and weren't were able to fiddle their way into the Bunch and bring up their corrupt ideas there. The result was that people were being killed daily without even the faintest show of justice. And then again, Everybodyevskyism means enabling all to have congenial employment plus the enjoyment of equal rewards. For the

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operation of this system the first need is to reform the economic set-up and the second thing is to strengthen, through education, the people's faith in everybody living for everybody else. But the members of *our* Everybodyevsky Bunch had no understanding whatever of economic problems, nor had they the faintest idea of how to create a new educational system. People had been killed; there was nothing to be done about that. They decided to start with the peasants and the workers; but they had no idea what 'farming' was or what was meant by 'industry.' They did once redistribute the land in equal lots; but everybody put his share of land under reverie trees, and all they could do until the trees grew was starve. The industrial workers would have been delighted to work, but there was no work for them. More would have to be killed; everybody maintained that if only a minority were left alive things would be easier. Which is rather like saying that if your skin is itching you'll be all right if you're flayed. Well, this is what happened with Everybodyevsky. It was just like any other political theory imported from abroad: where it came from it was the perfect prescription for the specific ailment; when it reached us we merely used it to bring trouble on our own heads . . ."¹⁶

After *Cat City* Lao She returned to an earlier vein, and surfaced this time with the pure gold of *Li-hun*, "Divorce."¹⁷ This is a far less ambitious novel than he later achieved, and it was written in ten weeks of a sweltering Tsinan summer to satisfy a publisher's insistence.¹⁸ Peking, as usual, makes its manifold contribution. It provides that natural geographical basis for a vernacular style which, already established for former ages in novels like *Hung-lou-meng*, "Red Chamber Dream," and *Erh-nü ying-hsiung chuan*, "Boy and Girl Heroes," has found lively new expression in Lao She. The common man of Peking, like the London Cockney, the Berliner, the New Yorker, has evolved a peculiar great city sharpness of wit: Lao She had his own Sam Wellers all about him. The streets of Peking, the dust, the crowds, the Pei-hai and the gleaming blue tiles of the Temple of Heaven, all these provide a colourful decor. But in *Divorce*, Peking is more than a background: it is as much a personage in the novel as is Paris in Henry James' *The Ambassadors*. The comparison is by no means fortuitous. Both novels play out their action on an overall pattern of irony, a kind of figure-eight structure. Lambert Strether goes to Paris to rescue a young acquaintance from the risk of corruption, and ends by being himself seduced by the city of light. Lao Li brings his bumpkin wife to Peking to make a modern woman of her and obviate the need, already present in his mind, for a fashionable divorce. He ends by himself retreating

¹⁶ *Cat City*, pp. 136-137 and 141-142.

¹⁷ First published 1935; revised version first published by Ch'en-kuang Press, Shanghai, 1947. Translated by Helena Kuo as *The Quest for Love of Lao Lee*, and by Evan King with the original title, *Divorce*.

¹⁸ See Lao She's "new preface" to the revised edition, written in New York and dated May 1947.

back to the country to curb the extravagances of a wife now emancipated beyond all limits. There is, of course, lots more plot than this; Lao Li's wistful yearning for the beautiful Mrs. Ma, his Chaplin-esque or Quixotic efforts to solve his friend's problems, the touch of melodrama which sharpens the edge of the comedy. But the reader remembers most gratefully Mrs. Li at her first Peking dinner (Western style): approached by a waiter bearing a huge tray of hors d'oeuvres, while Li and his office friends watch anxiously, she clears her place at table and says, "Put it down here."

Divorce deserves attention, for it was Lao She's first and last absolutely successful comedy. In three years before the war he was "worrying humour as a terrier worries a rat," turning out short stories of charm and polish like *Mo yi-k'uai ch'ien*, "The Last Dollar,"¹⁹ contributing with some regularity to Lin Yutang's fortnightly *Lun-yü*. He made fun of everything that was pretentious, hypocritical or illogical in the new society. He had neither the nostalgia of Shen Ts'ung-wen for the old ways, the folk ways: "I am not filled with reverence for anything in the past; there is no age in history more precious than the one we are creating"²⁰; nor any burning passion to overthrow the forces of reaction as identified by the left. Basically his position meant acceptance of the new China as it was shaping up, given the faith that the foibles of the human character, if enough fun and enough pity were played upon them, might at length be minimized.

Even *Lo-t'o Hsiang-tzu*, "Camel Happy Boy," stems from this position. This is unquestionably Lao She's best work, declared by C. T. Hsia to be even "the finest modern Chinese novel" up to the eve of the Sino-Japanese War²¹—and indeed many will agree up to the present day. *Hsiang-tzu* is stark tragedy, the story of the strapping young peasant coming to Peking to "sell his strength" for a living, fighting against cruel circumstance, the confiscation of his own hard-won rickshaw; fighting against the not-so-tender trap of the vividly-delineated Tiger Girl; fighting at last a losing battle against betrayal and poverty and disease and the loss of his proud vigour. Any slip, any relaxation of the writer's control might have invested the figure of Hsiang-tzu with self-pity or wrapped him in a mist of sentimentality. There is no such slip. Lao She looks long and hard at the city of Peking through the eyes of his rickshaw man, and there can be little enough for laughter in what he sees. Yet, it is precisely through the rigidly-controlled use of satire

¹⁹ Collected in *Ying hai chi*, see above, note 12.

²⁰ *Lao niu p'o ch'e*, p. 29.

²¹ Hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 187. *Lo-t'o Hsiang-tzu* was first published 1937; English translation by Evan King, *Rickshaw Boy* (author's name romanized as Lau Shaw) (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945).

that the practised humorist succeeds in avoiding sentimentality, overstatement or bathos.

Satire is most in evidence in the view presented of the world outside Hsiang-tzu and his own immediate misadventures. Even late in the novel, when the gloom is gathering, Hsiang-tzu's apathetic horror over his betrayal of the union organizer Juan Ming is set against the sardonic mock-heroism of the crowd's festival enjoyment of Juan's execution; and the effect of Hsiang-tzu's suffering is thereby not mitigated but intensified.²² Early on, the first great blow of fate under which Hsiang-tzu reels is the confiscation of his rickshaw and the abduction of his person to slave for a warlord's marauding troops. Here is the light-toned lead-in to this development:

News of war and rumours of war would shoot up almost every year along with the spring wheat, so that one could well take the ear of wheat and the bayonet as the respective symbols of the Northerner's hopes and despair. When Hsiang-tzu's new rickshaw was six months old it was just the time when the wheat is in need of the spring rain. The spring rain would not necessarily fall in response to the people's yearning; but war was always likely, whether anyone yearned for it or not. However, whether there were rumours or no and whatever the truth of them, Hsiang-tzu seemed to have forgotten he had ever been a farmer. He did not greatly concern himself with the destruction war brought to the farms, nor did he pay much attention to the presence or absence of spring rain. His only concern was his rickshaw. His rickshaw could produce fried cakes and all his food, it was a plot of land of unlimited capabilities, and moreover a plot which followed him about in all docility, a mobile plot, a priceless plot. Because of the lack of rain and the news of war the price of food had risen; this Hsiang-tzu knew. But like all the other city-dwellers he contented himself with grumbling at the dearth of food, without having any idea what he could do about it. If food was dear it was dear—who could make it any cheaper? It was this kind of attitude which kept his mind on his own livelihood and made him ignore whatever disasters and catastrophes might befall.

But however helpless the city-dwellers might be at anything else, there was one thing they were very good at, and that was the invention of rumours. Sometimes it was something out of nothing at all, or at other times a particle of truth was blown up to ten times its size: anything to demonstrate that they were not stupid and not out of the swim. They were indeed just like a school of little fish, with nothing better to do than stick their jaws up just above the surface and pride themselves on blowing a few totally useless bubbles. And among the rumours the most intriguing were those of war. Other rumours stayed rumours, like talk of ghosts or fox-spirits, you couldn't just keep talking and talking until you really did see a ghost. But with the rumours of

²² The action and mood of the final sections of the novel undergo considerable alteration in the English version, which provides a rather sentimental happy ending. See Hsia, *op. cit.*, p. 623, n. 15.

war, it was precisely because there was no accurate information whatever that a rumour could take immediate effect. On minor counts there might well be quite large discrepancies between rumour and truth; but as to whether or not there actually was war, nine out of ten times the rumours were true. "They're going to fight!"—once these words have been spoken, sooner or later there will certainly be fighting. As for who will fight whom, and how, each will have his own version of that.

Hsiang-tzu was certainly aware of all this. But those who earn their living with their own sweat—including the pullers of rickshaws—though they can hardly welcome war are still not necessarily certain to lose out when it does come. Every time war breaks out it is the rich who panic. As soon as they hear things are bad their first instinct is to run for their lives: money brings them to a place fast, but it sends them away again just as fast. Unfortunately they cannot run of their own accord because their legs are too heavily weighted down with money-bags. They have to hire many other people to take the place of legs, crates need men to lift them and dependants of all ages and both sexes need rickshaws to carry them. At these times the hands and feet of the brethren who specialize in the hire of their hands and feet rise all around in value:

"Main Gate, East Station!"

"Where?"

"EAST STA-TION!"

"Oho, like it or not that'll be a dollar-forty! And no haggling—the troops will be here any minute!"²³

To speak of acceptance in connection with *Hsiang-tzu* seems incongruous. But the real message of the rickshaw boy's degradation is that this is how life goes, that youth passes, dreams die and the world is hard. The sickness of society is a moral sickness, men must be brought to understanding in order to regenerate; there is no suggestion of a simple political panacea. There are enemies, certainly. But they are sexual enemies like Tiger Girl and Mrs. Hsia, or cheats like the detective who extorts Hsiang-tzu's savings; poverty itself is seen as a natural enemy like winter cold and summer heat. The struggle is the universal and eternal struggle for decency and common sense; it is emphatically not the class struggle against a dogmatically defined enemy. *Hsiang-tzu* is a tragic tale. But what is at work here is the reflex of Lao She's comic genius, that same reflex which inspired short stories like *Yüeh-ya-erh* or *Liu-chia ta-yuan*, "Liu's Court."²⁴ It is the tone and style that differ from the earlier comedies, not the people themselves nor the understanding that creates them.

Even into the years of the war against Japan Lao She retains his warm, tolerant humanism. *The Drum Singers*²⁵ is a kindly, moving

²³ *Lo-t'o Hsiang-tzu*, pp. 15-16.

²⁴ In the collection *Kan chi* (Shanghai: Liang-yu Book Co., 1934), translated in Chichen Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Stories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

²⁵ Translation by Helena Kuo (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952).

study of professional entertainers, displaced by the occupation of Peking, meeting with fortitude the exigencies of wartime Chungking. But the war put a halt to Lao She's major development as a novelist, even though his most ambitious work, *Ssu-shih t'ung-t'ang*, "House of Four Generations,"²⁶ came out of it. For the war destroyed that new China which he had been prepared, as we have suggested, by and large to accept. It defined sharply a new enemy, and Lao She saw himself cast in the new role of propagandist. He had resisted heretofore the call of party or programme, but he could not resist the call of straightforward patriotism. He led the Chinese Writers' Anti-Aggression Association in experiments with literary genres which could be used to the maximum propaganda effect. The drama was the instrument to present itself most readily and Lao She launched out on a career as dramatist which continues unabated. In addition to drama groups the Anti-Aggression Association mobilized singers and story-tellers in the effort to bolster morale in the Kuomintang-held areas. Lao She turned his attention to ballads and wrote among other pieces the very long *Chien-pei p'ien*, "North of the Chien-men Pass," celebrating at once the joy of discovery, by a writer formerly city-bound, of the great "interior," and the determination of the Chinese people in their struggle for survival.

C. T. Hsia makes a penetrating and unfortunately just analysis of *Ssu-shih t'ung-t'ang*.²⁷ So simple is the purport of the work, so extreme its reduction of personages to goods (patriots) and bads (collaborators and—mostly unseen—Japanese) that he wonders what sustained the author through its million words. The answer must be in terms of that passion, patience and pride which sustain the true craftsman in any major undertaking. Lao She the novelist did not survive the war; Lao She the craftsman goes from strength to strength. Into *House of Four Generations* he put all his superb resources of story-telling to make of Little Sheepfold a brilliant microcosm of occupied Peking. Since 1949 he has rejoiced in the selection and exploitation of perfect themes for propaganda dramas.

Whether or not Lao She really did see the United States, during his protracted post-war lecture-tour, as "steadily declining into Fascism,"²⁸ on October 13, 1949 he left San Francisco to put his talents at the service of the People's Government. He had observed, in the celebration of the "Double Tenth," reactions to the Communist takeover of the mainland:

²⁶ Published in three volumes, with separate titles but none intended as complete in itself: *Huang-huo* (Bewilderment), and *T'ou-sheng* (Ignominy) were published 1946, *Chi-huang* (Famine) not until 1950. Abridged English translation by Ida Pruitt, *The Yellow Storm* (New York: 1951).

²⁷ Hsia, *op. cit.*, pp. 369-375.

²⁸ "From San Francisco to Tientsin," in *Jen-min Wen-hsüeh*, No. 4, February 1950.

The world has been split into two great camps, and Overseas Chinese in the United States form no exception: on the one side they hoist the Red Flag, on the other they make a gift of a sword to the bandit-chiefs who have brought disaster to their country and their people.²⁹

One short article may serve as an illustration of Lao She's skill in adopting protective colouration. It is an object-lesson in what might be called "non-committal enthusiasm." One is almost tempted to read it as satire; in fact, Lao She is merely showing how to manifest the correct line without losing too much face. The subject is itself ironic: what shall he choose from the wealth of "new men, new events" of the past year as a fit subject of praise to celebrate the second anniversary of the People's Republic?—*an accusation meeting!* Perhaps intentionally, his description of the proceedings will arouse admiration or distaste depending on the reader:

The meeting started. The platform announced the purpose of the meeting and the crimes committed by the evil bullies. At appropriate intervals one group after another of the crowd, front and back, left and right, yelled out slogans: "Down with the Evil Bullies! Support the People's Government!" When the whole crowd then took up the cry the noise rose in a mighty tide. The people's voice is the people's strength, a strength sufficient to make the evildoer tremble. . . . Men and women, old and young, one after another came on to the platform to make accusation. When a speech reached its climax of feeling many in the audience would shout, "Beat them!" I myself, like the intelligentsia sitting by me, yelled out involuntarily, "Beat them! Why don't we give them a beating?" As police restrained those who went forward to strike the bullies, my own voice mingled with the voices of hundreds roaring, "They've asked for it! Beat them!" And this roar changed me into a different man! I used to be a man of pretensions to cultivation. To be sure, I hated evil bullies and wicked men; but had I not been at that accusation meeting, how could I have brought myself to yell ferociously, "Beat them!"? The people's indignation so stirred me that I became one of them. Their hatred was my hatred also; I could not, would not "look on with hands folded". . . . Tell me truly, how much a pound is it worth, this "cultivation"? The only feelings that are of value, that are to be prized, are hatred of your enemy, love for your country. . . . One of the accusers was attacking his own father! In any other times but these, how could such a thing happen? I was ready to shed tears. In the old days, Chinese people specialized in "son covers up for father, father covers up for son." So everyone covered up, and truth and justice were hidden away beyond hope of discovery. Today, the father-son relationship can no longer bury the truth beneath it.³⁰

There was no need for Lao She to demean himself excessively, nor, apparently, in view of his leg trouble, to take too active a part in attending

²⁹ *Loc. cit.*

³⁰ "The New Society is a Great School," in *Jen-min Wen-hsüeh*, No. 6 (24), October 1951.

meetings or going "down to the countryside"; though he did join a goodwill mission to the Korean front in 1953. Within three months of his return to China in December 1949 his name had been added to those of the original eighty-seven members of the Standing Committee of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers (elected at the 1949 Congress). Within twelve months he was writing the preface to his first volume as a Communist writer, *Kuo hsin-nien*, "New Year Holiday,"⁸¹ a collection of essays about and specimens of the *ta-ku* ballads, dialogues and other popular genres he had first investigated during the war. He was one of the major speakers to survey the new cultural scene before the "mobilization meeting" of the All China Federation at the time the *cheng-feng* "Thought Reform" movement was initiated in November 1951. With his three dramas, *Lung-hsü-kou*, "Dragon's Beard Ditch,"⁸² *Fang Chen-chu* and *Ch'un hua ch'iu shou*, "Spring Flowering, Autumn Reaping," he was the only established writer of the old school to publish anything new during the period 1949-53.

Small wonder that his major self-criticism, *Chairman Mao Gave Me a New Literary Life*, is filled with an optimism rarely found in such pieces. He concludes:

I am still far from being a writer schooled in the thought of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, but I shall forever try to advance step by step in accordance to Chairman Mao's instructions, as well as to rectify all my faults in thought and life. Only thus may I avoid the impediment of the burdens of the "old writer," only thus may I be enabled to accept all criticism with the utmost modesty and given a new lease of life in literature and art.⁸³

A "new lease of life" is exactly what Lao She has achieved. The status of Vice-Chairman of the Union of Chinese Writers has not interfered seriously with his output, as has more exalted rank with any plans Mao Tun or Kuo Mo-jo may have had. One cannot but admire, as much as his newly developed stagecraft itself (in the handling of large casts), the ingenuity with which he invests a propaganda slogan with lifelike trappings. Even more than *Dragon's Beard Ditch*, his recent *Ch'üan-chia fu*, "Joyful Reunion,"⁸⁴ is an almost cynical exercise of skill.

Members of the Wang family, scattered during the troubles of the Bad Old Days, are reunited in this play thanks to the efforts of the People's Police. The action is triggered by the demobilization from the

⁸¹ Shanghai Ch'en-kuang Press, 1951; third printing 1952.

⁸² English translation by Liao Hung-ying (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956).

⁸³ *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, May 21, 1952; translated in *Current Background* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 203, pp. 38-40.

⁸⁴ Included in *Lao She chü-tso hsüan* (Selected Plays of Lao She), Peking: People's Literature Press, 1959.

army of the elder son. His return recalls to his mother her two other children and their father, all long-lost. Her weeping excites the curiosity of neighbours; the police are informed and find the link between the sorrowing mother and a young man and a girl who unknown to each other are seeking lost parents. The curtain to Act Two falls on the meeting between younger son and daughter; the third and final act has its "grand reunion" (*i'uan-yuan*), a happy ending to end all happy endings.

Here is the perfect multi-purpose propaganda theme. It facilitates frequent recalls of events of the Bad Old Days for comparison with the happy present. It eulogises the People's Police (one young policeman seems to spend all his time fetching water for an old lady). The hunting of lost relatives is *par excellence* a task requiring that participation by the people in government work which is ostensibly so vital to the running of a people's democracy. Lastly, the play exhorts those who suffered shame and disgrace under the old order (Mrs. Wang had remarried, her daughter had been sold into prostitution) to shake off their burden of guilt and enter the new with a clean conscience, recognized victims of circumstances with all stigma removed.

Even more remarkable than the juiciness of the theme is the perfection of its timing. With the establishment of the People's Communes family ties were at their most vulnerable. Yet the devotion of the People's Government to the cause of family unity is precisely what the play extols. Throughout, the *min-ching*, People's Police, labour mightily to bring together family members scattered, be it noted, by the troubles inveterate in the *old society*. The variety of the "old evils" Lao She recalls in the play deserves comment. Mrs. Wang lost her husband when he beat up a Japanese during the occupation of Peking and had to flee the city: it was the *old society* which precipitated aggressive wars and permitted the conquest of North China. She lost her son to the tyrannous mother-in-law who drove out herself and her daughter after the husband's flight: it was the *old society* which perpetuated the domination of the old over the young. She lost her daughter when she entrusted her to a grasping "friend" who sold her into prostitution: it was the *old society* which countenanced prostitution and corrupted friendship and all moral standards with its ever-present poverty.

It must be obvious by now that Lao She has in no way relinquished his dominating concern for the very poor of Peking. Nor has he entirely lost his *yu-mo*: flashes of ironic wit still occur, as in *Dragon's Beard Ditch* when a new tax is foisted (by the old government, of course) on the ragged inhabitants of the banks of the noisome sewer: a *Sanitation Tax*. What he has done is restrict his satire and his indignation to the

Old Days which loom large in "new" works like *Ch'a-kuan*, "Tea-shop,"³⁵ as well as in the plays discussed above. In his treatment of the "new society" he holds fast to the Marxist interpretation of character as a product of environment. He forfeits real drama: *Hsiang-tzu* compelled our attention by his struggles against his own weaknesses of character, whereas the new personages are mere mechanical illustrations of textbook dogma. But he provides as good entertainment as is to be found in the unreal world of Peking letters.

Above all Lao She is the professional. Within nine years of the publication of his first novel he had given up his ricebowl teaching job and devoted himself to writing, to keeping the pot boiling if need be, but also to the exploration and exploitation of the techniques of all genres. With his fertile imagination, his head full of characters and incidents, he was a rare bird in his society. His fellow tended to be the young man with a message, whether for Self-Expression (*Kuo Mo-jo*) or Self-Analysis (*Yü Ta-fu*), for the anarchistic Emancipation of Youth (*Pa Chin*) or for the Exposure of the Forces of Evil (*Mao Tun*). Lao She had his concerns, as we have seen, the appalling plight of the urban poor, the hypocrisy of the well-to-do whose so-delicate hands were in fact calloused, in his eyes, by a dead "tradition". It was such concerns which saved him from the predicament, say, of Shen Ts'ung-wen, also very much the professional novelist, but one whose imaginative world was peopled with figures of nostalgic whimsy, with honest old soldiers, Miao tribesmen and innocent rustic lovers. One would need a separate study of the causes which led Shen Ts'ung-wen to an attempt on his own life shortly after the Communist takeover of Peking.

Lao She had no such message to convey, no panacea to promote, as would identify him with a "line" which might go out of fashion. Mental anguish and despair may have been the concomitants of his new conformity: there is no sign of them on the surface. He has won through to the position of master-craftsman. As such he is as much a free agent as any other craftsman, plumber or engineer, in the service of the new society.

Excerpt One: from *Old Chang's Philosophy*, Ch. 29.*

Chao Number Four: what sort of fellow is he? You won't find him in the theatres or the restaurants, you won't find him in the parks or the literary societies. All that we have seen him do so far is break his leg on the Te-cheng Bridge, then afterwards introduce Li Ying into the Salvation Army. All we know is that he is Chao Four: as to his parents,

³⁵ Also included in the above selection.

* See p. 45.

his grandparents, should anyone ask about them, all he will do is smile and say, "They went off and died along with all the other old folks." Then again, Mrs. Chao: we feel that on principle there must be such a lady. But when it comes down to it, Chao Four says, "What, with a face like mine and my blue cloth jacket—marry a wife and have children?"

And yet Chao Four also, before he turned into a rickshaw boy, was a free man with money in his pocket. From chatting with his neighbours we can unearth certain facts which Chao himself would nowadays be totally unwilling to admit. It appears that as a youngster he was smart enough, regarded by the whole district as a really promising lad. There was the time, on the second day of the New Year when offerings are made to the God of Wealth, when he bought eighty-odd little live carp, put them in a big wicker basket and went from door to door distributing them among such of the neighbours who were too poor or too stingy to buy their own live fish to offer to the spirits. There was the time when, with his white-bellied hawk and his yellow-tailed dog, with his tasselled sheepskin coat and his baggins of heated wine and dried beef, he would be off to the northern hills to catch the little white fox; though he might see one of a greyish or straw-coloured coat he wouldn't take it. There was the time when, dressed in a long white summer gown and blue satin boots, he jumped with a great "ker-plunk" into the stream outside the Western Gate to save a young woman from suicide. Do you think anyone laughed at him then? There was the time when he assembled all the truant school kids outside the city wall, and took them down to the reed pond to catch the little reed-sparrows with the yellow patch by the beak, then on together to a restaurant, thirty mutton dumplings apiece, eat them up and then scatter . . .

Things everyone else liked, he didn't; things no one else liked, he did. Plans everyone else made for their own benefit, he wouldn't make; plans no one else made—for the benefit of others—he was full of them.

Unfortunately, his money ran out before his taste for fun. He looked for no return of the money he was always giving away, and so now there was no return; what was more, the people who had had favours from him were now even readier to ignore him than those who had not. Many a time he would go up to someone, "Excuse me" . . . but their necks would twist and he would be facing the back of their head. Whereupon Chao Four would go outside the city, collect a pile of brickbats and chalk a circle on the city wall. Then he would try out his wrist and his eye against the day when he would be aiming at these heads.

To Chao Four's way of thinking it was all just a game: when there's money I treat you to dumplings, when there isn't I treat you to brickbats, in reality it's all the same thing. The strange part was that so soft were these people's heads, they could enjoy the dumplings but they couldn't take the bricks. And once he really did split a head wide open and out gurgled the red rich blood that properly belongs there. And so Chao Four was hauled off to jail by the policeman and did his three months' hard.

The ordinary sort of man contemptuously hangs a label marked "bandit" on anyone who has been in prison. The bandit himself, on the other hand, dignifies the jailbird with the title of "bravo." Which of them is right? I'd rather not say.

During the time Chao Four was fettered with heavy iron chains he certainly didn't consider himself a bandit, nor did he claim the title of

LAO SHE: THE HUMOURIST IN HIS HUMOUR

bravo. For, if he were a bandit, what were his vile crimes? And if a bravo, why had they trussed him up with fetters as they would a rabid dog?

Gradually it became clear to him: with money you were a bravo, without you were a bandit, to change from rich to poor was to change from bravo to bandit. Equally clearly he saw that expressions in daily use denoted no fixed, unwavering standards: the expression had always a number of things hidden behind its back. His old attitudes underwent no change of any kind, it was just that he wanted to get to the bottom of this matter of becoming a bravo. And being in prison seemed to provide an excellent opportunity for some deep thinking. With money you were a bravo, and without you were a bandit? He would have to work everything out again from scratch!

He puzzled out another crazy theory too. It didn't necessarily have to be money that made one into a bravo. If I were actually to slave at something for someone, perhaps that was even better than giving them money. If instead of buying carp to distribute among the neighbours I had done one or two back-breaking jobs on their behalf, perhaps then they wouldn't have started treating me myself like a carp—carp are cold-blooded animals, it's natural they should not appeal to the warm-blooded.

Having reached this point he sought out some of his fellow prisoners to discuss the matter further . . . He grew more and more confused; yet, in the still of the night he convinced himself again that he was right. And so when he finally came out of jail, the first morning he took all the odd bits and pieces he had around the house to market and sold them, and in the afternoon he thought out ways and means of helping others, in order to put into practice his ideal of the bravo.

On one occasion he tore the bucket out of the hand of a coolie watering the street and began to sprinkle the water for him right across the roadway. He earned half-a-dozen cuffs from a policeman, and later he learned that the street-waterer had been given the sack. Another time he went to do the neighbours' shopping for them, which cost him quite a penny or two in car-fares, and later discovered only that the neighbours were saying Chao Four was making money out of buying things for others! Another time, he went in the middle of the night in search of a doctor for a sick woman. Half asleep and bleary eyed, the doctor prescribed the wrong medicine; and Chao Four received the blame for having such an ill-starred fortune as to inveigle a celebrated physician into giving the wrong medicine!

He despaired. The philosophy he had thought out in jail was by this time proved to the hilt to be absolutely wrong. To sacrifice yourself for the good of others you had to have the right opportunity; otherwise, even if you were to carve off slices of your own flesh to feed the starving, they would probably complain that your flesh was tainted with the germs of some infectious disease.

He had sold every last thing; now it was a question of his own personal life or death! But like a true fathead, even at this vital juncture, he still sought a way of earning his living that would allow him at the same time to benefit mankind. It would have to be pulling a rickshaw; yet the thought still occurred to him, what a noble thing it was to pull a rickshaw: when someone meets with a crisis, to pull him along, isn't this what is meant by laying down your life for others?

Ha! Passengers climbed up as if they were hiring not a man but a two-legged ox; so far from giving him a word of thanks, some of them when they got out would even throw the fare on the ground. What was worse, people he had once known intimately, including some he had helped along, now when they saw him flying down the street would yell, "Hey, Chao! Careful of the ice, don't slip and slam your ear down into your neck, or you won't be able to hear when they cuss you!" The Buddhist monks and Taoist priests he had once known, who had addressed him as "patron" or "benefactor," now turned haughty faces to him and said, "Off with you, rickshaw boy, we don't want our temple yard turned into a rickshaw stand!"

Excerpt Two: from Joyful Reunion, Act II, Scene 1.

(Enter Wang Jen-te. He carries a basket containing bottles, etc., and is singing to himself, "Socialism is good . . ."):

Li T'ien-hsiang: Uncle! Uncle!

Wang Jen-te: Er . . . Who is it then?

Li: You don't recognize me? It's T'ien-hsiang, uncle!

Wang: T'ien-hsiang? T'ien-hsiang? Why, I wouldn't have known you, it's years since I saw you. But how did you manage to reach this size? Are you trying to outgrow the White Pagoda? (Warmly shakes his hand).

Li: You're worth looking at yourself, sir! Snowy white coat and hat, and you've put on weight, you certainly look the very picture of the *chef de cuisine*! Whoever would have expected to find a dining-hall here in the countryside, and with such a smart cook!

Wang: Wait till you've had a look at our kitchen and dining-rooms. I don't mean that we have everything you could ask for, that we're all fully equipped. But you must come and see how spotless it all is. (Takes out gauze mask to put across mouth).

Li: Don't put it on just yet, uncle, you won't be able to chat as easily.

Wang (Puts mask away): I was really only showing you. It doesn't matter what we eat, we have to have absolute cleanliness, we even boil the chopsticks when they've been used! That's "Public Hygiene" for you! Come on, let me show you! Never in my life did I manage to do anything to be particularly proud of, but if I don't feel a bit cocky about this dining-hall and my kitchen, then I'm being neither sincere nor honest with you!

The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai

By DAVID A. CHARLES

THERE is little reason for thinking that the anti-rightist campaign of 1957-58, which closed the Hundred Flowers interlude, was undertaken in order to overcome an organised opposition in the central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party rather than to deal with a political situation that was clearly getting out of hand. The victims were either bourgeois intellectuals and members of the so-called "democratic parties" or communist officials of the second rank, for the most part provincial administrators. Their fate presumably strengthened the hand of the doctrinaires in the Party and weakened the will of the moderates to oppose the extravagances of the subsequent "great leap forward"; and there are doubtless many in China as well as the West who believe that Mao's personal involvement in the fiasco of liberalisation may have constituted the first stage in a process which would lead eighteen months later to his withdrawal from the chairmanship of the republic. The political repercussions were, however, long-term; the immediate effect of the change of line may have been to cement rather than undermine the solidarity of the leaders.

The campaign against the "right-wing opportunists" launched after the eighth plenum of the Central Committee, held at Lushan in August 1959, was a very different affair. Its denunciation of "rightism" had an air of paradox, since the régime, as was shown by the announcement in the same communiqué of the transfer of ownership from the communes to the production brigade, was itself swinging slowly but inexorably to the right.¹ And the impression that on this occasion personalities rather than policies were involved was strengthened by the extraordinary virulence of the press campaign, accompanied as it was by the passionate reaffirmation of policies, which could be seen to have failed, at least as originally conceived, and by an emotional rallying round the person of Mao and exaggerated adulation of his leadership.

¹ The transfer, although announced at Lushan, had perhaps been discussed at the Wuhan plenum in December 1958 and may have been decided in principle at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo held without publicity at Chengchow in the following February. In any case, the turning point had come at Wuhan with the abandonment of the more ambitious claims made for the communes. Lushan neither halted the retreat from the communes nor reversed the trend towards the more rational planning: at the most it may have slowed down the implementation of policies which were already being put into effect.

At the end of September came the announcement of the replacement of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, the Minister of Defence, by Marshal Lin Piao, the hero of the revolutionary war, and of General Huang K'o-ch'eng, the Chief of Staff of the Army and P'eng's senior vice-minister, by General Lo Jui-ch'ing, the Minister of Public Security and a man whose record was more that of a policeman than a soldier. At the same time, in an unprecedentedly long list of appointments and removals, two Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Chang Wen-t'ien and Wang Chia-hsiang, failed to secure re-nomination. And a few days later, the absence of Ch'en Yun from the October celebrations in Peking provided the first proof of his fall from grace.² With the exception of Wang Chia-hsiang, who quickly rehabilitated himself, they were all consigned to an obscurity from which they have barely, if at all, emerged.

All of this fitted into the pattern of what, to borrow the jargon of the Kremlinologists, could be described as a "power-struggle" in the top leadership. The failure to name the rightist leaders could be explained as due to a desire to maintain the semblance of unity by which the Chinese Party has always set such store. Nor was there any evidence, for all the talk of deviationists at every level, that the purge was in fact being extended to the lower ranks of the Party on anything like the scale of earlier campaigns; indeed, as if to emphasise the difference, the authorities took the occasion of the dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai to rehabilitate a number of rightists of 1957 and earlier vintages.

This interpretation of the anti-rightist campaign of 1959—that the Party had to deal with a palace intrigue rather than a popular movement—was that of most Western observers at the time. It is confirmed by reports which have come out of China during the subsequent two years. We can now assert with confidence that P'eng was the leader of an "anti-party" group in the Politburo which made its challenge at the Lushan plenum, where P'eng read a memorandum attacking the whole policy of the Party; that P'eng's attack had been made with the knowledge of the Russians, for he, without the knowledge of the Politburo, had written a letter to the Soviet party criticising the great leap forward and the communes for which Moscow had already revealed its distaste; that his principal associate was Chang Wen-t'ien and that at Lushan or earlier he had enlisted the support of the veteran and highly respected Lin Po-chü; that Khrushchev's refusal to apologise for this intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps precipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute; and that at the Bucharest and Moscow Conferences in the following year Khrushchev continued to defend his actions and

² As pointed out below, Ch'en Yun's elimination from power may in fact have preceded the Lushan plenum.

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the right of the Soviet party to hold private discussions with leading members of other parties, whether Chinese or Albanian.³

The reports confirm that, as most Western observers had conjectured, the background to the case of P'eng Teh-huai was a dispute on nuclear strategy. Whether or not, as Lin Piao was subsequently to allege, P'eng had actively resisted Party control of the Army his original offence was that he had questioned the continuing validity of Mao's theories on partisan warfare; had come out in favour of a professional army employed as soldiers rather than auxiliary agricultural workers; and had opposed the concept of a nation in arms and its expression in the creation of an enormous untrained militia.⁴

P'eng's "rightism" may well have been conditioned by such military considerations. Thus his dislike of the communes perhaps sprang from their integration with the militia and the effect on the morale of a peasant army of the upheaval they caused in agrarian life; and it is likely enough that the plans of the Ministry of Defence for modernisation were disrupted by the diversion of effort into the extravagances of the great leap forward. In the same way, his disapproval of the breach with Moscow could plausibly be explained by a reluctance to quarrel with China's only supplier of modern weapons. It is clear, however, that, whether or not for tactical reasons, P'eng preferred to concentrate his attack on the political and economic policies of the Party rather than air his professional grievances. Throughout P'eng acted as a senior member of the Politburo rather than as a dissatisfied Minister of Defence. He was

³ The number of these reports and their general concordance on the main points at issue show how difficult it is for the Chinese Communists, at a time when they are actively encouraging contacts with the West, to keep the outside world permanently in ignorance of major political developments in the country. Some of the reports reflect the briefing which all Party members received at the time of the events. Others derive from a revival of Party interest in the 1959 affair which coincided with the exacerbation of Sino-Soviet relations in the summer of 1960. On this occasion selected cadres were told about P'eng Teh-huai's contacts with the Soviet leadership—an aspect of the case which had been concealed in the earlier general briefing. While it would be hazardous to suggest on the evidence available that the Chinese have actually wished the information to reach the West, they must have been aware that secrecy was unlikely to be maintained indefinitely in view of the wide circulation given to the information in a party of some 17 millions.

⁴ Alice Hsieh, in her article "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare" (*The China Quarterly*, No. 2, 1960), having identified P'eng on the strength of a speech in 1955 as a supporter and not an opponent of Mao's "partisan" theories of war, suggested that his dismissal was intended to solve a dispute between the "Maoist" Ministry of Defence and the more professionally minded General Staff, with Lin Piao as the reconciler of the two views. Reference to Lin Piao's Tenth Anniversary speech does not however bear out Mrs. Hsieh's contention that Lin placed equal emphasis on the importance of political control and modernisation. Indeed he stressed that politics is the "predominant" side and proclaimed the Party's belief that "although equipment, and technique are important the human factor is even more important." While P'eng may have been a comparatively late convert to the "professional" viewpoint it would have been paradoxical if he had not only been got rid of but disgraced for upholding the orthodox Maoist strategic theories which would soon be reiterated in the Lenin Anniversary, and many other articles.

disgraced as the leader of an "anti-party group" and not as the proponent of unacceptable military theories.

There is little evidence on which to speculate about the origins of P'eng Teh-huai's movement and its ramifications. Ch'en Yun, although his elimination from power was not noted in the West till his failure to appear in Peking for the October 1 celebrations, was in fact little in evidence throughout 1959 and relapsed into obscurity after his March article in the *People's Daily*. He may not even have been present at the Lushan plenum⁵ and, although sharing P'eng's dislike of the Party's economic policies, does not seem to have played any significant part in the intrigue. Chang Wen-t'ien on the other hand was deeply involved. Indeed, while keeping himself in the background he may well have been the moving spirit. P'eng himself has had little experience of political activity; and, even if Chang did not actually write P'eng's letter to the Soviet Party and his subsequent Lushan memorandum, we may suspect that the former Chinese representative on the Comintern and Ambassador to Moscow was the dissidents' link with the Russians.

On April 24, while the National People's Congress (April 18-28) was still in session, P'eng started on a "military good-will" mission to the capitals of the Warsaw Pact Powers, which was to keep him out of the country for some seven weeks. On the same day, and probably by the same aeroplane, Chang Wen-t'ien left for Warsaw as Chinese observer at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact Powers. This simultaneous departure was almost certainly a coincidence. Chang Wen-t'ien, as senior Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, would naturally represent his Minister in view of the latter's commitments at the National People's Congress; nor, in the case of P'eng, should too much stress perhaps be laid on the obvious analogy with the experience of Marshal Zhukov, who in 1957 was sent to Yugoslavia and Albania on an unexpectedly protracted tour which was clearly a put-up job to keep him out of the country while action was taken against him. So far from being eliminated during their absence, P'eng and Chang were, on April 28, confirmed in their offices and were still strong enough three months later to challenge the leadership. Whatever lobbying there may have been behind the scenes at the National People's Congress, it is unlikely that in April either the dominant faction or their critics regarded the time as ripe for a show-down.

On arrival in Moscow, and again on June 2, P'eng Teh-huai met the Moscow Commander, Marshal Moskalenko, who was surprisingly unsympathetic. On May 25, P'eng had a cordial meeting with

⁵ He does not seem to figure in the photograph published by the *People's Daily* on August 27. Identification is however difficult and his absence from the photograph might in any case have been due to his having come out in support of P'eng.

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Khrushchev in Tirana; and it may have been on this occasion that he delivered the letter to the Soviet Party which was to cause so much bad blood between the two countries. He finally got back to Peking, via Outer Mongolia, on June 13, having travelled from Moscow to Ulan Bator in the company of Marshal Koniev.

After his return P'eng seems to have held his hand while the Party was preparing to scale down the fantastic claims for the 1958 harvest and publicly shift policy on the communes. He was, however, busy—or so the Party afterwards alleged—collecting statistics and other evidence to prove the inadequacies of the great leap forward. What happened when he finally came out into the open at the eighth plenum of the Central Committee, held at Lushan from August 2 to August 16, can only be deduced from the tendentious accounts which Party members subsequently received. It is known, however, that P'eng proposed a resolution which attacked the Party's political and economic policies and that he set out his views in an extremely lengthy memorandum which he read to the meeting; that Lin Po-ch'ü, who had long stood for moderation, commented favourably on P'eng's initiative, which received the full support of Chang Wen-t'ien, General Huang K'o-cheng and a number of lesser personalities, while a good many other speakers at first wavered. P'eng's colleagues in the Politburo were surprised, or affected to be surprised, at his action and finally carried a counter-resolution which uncompromisingly rejected P'eng's criticisms, reaffirmed the entire correctness of the Party's line and, while admitting the right of P'eng to express his views in the Politburo, condemned him for factional activity in lobbying members of the Central Committee. There is unfortunately little evidence on which to assess the chances which P'eng and his friends had of success. Defeat, as is usually the case when the leadership of a Communist Party is unsuccessfully attacked, was overwhelming and perhaps appeared to be more easily achieved owing to the speed with which the waverers abandoned their rebellious colleagues as soon as the issue seemed to be decided.

A good deal is known about the content of P'eng's memorandum. After dealing fairly briefly with the shortcomings of the communes, which he attributed to their having been set up without adequate preparation, P'eng went on to criticise the conduct of the mass campaigns in industry and agriculture, without however disputing the correctness of Mao's "general line." He soon came to his main theme—the shortcomings of the great leap forward. The blunders and the waste of the small blast furnaces were dealt with at length. They had, he alleged, even been set up in places where coal was unobtainable, so that the peasants had had to cut the trees down and feed the furnaces with ordinary firewood. Yet so great had been the enthusiasm for the new idea that the undisclosed

target had been to overtake British steel production not in fifteen years as announced but in ten years and United States production in 15-20 years.

Many of P'eng's shafts such as his ascription of the great leap forward to "petty bourgeois fanaticism" and his reminder that the Communists used to condemn the Kuomintang for ruling the nation through the Party, stuck sufficiently to be quoted as the views of the anonymous rightists in the subsequent press campaign. The Party did not, however, venture to comment publicly on P'eng's bitter denunciation of their claims to have raised the standard of living of the masses. According to his statistics, in 1933-53 adults were getting one catty (half a kilogram) of rice a day and children three-quarters of a catty. In 1956 they got three-quarters of a catty and two-thirds of a catty respectively. In 1958 this had been reduced to half a catty and one-quarter of a catty in many areas. The masses could not survive on such a diet and had been reduced to eating algae, cotton-leaves and leaves of the mustard plant. If their rations were not improved, there would be a repetition of the riots which had taken place in 1957.⁶

Whether because they had been genuinely taken aback by the boldness of P'eng's onslaught or because they wished to allow his associates every opportunity for declaring themselves, the Party leaders allowed a protracted debate which was by no means one-sided. Indeed, at one stage there was an emotional scene when Mao, in reply to a suggestion that the disgrace of P'eng might be the signal for a revolt by the armed forces due to his popularity with them and in the country, declared with tears in his eyes that, if this happened, he would go back to the villages and recruit another army. The generals present then got up in turn and pledged their loyalty to Mao and to the Central Committee.

Of P'eng's supporters, Lin Po-ch'ü at least seems to have held out to the end. While not subjected to indignities, Lin had subsequently to make a self-criticism and was still under a cloud when he died in May 1960 and was accorded a national funeral. This was the occasion for P'eng's only publicly recorded appearance since his fall.

P'eng himself was treated more harshly. After his arrest and a period of intensive re-indoctrination, he made a formal confession in the shape of a short letter to Mao in which he alluded to his errors, regretted that he had failed to follow Mao's guidance and asked to be allowed to

⁶ These incidents, which were referred to in the Chinese press at the time, included a demonstration in early June by some 2,000 peasants from Kungan and Shih Shou in Hupeh and An Hsiang and Hua Jung in Hunan who joined hands and staged a demonstration at a village called Huang Shan Tou on the border between the two provinces. This was firmly suppressed with some loss of life. Subsequently there was serious student unrest in the Wuhan area, which was widely publicised. Mass trials for counter-revolutionary activity were also reported in the press.

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rehabilitate himself by working as a peasant. Although P'eng's letter could not be regarded by Communist standards as an adequate exercise in self-criticism, Mao, in an equally brief reply, after paying tribute to P'eng's services in the revolution, advised against manual labour in view of P'eng's age but suggested that he should visit factories in order to obtain first-hand experience of the masses at work.⁷ After completing his tour of Chinese industry, P'eng was sent as superintendent (or, according to some other accounts, deputy superintendent) of the much publicised and appropriately named "Sino-Soviet Friendship" State Farm in Heilungkiang. Nominally, he retains his membership of the Politburo.

Only P'eng's confession was divulged to the Party. Apart from Huang K'o-ch'eng and Chang Wen-t'ien, Chou Hsiao-chou, the provincial secretary of Hunan, seems to have been the only associate of P'eng's who was denounced by name to the cadres. His defection must have been a particularly bitter blow to Mao, since it emphasised the connection of his own province with the movement of his fellow Hunanese, P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng. Chou had served under Huang K'o-ch'eng when the latter was provincial secretary of Hunan (1949-52) and since 1953 had held that post. He has not been heard of since his removal, which was announced on September 27. Huang K'o-ch'eng has also faded into complete obscurity; nor has Chang Wen-t'ien made any public appearances, except at the commemoration of Lenin's birthday in April 1960 and at this year's October 1 celebration in Peking.

In the meantime the press campaign against the group had got under way. It opened quietly with two *People's Daily* editorials on August 6 and 7, four days after the plenum opened. Both articles were careful to limit their criticism to the spread of rightist "ideas" and avoid giving the impression that important personalities were involved. Nothing more was heard of "rightism" till August 16, the day the plenum ended, when a *Red Flag* article took up the theme. Again the tone was moderate: indeed *Red Flag*, while admitting that "dangerous" rightist-inclined tendencies actually existed now implied that they could be easily cured by urging that "help" should be extended to comrades, who had fallen a victim to them, in accordance with the principle of "treat the sickness to save the patient."

The main offensive was launched only ten days later on August 26, when the resolution of the Lushan plenum was published simultaneously with a speech by Chou En-lai to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Both documents were significant for the fact that

⁷ Reports that P'eng Teh-huai at one stage worked on the Shum Chun reservoir in Kwangtung may therefore be discounted.

what had previously been called rightist sentiments were for the first time classified as right-opportunist sentiments, *i.e.*, those who held them were not only misguided but heretical. Reference in the plenum resolution to "hostile enemy elements within the country" and "unfirm" cadres tainted from right-opportunist sentiments was matched by Chou's description of "reactionaries at home and abroad" and "bourgeois rightists" with possible sympathisers in the Party. The foreign theme, which in view of subsequent developments must always be regarded as containing a possible allusion to the Soviet Union rather than Yugoslavia, was taken up in a *People's Daily* editorial of the following day which claimed that the right opportunists had "joined the hostile elements at home and abroad in a campaign of slander and have attempted to create ideological and political confusion by killing the initiative of the masses." The article was also notable for calling the right opportunists "incorrigible" and admitting that "bourgeois anti-Socialism" existed within the Party and constituted a major danger. On August 30, *Red Flag*, in sharp contrast with its more lenient attitude of August 16, denounced the pessimism of the right opportunists as "criminal activity against the cause of building Socialism."

In September, references started to appear to the great heretics of the past. On September 1 the *People's Daily* recalled the cases of Kautsky, Plekhanov and Ch'en Tu-hsiu in China, to show that proletarian revolutionaries could "degenerate" into bourgeois revolutionaries. On September 4 the same paper described a "small number of right opportunists" as "enemy supporters and agents of the revolutionary ranks." On September 7 *The Chinese Youth Newspaper* referred to the possibility that rightists might hold "responsible positions" as "unit leaders" in the Party; and two days later the *People's Daily* warned comrades with rightist tendencies that they might "not be able to weather the storm." During the same month some articles in the provincial press for the first time linked the rightists with the Soviet Union by accusing them of advocating blind adherence to the Soviet model.

On September 16 came the announcement of the dismissals, and the public campaign reached its climax with the extraordinary Tenth Anniversary article of Liu Lan-t'ao, published on September 28. The violence of its language was in strong contrast with the moderation shown by other contributions to the series when discussing right opportunism: indeed the *Peoples' Daily* in its editorial on National Day did not refer to the subject at all. The appearance of the article to coincide with Khrushchev's arrival in Peking may well have been deliberate.

Apart from the proof which it provided of the seriousness with which the party regarded the affair, Liu's article was noteworthy for the light

which it threw on the position of the dissidents. Particularly interesting was the charge that the right opportunists had denounced the practice of placing the first secretary in command as "dictatorship" and "undemocratic." (This like so much else in the programme of the rightists of 1959 is now virtually the official line.) And Liu's eulogy of Mao's leadership as "indispensable to the success of the revolution" indicated that the deviationists had challenged this leadership.

The campaign continued through October and November with major articles by K'o Ch'ing-shih in *Red Flag* of November 1 and by Ch'en Po-ta in the issue of November 16. Neither added much to what had already been said, except for the accusation that the rightists were also revisionists. Their Socialism according to K'o Ch'ing-shih, "is the so-called socialism in the minds of the modern revisionists, who are traitors to Marxism-Leninism." Ch'en Po-ta linked them with the "bourgeois rightists" of 1957, claiming that both agreed with the "modern revisionists in various nations" in that they all identified the dictatorship of the proletariat with the non-party system. Both articles however provided useful summaries of the programme of the dissidents through the eyes of their opponents. According to K'o Ch'ing-shih it was "to oppose the general line of the party on socialist construction, to oppose the tremendous leap forward and to oppose the peoples communes." Ch'en Po-ta summarised rightist opposition to the general line as consisting of two articles: "article number one is opposition to the party leadership, and article number two is opposition to the mass campaign."

Space does not permit a more detailed analysis of the voluminous press and radio campaign. It is of interest not only as source material for reconstructing the arguments used by the dissidents but also for the evidence which it provides of the extent to which the party was shaken by the affair. The muted opening of the press campaign while the Lushan plenum was in session and the ten days delay in issuing the communiqué and launching the main offensive could be regarded as evidence of careful orchestration by the Communist authorities. An alternative, and perhaps more plausible, interpretation of the weak initial reaction to P'eng's onslaught is that the Party was playing for time. Certainly the *People's Daily* editorials of August 6 and 7 and the *Red Flag* article of August 16 were singularly ineffective as a reply to the Marshal's memorandum. Whether or not the issue had in fact already been decided, they do not give the impression that the Party had made up its mind how to deal with the revolt.

Indoctrination of party members was carried on at the same time as the press campaign. Several thousand cadres of the Ministry of Defence and National Defence establishments met to denounce the

activities of P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng; and similar meetings were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to criticise Chang Wen-t'ien. In due course Party members throughout the country were briefed down to the lowest level.

The principal item on the agenda at these nation-wide meetings was the reading and discussion of a long document which outlined the activities of the dissidents stigmatising them as an "anti-Party" group which had operated under P'eng to destroy the unity of the Party. The main attack was on P'eng, and the statement included a list of sixteen specific charges against him. Most of these dealt with incidents in his past career with the object of proving that he had "failed to pass the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution," *i.e.*, had never been a true Communist at all. As a former bourgeois (*i.e.*, Kuomintang) officer, he was accused of having joined the Communists merely out of opportunism and compared to a capitalist who invests his money wherever it will show him a profit. P'eng's subsequent military career was the subject of further charges. He was said, while winning a tactical victory over the Japanese in the Battle of the Hundred Regiments, to have committed a gross strategical blunder by prematurely exposing the strength of the Communists, which Mao had always been careful to conceal.⁸ The result was that Chiang Kai-shek decided to concentrate on eliminating the internal rather than the external enemy, while the Japanese and their Chinese puppets delivered a co-ordinated attack on the Communists and their supply lines. Many of the nuclei which had been operating behind the Japanese lines and would otherwise have expanded into military bases, were wiped out or had to join the main Communist forces. The economic situation became so bad that half the army had to be demobilised and the remainder ordered to become self-supporting. Even padded winter clothing could not be obtained. All these disasters were to be attributed to P'eng's folly in abandoning Mao's tactic of partisan and guerilla warfare. P'eng was also accused of having repeatedly ignored the directives of the Central Committee. Thus he was said to have fought the fifth and last battle of the Korean War on his own initiative, thereby becoming guilty of gross insubordination.⁹

Owing to the absence of publicity even within the Party it is difficult to determine the extent of the purge which followed the fall of the leaders.

⁸ The so-called Battle of the Hundred (or Hundred and Fifteen) Regiments was fought from August 20 to December 5, 1940.

⁹ According to Western reckoning, the fifth battle of the Korean War was the unsuccessful Chinese attack of April 1951, in which the Gloucesters were involved. The reference may however be to the final Chinese offensive against the South Korean troops, which was launched just before the armistice, apparently in order to secure last-minute gains of territory and overcome South Korean objections to an armistice. If this is the reference, it is strange that the Central Committee should disclaim responsibility for so political an operation.

At the Ministry of Defence, two of Huang K'o-ch'eng's fellow Vice-Ministers, General Li Ta,¹⁰ P'eng's Chief of Staff in Korea, and General Hsiao K'o, were removed at the same time as Huang but given other minor appointments, Li Ta becoming Vice-Chairman of the Physical Culture and Sports Commission and Hsiao K'o Vice-Minister of State Farms and Land Reclamation. General Hung Hsueh-ch'ih, the Head of Rear Services of the P.L.A., was removed on October 14 and has not since been heard of. He was Head of the Rear Services of the C.P.V. in Korea under P'eng and then served as Deputy Head of Rear Services under Huang K'o-ch'eng, moving up to Head of Rear Services when Huang became Chief of Staff. At about the same time the Commander of the Peking Garrison, General Yang Ch'eng-wu, was transferred to the Ministry of Defence, where he would not have command of troops. These seem to be the only publicly announced moves in the Army which could be regarded as directly concerned with the P'eng affair.

The civilian changes announced in the September 16 list of appointments and removals are difficult to analyse since, no doubt deliberately, they included a large proportion of routine changes, a good many of which probably dated from some time previously. Certainly there is reason for thinking that the opportunity was taken to remove, or announce the removal, of a good many administrators, particularly in the economic field, who had supported the more moderate policies of Ch'en Yun; and a long list can be compiled of officials who were not given other appointments or removed into positions where they could exercise little influence.¹¹ On the other hand, Ch'en Yun's direct involvement in P'eng's intrigues certainly cannot be regarded as proven. While it is possible that, in view of Ch'en's seniority, the Party deliberately concealed from the cadres the fact of his complicity, it is perhaps more likely that P'eng and Chang decided to mobilise support in the Central Committee and appeal to the Soviet Party only after Ch'en Yun and what may be called the legal opposition had withdrawn into sulky silence.

¹⁰ Li Ta is presumably now in reasonably good odour since he served as Field-Marshal Montgomery's conducting officer in China.

¹¹ They include: Lo Shih-yü, Deputy Director of the State Council's Central Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce; the directorate of the Fourth General Office of the State Council on its incorporation into the newly constituted General Office for Industry and Communications, *viz.*, the Director, Chia T'o-fu (who in 1949 had served under P'eng in the North West and subsequently under Kao Kang), and the two Deputy-Directors, Chou Kuang-ch'un and Sung Shao-wen (who however retained his appointment as Vice-Chairman of the National Construction Committee till its abolition in January 1961); a Vice-Minister of Food, Kao Chin-ch'un, who at the end of the war had been P'eng's principal civilian collaborator in Sinkiang; a Vice-Minister of Education, Ch'en Tseng-ku; a Deputy-Director of the People's Bank of China, Ts'ui Kuang; at least one Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Ni Wei; the Director of the Counsellors Office of the State Council and Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, T'ao Hsi-chin; and two Vice-Ministers of Health, Fu Lien-chang and Wu Yun-fu.

The failure of P'eng's attempt at direct action would naturally affect the position of all those who sympathised with his views, whether or not they had actively participated in his movement.

But P'eng's challenge to the leadership was not only a manifestation of discontent with the internal policies of the dominant faction. It also had a profound effect on Sino-Soviet relations. At what stage the Politburo learnt of P'eng's letter to the Soviet Party remains obscure. Even if P'eng took the natural precaution of writing his letter when safe on Soviet territory, he may have been betrayed by a member of his entourage. Nor is a leak on the Soviet side inconceivable. To mention only one possibility, we now know from the revelations of the 22nd Soviet Party Congress that Molotov, when Ambassador in Outer Mongolia, was opposing the official Soviet line on the possibility of co-existence and that in April 1960 he set out his views in an article for the Lenin Anniversary which was rejected by *Kommunist* at the same time as the Chinese were publishing their notorious series of polemics on the same topic. Certainly if P'eng was indiscreet enough, when passing through Ulan Bator on his way back from his European trip, to reveal anything of his conversations with Khrushchev to Molotov or his contacts, there would have been every possibility of his confidences reaching the Chinese.

The alternative theory is that the Politburo learnt of P'eng's contacts with the Russians only after his arrest and interrogation. Such a hypothesis perhaps fits in better with what is known of the course of Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev's announcement of his intention to visit the United States almost coincided with the opening of the Lushan plenum. Western observers at the time stressed the reservations expressed in Chinese official statements welcoming the Soviet move. More striking perhaps, in retrospect, is their comparative warmth. For all its doubt about the seriousness of American intentions, the *People's Daily*, with its references to the "melting of ice-bergs" and the "real possibility of a détente," set out a theory of summitry which would soon become rank heresy; and on August 16, *Red Flag* published an extraordinary article by the authoritative "Yü Chao-li" entitled "Peaceful Competition is an Inevitable Trend" in which, after quoting Marx, traditional Chinese sayings and even the Bible—"They who take the sword shall perish by the sword"—the writer concluded that anyone who denied his thesis "would stand convicted and condemned before the bar of history."¹² The Chinese are often slow to react officially; but it is hard to believe that they could have authorised so wholehearted an endorsement of the

¹² This article may be compared with the bitter and uncompromising attack on American Imperialism which appeared in *Red Flag* under the same pseudonym on September 16, the day Khrushchev arrived in the United States.

Soviet line after they had got to know that a member of the Politburo was in secret, and from their point of view treasonable, correspondence with the Russians. On September 9, Tass fired the first broadside in the current Sino-Soviet dispute by publishing a communique virtually disavowing China in her dispute with India. A sharp reaction by the Chinese to the discovery that the Soviet Union had prior knowledge of P'eng's views and rejection by the Russians of their protests would explain a deliberate provocation of China—which was not required by the interest of the Soviet Union in improving her relations with India and the West or by the failure of China to fall into line, however reluctantly, with the rest of the Communist bloc when Khrushchev dramatically announced his plans for a détente with "the main enemy."

In any event, the incident continued to poison Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev refused to apologise for his interference in the internal politics of China; and the issue remained unsettled after his unsatisfactory visit to Peking on his way back from the United States. In March 1960 the Chinese resurrected Chang Wen-t'ien from the obscurity in which he had lived since his dismissal after Lushan had him denounced at special Party meetings as a right opportunist who had propagated the erroneous view that China should concentrate on obtaining diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible, including the United States, and that peaceful co-existence in accordance with Five Principles and Bandung should be the basis of China's foreign policy. Chang was said to have opposed the Party's line which was that peaceful co-existence was a means to an end and not an end in itself, and that China should broaden the front in the fight against the main enemy, United States imperialism, by actively mobilising the forces in neutral countries which were hostile to the imperialists. It seems to have been at these meetings that some at least of the cadres learnt of P'eng's letter to the Soviet Party, the existence of which had not been referred to at the earlier briefings.

At the Bucharest Conference in the following June Khrushchev carried the war into the Chinese camp by openly accusing the Chinese of persecuting any comrade who had contacts with the Soviet Party. After referring to the case of P'eng Teh-huai and his dismissal for communicating his views to the Soviet Party, Khrushchev went on to defend the memory of Kao Kang, whose only offence, he suggested, had been that he opposed the incorrect policies of the Chinese Party towards the Soviet Union.

We may expect that, if and when China and Russia start open recriminations against each other, Soviet propaganda will provide fresh material for appreciating the place of the P'eng Teh-huai episode in the recent history of the Chinese Communist Party and in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the meantime two points may be made. First, the mistake

of P'eng and his associates was that they struck too soon. If they had held their hand, China at a time of acute food shortages, economic recession and mounting discontent, would now find herself with a Minister of Defence, a Chief of Staff and other leading personalities who were prepared to treat privately with the Russians in order to establish sanity in the leadership.

Secondly, the extraordinary bitterness of the current controversy between China and the Soviet Union becomes easier to understand when we realise that it was set off by the same kind of outrage to national sentiment as produced the breach between the Soviet Union and Albania. The disgraced members of the Albanian Politburo were, in the view of their colleagues, caught intriguing with the Russians or, as Khrushchev preferred to put it at the 22nd Congress, "had the courage honourably and openly to express their disagreement and come out for the solidarity of Albania with the Soviet Union." P'eng Teh-huai did no less. In both cases Khrushchev refused to disown his friends; in both cases economic sanctions were applied by the withdrawal of technicians and the denial of effective assistance at a time of agricultural crisis; nor were any but the obscurest hints of friction allowed to appear for many months in the Party press. The strange friendship of the Chinese and Albanian Parties is based not only on ideological sympathies but on the memory of a similar experience at the hands of the Soviet Union.

*The Organisation of Rural Trade in China since 1958**

By AUDREY DONNITHORNE

THE purpose of this article is to describe the developments in rural trade following on the formation of the rural people's communes in 1958, but first it is necessary to say something about the events leading up to the situation in the summer of that year. This topic has been treated by the author at greater length elsewhere.¹ A brief summary of certain points must, however, be made in order to sketch the background of the present subject.

By 1957 legitimate private trade had all but vanished: in that year it was reported to account for only 2.7 per cent. of total retail sales.² A corresponding figure for wholesale trade in 1957 is not available, but in 1955 private commerce was said to conduct only 4.4 per cent. of total wholesale sales.³ In addition there were the joint state-private concerns, former private businesses in which the state had by now become very much the senior partner. Thus the state, through the state commercial system (comprising both the state corporation specialising in different commodities and the supply and marketing co-operatives) and through its control of the joint state-private companies, was responsible for conducting almost all the officially recognised trade, both wholesale and retail.

The specialised companies were much more active in the towns, which contained only about 15 per cent. of China's population but where 60 per cent. of the companies' personnel were working in 1955, than in the countryside.⁴ In the rural areas the companies had some purchasing stations to buy produce from the peasants, but much of this task was undertaken by the supply and marketing co-operatives. Theoretically,

* This article was originally presented as a paper to the Study Group on the Economic History of East and South-East Asia held in July 1961 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. The subject will be discussed further and more recent developments covered in the author's forthcoming book, *The Structure of the Chinese Economy*, to be published by Allen & Unwin. The author wishes to acknowledge the generosity of the Houbton-Norman Fund in helping her to visit the Far East and to buy source material.

¹ In a paper for the University of Hong Kong Golden Jubilee Congress, Sept. 1961.

² *Ten Great Years: Statistics of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: 1960), p. 40.

³ *Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-kan* (*New China Fortnightly*), No. 91, 1956, p. 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 98, 1956, p. 82. "The Development of the State Commercial Network and the Basic Situation in 1955."

these co-operatives are voluntary associations but in fact they formed an integral part of the state trading system, buying and selling at the village level. They are under the control of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Co-operatives which, in turn, makes contracts with its superior body, the Ministry of Commerce, for the co-operatives to buy certain crops on behalf of the Ministry.

In 1953 the state commercial system, comprising both the specialised companies and the supply and marketing co-operatives, was given a monopoly of the purchase of all major agricultural commodities, that is, of all commodities falling in the two categories of "planned purchase and planned supply" and "unified purchase." Goods in the first category, "planned purchase and planned supply," were in addition rationed to the consumer under a centralised system: food grains, edible oils and raw cotton (as well as two manufactured commodities, cotton yarn and cotton cloth) were included in this category. Under the second category, "unified purchase," fell a wide range of agricultural products (besides certain non-agricultural items): sugar, tobacco, coarse fibres, live pigs, silk cocoons, wool, hides and skins, many medicinal materials and other items.⁵

As far as grain collection was concerned, the Ministry of Food had from 1954 onwards gradually superseded the supply and marketing co-operatives.⁶ For the main agricultural crops, quotas were set for compulsory deliveries to the state at state prices, and only after these had been fulfilled might the peasants choose between retaining what was left for their own consumption or selling more. From 1955 onwards a policy was proclaimed of fixing for three years at a time the quantities of grain to be produced, to be compulsorily delivered to the government, and to be sold by the government to grain-deficient peasants. As production depends on the weather and other vagaries, and is not amenable to official fixing, this policy in fact meant that deliveries had to be kept up regardless of production. In the case of grain, in addition to compulsory deliveries, considerable quantities were obtained by the government as agricultural tax, which was normally paid in the chief local grain crop.

At the end of 1957, the direct authority of the Ministry of Commerce had been relaxed and that of the provincial and local departments of commerce strengthened by a decree to decentralise the state commercial organisation in line with the general economic decentralisation that occurred at that time.⁷ Also, the number of targets set by the State

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 116, 1957, pp. 207-208. "Regulations on Certain Agricultural and Other Products which are subject to Planned Purchase or Unified Purchase by the State and are not to be permitted on the Free Market."

⁶ *Tung-chi Kung-tso (Statistical Work)*, No. 8, 1957, p. 9.

⁷ "State Council Regulations on Reforming the Commercial Management System," *Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-k'an*, No. 122, 1957, pp. 59-60.

Council for commercial bodies was reduced to four—total purchases, total sales, number of employees and amount of profits. As far as the profits target was concerned, it was not to be transmitted lower than the provincial or equivalent level: however, at first this change was to be made on an experimental basis only, and in fact it may never have been fully implemented. A year later a further step towards decentralisation was taken by a reduction from 417 to 132 in the number of commodities subject to central planning. However, these still included the major items of agricultural produce. Local authorities were to be responsible for the distribution of all other goods and for achieving local equilibrium in them.⁸

For one year, from July 1956 to August 1957, the government had permitted the revival of a free market in commodities subject to "unified" (but not "planned") purchase, after the quota for compulsory deliveries had been fulfilled. This was done in order to control inflationary tendencies. However, the free market had got out of hand and commodities subject to planned purchase had found their way on to it. Therefore in August 1957 all produce subject to unified purchase, as well as to planned purchase, was banned from the free market. Any above-quota sales of such products had to be made to state purchasing stores or (in the case of unified purchase only) to the supply and marketing co-operatives. In provinces well supplied with grain, local grain markets might be opened under official auspices.⁹ The attraction of the free market, licit or illicit, in 1957 was such that many peasants were reported to be giving up farming for trade. Large numbers drifted into cities and set themselves up as unlicensed hawkers, while in one *hsien* in Hopei unlicensed traders were reported to be twice as numerous as private traders had been in the old pre-socialist days.¹⁰

The growth of local self-sufficiency, inherent in the decentralisation measures of 1957–58, was carried further by the outstanding administrative innovation of this period—the formation of people's communes throughout rural China in the summer and autumn of 1958. In 1958, when a bounteous harvest led to the belief that problems of agricultural production were almost solved, great stress was laid on the development of rural industry of which the communes were to be the instruments. This would mean that they could supply much of their own requirements in the way of light industrial goods.

⁸ Yu I-san, "A Discussion on Changes in the Distribution System," *Chi-hua Ching-chi* (Planned Economy), No. 10, October 1958, p. 34.

⁹ "Regulations on certain Agricultural and Other Products which are subject to Planned Purchase or Unified Purchase by the State and are not to be permitted on the Free Market," *Hsin-hua Pan-yueh-K'an*, No. 116, 1957, pp. 207–208.

¹⁰ Pan Jing-wan, "The Struggle between the Two Roads on the Free Market," *Hsin Chien-she* (New Construction), No. 3, March 1958, pp. 18–19.

The trend towards collectivising social life lessened the scope of retail trade as many foodstuffs, and sometimes other consumer goods, went only to mess halls and other public institutions. This development, together with the increased employment of women outside the home led to a change in the type of goods demanded: for example, large cooking utensils were required for the public mess halls, the fact that fires for cooking were no longer lit in homes led to a demand for thermos flasks in which hot water could be brought back from the mess halls; women no longer had time for making clothes, and so garments and cloth shoes had to be bought ready-made. The upsurge in production in 1958, and the ambitious plans that were made at that time, led to substantial orders being placed for capital equipment for agriculture, water conservancy, transport and rural industry.

While the establishment of the people's communes led to a change in the nature of the rural market, it also affected the machinery both of collection of agricultural produce and of distribution of consumer and other goods. The commune was to be an all-inclusive, basic unit of rural life, thus embracing commerce along with the other factors of economic, social and political life. The exact relationship of the commercial element in the communes to the commune organisation on the one hand, and to the state commercial system on the other, was not clear and doubtless varied from district to district, and from province to province—and from one short period to another. A good deal has been written about this subject in the Chinese press, but here, as elsewhere, it is sometimes hard to decide if what is said is an account of actual circumstances or of what might ideally be desired. In many instances the common practice of the Chinese press is followed according to which a detailed account is given of the situation in one particular area or commune (one sometimes suspects it may have been idealised in the telling), with the implication that this model is worthy to be followed. In yet other articles, couched in general terms, a number of possible solutions to the problem of commercial organisation is set out. From all these sources a picture can be drawn, not in clear outline, but probably no more confused than the real situation.

The declared policy was for the workers and the resources of the state commercial departments at the basic (lowest) level to be placed under the local people's commune but their operation was to be closely controlled from above. This is the policy "two transfers, unified management in three fields and one guarantee" which Li Hsien-nien, Minister of Finance, mentions as being proposed in the autumn of 1958¹¹—the transfers being of personnel and capital to the communes,

¹¹ Li Hsien-nien, "A Glance at the People's Communes," *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), No. 10, October 1958, p. 7.

the three fields for unified (*i.e.*, centralised) management being policy, planning and circulation of capital (with special reference to price policy, unified purchase and supply and the need to refrain from diverting working capital provided by the State to purposes of capital construction), and the one guarantee being the guarantee of achieving the financial task. According to Li Hsien-nien, the new and the old status of these local commercial organs were to be combined, "the supply and marketing department of the commune is the organ of the commune in distributing commodities and is also the basic level organ of state commerce."¹² The state financial and trading departments must still maintain relations of "professional leadership with the financial and trading organs of the communes."¹³ Contracts would, according to Li, be the main commercial link by which state plans and commune plans would be co-ordinated.

At least in the early days of the communes, there seem to have been parallel operations rather than co-ordination. We read of a commune in Honan where, in September 1958, the basic level commercial machinery belonged to the two systems, "one is the commodities purchasing and supply station of the commercial department with fourteen retail stores. The other is the system of supply and marketing departments in seventeen natural villages under the leadership of the commune."¹⁴ When and where the state commercial machinery should be withdrawn in order to leave the field to commune-controlled commerce was something which, it was recognised, must be decided on the basis of concrete circumstances.¹⁵ In March, 1961, an article in the *Ta Kung Pao* mentioned that state-operated commercial agencies within communes run the central and branch stores, or supply and marketing departments, "together with a network of commercial units."¹⁶ A few months later mention was made once more of rural supply and marketing co-operatives.^{16a}

Another matter on which it was impossible to lay down a fixed rule was whether all commercial work or distribution of commodities which, in other circumstances would have been commercial, should be channelled through the commune's commercial department. It was thought

¹² *Ibid.* p. 8.

¹³ *Ibid.* Finance and trade seem always to be a single department in communes.

¹⁴ "Commercial work must keep pace with Development of Situation to Greet High Tide of People's Communes," *Shang-yeh Kung-tso (Commercial Work)*, September 3, 1958, translated in *Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP)* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), 1910.

¹⁵ Chong Fu, "Some Problems of Commercial Work in People's Communes," *Ta Kung Pao*, September 28, 1958, translated in *Current Background (CB)* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), 532.

¹⁶ Ch'en Hsing, "Strengthen the Economic work of State-operated Commerce in Trade at Rural Fairs," *ibid.*, March 6, 1961, in SCMP 2481.

^{16a} Kuan Ta-t'ung, "Strengthen the Ties between City and Countryside, Advance the Flow of Commodities," *People's Daily*, July 15, 1961.

unnecessary that the commercial department should handle means of production (e.g., small farm tools) produced for use inside the same commune. It was a more complex question whether subordinate parts of a commune—production teams, for example, or the commune's industrial department—might contact the state commercial organisation only through the intermediary of the commune's department of commerce. Even from the early days of the communes this was felt too cumbersome. For example, production teams were allowed to get into direct touch with state-owned commerce departments for the purpose of taking delivery of supplies, although the original indents should have gone through the commercial department of the commune. Similarly, deliveries of agricultural produce to the state might be made directly by production teams or by the specialised departments of the commune. It was considered unnecessary for the state commercial organisation to maintain its own machinery inside the communes for collection of agricultural produce, although it might need to station a few of its own workers there for liaison purposes.¹⁷

Another question which at first gave rise to some uncertainty was whether the commune's commercial department should buy only from the state commercial organisation, or whether it might also go to other sources for its requirements. It was soon apparent that to insist that all commercial dealings by communes with the world outside should be channelled through the state commercial organisation would be hopelessly restrictive. In some cases there was obvious need for direct contact with sources of supply. While "consumer goods and means of production must not be purchased from outside (*i.e.*, except through the state commercial organisation), small quantities of native and special products, such as fruits and subsidiary foodstuffs, cannot be dispatched over long distances and easily deteriorate. Such small items can only be partly handled by state-owned commerce which cannot and need not take over all these products in their entirety. Purchases and sales transactions with outside areas should therefore be permitted, or state-owned commerce departments may organise commodity exchange fairs for the interflow of such supplies. A similar situation also exists in respect of small farm tools."¹⁸ There was no great enthusiasm in the early days of the communes for commercial contacts of this nature, perhaps because horizontal trade links—between communes, for instance—are more difficult to fit into a plan than vertical ones between communes and the state commercial organisation. Nevertheless, some such trade was seen to be

¹⁷ Chong Fu, *loc. cit.*, September 28, 1958.

¹⁸ Ch'en Hsing, *loc. cit.*, March 6, 1961.

necessary: "While there must not be mutual efforts to push sales to outside areas, there should also be no mutual blockade."¹⁹

At first, contracts were intended as the principal instrument for implementing state commercial plans. The use of contracts for this purpose preceded the establishment of the communes, but now more importance was attached to it than previously. The sixth plenary session of the Eighth CCP Central Committee, held in December, 1958, resolved that "to see that the exchange plan is realised, the contract system should be extensively introduced between the state and communes and between different communes." The contract system was "an important means of implementing the state's planned leadership over the people's communes."²⁰ First, contracts would be made, often at special conferences, between the state commercial organisation at national level and the commercial departments of the major local authorities—(provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions). Then these local authorities would in turn make contracts with lower authorities, including the communes. Thus, in January 1959, officials of the agricultural and commercial departments of the chief local authorities met in Peking to conclude contracts on the production and marketing of farm products for the coming year. These agreements, it was said, "stipulate the plans of production of major farm products in various places this year, put in the form of contracts. They will serve to guide the people's communes in carrying out planned production and building up commercial activities and will help to bring the production of the people's communes more fully within the national system of economic planning."²¹

Within the framework of these agreements, the communes and the lowest level commercial organisations were to sign detailed contracts for delivery of produce. Supplies from the state of agricultural machinery, chemical fertiliser and other goods were also to be guaranteed through contracts signed with the commercial and agricultural departments. These contracts were for the most important types of agricultural output and of manufactured producer goods—those commodities which fell under the heads of "planned purchase and planned sale" and of "unified purchase." These now came to be known as first and second category commodities, embracing all those things which were included in the state plan: these two categories accounted for 80 per cent. of subsidiary agricultural production in addition to all the major products.²² Apart

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Li Cheng-jui and Yang Ch'un-hsu, "Apply the Contract System Extensively," February 20, 1959, in SCMP 1980.

²¹ New China News Agency (NCNA), January 18, 1959.

²² Peng Chien-fei, "The Significance and Role of Market Trade Launched in Rural Areas," *Ta Kung Pao*, August 24, 1959, in SCMP 2100.

from these, all other goods, with certain exceptions, were denominated third category commodities.²³

The formation of the communes put an end to the domestic manufacture of a host of minor consumer goods—straw sandals, for example, coir brooms and rain coats, baskets and bamboo hats. Some local authorities failed to make any provision for their continued production. The same held true, in places, of certain fruits and vegetables, the collection of wild plants, fishing and even of raising pigs and poultry.²⁴ Thus in the first months after the communes were established, severe shortages developed of many such goods. It was resolved to remedy this situation by bringing third category commodities within the ambit of the contract system. This was intended not only to satisfy consumer needs but also to help diversify the communes' economy, an aim on which great stress was laid in the early days of the commune movement and one which commerce departments at higher levels were ordered to further.

In May, 1959, the First National Conference on Exchange of Third Category Products was held at Shanghai under the joint auspices of the Ministries of Commerce and Light Industry. It was attended by over 4,000 representatives of the industrial and commercial departments of the chief local authorities. The Fifth General Office of the State Council, the National Economic Commission, the State Planning Commission, the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry, the Ministries of Forestry, of Marine Products and of Public Health, and the Economic Co-operation Areas of East China and of the North-east were also represented. The purpose of the Conference was "to ascertain the production and demand of the products of the third category which could not possibly be placed under direct state control, organise the circulation and production of these commodities, strengthen the co-operation between the urban and rural areas, between different localities and between industry and commerce, help the people's communes develop a multiple economy, find raw materials for industries and commodities for the market and export trade and meet the needs of national construction and the livelihood of the people."²⁵

An exhibition was held for the benefit of the delegates, at which a great variety of agricultural and industrial products was displayed. During the fortnight the Conference was in session, many thousands of contracts were said to have been signed, to a total value of 1,000 million yuan

²³ NCNA, May 7, 1959: "The first category consists of 38 types of products including grain, cotton and cloth, and the second category of 293 types including nails, wire and live pigs. Commodities not included in these two categories and other than those placed under the control of the relevant departments or provided for by the regulations of the state belong to the third category."

²⁴ Li Cheng-jui and Yang Ch'un-hsu, *op. cit.*

²⁵ NCNA, May 7, 1959.

for both spot and forward delivery of many kinds of commodities. Special emphasis was laid on trade between cities and rural areas which, it was noted, "restored the once-interrupted buying and selling relationship."²⁶ In addition, a number of agreements were made on technical co-operation—for example, some of the coastal and northern provinces agreed to send men with tools to certain inland provinces to give instruction in the making of straw bags which were in short supply. The Minister of Commerce, summing up the Conference, stressed the need to hold similar conferences at lower levels as a means of sharing out the production and collection quotas (to which higher levels were already committed by contract) among communes, production teams, factories,²⁷ and even, on occasion, individual households.²⁸

It had been hoped that conferences for the exchange of third category commodities, held at various levels, together with the contracts to which they gave rise, would solve the problem of ensuring the production and distribution of these goods. They probably helped towards this end; at any rate they continued to be held. However, difficulties were encountered, especially over the fulfilment of contracts, as had occurred even before the formation of the communes.²⁹ So we find before long the contract system going hand in hand with "commune fairs" or "commune trade markets." These were reported to make the contract system more feasible. According to an account from Hopeh, this was due to the greater uniformity of price which had come about as a result of the markets. "The contract system which our *hsien* commerce departments previously adopted could not be successfully enforced, due to unstable prices. Since the development of commune trade markets, prices have become uniform."³⁰ [This indicates absence of price control for third category commodities. Before the reopening of the markets, prices would therefore be decided by bilateral bargaining when contracts were being made, which, in the absence of an outside market, would have been fruitful of instability.]³¹

Thus in the course of 1959 the rural fairs were revived. These newly-revived fairs, it should be pointed out, were the traditional markets for rural trade. From time immemorial up to their temporary suppression they had been held at regular intervals (often every five or ten days) at market towns throughout the country. Thither the peasants

²⁶ NCNA, May 22, 1959.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Lin Yao, "Report of an Investigation of Trade at the Fair at Tingssuchiao, Sianning hsien, Hupeh." *People's Daily*, March 14, 1961.

²⁹ Li Cheng-jui and Yang Ch'un-hsu, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Li Ju-mei, "Functions of Commune Trade Markets," *Hopeh Jih-pao*, August 3, 1959, in SCMP 2134.

³¹ See below for a further discussion on prices.

had always taken their surplus output for sale and there they had bought their requirements from the outside world. Not only did these fairs fulfil an important economic function, but their social significance was also great in that they provided wider contacts, fun, bustle and excitement. Rural life must have been much duller while fairs were suspended. At a conference convened in June and July by the Ministry of Commerce, it was laid down that "the rural market trade should be extended step by step."³² An article appearing the day after the conference closed spoke of "the need to restore the basic level markets in rural areas, to widen the exchange of commodities and stimulate the growth of production." It went on to say that commodities of the first category would not enter these basic level markets, and second category commodities would do so only to a limited degree and under close control, with careful regard for the types allowed by the Central and provincial governments. "In areas which are placed under state collection, producers of commodities of the second category will not be allowed to sell in the market until the local commercial departments have bought enough through contracts with the producers to meet the collection task. In areas where no state collection will take place, producers of the commodities of the second category will be allowed to sell in the market and the local commercial departments must actively organise purchases according to plan."³³ Third category commodities would be allowed for sale at the fairs.

However, even before the Ministry of Commerce's Conference, rural fairs seem to have been in full swing. The conferences for exchange of third category commodities appear to have been intended for the purpose of trade between organisations—communes, state commercial organisations and so forth. Even in September, 1958, we have already seen, it had been suggested that state-owned commerce departments should organise fairs to assist communes in trading minor commodities with outside areas. Gradually, it seems, these or similar gatherings turned into fairs more like the traditional type, with individual producers and purchasers participating. While the Conference of June–July 1959 was still in session, commodity interflow fairs were reported in Kwangsi at which, in addition to trade between organisations, "commune members also traded between themselves."³⁴ Later in the summer, numerous reports of rural fairs came from many parts of China.

In September, 1959, the Central Committee of the Party and the State Council issued a Directive on the Organisation of Rural Fairs.³⁵

³² NCNA, July 17, 1959.

³³ Sung Che-ho, "On Development of Multiple Undertakings," *Ta Kung Pao*, July 18, 1958, in SCMP 2071.

³⁴ NCNA, July 7, 1959.

³⁵ NCNA, September 24, 1959.

This appears to mark an important departure by permitting even first category commodities to be sold at fairs under certain conditions. "Having supplied and sold the required quantities (sc. of first and second category goods) to the state," the communes and production brigades "may offer the remainder for sale in rural fairs. If required by the state they shall sell as much of the remainder as possible to state commercial departments." Sideline and handicraft goods produced by individual commune members "whether coming under the first, second or third category, may be offered for sale in rural fairs," with the qualification that in the case of "important commodities among the materials of the first and second categories, such as pigs" commune members might be required to sell definite quantities to the state.³⁶

The Directive goes on to lay down rules on price control at fairs (first and second category goods "without exception" are to be sold "at prices at which the state purchases them"), on who should participate and on the control that should be exercised. The principal participants in rural fairs are communes, production brigades, individual commune members and local state commercial departments.

The Directive is of particular interest when it lays down the conditions governing the participation of outsiders because it indicates the extent to which enterprises and bodies of all kinds had been by-passing the official channels of commerce in order to buy straight from the producers. Before being allowed to take part "procurement personnel of factories, mines, enterprises, public offices, people's organisations, and army units from outside must produce letters of introduction furnished by industrial or commercial departments at or above the level of the *hsien* in the areas from which they have come, and also seek the approval of local market control establishments." Pedlars and other small tradesmen might take part if they had been licensed for that particular area. "They are permitted to purchase commodities at one place and sell them at another place and derive a reasonable profit from the difference in price between these two places. But they are not permitted to do this if the two places concerned are very far apart." They were forbidden to make a profit by buying commodities and selling them at the same fair. However, they were allowed more scope than communes, brigades and commune members who were not allowed to buy goods at one place and sell them at a profit elsewhere.³⁷ Such activities are restricted (outside the state commercial organs) to specially licensed persons only. The authorities are afraid of peasants diverting their attention from agriculture to trade because of the

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

effect it might have on production, and also because of the political repercussions of an outburst of "spontaneous capitalism."³⁸ Finally, the Directive of September, 1959, laid down the necessity of market control committees being set up under the authority of the local Party committees. These market control committees should contain representatives of the relevant departments including those of commerce, food, banking, revenue, industry and agriculture.³⁹

Despite the apparent approval given by this Directive to the sale at rural fairs of first as well as second category commodities, after the compulsory deliveries had been fulfilled, nevertheless in discussions of rural fairs, and in descriptions of them, it is constantly stated that commodities of the first category must on no account be sold at the fairs, but only to the state commercial organisation. True, agents and organs of the state commercial system are present at fairs and it might be argued that what the Directive meant was that the peasants should be allowed to bring first category commodities to fairs to sell to the state organs—but the actual words of the Directive make no distinction between commodities of the first and second categories. Even if in September 1959 official approval was given to some first category goods going on the market at fairs, that approval appears to have been since withdrawn. In 1961, especially (although earlier as well), a large number of reports of individual rural fairs have appeared in the Chinese national press, pointing out the benefits accruing from such fairs, but at the same time, insisting on the limits to which they should be subject. One limitation stressed is the exclusion of first category commodities⁴⁰; perhaps the very insistence springs from a knowledge that this is not being observed. Even if the prohibition on sale of first category commodities in their original form was effectively enforced, ways might be found of getting round it by subjecting them to some form of processing—as, for example, by using grain to make rice wine, rice sweets (there is mention of these

³⁸ See *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Southern Daily), November 14, 1960, editorial: "Neither too Much, Nor None at all," in SCMP 2405.

³⁹ "Directive on the Organisation of Rural Fairs," *loc. cit.*

⁴⁰ e.g., *People's Daily*, November 25, 1960, "Trade Fairs make Economic Activity Flourish in the Countryside"; *People's Daily*, March 13, 1961, "State Commerce Leads Correctly: Rural Fairs are Lively but not Chaotic"; *Ta Kung Pao*, February 20, 1961, Wu Jen-k'uei, Director, Kiangsi Provincial Department of Commerce, "Carry Out Policy, Strengthen Leadership and Enliven Trade at Rural Fairs," in SCMP 2460; *Ta Kung Pao*, January 21, 1961, Work Team, Finance and Trade Department, Shantung Communist Party CCP Provincial Committee, "Report on an Investigation into Nanma Fair," in SCMP 2449; *Ta Kung Pao*, January 26, 1961, Kuan Ta-t'ung, "Firmly Enforce the Policy of Activating Rural Fairs," in SCMP 2456; *Ta Kung Pao*, January 13, 1961, Yang Hsiao-hsien, "Strengthen Organisational Leadership, Develop Rural Trade Fairs in a better way," in SCMP 2445; *People's Daily*, March 14, 1961, Ho Wei and Yang Ch'un-hsin "On Trade at Rural Fairs; *Ta Kung Pao*, March 6, 1961, Ch'en Hsing, "Strengthen the Economic Work of State-operated Commerce in Trade at Rural Fairs," in SCMP 2481.

being sold at a rural fair in Hupeh)⁴¹ or the large flat biscuits which are widely eaten. The communal feeding arrangements in the countryside would, of course, make it more difficult for peasants to make such products on the side, as supplies of both grain and fuel are supposed to be centralised in the mess halls. Still, it is difficult to imagine that the ingenuity of the Chinese country folk does not manage to circumvent these obstacles.⁴²

Among other points that are made in recent Chinese press reports of rural fairs is the need to prevent outsiders from participation—especially purchasing by outside collective bodies and by government concerns (except for the regular commercial organs) and by their employees. It was thought that they would raise prices. Also warnings are given about merchants and pedlars, who now it seems are also to be barred from the fairs. Thus the rules on participation in fairs appear to have become considerably more rigorous since the Directive of September 1959. "Speculative activities," *i.e.*, buying with the intention of reselling, were vigorously denounced.

The role of the state commercial organs at rural fairs is, or at least is meant to be, extremely important. For example, at the first seven occasions that the fair was held at Tingssuchiaio, Hupeh, nearly 70 per cent. of the purchases of agricultural produce (which totalled 171,800 yuan) was reported to be made by state commercial agencies. For many third category commodities the state buying plans were said to be over-fulfilled⁴³ (this indicates that such plans are couched in terms of a minimum to be bought rather than a target to be achieved exactly). As well as buying agricultural produce, the State Central Store at this fair, like its counterparts at other fairs, sold manufactured goods—such as towels, socks, thermos flasks and rubber footwear. Also it organised local handicraft industry to make various items to supply local needs. (In other fields as well the commercial departments are expected to play an active part in fostering production.) Counting both factory and handicraft products together, the state shop sold 74,234 yuan worth of manufactured goods at the first seven fairs. In this period the Store also sold more than 60,000,000 yuan worth of raw materials and fuel to communal bambooware, woodwork and ironware workshops.⁴⁴ The activities of the state commercial organs at this fair were considered particularly satisfactory.

Another article, appearing at about the same time⁴⁵ complains that "the rural trade fairs have not been held in a completely satisfactory

⁴¹ Lin Yao, "Report of an Investigation of Trade at the Fair at Tingssuchiaio, Siennang hsien, Hupeh," *loc. cit.*

⁴² I am grateful to W.K. for a discussion on this topic.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³ Lin Yao, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Ch'en Hsing, *op. cit.*

manner" in some places. The range of commodities on sale is limited and "speculative activities" occur. One of the chief reasons for this state of affairs is thought to be "that state-operated commerce has not kept pace in its economic activities with rural trade fairs, so that it has failed to play its due role of leadership. . . . Leadership over trade at rural fairs is provided through the economic efforts of state-operated commerce, and through its administrative control over the market economic efforts should form the keystone of the leadership. . . . Provided that state-operated commercial agencies buy, sell and serve in a satisfactory manner and perform well the task of promoting production apart from exercising the necessary control over the market, we can assuredly operate a rural trade fair in a normal, brisk and healthy manner. The managers of some commercial and state-run stores do not fully realise the importance of exercising leadership through economic work, as they overlook economic leadership and over-emphasise administrative control, with the consequence that the rural trade fair yields poor results." State commercial organs must actively encourage subsidiary production. They should also ensure that quotas for compulsory purchases of second category goods are efficiently allotted, so that the peasants will know how much they have left over for sale at the fairs. "At present, just because the work connected with the allotment of purchase quotas for commodities of the second category has not caught up, some commercial cadres fear that the conducting of rural trade fairs would make it difficult to fulfil such quotas, and focus their attention on the control of such commodities of the second category in the fair. Communes, production brigades, production teams and commune members, not having an exact idea about the purchase quotas to be fulfilled, do not know the volume of commodities they should retain for sale at the fair."⁴⁶ The appearance at fairs of small merchants peddling goods unobtainable at the state store is due to the store's inefficiency. "State-operated commerce . . . should be in a position to supply in time all commodities, be they needles or thread, indispensable to the everyday life of the masses."⁴⁷ Thus the private merchants would be edged out.

Discussion of price at rural fairs has been surrounded with considerable ambiguity. The Directive of September 1959, mentioned above, said that first and second category commodities must be sold "without exception" at the prices at which the state purchases them. The most important third category products should be sold at prices set by the state. In the case of some commodities of this category the commercial departments might set maximum and minimum prices. The prices of "odd and petty" products might be settled between buyer and seller "with the

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

guidance of market control committees.”⁴⁸ The need for price stability and for control to prevent prices going “beyond reasonable limits” was laid down. Two months later an article in the *People's Daily* said that sales of surplus first and second category commodities, after the compulsory deliveries had been fulfilled, might be sold at slightly higher prices than those set by the state for its purchases.⁴⁹ A year later, a Directive of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Council suggests that prices 10 per cent. to 20 per cent. above the official state purchasing prices might be given for above-quota sales to the state.⁵⁰ Rational or reasonable prices, which are frequently demanded are defined as prices calculated according to the social labour necessary for the production of the commodity concerned, and not on the production costs of the individual producer.⁵¹ Publicity and exhortation should be undertaken to support the policy of price stability and “the great mass of people should be brought to understand equitable dealings, exchange at parity of value and the harmfulness of speculation.”⁵² In July, 1960, a Vice-Governor of Liaoning, writing in *Red Flag*, discussed whether vegetable production should be encouraged by political pressure or by a large rise in the state purchasing price: he came down strongly in favour of the first alternative.⁵³ However, the trend towards free fixing of prices seems to have been strong. In March, 1961, it was stated in the *People's Daily* that the sellers might fix the price of all farm produce offered for sale at rural fairs, or alternatively that the price might be settled by haggling between buyers and sellers.⁵⁴ Reports from persons leaving China tell of widespread black market activities in first and second category commodities with prices some three to five times higher than the official level.

The revival of the rural fairs is a step towards allowing economic incentives a larger role. The rural fair is described as “the key to the treasure house of the peasants” by using which the “treasure house” of increased production can be thrown open.⁵⁵ Three years ago this key would have been thought of in political terms. Although politics is still in command, and it would be wrong to belittle this continued fact, some steps have been taken towards allowing more play to economic forces.

⁴⁸ NCNA, September 24, 1959. ⁴⁹ Kuan Ta-t'ung, *op. cit.* “On Trade at Rural Fairs.”

⁵⁰ *Nan-Fang Jih-pao*, December 28, 1960, “Kwangtung Provincial People's Council Publishes Directive on Re-adjustment of Control List of Products,” in SCMP 2421.

⁵¹ *People's Daily*, November 24, 1959, Su Hsueh-sheng, “Discussion on Holding Markets at Different Levels.”

⁵² Ch'en Hsing, “Develop Trade at Rural Fairs in a Guided and Planned Manner,” *People's Daily*, November 25, 1960.

⁵³ Huang Ta, “Even Industrial Centres can become Self-Sufficient in Vegetables,” *Red Flag*, No. 14, 1960, pp. 24-25.

⁵⁴ *People's Daily*, March 14, 1961. Ho Wei and Yang Ch'un-hsu, “On Trade at Rural Fairs.”

⁵⁵ *People's Daily*, January 18, 1961, Sung Lin, “Develop Trade at Fairs, Make the Rural Economy Active.”

Five Years of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, 1955-60

By J. P. LO

1

SINKIANG, that vast, rugged land in Inner Asia, rich in undeveloped resources and peopled by farmers and nomads of many races and creeds with deeply-rooted differences in ways of life and long years of conflict over political aspirations, is today in the throes of a revolution of unprecedented magnitude and intensity aimed at the achievement of sweeping cultural, social and economic changes. This prodigious effort at transformation is the keynote of Chinese Communist rule of Sinkiang. Its groundwork was laid in the first years after the Chinese Communists took control in 1949.

From the very outset of their rule, the Chinese Communists had taken pains to assure their domination by emphatic assertions of the paramountcy of the Party and the inalienability of the region, by monopoly of the key positions in the machinery of government and by outright display of military power.¹ Half of the officials of the provincial people's government and three-quarters of the members of the provincial Party committee were Chinese. A determined effort was made to recruit a corps of disciplined and faithful functionaries from the minority races to assist the Chinese cadres. By 1955, there were 36,000 native cadres, three times the number of 1950, but only 5 per cent. of them held government or Party positions above the county level.

Paying special attention to the young, the Communist authorities opened more schools so that the number of primary school students reached 366,000 in 1955, a 70 per cent. increase over 1950. The people were grouped into mass organisations. The campaign for the suppression of the counter-revolutionaries weeded out the dissidents and silenced the opposition, while land reform prepared the way for collectivisation. By September 1955 over 62 per cent. of the rural population was organised into mutual aid teams and 5 per cent. into 1,702 agricultural

¹ The inalienability of the national autonomous areas is stipulated in article three of the 1954 constitution of the People's Republic of China and the subordination of the governments of these areas to the Communist Party of China is stressed in the statement of Wang Feng, vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission of the State Council, *People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao)* hereafter abbreviated as JMJP) September 27, 1959, as translated in *Current Background* (hereafter abbreviated as CB) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 609.

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producers' co-operatives, and there were seventy-two state farms, over half of which were mechanised. Between 1950 and 1955, the Communists claim, the cultivated acreage increased by 25 per cent. to about 3.6 million acres and the number of livestock rose from twelve to seventeen million head.

Under the impetus of Soviet guidance and assistance, industrialisation got under way. Before they were turned over to the Chinese in 1955, the four Sino-Soviet joint stock companies helped the Chinese in prospecting and surveying, in technological direction and planning, and in equipping and constructing modern factories. As a result, while there were only fourteen factories in 1950, there were sixty-four in 1955 and production in 1955 was said to be ten times the volume of 1950. By 1955, there were about 2,500 miles of highways and a tenth of the 1,500-mile Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway, begun in 1954, had been built.

The construction work was carried out largely by Chinese labour since native workers, numbering about three thousand in 1955, were considered untrained. Besides the large numbers of Chinese who were brought into Sinkiang, 30,000 in the year 1955 alone, the Chinese Communists, following the historic Chinese practice of employing military colonists, organised a large body of labour troops, at first mostly former Nationalist soldiers, to farm, to reclaim wasteland and to build roads and factories. Called the Production and Construction Corps of the People's Liberation Army, its men tilled in 1955 over a million acres of land besides performing military duties.

After setting the stage by these measures to tighten their grip over Sinkiang and after experiments conducted at lower administrative levels in 1954 had shown that their system of controlled and limited self-government for the minority peoples was safe, the Chinese Communists finally granted autonomy to the whole of Sinkiang.² The Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, comprising of three municipalities, seven administrative districts, five autonomous districts, seventy-three counties, six autonomous counties, and a population of 4,874,000 (according to the 1953-54 census), 4.3 million of them non-Chinese (including 3.6 million Uighurs), formally came into being on October 1, 1955.

Although the majority of the people probably attached little political significance to the establishment of the Autonomous Region, the event did mark, in a way, the conclusion of the stage of preliminary preparations by the Chinese Communists and the opening of the developmental stage to increase the agricultural and

² For a review of the political developments in Sinkiang during the first five years under Communist domination, see the chapter "Political Dynamics" by J. P. Lo in *A Regional Handbook of Northwest China* (Human Resources Area Files, Inc., University of Washington, 1956), II:483-531.

industrial productivity of the region and to integrate the economic development of the region with the overall plans of China. Since Sinkiang is now closed to non-Communist observers, the only available information are the glowing accounts and the array of figures presented by the Communists, but, even after making due allowances for the inaccuracy of their statistics and the exuberance of their claims, a picture emerges of colossal changes that have come over Sinkiang.

2

As Saifuddin Azizi, chairman and concurrently a Party secretary of the Autonomous Region, remarked in 1959, both the Soviet Union and Communist China had a share in Sinkiang's economic growth. From 1950 to 1960, 1,066 large tractors, 140 combines, and 4,000 tractor ploughs, drills and other equipment came from Soviet Russia besides the parts for the thousands of tractors turned out by the October 1 Motor Repair and Assembly Shop, which was itself built with Soviet help. Soviet planes sprayed insecticides, Soviet experts gave technical direction to increase cotton production, the Soviet Government donated two hospitals, and, after Soviet engineers helped in the discovery of the Karamai oilfields, "everything was done by the Russians and all the heavy machinery and tools for prospecting—30 to 40,000 tons a year—came from Soviet Russia."⁸

The Chinese Communists, handicapped by distance and the lack of railway lines, furnished manpower and capital. Factories, highways, dams and many major engineering works were built by the army's labour corps augmented by workers from China. The credit which Peking extended to Sinkiang to cover general operational expenses and to meet its budgetary deficit came to 13,980 million yuan for the 1950-58 period. However, nearly half of this amount was for the year 1958 alone to defray the expenditure needed in the establishment of the communes and the "big leap forward" in production. Of the 2,522 million yuan appropriated for the educational, cultural, economic and administrative development of the region from 1949 to 1957, 1,630 million yuan came from Peking, and of the investment of 1,720 million yuan for capital formation (not wholly in industry), 1,310 million yuan came from Peking. Since the cost of living is not published, there is no way of knowing the

⁸ JMJP November 6, 1957. On Soviet aid to Sinkiang, see New China News Agency (hereafter abbreviated as NCNA) feature article, "Extensive Soviet help to Sinkiang," October 28, 1957, translated in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (hereafter abbreviated as SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), 1642, and article by Saifuddin, "Sinkiang's great achievement in agriculture in ten years," *Chung-kuo Nung-pao*, 1959, No. 19 (October 8, 1959), translated in *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General) (hereafter abbreviated as ECMM), 193.

actual value of these sums. Moreover, the transactions were not entirely one-way; Saifuddin mentioned the taxes paid to Peking and revealed that of the proceeds from government enterprises only 20 per cent. was retained by Sinkiang.⁴

The goal of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57) in Sinkiang was the achievement of economic self-sufficiency. In 1958, when the Second Five-Year Plan was undertaken, the Party committee of Sinkiang, in compliance with the directive of the Eighth Party Congress, announced the aim of converting Sinkiang into a base for the production of iron, steel, oil, coal and cotton, an objective to be attained by launching a multi-phase campaign: propaganda, a purge of the rightists, increase of production, technological improvements and a cultural revolution.⁵

One of the means to the achievement of economic self-sufficiency was to speed-up the programme of collectivisation. By spring of 1956, there were 8,500 lower-type agricultural producers' co-operatives in which ownership of private property was permitted to a certain degree. They comprised 45 per cent. of the farming population. At the end of 1957, when over 95 per cent. of the peasants were in collectives, the transition to a higher type of co-operatives took place. There were 5,800 of these co-operatives in which all means of production were communal property and wages were distributed according to labour. Meanwhile, in the pastoral areas, 46 per cent. of the herdsmen were organised into co-operatives. In the autumn of 1958, 7,000 agricultural and a number of animal husbandry co-operatives were merged into 450 large-scale communes embracing over 96 per cent. of the peasants and herdsmen and operating over 17,000 small factories and mines.⁶ At the same time, the number of state farms and ranches reached 220, of which 178 were mechanised, occupying a million acres of farmland and possessing two million head of cattle.

The biggest and the best of the communes, as the Communist leaders hailed it, is the aggregate of farms of the Production and Construction Corps which since 1955 had multiplied enormously in size. One division in 1959 was three times its 1954 strength and press dispatches mentioned as many as eight divisions. Besides operating 147 mechanised farms and

⁴ The figures for the loans and investments are cited by Saifuddin in his article, "Celebrate the tenth national day with tremendous achievement in production increase and economy," *Min-tsu T'uan-chieh*, 1959, No. 10 (October 6, 1959), translated in ECMM, 196, and Wang En-mao, "Struggle to implement the people's Marxist-Leninist line for the solution of the nationality question," *JMJP* June 27, 1958, in CB 512.

At the official rate of exchange, a yuan is equivalent to three shillings or U.S. \$0.42.

⁵ Speech of Wang En-mao, *Sinkiang Jih-pao* (hereafter abbreviated as SKJP) June 6, 1958, in CB 512.

⁶ Saifuddin's articles "Celebrate the tenth national day" and "Sinkiang's great achievements."

ranches covering nearly 1.6 million acres of farmland, they built 430 factories between 1955 and 1959. In 1957, their output of cotton came to 29 per cent. of the regional total and their industrial output to 36 per cent. In addition, the men of the labour corps not only lent armed support to the regular army and the public security forces, but they also trained cadres and technical personnel in the management of co-operatives as well as in the operation of tractors and combines.⁷

The people's communes were launched in Sinkiang, according to Communist press dispatches, in an atmosphere of prosperity and abundance. In response to the exhortation of Party committees to carry out the "big leap forward" in agricultural production, the farmers "joyously reported and happily celebrated an unprecedented bumper harvest."⁸ Grain production was reported to have reached three million tons in 1958, nearly three times the amount of 1949,⁹ and cotton production reached 58,000 tons, eleven times that of 1949.

A major factor for the increase of agricultural production was said to be the extension of the irrigated acreage from 2.4 million acres in 1949 to 5.6 million acres in 1959 brought about by the construction of hundreds of small reservoirs and canals. By 1959, the cropping area reached over 6.6 million acres, over a million acres of which were added during late

⁷ Summary of the work of the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps in JMJP April 16 and July 31, 1960, and the article "Brief account of the achievements of the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps of the army in the last ten years," *Chung-kuo Nung-k'ien*, 1960 No. 3 (February 5, 1960) in ECMM 204.

⁸ SKJP September 30, 1958, translated in Union Research Service XIII:17 (November 21, 1958).

⁹ These were the revised figures for 1958 as cited in the article "Sinkiang's great achievements" by Saifuddin, who revealed that the per *mou* (one-sixth of an acre) yield of grain was 290 pounds. Previously, the grain production for 1958 was, according to the SKJP, September 30, 1958, estimated at three and a half million tons and the per *mou* yield was over 365 pounds. This SKJP dispatch also revealed that the farming population of Sinkiang, in 1958, was still 4.2 million, indicating almost no substantial increase from the number of peasants in the 1949-53 period. Since the per *capita* production of grain increased from 500 pounds to 1,100 pounds in 1958, the 1958 total could only have been a little more than double the 1949 amount, certainly not three times. In his speech in April, 1960, when he reported that the production of grain in 1959 was three and a half million tons, Saifuddin said that it was only 2.4 times the amount of 1949 (NCNA, April 5, 1960).

The preliminary estimate given in the SKJP, September 30, 1958, stated that the grain harvest of 1958 was 70 per cent. more than the 1957 figure, but Saifuddin, in his report on the readjustment of the production figures (SKJP, September 5, 1959, in SCMP 2132), revealed that the grain production of 1958 was only 45.5 per cent. over 1957 (in his article "Sinkiang's great achievements," he declared that it was 47.5 per cent.), and he revealed, too, that the annual rate of increase from 1952 to 1957 was 4.8 per cent. These percentages were high compared to percentages of overall agricultural growth in Communist China where the 1958 total was 35 per cent. over 1957 and the rate of increase from 1952 to 1957 was 3.7 per cent. Cf. Noboru Tsuchii, "Analysis of economic growth in Communist China" (Chugoku no keizai kakudai ni tsuite no Kento), *Ekaful Tsushin* 229 (May 21, 1960), 1-30, translated in United States Joint Publication Research Service 7051 (November 15, 1960) and Choh-ming Li, "The First Decade, Part II, Economic Development," *The China Quarterly*, No. 1 (January-March, 1960), 40-41.

1958 and early 1959. Working in the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins, the men of the army's labour corps reclaimed 2.7 million acres of desert land from 1955 to 1959, and, in the first six months of 1960, when 30 per cent. of all the able-bodied men of the region were mobilised to build irrigation works, nearly 1.5 million acres of arid and alkaline land were reported to have been reclaimed.

Besides enlarging farm acreage, the authorities made vigorous efforts to increase the productivity of the soil by campaigns to collect manure for fertiliser, by deep ploughing, and by urging the farmers to work their fields more intensively. *Per capita* production of grain, which averaged 500 pounds in 1949, rose to 800 pounds in 1953-57, and to 1,100 (1,320 in south Sinkiang) pounds in 1958. *Per capita* production of cotton rose from 22.8 pounds in 1949 to 68.8 pounds in 1958.

Elated by such returns, which were far above normal, the Party leaders set even higher targets for 1959. The *per capita* production of grain was to be raised to 2,200 pounds and the regional total to six or six and a half million tons, doubling the 1958 total. *Per capita* production of cotton was to be raised to 65-75 pounds and the total increased to 180,000-225,000 tons. The targets for southern Sinkiang were even higher.¹⁰ But, as in China proper, the Party leaders had over-estimated. Neither cajolery nor coercion could make the farmers produce more, and the failure to reach the targets necessitated a drastic readjustment. Instead of six to six and a half million tons of grain, the amount harvested in 1959 came to only three and a half million tons. And even though this amount was, as Saifuddin modestly revealed, 2.4 times that of 1949 (*sic*), a food shortage was felt all over Sinkiang which he attributed to waste, lack of manpower, inadequacy of techniques, rightist opposition, and natural calamities. He urged the people to work harder and to make greater sacrifices so that the state could have sufficient food to feed the growing population in the industrial and mining areas and in the towns through which the Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway would pass.

Meanwhile, the number of livestock also increased, from seventeen million head in 1954 to twenty-two million in 1958, but the Party directive to increase the 1959 figure to twenty-eight million head was not carried out.

3

The most conspicuous aspect of economic development in Sinkiang has been in industry.¹¹ Exclusive of handicraft workshops, the number of

¹⁰ The production targets for 1959-62 are mentioned by Wang En-mao in SKJP June 28, 1958, and July 18, 1958, in CB 521.

¹¹ The statistics on industrial expansion, particularly regarding the leap forward, are to be found in the above-mentioned articles by Saifuddin and Wang En-mao and in numerous press dispatches. See, in particular, Saifuddin's "Report on the readjust-

factories rose from sixty-four in 1955 to over four hundred in 1957, and to over fifteen hundred in 1958. Particular emphasis was placed on the production of petroleum, coal, iron and steel, and electric power, the prerequisites of modern industry.

Oil: Sinkiang's petroleum industry was born during the Second World War. By the end of the war, the output of oil reached 22,000–29,000 tons, the bulk of which came from Hungtungshan (Kolayalun) and Tushantzu, the site of a Soviet-built refinery. The large-scale and systematic surveys and prospecting carried out jointly by Chinese Communist and Soviet teams led to the discovery of many new oilfields, the largest of which is in the area around Karamai (Black Oil) and Uerho in the northern part of the Dzungarian Basin. When oil gushed forth from an experimental shaft in the winter of 1955, workers from thirty Chinese cities and oilmen from six East European countries immediately flocked there, while Soviet Russia supplied all the equipment. The Chinese built 300 miles of roads in the area, laid a pipeline to the Tushantzu refinery, and dug a canal to supply water. Karamai is said to be so rich that, in 1959, one well alone produced 30,000 tons a year and, along with other new oilfields, it contributed to a huge increase in oil production. In 1958, Sinkiang produced 330,000 tons and, after the production of 400,000 tons (more than a tenth of China's total) in the first six months of 1959, the target for the year was set at 670,000 tons.

Coal: Chinese Communist claims of the discovery of new coal deposits, many along the path of the new railway, have raised the estimate of the coal reserves in Sinkiang from thirty-two to thirty-five billion tons. By 1955, coal production was thirty-one times the amount of 1950, and in 1958 it reached 3.6 million tons. After 2.2 million tons were mined in the first half of 1959, the year's target was readjusted to 3.9 million tons.

Iron and steel: Although Sinkiang has rich deposits of iron ore, estimated at 48.7 million metric tons, the large-scale manufacture of iron and steel began only with the construction, with Soviet assistance, of the August 1 Iron and Steel Plant at Urumchi in 1951. By 1957, production came to only 17,230 tons of iron and 14,640 tons of steel. In 1958, when the "big leap" was launched, with the aim of increasing the output of ferrous metals, the targets for Sinkiang were set at 57,000 tons of pig iron and 30,000 tons of steel. But, at the end of nine months, only 18,500 tons of iron and only 11,000 tons of steel had been produced, of which 18,000 tons of iron and all of the steel came from the August 1 Plant. The 90,000 home-made furnaces and workshops turned out four

ment of the principal targets set in 1959 National Plan of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and the unfolding of the movement for production increase and economy of the region," in SKJP September 5, 1959, in SCMP 2132.

thousand tons of unusable scrap. After the installation of fifty blast furnaces and more than thirty steel converters in the August 1 Plant between 1958 and 1959, the Party leaders set the 1959 targets at 228,000 tons of pig iron and 228,000 tons of steel, for which the August 1 Plant was assigned 200,000 tons of each category. But when only 98,000 tons of iron and 17,000 tons of steel were produced during the first six months, the year's targets were reduced to 120,000 tons of iron and 60,000 tons of steel. The main obstacles were said to be the low iron content of the ore—less than 31 per cent.—and the poor grade of coke. The shortage of steel is said to be one of the chief reasons for the delay in track-laying of the Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway.

Electric Power: Up to 1954, the Urumchi Thermo-electric Plant produced 40 per cent. more power than the combined output of all the other plants in Sinkiang. With the installation of new generators, power output in 1955 was reported to be thirty times that of 1950 and in 1957 seventy-two times. Between 1957 and 1958, the construction of hydro-electric plants at Urumchi and Kashgar and nearly 200 small hydro-electric stations boosted power output to thirty-eight million kilowatt hours and, it is claimed, in the first six months of 1959 power output reached a hundred million kilowatt hours and that the target for the year was revised to 184 million kilowatt hours.¹²

Under this accelerated programme, industrial production is reported to be gaining on agricultural production. The gross value of production is revealed to have increased ten times since 1949 to 5,347 million yuan in 1958, an exorbitant figure divorced from any invariable index for calculation and derived from over-enthusiastic data received, which obliged the Party leaders to reduce the 1959 total to 2,487 million yuan. In the meantime, the value of industrial production rose from 5.7 per cent. of the total value in 1952 to 20 per cent. in 1956, and to 27.7 per cent. in 1957, when it surpassed the planned amount by 5 per cent. The revised value for industrial production in 1959 was 1,058 million yuan, or 40 per cent. of the total.¹³ The original plans called for industrial production to occupy 57.5 per cent. of the total production by 1962, the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, but after what happened in 1958 and 1959, this goal may have to be postponed.

¹² As in the case of the other production figures, there is no way of ascertaining the veracity of the claims for electric power output. Saifuddin, in his article "Sinkiang's great achievements," mentioned 192 hydroelectric stations in 1957-58 and stated that more were under construction. But, according to an article in the *Chiao-shih Pao* (Peking), March 19, 1957, the Urumchi hydroelectric plant had a capacity of only 2,000 kilowatts compared with the thermo-electric station at Hungyenchih, near Urumchi, which a Urumchi dispatch published in the *JMJP*, November 9, 1958, claimed to have a capacity of 900,000 kilowatts.

¹³ Saifuddin, "Celebrate the tenth national day," and Wang En-mao, in *JMJP*, June 27, 1958. Also Shao Min-ling, "Sinkiang today," *Peking Review* 1:19 (July, 1958), 12-13.

Among the excuses offered by the Party leaders for this failure, the chief one was the shortage of skilled workers—an excuse, too, for the huge influx of Chinese into the region. At the end of 1957, the Sinkiang branch of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had a membership of 252,000 “clerks and workers,” among whom 172,000 were Chinese. Of the remaining 80,000 native members, 43,000 were industrial workers, a marked increase in two years. In spite of its protestations, the Party is, apparently, reluctant to hire too many natives for industry. It banned migration of jobless farmers into the cities to find employment in factories, as, for instance in 1957, when 20,000 farmers were told to leave Urumchi. The figure of 650,000 native workers in 1958 can be discounted since most of them were local people making iron in backyard furnaces. Chinese immigrants continued to enter Sinkiang in ever-increasing numbers. One batch in the spring of 1959 numbered 100,000. Besides the troops of the army’s labour corps who were engaged in industry, there have been persistent reports of convict labourers in roadbuilding and in the mines.

Telephone lines and highways were said to be over 6,000 miles in length by 1958. The army’s labour corps which built the 180-mile Urumchi-Kurla highway over the Tienshan Range also operates a fleet of lorries which, in 1957, carried over 40 per cent. of Sinkiang’s freight. The Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway, a vital link in Chinese Communist plans for the development of the region, reached Hami (Qomul) at the end of 1959 and was, by July 1960, within 200 miles of Urumchi. The roadbed, bridges and culverts have been built beyond Urumchi as far as Shihhotzu, but construction has been delayed by the shortage of steel rails and the problem of water on the desert stretch. A railway around the Tarim Basin to join the Lanchow-Sining-Tsaidam Railway, now under construction, is envisaged for the future.

4

All these physical changes in Sinkiang have taken place, *pari passu*, with a profound transformation of the life of the people. To further ideological indoctrination, the number of schools has been increased and, by 1960, the number of primary school students reached 957,000, comprising almost all of the children in the region.¹⁴ Sinkiang College, with an enrolment of 4,000 in 1960, will be elevated to a university in 1962. Peking opera, plays and motion pictures bearing such titles as “In the footsteps of Mao Tse-tung” are now the dramatic fare in Sinkiang theatres.

¹⁴ Kuan Ou-lo, “Sinkiang’s higher education is developing rapidly,” JMJP, July 10, 1960, in United States Joint Publications Research Service, 4013 (August 26, 1960).

A more significant example of the sinification of Sinkiang's culture is the use of Chinese as the official language and, after ten years, the native languages have come to be interspersed with Chinese political and scientific terminology. The people are told that the study of Chinese is the only way to advancement, many government offices reject documents not written in Chinese, telegrams written in Chinese are given priority, and the majority of Chinese officials disdain to learn the native tongues. A government directive of February 1960, one of the many since, 1958, decreed that, in the interest of solidarity between Sinkiang and the rest of China, Arabic and the Cyrillic alphabet, introduced from Russian Central Asia in 1956, would be replaced by the Latin letters of the Chinese orthographical system, and the Uighur and Kazakh languages, heretofore written from right to left, would be written from left to right.¹⁵

Collectivisation, too, has brought in its train a social upheaval in the countryside. Home life is gone when the people are compelled to eat in the 30,000 communal kitchens in the region and to leave their children in communal nurseries. With collective ownership of the means of production, the system of property inheritance has disappeared. Collectivisation in the pastoral areas has changed the age-old way of life of the nomadic peoples: they have become sedentary. In 1958, 600,000 Kazakhs, Khalkhas, Tajiks and other tribes were settled in co-operatives and by the end of 1959 two million nomads in Sinkiang and neighbouring regions had moved from their yurts into clay and wooden houses in the communes.¹⁶ In 1959, the Marriage Law of Communist China, heretofore considerably modified in Sinkiang, was strictly enforced with particular stress on monogamy and legal sanction for divorce. Women were required to perform more labour than before. A traveller reported that many of the wells in the Karamai oilfields were operated by women. Among the many changes in the customs of the people was the reduction of the month-long holiday during Ramadan to two days.

Meanwhile the population of the region steadily mounted. The 4.3 million native peoples in the 1953-54 census grew to 4.6 million by 1956. The multitude of Chinese, military and civilian, who poured into the region further swelled the population. By the close of 1958, the population of the region was mentioned as being six million.¹⁷ As the rural inhabitants are now herded into communes so industrialisation has spurred the growth of urban population in some localities. Following the opening

¹⁵ JMJP, February 10, 1960, in SCMP 2198.

¹⁶ NCNA, December 13, 1960, 1959 and *New York Times*, January 20, 1960.

¹⁷ Speech of Wang En-mao, SKJP, September 11, 1958, in Union Research Service XIII:15 (November 21, 1958). The rural population was still cited as 4.2 million, see SKJP, September 30, 1958, in Union Research Service, XIII:17 (November 28, 1958).

of railway traffic, the population of Hami rose to 100,000. By 1956, Urumchi, the capital of the Autonomous Region, had 210,000 residents, 50 per cent. more than in 1949. A new industrial centre at Shihhotzu has been built by the army's labour corps and, at the Karamai oilfield, a new city is rising out of the desert sand, a city which is already elevated to the rank of one of the four municipalities of Sinkiang and which by 1959 had a population of 50,000.

5

This picture of the recent developments in Sinkiang, it must be reiterated, is a highly coloured, one-sided view as seen by the Chinese Communists and as they wish it to be seen by the world. The emphasis has been on prominent, visible features and on quantity rather than quality. As the 1958-59 production record reveals, the glowing reports and impressive figures published by the Communists must be carefully scrutinised and re-examined before they can be accepted. On the obverse is the grimy, unadorned side of the picture as seen by the local residents who must endure the regimentation and the privations, the hardships and the sacrifices forcibly imposed upon them as a result of these convulsive changes. The overwhelmingly large proportion of non-Chinese peoples who are proud of their cultures and traditions and attached to their religions, who have long yearned for independence and many times have risen in revolt, and who are still stirred by the appeal of Pan-Turkism, seriously complicate the picture.

The Chinese Communists granted regional autonomy to Sinkiang as a sop to the pride of the local peoples, assuring them, as Burhan Shahidi, chairman in 1955, did, that an autonomous region had the same status as a province of China but more power. Even though the people must have had little illusion about the autonomy granted them, they were still shocked to find what the Chinese Communist definition of it really meant. The autonomous powers, as promised, included the exercise of local authority, the administration of finances and the public security forces, and the use of native languages, but they all had strings attached to them. As Saifuddin disclosed in December 1957, the people were dissatisfied with the degree of autonomy and moreover objected to the drain of money and supplies from Sinkiang. All major decisions had to be approved by Peking and the administration of local autonomy "must be inseparably linked to the Chinese Communist Party, helped by the Chinese and local Party members."¹⁸ The people were promised political equality but they had to submit to the guidance and help of the Chinese.

¹⁸ An oft-repeated statement by Saifuddin, Wang En-mao and others. Also see Hsia Fu-chen, "Marxism vs. nationalism in Sinkiang," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, April 10, 1958, in SCMP 1764.

Consequently, the bulk of the Party members and cadres in Sinkiang are Chinese. The number of cadres reached 134,000 in 1959, but native cadres comprised only half. In 1957, 5 per cent. of the native cadres held rank above the county level, comprising a third of the cadres promoted to these positions. Party membership in 1959 reached 130,000 in nearly 9,000 local branches, twice the 1956 membership, but less than half were natives.¹⁹ In the Urumchi Party committee, only nine of the twenty-three members were natives. Since the native peoples comprised nine-tenths of the population, the most persistent demands have been for the promotion of more native Party members and cadres and the assignment of more offices to them according to population ratio. In reply, Wang En-mao, regional Party first secretary and concurrently commander of the Sinkiang Military District, told them in 1958 that these demands were impossible and contrary to Party policy.

The invasion of Chinese workers has been a chief cause of resentment. The natives, whom the Communists labelled "local nationalists," charged that the Chinese ate up all the rice, held the best jobs, and left the heavy work for them to do. They refused to co-operate with the Chinese, whom they called "new exploiters" and colonists. The main target of attack is the army's labour corps which, engaged in all kinds of economic enterprises, is regarded by the natives as unfair competition. Native peasants felt that they were steadily being pushed back when they saw the combined acreage of the army's labour corps and the state farms occupying 2.6 of the 6.6 million acres of crop land. The peasants of southern Sinkiang claimed that collectivisation had reduced them to starvation. The local peoples declared that industrialisation benefited China more than Sinkiang and they criticised the "big leap" as a fanatical scheme to apply Chinese methods to local conditions. Scorning the Communist type of literature as nothing better than almanacs, they opposed the study of Chinese and sought "linguistic independence."

There were murmurings of discontent in 1956 when Saifuddin asked for the promotion of more native cadres and for more powers for the regional government to regulate its affairs. But, except for some mild admonitions against "great nation chauvinism," nothing was done. Following the Hungarian defiance of Soviet rule and the brief relaxation of control in China in 1957, the attacks on the Chinese Communist Party and Government came boldly out in the open and the chorus of anti-Chinese sentiments was echoed by many native cadres and officials in high places. They called for the expulsion of the Chinese and the Chinese Communist Party from Sinkiang, the change of the name of

¹⁹ In addition, there were, in 1959, 10,280 branches of the Young Communist League in Sinkiang with a membership of over 220,000, half of whom were natives.

Sinkiang to Eastern Turkestan or Uighurstan, and the establishment of an independent federal republic.

The Chinese Communists struck back in November and December by the wholesale arrest of "counter-revolutionaries" followed by a series of rectification campaigns, in which, in speech after speech, it was pointed out that Sinkiang was an inalienable part of China, that Sinkiang owed a deep debt of gratitude to China, that the policy of the Party was correct and unchallengeable, that the large number of Chinese in responsible positions was necessary for the collective leadership and the hordes of Chinese workers were needed for economic reconstruction, and that there must be solidarity between the natives and the Chinese people.

The real work of the conferences was the shake-up and purge of the cadres. After the first conference in December 1957, 50,000 cadres were demoted to lower levels and their pay was cut by more than 7 per cent. The six-month-long conference, ending in June 1958, resulted in the purge of five high officials holding concurrent positions in both Party and Government, including the Mayor of Urumchi. The seventy-five-day conference at Kashgar led to the dismissal of Iminov, commissioner of the administrative district and one-time regional vice-chairman. Five high officials were suspended at the September conference, including the president of the court in an autonomous district, and nine more in February 1959. Conferences of other public bodies purged many more and hundreds were condemned to corrective labour. The police and the courts were ordered to be more severe and rigorous in making arrests, persecution and convictions.²⁰

While the Communists may have raised this hue and cry about the rightists, the nationalists and the counter-revolutionaries to divert attention from the miscarriage of their economic plans, it is quite apparent that unrest and opposition is widespread in Sinkiang, and the antagonism is likely to grow as the Chinese bulldoze their way ahead. Sporadic revolts in Sinkiang were reported in the summer of 1959 during the Communist involvement in Tibet. On November 25 and 26, 1959, the *Sinkiang Jih-pao* revealed in four articles the existence of an organised

²⁰ Among the many publications on the spread of local nationalism in Sinkiang and the purge of local officials and cadres who entertained such dissident views, the more important documents are the speech by Saifuddin at the enlarged meeting of the Party committee of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region on December 16, 1957, in JMJP, December 26, 1957, speeches of Saifuddin and Wang En-mao at another enlarged meeting of the Party committee in the summer of 1958, JMJP, June 27, 1958, both in CB 512, the Decision of the Party to carry out the Rectification Campaign and the Resolution of the Sinkiang Regional Party Committee to Oppose Local Nationalism, in *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, September 11, 1958, in SCMP 1873, and speech of Saifuddin at the second session of the Second National People's Congress, NCNA, April 5, 1960, in SCMP 2238. Also SKJP dispatches of June 9, 1958, March 10 and 11, 1959, and August 22, 1959, in SCMP 1917, 1998, and 2134, and JMJP, February 14, 1958, in CB 500.

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movement led by middle-grade peasants and supported by cadres and poor peasants to wreck the commune system, and, as late as the summer of 1960, after reports of sabotage and opposition to the Government's economic policies, Saifuddin exhorted the people to carry out ruthlessly the fight against local nationalists.

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EDUCATION

The Agricultural Middle School in Communist China

By ROBERT D. BARENDSEN

WHEN the Chinese Communist régime undertook the re-examination of its educational system in the latter half of 1957 and early 1958, one of the main conclusions reached by the authorities was that the government, through its regular political subdivisions, could not afford the tremendous expenditures that would be involved in achieving its long-range educational goals. These goals included the provision of the opportunity for junior middle school (7th through 9th grade) education to all young people by 1967. The régime decided that the only realistic course to follow in pursuing its goals was to assign the major part of the task of establishing and running schools in the vast rural areas to the basic socio-economic units in those areas, mainly, in other words, to the agricultural co-operatives. Accordingly, the late winter and early spring of 1958 were marked by the announcement of the rapid establishment of great numbers of *min-pan hsüeh-hsiao*, or "schools run by the people."

At the secondary level alone, tens of thousands of these *min-pan* schools were set up within a few months. A report published in the *Chiao-shih Pao* (*Teachers' Newspaper*) on May 2, 1958, stated that more than 55,000 new middle schools of this kind had been established in nineteen provinces and had enrolled over 2½ million students. An official New China News Agency (NCNA) dispatch of June 10 said 61,000 such schools had been set up between February and May, and figures cited in mainland sources during the summer of 1958 raised the number in existence to 68,000. These schools were vocational in their orientation, concentrating on general agriculture or on related local rural specialties such as vegetable cultivation, sericulture, tea growing, and animal husbandry. In some areas the schools reportedly specialised in forestry or fishing; in others, they concentrated on training for local industries such as paper-making, ceramics, or wine-distilling.

Most numerous among the *min-pan* middle schools and the most publicised in their group are the schools which became known in the spring of 1958 as *nung-yeh chung-hsüeh*, commonly translated as "agricultural middle schools." The agricultural middle school, a

THE AGRICULTURAL MIDDLE SCHOOL

theoretically self-supporting half-time junior middle school, is not only the predominant type of *min-pan* middle school; it is also the pivotal educational undertaking in the new communes which supplanted the agricultural co-operatives in the summer and autumn of 1958. It embodies in classic form the concept of the close integration of study and productive labour stressed in the educational reforms instituted in 1958, and its success or failure will largely determine the result of the régime's efforts to extend educational opportunity into the rural areas and to surmount the cultural and economic drag of the massive semi-literate and technically unskilled peasant population. For these reasons, an understanding of the agricultural middle schools is the key to comprehension of the Chinese Communists' overall educational philosophy and policy, and to an evaluation of their prospects for success in this field.

ORIGIN, GROWTH AND SPECIAL ROLE

As is the case with the communes themselves, it is difficult for an outside observer to ascertain with assurance just when the "agricultural middle school" in its recent form first appeared on the Chinese scene. There are a few retroactive references in available materials to schools of a similar nature in existence in 1956 and 1957, but the genesis of the idea is usually credited in Chinese sources to the authorities in Kiangsu province, where the first agricultural middle schools were reportedly established in March 1958. In any case, it was apparently the particular form developed in Kiangsu province which first received the stamp of approval of the central authorities. This approval was conveyed by no less a person than Lu Ting-yi, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the Party's main spokesman on educational matters. Lu attended a conference concerning the new schools in Kiangsu in mid-March, and his favourable reaction was immediately reported in Chinese news media.¹

Pattern of growth

In the wake of Lu's action, many reports of the establishment of agricultural middle schools began to appear in a pattern typical of the early stages of the implementation of any new movement in Communist China. The pace of frenzied activity can best be traced through the record of what happened in Kiangsu, where the course of the movement is best documented. Starting from a base of two such schools in mid-March, Kiangsu was reported to have established more than 2,000 by the end of the month. By April 21, when the authoritative Central Committee journal, *People's Daily* (*Jen-min Jih-pao*), gave firm editorial

¹ Chinese Home Service broadcast, March 18, 1958.

support to the campaign, that paper stated that there were already 5,600 agricultural middle schools in Kiangsu. A Kiangsu official later gave the figure for April 1958 as "over 6,000" schools.² Meanwhile, scattered accounts indicated similar activity in other areas. Domestic radio broadcasts reported that Anhwei province had established 2,654 agricultural middle schools by early April, that 608 had been set up in the outskirts of Shanghai by early May, and that by July there were more in Szechwan than in the model province of Kiangsu.

The national rate of growth of the agricultural middle schools during the following year and a half is difficult to trace, as reports for the latter part of 1958 and early 1959 are not available in sufficient numbers to establish a clear pattern. It would appear that during the hectic several months after the mass campaign to establish communes began, in the late summer of 1958, the agricultural middle schools were revamped and adapted to the new organisational framework in rural areas. A domestic news release suggested as much when it later reported that the schools had been "comprehensively overhauled, consolidated, and improved" in the wake of the commune-isation movement.³ In the spring of 1959 there was again a flurry of publicity for these schools, tied to the first anniversary of their official founding. By the latter part of 1959 and early 1960, the situation had apparently become stabilised to the degree that the first national statistics on the schools and their enrolment could be released.

The first of the new set of statistics, which came in piecemeal in the latter half of 1959, concerned the situation on the provincial level. By April 1960 the following data on the number of agricultural middle schools and their enrolment in various areas were available from Chinese sources:

<i>Provinces, etc.</i>	<i>No. of Schools Enrolment</i>		<i>Date</i>
Liaoning	930	n.a.	Aug. 1959
Shanghai (outskirts)	220	27,000	Aug. 1959
Hopei	2,125	230,000 +	Nov. 1959
Shantung	1,380	134,000	Nov. 1959
Kwangsi Chuang	530	46,996	Nov. 1959
Autonomous Region			
Inner Mongolian	400	31,000	Jan. 1960
Autonomous Region			
Kiangsu	2,174	279,890	Apr. 1960
Szechwan	4,640	385,113	Apr. 1960
Fukien	560	41,200 +	Apr. 1960

² Ouyang Hui-lin, "Agricultural Middle Schools in their First Year," *Red Flag* (Hung Ch'i), No. 7, 1959.

³ NCNA, March 15, 1960.

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Although incomplete, the data is representative of the situation in various dissimilar parts of the country. From these figures it would appear that there was a considerable shrinkage in number of schools, in at least some areas, between the early days of the spring of 1958 and the end of 1959. The later figures for Kiangsu, which are repeated in substantial agreement in several sources, are especially interesting. Whereas the province had been reported as establishing over 6,000 agricultural middle schools in a few months in the spring of 1958, only slightly over 2,000 were mentioned in the spring of 1960. The official explanation of this difference is that during the commune movement the agricultural middle schools underwent a process of "appropriate amalgamation" during which in some cases as many as seven schools were combined into one.⁴ Although some consolidation may have been logically called for by the amalgamation of many co-operatives into one commune, it is possible that other factors, such as unrealistic over-extension or exaggerated reporting in the early stages, played a role in the cutback in numbers. It is noteworthy that the late 1959-early 1960 figures reported for the Shanghai hinterland and Szechwan province also suggest a substantial shrinkage from the 1958 accounts.

Toward the end of the period during which the partial figures reported above were being released, the régime issued the first comprehensive national figures for numbers of agricultural middle schools and their enrolment. Unfortunately, the resulting picture is not as clear as one would wish, since two very different sets of national figures were released within a month and a half. On February 2, 1960, the *People's Daily* reported that in the whole country there were "over 20,000" agricultural middle schools with 2,190,000 students. Six weeks later, the official news agency reported that there were "over 30,000" agricultural middle schools with a total enrolment of 2,960,000.⁵ A possible explanation of the discrepancy between the two figures is to be found in the fact that in the dispatch giving the larger numbers, NCNA said that the figure was for "agricultural middle schools," but added parenthetically that this included "technical schools," which it later spelled out as being "technical middle schools of forestry, animal husbandry, side-line production, and fishing." It is thus possible that the 20,000 schools represent what might be called the "general" agricultural middle schools, while the 30,000 figure includes about 10,000 "specialised" agricultural middle schools—schools whose vocational speciality is generally the predominant occupational pursuit of the rural locality but not crop-cultivation agriculture. Such a definition could still exclude the *min-pan*

⁴ Ch'en Kuang, "There is a Great Possibility for Agricultural Middle Schools," *Red Flag*, No. 9, 1959.

⁵ NCNA, March 15, 1960.

middle schools which specialise in local industrial skills such as ceramics, paper-making, and wine-distilling. And it would presumably not include any of the senior middle school level (10th through 12th grades) "specialised" (technical or vocational) schools which are a separate category in Communist China's school system, since the 2,960,000 students are specifically stated to be of *junior middle school* level. It should be noted, however, that since the release in mid-March 1960 of the 30,000 figure, it has been cited on several occasions in the mainland press as simply representing the number of "agricultural middle schools," without any qualification or indication of the inclusiveness of that term. On the other hand, the 20,000 figure seems not to have been used after March 1960. Since during the past year no new national figures have become available, the report of 30,000 schools and 2,960,000 students remains the latest and best obtainable.

It is immediately apparent that the number of agricultural middle schools averages out at roughly about one such school per commune for the entire country.⁶ The distribution throughout the country is uneven, however. The NCNA item of March 15, 1960, which gave the national figure of over 30,000 schools, stated that almost every commune had at least one agricultural middle school, and that some had as many as six or more.

Broadening educational opportunity

The March 15, 1960, NCNA report also discussed the role then being played by such schools in the effort to extend junior middle school education to a larger segment of the population. It said that the 2,960,000 students in agricultural middle schools already represented 27 per cent. of the total enrolment at junior middle level in the whole country, and that these schools were currently "doing a third to a half of the work of universalising junior middle school education." This latter phrasing was apparently a reference to the comparison between beginning enrolments in agricultural middle schools and ordinary junior middle schools. The draft economic plan for 1960, submitted to the National People's Congress in March of that year, stated that the enrolment of new students in ordinary junior middle schools in the fall of that year would be 4,000,000, while another 2,800,000 would enter "agricultural and other vocational middle schools" at the junior middle level. It should be pointed out that the 1960 figures for entering students do not suggest that the Chinese Communists were closely approaching the goal of

⁶ There were about 26,000 communes in China after the initial commune-isation movement in 1958. The figures generally quoted for later years indicate that there are now in the neighbourhood of 24,000. An average commune includes about 5,000 households.

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universalising junior middle school education at that time; data from the 1953 census would indicate, for example, that there were probably 12 to 13 million young people of thirteen years of age (the normal age for entering junior middle school) in China in 1960.

The emerging role of the agricultural middle school in expanding the opportunity for middle-school education, as seen in the spring of 1960, was a major one. For example, a Kiangsu delegate, speaking to the National People's Congress in April, reported that his province alone planned to have 1,450,000 students enrolled in agricultural middle schools by 1967. The attainment of such a level of participation on a national scope would enable the régime to approach its goal of universalising junior middle school education, since there will probably be between 40 and 50 million young people in the relevant thirteen-sixteen age bracket at that time.⁷ If the goal is to be attained, it will be reached through the agricultural middle schools, and the great majority of students at the junior middle level will be enrolled in schools of this type.

NEED FOR A NEW TYPE OF RURAL SCHOOL

With this brief survey of the role that the agricultural middle schools were playing in the total educational picture in 1960 and the importance ascribed to their future development in mind, one may pause briefly to examine in greater depth the régime's thinking as to the reasons why such schools are necessary and the main purposes the schools are expected to serve.

The need for middle schools in the countryside is clear. Lu Ting-yi, in an article in the February 1960 issue of *Jen-min Chiao-yü* (*People's Education*) acknowledged that prior to the establishment of the agricultural schools, middle-school level education had "failed to penetrate" into the rural areas. The reasons why a special type of junior middle school is deemed necessary in the rural areas are primarily economic. On the one hand, the régime feels it is unable to support an academic-type junior middle school education for the great numbers of primary school graduates now emerging in the countryside. On the other hand, it sees a great need for a vast number of young people who possess a minimal ninth grade general education and who have in addition some knowledge of modern scientific agricultural methods and the ability to handle the tools and machines to be used in the environment of a mechanised and electrified agriculture which the régime is striving to attain. The age group from thirteen to sixteen is not yet adjudged to be

⁷ Lu Ting-yi, in an open letter dated March 14, 1959, published on the first anniversary of the founding of the agricultural middle schools, said that there were then about 37,000,000 in the 13-16 age bracket. He added that only a little over 7,000,000 of these could be accommodated in ordinary full-time junior middle schools.

physically mature and capable of carrying a full load in the workaday world. Therefore, it is considered feasible and advisable to allow this group to continue its education to a point enabling it to play a more useful role in society, provided that this schooling will not involve large expenditures of public funds. A corollary of this view is that education for older rural youth at the senior middle level will generally be available only on a spare-time basis, since young people over sixteen are needed for full-time employment.⁸

The need for "junior agricultural technical personnel" in the communes is seen as being very urgent. Lu Ting-yi, in his February 1960 article in *Jen-min Chiao-yü* stated that China would need 1,840,000 agricultural machine operators and 440,000 "technical farming cadres" in order to complete the task of mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture. These are the people who will be counted upon to drive the tractors and combines, maintain the electric motors powering irrigation equipment, perform skilled tasks in local fertiliser and insecticide factories, act as surveyors, veterinary assistants, and bookkeepers, and do similar lower-lever technical work in commune farms and factories.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW SCHOOLS

Such are the purposes which the agricultural middle schools are designed to serve. But what is the nature of the new type of institution founded to meet these needs, and what kind of educational experience does it offer to the young Chinese students in rural areas?

First of all, it must be remembered that the agricultural middle school is a *part-time* school. It is thus distinguished from the other two types of educational institutions in Communist China considered from the point of view of the daily proportion of the student's time spent in classes: the ordinary junior middle school which is a *full-time* school, and the many *spare-time* (i.e., after a normal working day) schools and classes at all levels which are run by communes and factories. The agricultural middle school is often referred to in mainland sources as "half-school, half-farm," since its students normally devote half their time to classes, and the other half to productive labour, the proceeds from which are used to finance the operation of the schools.

In theory, the students in agricultural middle schools are all in the normal junior middle school age bracket—thirteen to sixteen years. In practice, however, at least in the first year or so, a considerable proportion of the students were apparently over-age. Articles in *Red Flag* by a Kiangsu official in May of 1959 and again a year later made it clear that a sizeable number of students in that model province were over

⁸ See *ibid.*, in which this line of reasoning is succinctly expressed.

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sixteen.⁹ At least in Kiangsu, the entrants were described as coming mainly from the families of the poorer peasants and hired farm labourers. It would appear from several accounts of early sceptical attitudes toward the schools¹⁰ that this description of the entrants, in the early years at least, would be more broadly applicable, since many families seem to have held out hopes of getting their offspring into the ordinary schools.

Little data is obtainable on the physical facilities available to the schools for classroom work. Early schools were apparently operated in temples, pagodas and temporarily unused buildings and rooms. The *People's Daily* of April 7, 1958, described the classrooms as having a bare minimum of furnishings, with tables and benches brought in by the students from home or borrowed temporarily from offices. An article in *Red Flag* on May 16, 1960, looking back in retrospect on the early days of the movement in Kiangsu, said that "some of the [schools] were started . . . without fixed premises. The teachers taught . . . in the open, and doors were temporarily used as blackboards with the students squatting and using their knees as desks." Items describing the situation at a later date refer in some cases to new permanent classroom buildings, but offer no details. In view of the considerably greater attention given to describing the installations available for productive labour, this leaves the impression that classroom facilities are minimal.

It is not clear from available data to what extent the students live on the school premises. Probably where housing exists, this practice is generally followed, but there are very few references to dormitories in available mainland sources on the schools. One article concerning the situation in Kiangsu in 1959 took up the question of whether or not the schools should be boarding schools, and said this point was a controversial one after a year's experience. The author stated that the living-in system had some clear advantages where facilities existed, but cautioned against large boarding institutions.¹¹

The size of agricultural middle schools seems to vary considerably. The national statistics indicate that the average enrolment is about 100 students per school, but enrolment as high as over 600 has been cited in the sources. In Kiangsu, the recommended enrolment is between 200 and 500 per school, with 300 considered an ideal number, but the reported enrolment in the spring of 1960 averaged well below 200 per institution.

Teaching staff

More important than the physical facilities in determining the total educational environment is the teaching staff. In numbers, the teaching

⁹ In the May 1, 1959, article the author noted that in one school 86 of the 303 students were over 17 at the time of their enrolment. Again, on May 16, 1960, he noted that many students were "relatively advanced in age."

¹⁰ See pp. 128-130.

¹¹ Ouyang Hui-lin, *loc. cit.*

force for agricultural middle schools is relatively small. For example, the February 2, 1960, item in the *People's Daily* which gave the national figure of over 20,000 agricultural middle schools with over 2,000,000 students said that there were 60,000 instructors in these schools—an average of less than three teachers for each three-year school and one teacher for each thirty-six students. The reported ratio for Kiangsu and Szechwan (the only areas where provincial-level figures for total teachers are available) is approximately the same as the national ratio.

Teachers are drawn from several sources. When available, graduates of ordinary senior middle schools are taken. Otherwise, the recourse is to ordinary junior middle school graduates, primary school teachers, government functionaries who have been sent to the countryside for experience in "basic-level" work, local Communist Party leaders, and even experienced peasants. The principle behind teacher recruitment is that "every knowledgeable person can teach" and that formal teaching qualifications are not necessary. As a result of this approach and the general shortage of teaching personnel throughout the country, the agricultural middle schools are staffed largely with people who, at the time of their appointment, have admittedly had neither teacher training nor teaching experience.

The nature of this group has posed persistent problems, and has necessitated special training measures which will be discussed later. The problems were apparently not overcome after two years of experience with the new schools. A report on the situation in the Szechwan schools delivered to the National People's Congress in April 1960 stated that only slightly over half of the teachers in that province had had a senior middle school level education, and that inadequate political training and lack of teaching experience were prevalent shortcomings. A speech to the same convocation by a delegate from Liaoning acknowledged that the teachers in that province's schools were "not very good," and cited the difficulties experienced by a fresh graduate of an ordinary junior middle school assigned to teach in an agricultural middle school. According to an article in *Red Flag* in May 1960, teachers in the early days of the Kiangsu schools were often poor: the author cites cases of a female teacher of agriculture who knew nothing of agricultural production, and a teacher of agricultural mechanisation who could not operate a tractor or identify parts of the machine. He claims that conditions in 1960 were much improved, and that 87 per cent. of the teachers in the province had a senior middle school or better level of education.¹²

¹² Ch'en Kuang, "The Growth of Agricultural Middle Schools," *Red Flag*, No. 10, 1960.

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Time allotments for study and labour

Such, then, is the educational environment into which a student of an agricultural middle school enters. But how does he spend his time while he is enrolled? As indicated previously, the student spends about half his time in classroom study and half in productive labour. Apparently the majority of the schools use a split day, and a minority use alternate days for study and work. Other arrangements, such as alternate-week systems and a system with study in mornings and evenings and work in between, were apparently tried and rejected because of poor academic results or the overburdening of the student.¹³ The half-day or alternate-day system is a general practice but is subject to alteration according to the farm calendar. A joint report to the National People's Congress in April 1960 by three Fukien delegates stated that the principle which governs division of time in that province was "less study during the busy farming season, more during slack farming season, occasional study during the busiest season, and all-day study on rainy days."¹⁴ A Szechwan delegate told the same meeting that the work-study schedule in his province varied from month to month and that in busy seasons teachers went to the fields to conduct brief review lessons or introduce new material. Schools in Kiangsu are reportedly in session for eleven months of the year, with either the equivalent of five months given to study and six months to labour or five months for labour and six months for study. In Hopei, on the other hand, schools are apparently in session for virtually the full twelve months, with their overall time divided equally between study and labour.

The Kiangsu schools are variously reported to spend twenty or twenty-three hours per week in classroom study, and one Anhwei school is described as having twenty-four lesson periods per week. The schools presumably operate on the six-day week basis which is the usual system for middle schools in Communist China. No weekly hours are reported for other provinces, but Szechwan schools are said to provide 900 "lesson-hours" per year, a figure which would average out to about eighteen and three-quarter hours per week for an eleven-month (forty-eight-week) year, and less for a longer school session.¹⁵

Curriculum and academic standards

The curriculum in agricultural middle schools consists of a limited number of subjects. There are four basic courses: Chinese language,

¹³ See Ouyang Hui-lin, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ Liu Yung-sheng, Cheng I-mu, and Chou Chü-chen, "Secondary Agricultural Schools Have Struck Root in Rural Areas," *Peoples' Daily*, April 16, 1960.

¹⁵ Chang Hsiu-shu, "Agricultural Middle Schools: More and More, Better and Better," *People's Daily*, April 16, 1960.

mathematics, politics, and a course in agriculture which is most commonly referred to as "basic agricultural knowledge." Language and mathematics are referred to as the two major courses in the curriculum. No specific information on the coverage of the language course is available, other than the general statement that it corresponds to that offered in ordinary junior middle schools. Since most accounts do not mention "literature" specifically, however, it is possible that the course coverage is actually narrower than the scope of the course in Chinese taught in ordinary middle schools. It is not clear whether mathematics as taught in the typical agricultural middle school in Kiangsu includes algebra and geometry; presumably it does. A spokesman from Szechwan listed these subjects as well as arithmetic in the curriculum generally in use in his province. The course on politics includes material on such subjects as important domestic and international current political topics, the programme for agricultural development, and Mao Tse-tung's political thought. The coverage of the "basic agricultural knowledge" course is not well defined in the sources, but it apparently includes such things as basic techniques of crop cultivation, irrigation methods, and fertiliser application. One source states that the teaching materials used in this course are derived from those used in ordinary junior middle school botany and zoology, and give special emphasis to the régime's "8-point charter" for agriculture (a set of guidelines regarding close planting, deep ploughing, fertilisation, etc.)¹⁶ Perhaps the best way to indicate what is included in the basic agricultural course is to note the subjects of some of the courses added to the original four in some schools. Most prominently mentioned among these is a course on agricultural machinery, indicating that this topic is not included in the basic agriculture course. Other special courses which have been added to the curriculum in some areas include animal husbandry, gardening and sericulture. It is claimed that a number of the schools teach physics and chemistry to students in the second or third year of the three-year course, but it is not clear just how widely these courses are offered.

There is unfortunately little indication of the way in which the 20-odd hours of weekly classroom work are divided among the various subjects. The writer has found only one such schedule in the available data, and it pertains to only one agricultural middle school in Anhwei. The schedule covers a class week consisting of 24 "lessons" (presumably equal to class hours), and is divided as follows¹⁷:

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Li Chien, "The Huang-k'ou Agricultural Middle School in the Past Two Years," *Red Flag*, No. 13, 1960.

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Language	6 lessons
Mathematics	6 "
Politics	2 "
Biology	3 "
Chemistry	2 "
Cotton cultivation	2 "
Animal husbandry	2 "
Physical education	1 "
Total	24

Since it is not made clear for which of the three years this plan is designed, and since it does not include a basic agriculture course as such, and does include a course in biology which is not mentioned in the other sources, it is impossible to generalise from this one example. It is probably indicative, however, of a lack of standardisation in the curriculum pattern of such schools.

What standards are achieved in the academic courses in the agricultural middle schools, and how does the record of performance of their students compare with that of students in the ordinary junior middle schools? The general claim repeated frequently in mainland press and periodical articles about the agricultural middle schools is that their students have achieved standards comparable to those of students in the ordinary junior middle schools in the "main subjects" in their curriculum. But more minute examination of the claims reveals that they are often considerably qualified so that this evaluation would apply to only some of the students (or some of the schools) in a given area. A typical example of the resulting vagueness is a statement in a joint article by three officials from Kiangsu in the November 17, 1959, issue of the *People's Daily*. Discussing the schools in Kiangsu, the article says that "the standard of *several* subjects taught in the agricultural middle schools is not lower than that taught in the regular middle schools *in general*, while results achieved by students of *a number of* agricultural middle schools are even better than those achieved by the students of regular middle schools" (emphasis added).

As for achievements in specific subjects, there are several claims of equivalence or near-equivalence to ordinary middle school standards in language and mathematics, and one or two claims of comparable performance in tests on politics; but these claims are balanced by provincial reports which convey a different impression. A Kiangsu delegate to the National People's Congress in April 1960 stated that only about half of the Kiangsu schools inspected equalled or excelled the standards of local

ordinary full-time middle schools in language and mathematics. The joint report to the same meeting by the three Fukien delegates stated that in less than one-fourth of the agricultural middle schools in Fukien did the quality of language and mathematics teaching match that in ordinary schools. Tests in three areas in Hopei reported in the *People's Daily* on August 10, 1960, showed that only 50 per cent. of the agricultural schools there had attained the standard of ordinary full-time schools in "cultural studies." It may be noted that whereas there is frequent mention of admirable standards in language and mathematics, standards in physics and chemistry are almost never specifically cited; only one instance of the claim of performance in these sciences comparable to that in ordinary schools has been encountered in the available data.

Perhaps the best evidence of actual nation-wide standards in these new schools is contained in an editorial in the *People's Daily* published March 15, 1960, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding of the schools. Although praising the schools and calling for greater numbers of them on a national scale, the editorial says that since they are half-day schools, they "should naturally be regarded as different from the ordinary full-time middle schools in the standards of such fundamental subjects as cultural and scientific subjects." The editorial adds that they "may be able to catch up" with ordinary schools in such "principal subjects" as "language, mathematics, etc." This evaluation was in line with that voiced by a Liaoning delegate to the National People's Congress the following month. He told the meeting that "generally speaking, the students of agricultural middle schools are still somewhat behind the students of full-time middle schools in book knowledge, but their knowledge of productive labour far exceeds that of the latter."¹⁸

It is clear from the available data that the agricultural middle schools in general offer a substantially watered-down course of study compared to that obtainable in the ordinary junior middle schools in Communist China. It may well be true, as claimed, that by offering only a limited number of basic courses, the schools provide as many hours of instruction in them per year as are offered in the ordinary schools. But it also is evident that the complete absence of the usual junior middle school courses in history and geography, and the indicated lower standard in physics and chemistry where these science courses are offered, would suffice to draw a clear line of distinction between graduates of these new schools and the ordinary schools.

¹⁸ Ch'e Hsiang-chen, "The Promising Future of the Agricultural Middle Schools," *People's Daily*, April 12, 1960.

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Schools at senior middle level

Although the original agricultural middle schools and still the overwhelming majority of such schools consist of a three-year course at the junior middle school level, it should be noted in passing that there has been some experimentation with the idea of establishing a continuation of such schools at the senior middle (10th through 12th grades) level. This idea was first publicised in the autumn of 1959, when it was reported that in Kiangsu province a small number of senior agricultural middle schools had been established. The first reports in late November 1959 indicated that fifty such schools with an enrolment of 1,300 students were in existence. The figures released in April 1960 stated that of Kiangsu's 2,174 agricultural middle schools with an enrolment of 279,890 students, 51 were on the senior middle level and enrolled 4,930 students. Thus the proportion of schools and students at senior level was but a minor fraction of the total. An NCNA English-language news release of March 5, 1960, stated that "a number of" senior-level schools had been set up in Kiangsu, Hopei, and "a few other provinces," but no further details on their establishment outside of Kiangsu have been released.

Reasons cited in Kiangsu for the extension of the agricultural middle school system included the claimed successful results of the junior-middle level schools, and the need for more "intermediate-level" technical personnel in the communes. Also mentioned was the desire for further educational opportunities on the part of students in the junior level agricultural schools and graduates of the ordinary junior middle schools who were unable to gain entrance into the limited number of ordinary senior middle schools. The curriculum in the senior-level schools is not given in detail in the sources, but an item in the *People's Daily* on November 27, 1959 indicated that physics and chemistry were definitely being taught and that the mathematics courses included algebra and geometry. A second item in the same issue of the paper said that botany and planting and crop cultivation techniques were being taught in the senior schools. A speech to the National People's Congress by a Kiangsu delegate in April 1960 stated that 30 per cent. of the students in senior-level schools should concentrate on "basic lessons" and be trained to be teachers, while the other 70 per cent. should concentrate on "professional lessons" to prepare to take their places as technical and management cadres in the communes.

The relationship between the new part-time senior-level agricultural middle schools and the full-time technical senior middle schools which specialise in agriculture has not been made clear. Presumably the graduates of the senior-level agricultural middle schools would have qualifications higher than those of junior part-time agricultural school

graduates, but lower than those of senior full-time agricultural technical school graduates.

The development of the senior agricultural middle schools will probably remain quite limited. Lu Ting-yi, the Party educational spokesman, gave the existing ones qualified endorsement in his *Jen-min Chiao-yü* article in February 1960, but added pointedly that "it is impossible to set up many half-day senior middle schools at present." A Kiangsu education official was even more specific when he wrote in the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* on July 27, 1960 that "present economic conditions do not permit more half-day session senior middle schools to be built." It would appear that the régime's basic policy that the vast majority of the physically mature youths over sixteen years of age must further their education in spare-time study after a full working day will preclude any rapid development of senior agricultural middle schools in the next few years.

Productive labour activities

The foregoing material has provided a brief outline of the way in which the student in an agricultural middle school spends that half of his time which is devoted to classroom study. It now remains to consider his use of the other half of his time—that devoted to productive labour. The picture derived from numerous accounts indicates that the student's labour is performed in a variety of enterprises in "production bases" made available to the schools through the local communes. The production bases are of two kinds: agricultural and industrial. Schools have their own crop farms, a part of which are experimental plots. They also often have livestock and poultry farms, orchards and tree nurseries. In some cases they have vegetable gardens, tea plantations, aviaries and stocked fish ponds. The factories run by the schools are generally small, many of them in the nature of handicraft workshops. The two most commonly mentioned types of small plants are those producing local types of fertiliser (both chemical and bacterial) and insecticides. Other shops engage in the processing of economic crops such as soy beans. The *People's Daily* of March 16, 1960, stated that the principal undertakings of productive enterprises run by the schools should be cultivating of high-yield economic crops and making handicraft products of the types produced by rural people as sideline occupations.

There are no national figures available for acreage of farmland cultivated or workshops operated by agricultural middle schools. However, provincial-level figures for three provinces have been reported. In Kiangsu, the 2,174 schools were said to be cultivating 115,400 *mou* (a *mou* equals about one-sixth of an acre) and operating 1,446 handicraft workshops and factories in April 1960. In Fukien at the same time, 560

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schools were tilling 16,500 *mou* and running 330 "factories and farms." In August 1959, 930 schools in Liaoning were cultivating 4,532 *mou* and operating 1,016 factories. These figures indicate a rather wide variance in the scope of productive enterprises in the three areas, and suggest that in many schools the students are confined to agricultural labour or work in enterprises that are not run directly by the schools.

The production plans of the schools are incorporated into the overall plan of the commune and the commune assists the schools in obtaining draft animals and large agricultural tools, with arrangements for the supply of raw materials for the workshops, and with the marketing of products. Division of labour within the schools is reportedly based on age and sex, with the older students specialising in agricultural labour and the younger ones in handicraft production. The boys are commonly assigned to heavier work, and the girls undertake lighter tasks such as feeding animals and poultry.

There is little information available on the type and volume of products produced by the school workshops. One account of a school in Anhwei reported that it had manufactured 98 kinds of insecticides and 177 different kinds of chemical and bacterial fertilisers, and that over a period of two years it had produced 5,100,000 catties (a catty is slightly heavier than a pound) of insecticides and 37,000,000 catties of fertiliser for market.¹⁹

Part of the staff of the school is charged with the special responsibility for supervising productive work. For example, one Kiangsu school with 303 students was reported in the spring of 1959 to have seven "experienced peasants" and "technical workers" in charge of production, in addition to the eleven teachers on its staff.

Degree of financial self-sufficiency

A description of the productive enterprises of the agricultural middle schools leads logically into a discussion of their finances, since the schools are designed to be virtually self-sufficient through their own production activities. The proudest boast concerning these schools has to do with the economy of their operation.

In discussing the economic advantages of the agricultural middle schools, the régime has released some interesting figures on the comparative costs, to the state and to the student's family, of educating a youth in agricultural middle schools and ordinary junior middle schools. The figures used in the discussion are based on statistics collected in the model province of Kiangsu. Three somewhat different versions of these figures are available in the data, but perhaps the most authoritative is

¹⁹ Li Chien, *loc. cit.*

the one included in a detailed report to the National People's Congress in April 1960 by a Kiangsu delegate. The figures, on a per student per year basis, are as follows ²⁰:

	<i>Cost to State</i>	<i>Cost to Family</i>
Ordinary junior middle school	187 yuan	108 yuan
Agricultural middle school	13 "	38 "

The figure for the cost to the state of ordinary middle school study is roughly confirmed by another source, which reports that it costs the state about 500 yuan to put a junior middle school student through his three-year course.²¹

It is not completely clear what is meant by "cost to the state" in the case of agricultural middle schools. Presumably this expense is actually charged to the communes, but it is possible that the provincial or lower-level governmental subdivisions still play a small role directly in the financing of the schools. In any case, it is apparent that the cost of running the agricultural schools borne by the authorities is but a small fraction of the cost of supporting ordinary junior middle schools. The reduction in the financial burden on parents is not so great, but is still equal to two-thirds of the expense of supporting a student in the ordinary schools.

The initial cost of establishing the schools, such as making available school buildings and farm land, is usually borne by the communes out of their welfare fund. From that point on the school is expected to strive as quickly as possible to earn enough to pay its teachers' salaries and its students' tuition, to provide operational funds, and to supply the students with food, books and other needed school supplies.

The extent to which self-sufficiency has actually been achieved by these schools is difficult to determine. There are glowing accounts of individual schools or groups of schools which have paid all their expenses and returned a profit to the communes, and there are frequent statements that "many" agricultural schools are "wholly or partially" self-supporting. But few hard statistics have been released, and those which have become available indicate that the goal of self-sufficiency has proven to be elusive. The case of Kiangsu is again illustrative. In May 1959, after one year's experience with these schools, a Kiangsu official wrote in *Red Flag* that all the agricultural middle schools in his province should be entirely self-sufficient within two years—i.e., by the spring of 1961. About a year later, in July 1960, an enthusiastic NCNA release stated

²⁰ Kuan Wen-hui, "Agricultural Middle Schools in Kiangsu," NCNA, April 7, 1960. The other two versions of these figures differ mainly in the cost to the state of the agricultural middle schools, which is variously cited as 10 and 18-20 yuan.

²¹ Ch'eng Cho-ju, Sun Shui-kuan, and Hsü Wen, "Hail the Success of Agricultural Middle Schools in Kiangsu Province," *People's Daily*, November 27, 1959.

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flatly that most of the schools in Kiangsu were already able to cover all their expenditures. But Kiangsu delegate Kuan Wen-hui's speech to the National People's Congress a few months earlier suggests that this report was premature. This speech (in April 1960) stated that at that time only 19 per cent. of the Kiangsu schools were "wholly self-supporting," another 18.6 per cent. were "to a large extent self-supporting," and 31.8 per cent. were "partly self-supporting." The implication left was that the remaining 30.6 per cent. were still wholly dependent on outside sources. In the same speech it was reported that the plan now called upon the schools in Kiangsu to "strive for self-support, partly or wholly," within "two years or a little longer," indicating that full independence was not seen as attainable before 1962 or later.

Reports concerning Fukien in the spring of 1960 suggest a similar situation. Of the 560 agricultural middle schools there, 55 were reported to be able to pay their teachers' salaries fully, and another 61 to be self-sufficient in food. Individual cases of schools which had paid for teachers' wages, food and other expenses were cited, but the impression conveyed was that only a relatively small minority of the schools were able to pay the major part of their expenses.²²

The best available example of the way in which a typical agricultural middle school seeks to balance its budget is given in an article in *Red Flag* on May 1, 1959. It concerns a school in Kiangsu, and presents the school's balance-sheet of receipts and expenditures in 1958 as follows ²³:

Receipts:

<i>Source</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Agricultural products	13,824.40 yuan
Silkworm rearing	400.00
Wool	76.00
Pig rearing	280.00
Rabbit rearing	11.00
Mfg. of straw ropes	25.00
Mfg. of rush mats	300.00
Mfg. of fertiliser and insecticides	1,100.00

Total 16,016.40 yuan

Expenditures: [not broken down] 18,792.00 yuan

For 1959, the same school planned to attain complete self-sufficiency by earning a total of 30,890 yuan through cultivating 135 *mou* of wheat,

²² Liu Yung-sheng, Cheng I-mu, and Chou Chü-chen, *loc. cit.*

²³ Ch'en Kuang, "There is a Great Possibility for Agricultural Middle Schools," *loc. cit.*

121 *mou* of paddy rice, and 5 *mou* of soya beans, and by growing vegetables and ramie, raising pigs, sheep, chickens, and fish, and making rush mats.²⁴ Expenses contemplated for 1959 were as follows:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Yearly boarding charges (calculated at 6 yuan per capita per month)	22,608 yuan
Wages and salaries of teachers and staff	5,160
School operating expenses	1,100
Books and stationery	1,212
Total	30,080 yuan

Research and experimental work

In addition to producing goods for market to achieve self-sufficiency, the agricultural middle schools, like all middle schools and colleges in Communist China, are supposed to give substance to the tripartite combination of learning, labour and research by engaging in various types of experimental work. The schools are generally reported to be devoting at least a part of their agricultural acreage to experimental plots, and there are numerous reports of their achievements in attaining high yields. A number of schools are reported to conduct experimental work in meteorology (weather forecasting) and water conservancy. Some schools apparently also do research on fertiliser, insecticides and soil analysis, and their students design (as well as trial manufacture) new types of farm implements and machinery. In regard to this latter category of investigation, one report stated that senior students in Kiangsu agricultural middle schools had "created" ten kinds of modern agricultural tools, including a mowing machine, a fodder mixing appliance, an insecticide sprinkler, and rice and wheat threshing machines.²⁵ As has been noted previously, another account stated that students in one school in Anhwei had trial-manufactured 98 different kinds of insecticides and 177 kinds of chemical and bacterial fertilisers.

This kind of activity is considered to be very important. After two years of experience with the schools, the régime emphasised their role as "strongholds for scientific research for the people's communes" and exhorted them to do more in this field.²⁶ In carrying out experimental work, the schools are urged to focus on problems confronted in current production, and to seek solutions through native methods appropriate to local conditions.

²⁴ The breakdown of income among these several sources was not given.

²⁵ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 23, 1960.

²⁶ *People's Daily* commentary, May 18, 1960.

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Communist Party Leadership

The importance attached to the agricultural middle schools is apparent in the particularly intimate role which Communist Party functionaries play in the daily life of the schools. From the days of their inception, reports from all areas have stressed that the secretaries of the Party Committees in the communes commonly act as heads of the schools. They or other high-ranking local Party functionaries usually are reported to teach the political courses. An unsigned article in the *People's Daily* on February 2, 1960, stated that throughout the country Party Committees at all levels actively supported the schools, included discussions of their work on the agenda of their daily meetings, and inspected them regularly. An editorial in the same paper on March 16, 1960, emphasised strengthened leadership by commune Party Committees as the basic guarantee of the success of the schools, and stressed the familiar dictum that "politics must be in command" and the ideological and political consciousness of both students and teachers must be brought to a high level. Due attention is paid to the fostering of membership in the Young Pioneers and Communist Youth League (for students) and the Communist Party (for teachers).

THE FIRST GRADUATES

Earlier in this article the origin and growth of the agricultural middle schools has been traced and the régime's thinking concerning the reasons and purposes behind their establishment has been examined. This has been followed by a detailed description of the schools and the way they function. Before going on to discuss in summary fashion the advantages seen by the régime in this type of school as compared with the acknowledged problems and criticisms which their launching has engendered, it may be useful to take a close look at the first graduates of these new institutions in order to see what knowledge they are actually claimed to have acquired and to ascertain what plans the régime has for them.

Inasmuch as most of the three-year agricultural middle schools are considered to have been established since the beginning of 1958, it came as something of a surprise to outside observers that a number of graduates of these schools emerged in the summer of 1960. This development seems, incidentally, not to have been expected by even so eminent a personage as Lu Ting-yi, for the Party spokesman stated flatly in his February 1960 article in *Jen-min Chiao-yü* that the first graduates would come out "next year"—i.e., in 1961. Nevertheless, less than a month later articles began appearing with the news that there would be graduates in the summer of 1960. The first of these articles to become available, published in the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* on March 12, stated that about

one-fourth of the students who had entered the third year of the course in one school would be graduated the following summer. It added that the early graduates had been "transferred [into the schools] from a supplementary class," thus suggesting that some of the students may have gained advanced standing through spare-time study before their entry into the agricultural schools. Another possibility would be that students had actually been transferred with advanced standing from ordinary junior middle schools.

Kiangsu was not to be allowed an unchallenged claim to the first graduates, however. A speech to the National People's Congress in April by a Szechwan delegate asserted that a school in his province had turned out 34 graduates in 1959, and an article in *Red Flag* later in the year (July 1, 1960) claimed that in 1959 one school in Anhwei had graduated 298 "students with excellent records" ahead of time, to meet the needs of the commune.

Despite these early suspiciously competitive-sounding claims—reminiscent of the earlier apparent competition for the credit for establishing the first agricultural middle school—the main cluster of publicity concerning the "first" graduates came in the late summer of 1960. Between late July and early September scattered accounts revealed that about 50,000 graduates of the schools were turned out that summer in six provinces. Once again Kiangsu came out second best, since Hopei province was reported to have graduated over 37,000 who were said to have studied for three years, while Kiangsu's 6,000-plus graduates were said to have been in school for only 2½ years.²⁷

In the fanfare surrounding the emergence of the first sizeable numbers of graduates, their accomplishments were highly praised. The *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, for example, speaking of the Kiangsu graduates on July 23, 1960, said:

The half-farming and half-study agricultural middle schools have produced rich fruits. The rural people's communes now begin to have a research force of new-style intellectual and technical cadres trained by themselves. This is a great victory of the thought of Mao Tse-tung and a great victory of the Party's educational programme.

The skills acquired by the new graduates were enumerated in detail. A *People's Daily* commentary of August 10 affirmed that "most" of the graduates had learned how to cultivate farm crops and raise animals, that some of them had learned how to make native-type fertilisers and insecticides and to repair farm implements, and that some had mastered the basic techniques of operating electric motors, diesel engines, lathes, and other machine tools. The article on Hopei's 37,000 graduates in

²⁷ See a group of four items in the *People's Daily*, August 10, 1960.

the same issue of the paper reported that 8,000 of them had learned to drive tractors, 12,000 had learned to operate machines used in irrigation and drainage work, and "quite a few" had learned to make and repair machines, to make soil surveys and plans for water conservancy. Shensi graduates were generally reported to be able to cultivate various crops, control plant diseases and insect pests, irrigate fields, feed and care for domestic animals and fowl, operate agricultural machines, do farm accounting, and make fertilisers and insecticides; "many" among them had learned how to operate special ploughs and weeding and sowing machines. Data on Kiangsu cited the example of one school where all the graduates had learned to cultivate major crops and raise animals, and just under one-third of them had learned either to make native chemical fertiliser and insecticides or to repair farm tools; another group of slightly under one-third of the total had learned such things as weaving, sugar making, and wine brewing, while "some" (apparently a still smaller group) had grasped the main techniques of operating motor-driven machinery.²⁸ It would appear from these accounts that not all graduates emerged from the schools with the same skills, as a result of either specialisation within the school or differentiation on the basis of ability.

The question of the assignments of these graduates was discussed in the same articles. As expected, the principle was firmly stated that most of the graduates would remain in the rural areas and go to work in the communes. The authoritative *People's Daily* commentary on the graduates said nothing about any of them going on to further study, stating merely that "they will stay in the rural areas to work, as required by the people's communes." The *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* article concerning Kiangsu asserted that 80 per cent. of the graduates in that province would stay in the communes, and the remainder would go on to higher studies. Other reports simply stated that most graduates would take up work assignments, with a small number going on to school.

Graduates were assigned to the communes to work as tractor drivers and mechanics, bookkeepers, workers in weather stations and agricultural experimentation centres, teachers in *min-pan* primary schools, and as holders of a variety of "technical" positions in agricultural machinery, fertiliser and insecticide plants. Some of them were assigned to take further short-term training in such specialities as agricultural technical work, accountancy, chemistry, health work, pedagogy and meteorology before undertaking their jobs.

²⁸ For these details, see the *People's Daily*, August 10, 1960, and *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 23, 1960.

CLAIMED ADVANTAGES AND ACKNOWLEDGED PROBLEMS

Most of the advantages seen by the régime in the institution of the agricultural middle schools have been mentioned in passing earlier in this article. To summarise briefly, the Chinese Communist leadership views these schools as a means to satisfy growing popular demands for post-primary education. It also sees them as a way to train large numbers of rural youths to serve the communes in a variety of lower-level technical and administrative jobs requiring a rudimentary form of junior middle school education plus vocational training in crop-cultivation agriculture and other related rural occupations. It evaluates the form of the schools highly because they are at least potentially able to be self-supporting. They are also able to function with fewer teachers than ordinary middle schools and to utilise local sources of teaching personnel. It is also claimed that the integral combination of education and labour in these half-day schools provides the student with an ideal environment in which to see more clearly the relationship between theory and practice and, through opportunities to apply his learning directly and immediately to practical work, to digest and better understand the things he is taught in class. The research and experimental work performed by the schools is considered to be especially valuable because it is closely geared to current local problems and its results are directly popularised among the local rural people through the students who live and work among them.

One final advantage of the schools is seen in the political sphere. The student body is given political instruction and is then used as an organised young activist group in the furtherance of the various centrally inspired mass movements through which policy is implemented in Communist China. One account, for example, notes that because of their active role in the campaign to establish the communes in 1958, the Kiangsu schools "were praised as 'political propaganda stations,' while their students were called 'propagandists'."²⁰

Although the agricultural middle schools are highly praised and their allegedly great advantages have been frequently cited in the available mainland sources, these same sources also make it clear that the establishment of the schools has elicited criticism from some quarters and has resulted in a number of admittedly difficult problems. Among the difficulties mentioned as encountered by the new schools in their early days were shortages of competent teachers, lack of needed school facilities and equipment, shortages of funds, inadequate provision of production facilities, and poor organisation of arrangements for the division of time between study and labour. As a result of these problems, there was apparently considerable early scepticism about these schools on the

²⁰ Ch'eng Cho-ju, Sun Shui-kuan, and Hsü Wen, *loc. cit.*

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part of the masses and some cadres, and these doubts were reflected in low enrolments and, in some cases at least, a serious rate of drop-outs.

As early as July 12, 1958, a few months after the big push to establish such schools began, a domestic radio broadcast reported that some people were saying that the quality of the schools was low, that there were no good instructors in them, and that they were not welcomed by the masses. A Kiangsu official, writing later about the early days of the schools, stated that some people showed a "negative attitude" towards them, asking: "What would be the use for farmers to learn farming?" He added that others predicted that the schools would be failures from beginning to end. The official himself admitted that in the early stages the schools were "inadequate and inferior" in relation to the ordinary middle schools in regard to both facilities and teaching quality.³⁰ An article in the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* on August 14, 1959, stated that after a careful "propaganda campaign," that year's graduates of primary schools in one Kiangsu area were saying that they would "cheerfully apply" to get into the agricultural middle schools if they failed in entrance exams for the ordinary full-time schools—a clear indication that the agricultural schools were considered to be second-rate.

Further criticisms of the early days were belatedly acknowledged in the spring of 1960. An NCNA dispatch of March 15 revealed that some critics had complained that the schools were "supposed to be institutions of education and production but are in fact neither." A Szechwan delegate to the National People's Congress reported in April that ideological problems had been prevalent among both teachers and students. This situation was later reflected in an article in *Red Flag* on July 1, 1960, which stated that at first "the hearts of the teachers and students were not in the school." The author illustrated the point by saying that after early results in one Anhwei commune's school turned out to be "poor," 16 students of an original 80 dropped out in less than half a month and there were "grumbings" among the masses. A Liaoning delegate to the 1960 People's Congress told the meeting that "those obsessed with the capitalist class view of education" said, when the schools were first set up, that since the teachers had not finished senior middle school and the schools were run by the masses, they could not be run well and would not last very long. Perhaps the sharpest early criticism was that reported by Ch'en Kuang in an article in the May 16, 1960, issue of *Red Flag*. The Kiangsu official said that at the beginning "persons with bourgeois viewpoints" derided the agricultural middle school and "called it a school for beggars." He acknowledged that some parents were unwilling to have their children attend.

³⁰ Ch'en Kuang, "There is a Great Possibility for Agricultural Middle Schools," *loc. cit.*

Apparently the children and their parents were not the only ones who took a dim view of the schools in their early stages. An article in *Red Flag* on April 1, 1959, chastised those cadres who were running the schools "like a spare-time and temporary school." A year later a Kiangsu delegate to the People's Congress criticised "a small number of lower-level cadres" who had felt that attendance at the schools took too much time away from production: "They intended to turn agricultural middle schools into spare-time schools, and . . . would consider these schools as production shock teams."³¹

The majority of the above-mentioned acknowledged criticisms, it will be noted, were publicised only belatedly, and their revelation was customarily accompanied by assertions that the problems which elicited the complaints had been overcome. But some authoritative items in the mainland press published as late as the spring of 1960 indicated that the new schools were not yet accepted as completely successful at that time. For example, an unsigned article in the *People's Daily* on February 2, 1960, made the distinctly qualified evaluation that the agricultural middle schools "have now begun to shape up" and "have fulfilled fairly well their teaching and productive labour plans." An editorial in the same central Party journal on March 16, although calling for more of the schools throughout the nation, admitted that "not everybody is clearly aware of the great significance of the agricultural middle schools. Some say that the agricultural middle schools do not look like schools."

Probably the most persistent single problem faced by the régime in attempting to consolidate the schools has been the recruiting of sufficient teachers with adequate preparation. The existence of this problem is not surprising, since there is abundant evidence of a chronic shortage of qualified teachers in the schools at all levels in Communist China.³² But the frequent references to the problem and accounts of a variety of stop-gap measures taken to deal with it show that it is particularly serious in the agricultural middle schools. Reference has been made earlier in this article to the calibre of teaching personnel and their level of qualifications. The problem arising out of the recruitment of such people was recognised by the régime. A Kiangsu official, writing in *Red Flag* on May 16, 1960, stated that at the beginning, when the agricultural schools had no full-time teachers and therefore borrowed instructors from the ordinary schools, the policy question arose as to whether it was better to train teachers first, or to set up the schools first. It was decided to establish the schools, obtain a staff, and then train it. This training

³¹ Kuan Wen-hui, "Agricultural Middle Schools in Kiangsu," NCNA, April 7, 1960.

³² In this connection, see Theodore H. E. Chen, *Teacher Training in Communist China*, Studies in Comparative Education series, OE-14058 (Washington: U.S. Office of Education, December 1960).

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was given through correspondence courses, short-term special vacation courses organised by normal schools and normal colleges, and in some cases by sending outstanding teachers to attend normal schools. The aid of teachers in the ordinary schools was solicited, and teachers in the agricultural schools visited their classes and learned from them.

There is evidence that not all the teachers were happy with their assignments. Acknowledged "ideological problems" affecting the teachers in Szechwan have already been mentioned. A similar problem was also faced in Kiangsu, where many of the teachers, most of whom were originally from the city, were admitted to have at first disliked the countryside and their appointed tasks there. Their views were reported to have changed as a result of political indoctrination and their salutary experience with labour.³³

The régime encountered one new problem only in the summer of 1960, when the first sizeable contingent of graduates emerged from the agricultural middle schools. This was the disgruntlement of graduates upon learning that they would not be allowed to continue their schooling. The Director of Education in the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee acknowledged in an article in the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* on July 27 that he himself had received a number of letters from "graduates who expressed unwillingness to obey the unified assignments of communes and demanded higher education. Some even expressed reluctance to stay in the countryside and take part in agricultural production." He added that the reasons for going to work in the countryside "are not adequately understood by all graduates. . . . Not a few of them are unable to adjust their thoughts." The Director's answer was to address a stern lecture to the recalcitrant students, telling them that if they were unwilling to take part in labour, it was because they were subject to the "extremely harmful" influence of "bourgeois ideas." He also called upon all the authorities concerned to conduct "penetrating ideological education" among the graduates to explain the necessity for the assignments to jobs.³⁴ The duty to devote themselves to rural work was also stressed in the commentary accompanying the several reports hailing the graduates published in the *People's Daily* on August 10, 1960.

STATUS OF THE SCHOOLS IN 1961

Despite these problems, the agricultural middle schools were hailed by the régime throughout the first two years of their existence as a highly valuable new educational development. When Lu Ting-yi wrote his

³³ Ch'en Kuang, "The Growth of Agricultural Middle Schools," *loc. cit.*

³⁴ Ouyang Hui-lin, "Obey Assignments by the Commune, Be Content with Staying in the Country, and Work for the Development of Agricultural Production," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, July 27, 1960.

authoritative and widely cited article on the educational reforms of 1958 in the September 1, 1958, issue of *Red Flag*, he said:

Two measures taken at the end of last year and early this year stimulated the advance in education. One was to apply in all schools the principle of diligent work combined with thrifty study [*i.e.*, the combination of education and labour]. The other was the opening of agricultural middle schools. (Emphasis added.)

On the occasion of the first and second anniversaries of the founding of the schools, in the spring of 1959 and 1960, Lu again lent his prestige to them by writing commemorative pieces.

Lu's important endorsement of the schools was seconded by enthusiastic articles in authoritative newspapers and magazines during the same two-year period, as has been noted. There was a significant clustering of publicity for the agricultural middle schools around the March anniversary date in 1959 and 1960, but other items appeared from time to time throughout the period. At the time of the second anniversary of the founding of the schools, in March 1960, the *People's Daily* forcefully repeated its earlier endorsement of them and called for the opening of such schools "at once" in all areas where they did not yet exist. It described the setting up of new agricultural middle schools and the strengthening of the old ones as an "urgent task" in rural educational work.³⁵ This strong approval voiced by the central Party journal was reflected a few months later in the summer of 1960, when the emergence of the first agricultural middle school graduates was greeted with a fanfare of publicity.

Thus as late as the summer of 1960 there was every indication that the schools had established themselves as an important and highly regarded new feature of the educational system and as the object of continuing favourable comment in mainland media. With the onset of the fall of 1960, however, news of the agricultural middle schools seems to have virtually disappeared from Communist Chinese sources. Throughout the fall and into the spring of 1961 there was no indication in available materials that these new institutions were discussed at any appreciable length in the mass media. Up until March 1961 the absence of such accounts was not particularly noteworthy, as gaps of several months had occurred between earlier flurries of publicity on the subject. But when the third anniversary of the officially celebrated founding of the schools passed in March 1961 apparently without notice, the contrast with earlier anniversaries was rather striking.

There seems to be no particular reason why the third anniversary should have passed unobserved while the earlier two were made the

³⁵ *People's Daily* editorial, March 16, 1960.

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occasion for considerable publicity featured by comment at authoritative levels. In fact, there was reason to believe, from an earlier high-level statement on the pace with which the schools could be expected to develop, that the third anniversary should have been an especially auspicious one. In the course of endorsing the schools on the occasion of their founding in Kiangsu in March 1958, Lu Ting-yi had predicted that it would take three years to work out their problems and consolidate them.

The conspicuous drop-off in publicity for the schools during the last quarter of 1960 and the first quarter of 1961 raises inevitably some question as to their current status. There is no indication as yet that the schools have been abandoned. As a matter of fact, their continued existence was apparently confirmed in an editorial in the *People's Daily* published on February 28, 1961. This editorial was directed toward the problem of the shortage of personnel capable of handling tractors, irrigation equipment, and other agricultural machines. It mentioned in passing that the opening of numerous agricultural middle schools had been one factor in the training of operators of tractors and other agricultural machines, and it called upon all such schools to set up courses enabling their students to master the skills involved. But the editorial placed no particular stress on the role of the agricultural middle schools in training such personnel, and appeared to take the position that the development of the needed skills was a complicated matter that required more attention than was being given it. In calling upon the agricultural schools to set up effective courses to achieve these goals, it also implied that such courses were not yet generally in operation. This implication was somewhat curious, in view of the fact that the ability to handle tractors and other agricultural machines had been previously reported as one of the main attributes of agricultural middle school graduates. Thus the net effect of the editorial, viewed in retrospect, is to suggest that the esteem in which the agricultural middle schools were held by the régime may have suffered somewhat during late 1960 and early 1961. This in turn might be part of the explanation for the marked decline in publicity for the schools during the same period.

Another possible explanation may be found in the nature of conditions prevailing in the rural areas during the fall of 1960 and early 1961. These months have been marked by the continuation of an acknowledged agricultural crisis which has led the régime to take drastic measures to reinforce the manpower available on the agricultural front. Accounts in the mainland press, for example, have reported that several million people were moved from cities to the countryside in late 1960 and early 1961 to augment the supply of farm labour. It is unlikely that the régime

would take such drastic measures until all resources already available on the scene had been utilised. The temporary closing down of schools in such an emergency would not be unprecedented in Communist China. And the agricultural middle schools in particular were designed to adjust their classwork to the necessity for more labour in the "busy agricultural season." All evidence indicates that the period from the fall of 1960 to the spring of 1961 was virtually one continuous "busy season" in the rural areas of Communist China. Thus it is not inconceivable that the operation of the agricultural middle schools has been drastically curtailed or that some of them have even been temporarily suspended during this critical period. Such a situation would serve to explain the absence of publicity for the schools in the spring of 1961.

There is much at stake for the régime in the fate of these new-style institutions which embody their basic educational principles in a striking form. For this reason it is probable that, even if they have been forced to cut back their operations during a period of serious crisis, these schools will be revived, perhaps in a somewhat modified form, once the emergency has passed. To abandon them at this juncture would be to abandon one of the fundamental instrumentalities through which the Chinese Communists hope to achieve their goals in both education and production.

*Higher Education: Some Problems of Selection and Enrolment*¹

By JOSEPH C. KUN

AN energetic new intellectual élite is being moulded in Communist China's rapidly growing network of higher educational institutions. Some time from now members of this "new class" are expected to replace the distrusted old-style intellectual. Each year an increasing number of young men and women enter colleges and universities and, emerging four or five years later, take up responsible positions of leadership in the country's economic and intellectual life. Many phases in the training of the present-day Chinese student are still little known to us. Who are, after all, these new students in China's new universities? On what basis are they selected? Who does the selection and how? And, last but not least: why is selection necessary? In the following pages we shall attempt to find answers to some of these questions.

The basic idea of higher education in Communist China has been to ensure that every branch of the national economy, every aspect of the society's life would be supplied with sufficient numbers of high-level personnel. There is an enormous demand for doctors, teachers, agricultural specialists and most of all engineers who can lead the process of socialist transformation. In order to satisfy this demand of the planned economic system and under the strong influence of the Soviet educational practice, the government set up a planned, centrally organised and controlled system of higher education. At the same time the desire to overcome the difficulties that originated from the existing inequalities between the number of young people seeking higher education and the number of vacancies to be filled, the applicants' choices and the demands of the national economy, the location of the student supply and the location of the demand (*i.e.*, the higher educational institutions), resulted in the introduction of a thoroughly centralised, planned system of selection and enrolment work.

Naturally, similar problems also exist in countries other than China. Under democratic conditions solutions are likely to be sought in the principle of free choice: freedom on the part of a university to select (or for that matter reject) any student, and equal freedom on the part of the

¹ This article is based on a longer study, "Selection and Enrolment of New Students in Higher Educational Institutions of Communist China," which is being published by the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

student to choose the institutions he wishes to enter. In Communist countries the free enterprise element had been eliminated and together with it went, among other things, the right of free selection for both parties. Selection and enrolment of students is usually directed, and in some cases practised, by a government agency of some kind (e.g., the Ministry of Education or Higher Education). Even within the Communist bloc, however, there are certain differences in the way the work is carried out as well as in the degree of government participation. Throughout this article an attempt will be made to point out some differences between the Soviet and Chinese ways of handling student selection and enrolment if they are thought to be of more than passing importance.

ORGANISATION OF THE SELECTION

Before 1958 the most important single feature of selection and enrolment work was its extreme centralisation and planning. In order to ensure efficiency in implementation the government devised and set up a network of "enrolment committees" on the various levels of the state administrative system, and carried out every phase of the work through these agencies.

On the national level a National Enrolment Committee (NEC) was set up in 1952 which provided centralised leadership for similar committees on lower levels and co-ordinated their work. Each year the NEC, in agreement with the national economic plan, determined the number of new students to be admitted to higher educational institutions all over the country and drew up an overall plan for their distribution among the various administrative areas, provinces and even individual institutions. In annual "Enrolment Regulations" it prescribed both the general principles and organisation of the selection and enrolment work.² These regulations determined the days when entrance examinations were to be given, the subjects in which the candidates would be examined, the places where examinations would be held, and numerous other details, from the medical examination of the candidates to the availability of travel allowances for certain applicants.

Implementation of the work was entrusted to the provincial enrolment committees under the supervision of the provincial educational authorities. The role of higher educational institutions, on the other hand, was limited to sending their representatives to participate in the work of the provincial enrolment committees, and to handle phases of the selection and enrolment task in which the Party and administrative cadres needed

² *Ch'üan-kuo kao-teng hsüeh-hsiao chao-k'ao hsin-sheng-ti kui-t'ing* (Regulations Governing the Enrolment of New Students for Higher Educational Institutions), published annually since 1952.

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assistance (conducting the entrance examinations, evaluating the candidates' papers, making up plans for distribution, etc.).

Until 1958, therefore, the so-called "unified" (*t'ung-yi*) method of enrolment completely transferred the work of selection and enrolment of students from the higher educational institutions to the various enrolment committees. In this the Chinese went beyond the Soviet methods of admission. During the same years in the Soviet Union, while the principles, general rules, and overall planning of selection and admission were also assumed by the state, the enrolment task itself remained with the individual institutions. Moreover, owing to this fact, the admissions criteria including the standards of entrance examination necessarily varied from institution to institution. In China, on the other hand, with the exception of a small number of selected universities the overwhelming majority of higher educational institutions were excluded from the enrolment task, and the candidates were, on the basis of unified selection, centrally selected, examined, accepted and finally distributed among them. This meant that the individual institution in most cases had no way of determining its own student body and had to accept a student group that was allotted to it, no matter what its composition.

The "unified" system of selection and enrolment was centred around the network of "examination centres." Located in provincial capitals and large municipalities the examination centre was the place where applicants from the surrounding counties assembled to take entrance examinations for higher educational institutions. Each year the number of such centres was centrally determined by the National Enrolment Committee. Their number increased from 77 in 1954 to 91 in 1957.³

Since 1958, due to the general trend of decentralisation, considerably more responsibility has been given to the provincial authorities and some freedom of action to the individual higher educational institutions. In that year it was suddenly realised that the "unified" system of selection had certain limitations: it could not satisfy the local conditions and suppressed local initiative. Therefore, while leaving overall planning and co-ordination with the NEC, under the slogan of "combining centralised leadership with decentralised handling" much of the responsibility was transferred to the provinces. Since 1958, for example, the number of examination centres within a province has been determined by the local authorities who can better adjust it to actual requirements. "Unified" enrolment on the national scale gave way to "joint" (*lien-ho*) enrolment within provincial limits.⁴ As a consequence of decentralisation the role

³ *Enrolment Regulations* for 1954 and 1957.

⁴ "Joint enrolment" is understood to have been applied as follows: Individual higher educational institutions within a geographical unit (province, county or city) carried out their selection and enrolment work "jointly"; they together decided upon the

of the individual university or college must have, during the last years, grown significantly and the institutions regained some of their lost voice in the affairs of selecting their own students.

Planning of Selection and Enrolment

Decentralisation seems to have left much of the task of overall planning in the hands of the central authorities. The Ministry of Education, basing itself on the recommendation of the provinces, still continues to set up enrolment quotas for higher educational institutions. Preparation of the enrolment plan is a collective affair in which, besides the Ministry of Education, all other government agencies in charge of higher educational institutions as well as the various provinces take part.

TABLE I. ANNUAL GROWTH IN ADMISSION OF NEW STUDENTS

Year	Number of senior middle school graduates	Number of new students to be admitted	Number of candidates to take the examination
1952	36,000 ¹	65,900 ²	—
1953	54,700 ³	71,500 ²	—
1954	70,000 ⁴	90,000 ⁵	110,000 ⁴
1955	(86,000)*	90,000 ⁵	—
1956	156,000 ⁶	164,000 ⁷	—
1957	180,000 ⁸	107,000 ⁸	250,000 ⁸
1958	220,000 ⁹	148,000 ¹⁰	—
1959	(350,000)**	250,000 ¹¹	—
1960	—	280,000 ¹²	—

*Assumes an identical rate of increase between 1954-55 as between 1953-54.

**Estimating graduates at less than one-third but more than one-quarter of enrolment in senior middle schools in the school year 1958-59.

Sources

- ¹ Shih Chung, *Higher Education in Communist China* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1953), p. 71.
- ² *Jen-min Jih-pao* (JMJP), September 26, 1952.
- ³ *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, September 25, 1953.
- ⁴ Chang Hsi-jo, Speech to the National People's Congress (NPC), July 22, 1955.
- ⁵ NCNA, Peking, June 28, 1955.
- ⁶ NCNA, Peking, April 4, 1956.
- ⁷ Yang Hsiu-feng, Reports to the 3rd session of the First NPC, June 20, 1956.
- ⁸ JMJP, Editorial, August 22, 1957.
- ⁹ *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 13, July 1, 1958, p. 20.
- ¹⁰ JMJP, July 3, 1958.
- ¹¹ Li Fu-ch'un, Report to the 1st session of the 2nd NPC, April 21, 1959.
- ¹² NCNA, June, 3, 1960.

The enrolment targets for higher education are set up according to the needs of the national economy, taking into consideration the various factors that permit or limit the rise of target figures. The national economy naturally demands larger quotas. Normal increase in the number of higher educational institutions permits each year to enrol a

students to be admitted, and distributed the new students among each other on the basis of common agreement. Another form of joint enrolment was that institutions of the same specialty (for example agricultural institutes) of the same geographical area joined in the selection and enrolment of students and distributed them among each other.

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somewhat larger number of students. Both the existing vacancies and the possibilities for development (equipment, teacher supply, etc.) are however, limited. So was, up to 1957, the availability of qualified middle school graduates.

While during the first Five-Year Plan period (1953-57) both secondary and higher educational facilities were increased significantly, the development of the middle school network was, as could be expected, more rapid than that of the higher educational institutions. In spite of the high rate of growth, each year before 1957, as Table I suggests, the number of senior middle school graduates still fell short of the enrolment targets for higher education. That year, however, there was a radical change in this situation and, according to our estimate, middle school graduates have been outnumbering those admitted to universities by 80,000 or more per annum ever since.⁵

TABLE II. STUDENTS ADMITTED TO HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
THEIR DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO FIELDS OF STUDY
(number of students in thousands)

Fields of Study	1952 -53	%	1953 -54	%	1954 -55	%	1955 -56	%	1956 -57	%	1957 -58	%	1958 -59	%
Engineering	33.6	30.9	29.6	42.3	33.9	37.6	35.0	38.9	62.4	37.8			46.0	31.1
Teachers Training			18.3	26.1	25.0	27.6	21.0	23.4	45.0	27.3			52.5	35.5
Medicine			7.2	10.3	9.2	10.2	9.0	10.0	14.2	8.6				
Agriculture & forest			3.2	4.6	4.2	4.6	8.0	8.9	17.0	10.3			10.3	6.9
Sciences			4.5	6.4	5.7	6.4	5.0	5.6	9.7	5.9				
Humanities			3.0	4.3	7.1	7.8	5.0	5.6	7.5	4.5				
Finance and econ.			2.0	2.9	2.0	2.2	3.0	3.4	4.5	2.7				
Pol. Science & law			1.1	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.1	2.5	1.5				
Physical educ.			0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.4	1.5	0.9				
Fine Arts, Music, etc.			0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.5				
Other	32.3	49.1											39.2	26.5
TOTAL	65.9	100.0	70.0	100.0	90.5	100.0	89.6	100.0	165.2	100.0	107.0	100.0	148.0	100.0

Sources: 1952/53: JMJP, September 26, 1952.

1953/54 and 1956/57: Kung-fel Kao-teng Chiao-yü chih Yen-chiu (A study of Higher Education under the Communist Bandits), (Taipei: 1957).

1954/55: Enrolment Regulations, 1954.

1955/56: NCNA, June 28, 1955.

1957/58: JMJP, August 22, 1957.

1958/59: NCNA, July 2, 1958.

⁵ It should be noted that if it had not been for an exaggerated increase of admissions target in 1956 compelling the institutions to absorb 163,000 freshmen, i.e., about 90 per cent. more than in the previous year (a planning "error" which was later duly renounced), an oversupply of senior middle school graduates would have occurred a year earlier. In this article, we are concerned with the regular higher educational institutions only, i.e., with the ca. 230 institutions that existed prior to August 1958. The appearance later that year of 700-800 new "colleges" and "universities" is said to have created a new shortage of secondary school graduates. Still, the regular "core" institutions probably have many more applicants than they.

One of the most prominent characteristics of Chinese Communist policy on higher education in general has been the tendency towards specialisation. During the last eleven years the institutions specialising in medicine, teacher training, agriculture and the various fields of engineering increased the most rapidly. Besides these four categories the numbers of other institutions generally showed a declining tendency or remained static. Consequently, the same four fields took up an overwhelming majority of the students. For example, in the academic year of 1957-58, out of the total enrolment of 434,600 students in higher educational institutions, 362,200 (83.3 per cent.) studied in the above four fields, while only 72,400 (16.7 per cent.) studied in the rest.⁶

Such a situation could not have been achieved unless the government took particular care in *directing* large numbers of students to certain areas of study. Table II indicates that, in the years for which official statistics are available, the above-mentioned four fields enrolled the largest number of new students.

COMPOSITION OF THE STUDENT BODY

In the course of the last ten years the Chinese Communists have undertaken to change systematically the class composition of students of higher educational institutions, bringing large numbers of students of worker and peasant origin (as well as actual workers and peasants) into colleges and universities. This move, it is argued, was necessary in order to achieve an equality of opportunity for education, that is, to give an equal chance to the children of the labouring masses (that make up more than 80 per cent. of China's population) for education on the highest level. Transformation of the class composition could most efficiently begin with careful and deliberate selection.

In view of this fact it is surprising that from the very beginning of the new educational system (1951) higher educational institutions were instructed to rely for the main supply of students on senior middle school graduates or on those who attained a corresponding cultural level.⁷ Naturally this did not mean that only such students entered higher educational institutions. On the basis of the Enrolment Regulations issued from 1952 up to the present we can determine the various categories of students that have been available for admission:

1. Graduates of regular senior middle schools, senior specialised middle schools and workers' and peasants' accelerated middle schools.

⁶ *Jen-min Chiao-yü (People's Education)*, October 1957.

⁷ Decision Concerning the Reform of the Educational System, October 1, 1951. Full text in *Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao (New China Monthly)*, IV.6, October 1951.

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2. Workers, peasants, cadres of Party, government and mass-organisations, "revolutionary cadres" and demobilised or transferred military personnel.
3. Young men and women who, although having previously completed their studies in senior middle schools, remain unemployed.
4. Chinese students from various countries outside of China and students from Hong Kong and Macao planning to continue their studies on the Mainland.

Beyond the ideological commitment mentioned above, one of the reasons for such a diverse student body was the constant shortage of secondary school graduates until 1957. The target figures for enrolment had to be met and the existing gap was filled up from outside sources by people with little or no academic background. In the second place, the regime, in order to keep in touch with the large numbers of Chinese residing outside China (the Overseas Chinese), was from the very beginning eager to train students from Hong Kong, Macao and the various countries of Southeast Asia who, after finishing their studies, usually returned to their own country and in some cases became valuable advocates of the Communist cause.

The core of the candidates, however, continued to remain the regular middle school graduate. Since during the last eleven years of the Communist rule in China the social composition of middle schools has shown a considerable change, registering rapid gains in students of worker and peasant origin, the number of such students has also been on the rise (although on a considerably more modest scale) in higher educational institutions. Still, up to the present, a high percentage of the applicants remain students of "bourgeois" middle-class origin.⁸

For the sake of comparison it is interesting to recall that during the first years after they came to power in Russia, the Bolsheviks desperately tried to do away with everything that belonged to the old régime and in any way reflected the former class differences. Abandoning all academic qualifications they declared that

any person irrespective of citizenship or sex who has reached the age of sixteen may enrol as a student at any institution of higher learning without having to submit a diploma, certificate or other evidence of completion of secondary or other schooling . . .⁹

It is very significant to point out that no decree which would have permitted such an indiscriminate flow of unqualified student material

⁸ Although the number of students of worker and peasant origin showed a steady rise (20.46 per cent. in 1952-53; 29.20 per cent. in 1955-56; and 34.29 per cent. in 1956-57), in the academic year of 1957-58 it reached only 36.42 per cent. (*Peking Review*, No. 12, May 20, 1958, p.16.)

⁹ "Decree of the RSFSR Council of Commissars," August 2, 1918, quoted in A. Korol, *Soviet Education for Science and Technology* (New York: Technology Press of M.I.T. and John Wiley, 1957), p. 169.

has ever been published in China. Similarly, during the last eleven years no enrolment regulations have contained restrictions barring children of "class enemies" from higher educational institutions, as was the regular practice in the Soviet Union until the mid-1930's. Naturally this does not mean that in China there was no discrimination against students on the basis of social origin. To ensure rapid change of class composition at the universities, selection had to be deliberate. What it does reflect, however, is that the Chinese have been somewhat more discreet and a great deal more realistic in their way of conducting the work of enrolment and selection.

ENROLMENT PROCEDURE AND ENTRANCE EXAMINATION

In order to ensure nation-wide uniformity, the National Enrolment Committee prescribes even the smallest details of enrolment work. At a time usually set by the provincial authorities all candidates of the province apply for permission to take the entrance examination. Students apply through their school while all other candidates through the factory, farm or unit to which they belong. The applications must be accompanied by certain documents: registration form, application form and record of physical examination are required from everybody. In addition to these three, middle school graduates must present their graduation certificates (diplomas), while applications from graduates of specialised middle schools must be accompanied by written permission from their schools to continue their studies at a higher level. Workers, peasants of the collective farms, discharged members of military units must also present permission or recommendation from the Party organisation and the management of their factory, farm or military unit.

One of the most important steps of the enrolment process is the compulsory medical examination, which is also organised through the schools, factories, etc. It takes place in the hospital of the district or town where the school is located, somewhat before the date of graduation (usually during May, but always before June 15). After 1958, due to decentralisation, the main responsibility for the medical examination of candidates seems to have been transferred to the individual higher educational institutions. Upon receiving their new students (selected on the basis of provincial entrance examinations) the institutions immediately conduct a health check-up. Those who fail to meet the requirements, although already admitted on the basis of entrance examination, can still be disqualified.

Those candidates fortunate enough to have satisfied all the above requirements then can sit for the unified entrance examinations. These are given only once a year, at the same time all over the country, usually

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in a two- or three-day period between the 15th and 31st of July, in the examination centre closest to the candidate's home district.

Each year the National Enrolment Committee, in order to assist candidates in their preparation, publishes a booklet¹⁰ covering outlines for every subject that is presented at the entrance examination. The material is made up on the basis of the current level of secondary education, and represents the general standard required from all applicants. In 1959, for example, examination outlines were given for ten different subjects: Chinese language, political knowledge, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history, geography and two foreign languages—Russian and English. Due to the confusion which still prevails in distribution and content of middle school textbooks, should they be available at all, and to frequent changes made in the syllabuses of the various courses, the material covered by the outline is usually wider in scope than that studied by the applicants in the schools. Therefore the outline serves only as a guide to the scope and level of the examination. The actual questions are made up by the examiners who can adjust the level of the examination according to local conditions and the relation between the number of applicants and the vacancies available in higher educational institutions.

Since it is expected that many of the candidates have not studied exactly the same material, students are advised to make up their deficiencies as soon as possible in order to pass the test. To assist them in their preparation, during summer vacations some institutions organise preparatory classes in which the students can participate voluntarily.

Depending on the field of study they wish to enter the applicants pass examinations in five or six different subjects. The fields for which one can apply are either technical and scientific (under groups A and B), or humanities and social sciences (group C).

	<i>Fields of Study</i>	<i>Required Subjects</i>
Group A	1. engineering	Chinese language
	2. science	political knowledge ¹¹
	3. certain specialisations within	mathematics
	the fields of agriculture and	physics
	forestry	chemistry

¹⁰ *Kao-teng hsüeh-hsiao chao-sheng k'ao-shih ta-k'ang* (Outlines of Entrance Examinations for Institutions of Higher Education), compiled and published annually by the National Enrolment Committee.

¹¹ A special remark about the "political knowledge" subject gives us a notion as to its content: "In political knowledge, the candidates will this year be examined from the important political events of domestic nature and other important events which took place during the year 1957-58. This is principally to test the awareness and attitude of the students concerning the rectification campaign and the anti-rightist struggle" (*Enrolment Regulations*, 1958).

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	<i>Fields of Study</i>	<i>Required Subjects</i>
Group A	4. biochemistry and biophysics in medicine	(foreign language) ¹²
Group B	1. medicine 2. agriculture and forestry 3. biology 4. physical culture 5. psychology at comprehensive universities	Chinese language political knowledge biology (or "foundations of Darwinism") chemistry physics (foreign language)
Group C	1. literature 2. history 3. political science and law 4. finance and economics 5. fine arts and music 6. philosophy and economic geography at comprehensive universities	Chinese language political knowledge history geography (foreign language)

Although all candidates, with a few exceptions, are required to pass the entrance examination, their examination results are not necessarily judged on the same basis. While graduates of regular and specialised middle schools are admitted on a competitive basis, other candidates can be enrolled on the basis of priorities.¹³ This means, that although they also take the examination, "if their scores are the same or close to that of the middle school graduates," they can enter under preferential treatment.

The relatively low percentage of students of worker and peasant status or social origin in institutions suggests that, up to 1958 at least, not too many such applicants could fulfil these conditions, or even if admitted under these special conditions, being unable to keep up with the rest of the student body, must have left the institutions.

In order to improve this situation the government introduced in 1958 a third form of admission, outside the examination system. Under this system, from that year on, workers, peasants and "veteran cadres who had completed at least ten years of revolutionary work" could be

¹² A foreign language was not listed as a requirement for the years between 1955 and 1958. It was required before 1955, and reappeared again in the new Regulation issued in the summer of 1958. The examination can be taken in one of the two languages Russian and English. Exemption can be given for those applicants who have not studied foreign languages in middle school.

¹³ The various categories of applicants for whom priorities are granted have been listed each year in the Enrolment Regulations. They usually include: workers and peasants, students of worker and peasant origin, revolutionary cadres, national minority students, demobilised army personnel, children of revolutionary martyrs, and overseas Chinese students.

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admitted to universities on the basis of "recommendation" or could be given priority "before selection" (*i.e.*, before examination).¹⁴

It should be noted here that the type of priority which, until recent years, played an important role in the Soviet enrolment system, the admission of certain students ("gold and silver medal holders") without entrance examination on the basis solely of their academic excellence, has been entirely absent in Communist China.

Neither are there any indications that China will introduce the method of admitting students after a certain number of years spent in "productive work" only, which since 1958 has become one of the standard requirements in the Soviet Union.

THE NEED FOR SELECTION

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that university selection is neither restricted to China nor to the Communist countries alone. It has been a truly international phenomenon. Practically everywhere there are certain limits in university admissions and it is frequently doubted whether universal, that is non-selective, higher education could, even among the most ideal and democratic conditions, be realised. The most obvious reasons for selection are the larger number of candidates than places available, and the somewhat natural (but not always openly stated) desire that, while making secondary education really "general," higher education should be kept *higher*, *i.e.*, above the general.

From the previous pages it emerges that in China the principal reasons for selection have been: (1) the limits of higher educational facilities against the rapidly growing supply of people seeking higher education (which we call the natural factor), and (2) the attempt to raise the participation of certain social groups while slowly forcing out others (artificial factor).

In non-totalitarian societies the second factor of selection might be held desirable or has even been under way, but as a consequence of normal development and never artificially enforced by the government or other agency.

In the second place, why did the Chinese Communists introduce extensive "unification" in both selection and enrolment?

Even in China it has been impossible not to recognise that the student has certain vested interests in his study. It was recognised, too, that students can achieve better results if allowed to study in the field they select for themselves.

The student's choice is, however, dependent on a number of considerations. He can be favourably inclined toward certain institutions of

¹⁴ Enrolment Regulations for 1958 and 1959.

higher quality, long tradition, or with a wider variety of fields to offer, towards certain areas where he prefers to live (the attractions of big city living), or also by the lucrativeness of certain much-sought-after professions. On the other hand, he might resent going to schools located in far-away, backward areas, or into fields neither particularly promising nor financially desirable. (No wonder that vacancies are still hardest to fill in the teachers' colleges.) From the government's point of view, the fulfilment of the admissions quotas for every institution is equally important.

This is the main cause of clashes in interest and in the conflict that ensues it is the student's choice which is most likely to be subjected to change.

The student's interest in a field is, however, encouraged and supported when it does not exceed the limit of professional interest in the subject, *i.e.*, not personal. As it has been frequently pointed out:

many students are still considering the problem [of selecting their field] from their personal point of view, placing interests of their own above that of the whole nation, without seeking the glory and happiness of being a youth in Mao Tse-tung's Age. Such considerations are incorrect. . . . The proper attitude is to join the unified entrance examination. . . . Any short-sighted, personal plans in the face of the great call of the state are negligible. . . .¹⁵

Still, each year every applicant is allowed to indicate certain preferences in both his future field and the university he wishes to enter. For example, in the East China Region in 1952 every student was permitted to make three choices for fields and under each of these five choices for institutions.¹⁶ Although this applied first of all to the East China Region, it was very probably characteristic of the whole country. Six years later, in an article discussing enrolment work in the Central South Region, it is provided that "each candidate must indicate in his application form more than ten chosen schools and specialisations [narrow fields of study]. . . ."¹⁷

How are these preferences dealt with? For years after the introduction of the "unified" entrance examination system large numbers of candidates were distributed on the basis of so-called "planned distribution" (*chi-hua fen-p'ei*) without consideration of their wishes, in order to fulfil quotas in less-sought-after institutions. "Planned distribution" meant a centralised allocation of students by enrolment committees to schools not designated on their lists of choices.

¹⁵ *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Liberation Daily), July 24, 1952.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Cheng-ming* (Contend!), No. 2, (February 10, 1958).

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We do not know what percentage of the students were placed through the planned way in the years when "unified" enrolment was at its height. It took the régime about five years to limit and finally abolish "planned distribution," which incidentally happened simultaneously with the termination of the "unified" enrolment system in 1958.

Finally, two technical problems that make a "unified" selection and enrolment system necessary were both China's enormous distances and the unbalanced distribution of secondary schools and higher educational institutions over its territory. While most institutions are located in large cities like Peking, Shanghai, Wuhan, Sian, etc., middle school graduates come from both the big cities and the district centres and towns all over the country. Therefore in most of the cases the applicants are instructed to choose institutions within their own province or region. Owing to the country's size the selection must take place in the examination centres closest to the candidates' home since travel expenses are forbidding.

CONCLUSIONS

From the above pages there emerge some general conclusions as to the *prospects* for selection and enrolment work in Communist China.

1. Many of the problems that were caused by over-centralised management still continue to exist, and some new problems have also appeared. Decentralisation, however, seems to have corrected some of the former mistakes and given a better chance for the individual institutions to select their students.


2. As to social composition—a further rise of students of worker and peasant origin can be expected. At the same time, the adequate supply of middle school graduates might slowly eliminate the other categories of candidates formerly admitted. Both this and the former point could significantly contribute to the better quality of higher education, as well as to that of the graduates.

3. Although the admissions figures show a gradual year-by-year increase, the larger rate of growth in middle school graduates will continue to create a constant oversupply (as far as the *regular* higher institutions are concerned). In addition to this, the régime's efforts to raise academic standards will make selection a permanent feature for the years to come.

4. Certain differences between the national interest and that of the individual student are not likely to disappear in the near future. Selection and enrolment on a planned and state-controlled basis (either provincial, regional or national level) will therefore continue to be applied.

APPENDIX: CENTRAL ORGANISATION OF ENROLMENT WORK

Administrative
levels



Spare-Time Education in Communist China

By MUNEMITSU ABE

WHAT IS SPARE-TIME EDUCATION?

THE first Chinese Five-Year Plan ended in 1957, and the second began the following year. The launching of the "great leap forward" in industrial and agricultural production and the transformation of the rural collectives into "People's Communes" in 1958 accelerated the pace of work of both workers and peasants.

In the field of education, under the slogan that "education must be combined with productive labour," it was prescribed that all students should engage in productive labour for a specific period of time. ("Directive Concerning Educational Activities" issued in September 1958.) And education was expanded to include a system of schools "run by the people" (*i.e.*, factories, communes, villages, etc.), in which the expenses for educational administration were covered by the students' labour.

It is now common both in cities and in agricultural areas for schools to have their own factories or farms and for factories and communes to have their own schools, and students go to the corresponding factories or farms to work. Thus, as regards the question of the relationship of education to labour, Communist China has come to have three types of schools—full-time, half-time, and spare-time. ("Directive Concerning Educational Activities" issued in September 1958.)

Full-time schools are the conventional ones, where elementary, secondary and higher general education, and secondary and higher professional education are provided for students of appropriate age; productive labour is assigned to the students at such schools as labour education. Schools of this type are mostly maintained by the government, central or local.

The [half-time school] is a new type. The half-time system was [introduced in 1958 for the purpose of providing education mainly for young people of thirteen to sixteen years of age who were engaged in a half day's labour after their graduation from elementary school.] Nowadays, half-time education is also provided for youths of over sixteen. In this type of school, schooling and labour are assigned alternately either for half a day each or every other day. Most of such schools are agricultural middle schools run "by the people," *i.e.*, local organisations.

In addition to the conventional full-time schools and the newly established half-time schools, there is another type of school, the spare-time school, which is the main subject of this article.

The spare-time school aims to provide education for cadres, workers and peasants. Formal evening universities and correspondence schools for cadres (these two types are generally known as "spare-time universities"), literacy classes, unofficial spare-time elementary schools for former illiterates who have completed literacy classes, refresher courses of teachers, etc., are all included in the category of spare-time education. Recently, spare-time education of the semi-professional type has been developing. However, no spare-time graduate school yet exists.

So at the present it is inappropriate to classify schools in Communist China in terms of full-time and part-time or in terms of formal education and adult education in the European sense of the words—because labour comes before education and because almost all adults are required to receive an education similar to that given to school-age children. It is reported that in 1949 the illiteracy rate was as high as 80 per cent.

In order to fulfil this purpose, thought education, moral education, intellectual training, art education, physical education and labour education are provided in elementary and secondary schools; and to cultivate so-called "red as well as expert" persons, that is, men of firm ideology who have a speciality and at the same time are versatile, is the aim of higher and professional education.

What are mentioned above are the objectives of not only full-time and half-time schools but also of spare-time schools. Intellectuals should receive labour education, while peasants and labourers should get general education. And all the people should be given thought education.

However, as spare-time education is for those who are engaged in manual and mental works, spare-time schools consequently place an emphasis upon thought education. Important parts of thought education are instruction in Marxism-Leninism and thought of Mao Tse-tung, study of current events, participation in propaganda campaigns, etc.

Intellectual training to educate illiterates in the three Rs and then give them general education, especially fundamentals of science. Technical education aims at training of skills and techniques closely related to actual labour.

At present, full-time and half-time schools in principle do not enrol those over the corresponding school age. Entrants to higher educational institutions are supposed to be under thirty years of age. Only exceptionally are students permitted to transfer from full-time schools to spare-time schools, although the door of full-time schools is not entirely closed to spare-time school graduates.

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The history of Chinese Communist spare-time education is long, dating back to 1930 when the Party was establishing Soviet districts. Since then, all through the civil war against the Nationalists and the war against Japan, literacy education for agricultural workers and soldiers and education for cadres have been provided on a spare-time basis.

More recently spare-time education has performed two tasks. First, it gives the opportunity of education to youths and adults who were and are deprived of it due to the shortage of schools; secondly, it provides higher education for the graduates of elementary or secondary schools.

Spare-time schools performing the first task will disappear as formal school education spreads. But spare-time schools performing the second task are expected to continue to exist even after elementary and secondary school education have been popularised.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPARE-TIME EDUCATION

Enrolment in spare-time schools at various levels since 1949 when the Communist régime was established is shown in the following table.

Number of Spare-time School Students and Graduates from Literacy Classes (in thousands)

School Level	Higher	Semi-professional	Secondary	Elementary	Graduates from Literacy Classes
1949	0.1	0.1	—	—	657
1950	0.4	0.1	—	—	1,372
1951	1.6	0.3	—	—	1,375
1952	4.1	0.7	249	1,375	656
1953	9.7	1.1	404	1,523	2,954
1954	13.2	186.0	760	2,088	2,637
1955	15.9	195.0	1,167	4,538	3,678
1956	63.8	563.0	2,236	5,195	7,434
1957	75.9	588.0	2,714	6,267	7,208
1958	150.0	—	5,000	26,000	40,000

Data from *Great Progress in 10 Years—Statistics Concerning Economic and Cultural Construction in the People's Republic of China* (Peking: State Statistical Bureau, 1959), p. 176.

The spare-time elementary and secondary school system was established in 1951. But it was in 1954 that the number of pupils of these schools began to increase sharply. Already in 1949 there were some students of spare-time institutions of higher education and semi-professional schools, though small in number. But the number of students

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in these two types of school has been on the increase since 1954 and 1956 respectively. Spare-time schools at all levels expanded greatly in 1958, and full-time and half-time schools also enrolled a great number of pupils and students that year.

What then is the actual status of spare-time education?

The following table shows the enrolments in full-time and half-time schools in 1957 and 1958.

(Numbers in thousands)

	Full-time				Half-time
	Higher	Semi-professional	Secondary	Elementary	Secondary
1957	441	778	6,281	64,279	—
1958	660	1,470	8,520	86,400	2,000

Data from same source as previous table, p. 170.

The State Council published in 1951 the "Decisions on the Reform of the School System," the first Communist regulations on this topic. At the same time as this school reform was introduced, spare-time elementary and secondary schools, literacy schools and the like were established.

In those days, spare-time education for workers and peasants covered only literacy and elementary and secondary education. Spare-time education at the higher and semi-professional levels was not emphasised nearly so much. But some rudimentary forms of spare-time schools at the university and junior college level had been established even then. For example, in 1949, an evening course for technical education was set up in Wushun Mining College. And in 1953, correspondence courses were introduced at the Northeast Teachers' University and the Chinese People's University. Most of these spare-time schools aimed at either in-service training of teachers or inculcating knowledge of finance and economics.

In the First Five-Year Plan embarked on in 1953, spare-time schools as well as full-time ones were charged with fulfilling the following two functions: first, and more important, the training of personnel for economic development, especially the training of technologists and skilled workers; secondly, the extension of general education for the purpose of raising popular "cultural standards."

In addition to the full-time schools, evening universities and colleges, correspondence schools and spare-time semi-professional schools were also assigned the function of providing refresher courses for cadres, technicians and craftsmen. In order to elevate popular cultural standards,

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government agencies and factories were required to provide not only formal education but spare-time elementary and secondary schools for cadres, workers and peasants who could not afford to receive formal education.

This policy aimed to elevate the educational level of cadres and workers from junior elementary school level to senior elementary school level, and to eradicate illiteracy among workers by 1957. Illiterate workers were estimated to number approximately 23 million. These various types of spare-time school were in principle to be established at the workers' own expense and to place an emphasis on productive and political education.

At the joint meeting on spare-time education of the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Education and the Trade Unions convened in 1955, policy and the general system of spare-time education were discussed. In the same year, the Ministry of Higher Education published directives concerning the intensification of spare-time in-service training of elementary and secondary school-teachers, and the Ministry of the Machine Industry published directives concerning the establishment of spare-time semi-professional schools. Such measures show that the primary aim of spare-time education beyond secondary school level is the expansion of technical education and teacher training.

On the other hand, in 1956, two decisions were made on spare-time education which aimed to raise the cultural standard of the workers. One was made by the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Education and the Trade Unions concerning expenditure for spare-time education for craftsmen. It prescribed that 75 per cent. of the amount, equivalent to 2 per cent. of wages, contributed by employers to the Trade Union should be appropriated for spare-time elementary education (including literacy classes) and secondary school education. (The percentage was changed from 75 to 50 in 1957.) The other decision was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council on the eradication of illiteracy. This decision aimed to wipe out illiteracy among workers in five to seven years from 1956.

As regards spare-time higher education, the Ministry of Higher Education issued a notification for the revision of the curriculum of higher educational institutions in 1957. The education reform of 1958 was conducted on this basis.

THE SPARE-TIME SCHOOL SYSTEM

In the "Directives on the Reform of the Educational System" published in 1951, spare-time elementary and middle (secondary) schools and literacy classes are outlined as follows:

(a) *Spare-time Elementary Schools*

Workers and other youths and adults may be enrolled and given a spare-time education equivalent to full-time elementary school education. The number of years required to complete the course of a spare-time elementary school will not be fixed for the time being. Students at these schools can graduate at the completion of the prescribed course of study. Graduates can proceed to a spare-time secondary school or other secondary schools after they have passed the appropriate entrance examinations.

(b) *Literacy Schools (Winter Schools and Literacy Classes)*

The aim is to eradicate illiteracy. The number of years required to complete the course of a literacy school has not yet been fixed.

Literacy schools have gradually become organised systematically. Recently the term "winter school" has not been used. In the "Directives on the Eradication of Illiteracy" published in 1956, it is prescribed that workers should be guaranteed at least 240 hours a year for reading, writing and arithmetic. The goal was that workers should become capable of reading and writing about 1,500 Chinese characters for daily use and of doing simple calculations.

Chinese characters are ideographs; the forms of the characters are very complicated and there are too many characters. These have been the primary obstacles to literacy education. That there are many kinds of dialects is another obstacle. Accordingly, the government has taken measures since 1952 to simplify the forms of characters, to have all the people use the standard language, and to create phonetic alphabets.

(c) *Spare-time Middle Schools*

Spare-time middle schools are divided into two levels, junior and senior. Three to four years are required to complete the course at each level.

Junior and senior spare-time middle schools may be set up independently. Spare-time junior middle schools enrol graduates of spare-time elementary schools. Spare-time senior middle schools enrol graduates of spare-time junior middle schools or those who have received an equivalent education. Spare-time middle school students are given the education corresponding to that of ordinary middle schools. There are no fixed requirements as to entrance age.

Graduates of spare-time junior middle schools can advance to ordinary senior middle schools, spare-time senior middle schools or semi-professional schools of equivalent educational level through examination. Graduates of spare-time senior middle schools can go on to institutions of higher education through examination.

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As an example of *spare-time professional schools* one can take the schools which are regulated by the 1955 directives concerning such schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Machine Industry. In spare-time semi-professional schools, as in full-time semi-professional schools, specialised courses are set up, and the systematic training of technicians is provided for. Graduates are required to enter the technical field in which they were trained.

Spare-time semi-professional schools fall into two categories according to the amount of work students have to do outside school—five-year course with twelve hours at school per week and a six-year course with nine hours of school per week.

(d) *Spare-time Higher Education*

(1) Hours of Instruction

(a) An academic year consists of thirty-eight to forty weeks of nine hours per week in spare-time higher educational institutions. The duration of the course is six years. The examination period lasts four weeks. The vacation ranges from eight to ten weeks. For the whole course, approximately 2,160 hours are required. The educational standard reached should be similar to that of the fourth (final) year at a full-time regular institution. Tuition is provided three days a week, three hours each evening. Homework must be done for three hours every evening.

(b) When workers are allowed much time to study, the hours may be extended to twelve hours a week. In that case, the vacation period should be eleven weeks. But the total length of the course is supposed not to be shorter in order to prevent the students being over-burdened.

(c) Workers must be guaranteed four hours a week for homework, two weeks a term for examinations, and three to six months gainful holiday.

(d) The study hours for correspondence students depend upon their specialities, but approximately sixteen to eighteen hours a week are required. The period of schooling ranges from six to eight weeks a term.

(e) Special classes are provided for cadres. These special classes last three-and-a-half years, and 1,260 classroom hours are required each year. Political education is not required here.

(2) Curriculum

(a) As students of spare-time higher educational institutions have more working experience and technical knowledge than students at ordinary universities, the teaching of fundamental general and technical subjects is emphasised, and the number of subjects and the number of hours for specialisation is less than in full-time institutions.

(b) In the faculty of technology, fundamental general and technical education is provided in the first four or four-and-a-half years, and specialised education is given in the final two to two-and-a-half years. Examinations are set for each course and for each academic year, and certificates of completion are issued for each course and for each academic year for the benefit of students who are taking only a few courses.

(c) In order to alleviate the excessively heavy study load of the students in the faculty of technology, subjects like foreign languages, physical training and military training are not required. But political education cannot be abandoned.

(3) Consolidation of Educational Institutions

(a) Measures should be taken to recruit teaching staffs for independent evening universities, to increase the number of specialised subjects, and to increase the enrolment at evening universities attached to full-time universities and for correspondence courses.

(b) Universities should try to increase the efficiency of higher education in co-operation with the evening universities attached to themselves, and with the guidance of full-time universities which do not have attached evening universities. Factories may establish supplementary courses for senior secondary school graduates instead of evening universities when sufficient teaching staff cannot be found.

(c) Education officials should be stationed at evening universities attached to higher educational institutions and in correspondence schools.

(d) Since the aim of spare-time higher education is the increase of productivity, workers can apply for admission to spare-time higher educational institutions for any term of the academic year as the case may be, and there are no uniform requirements for applications.

*THE SITUATION AFTER 1958

As I have stated above, spare-time education is making progress along with the development of the educational system as a whole. The present provisional spare-time education system is becoming a permanent one. In 1958 the administration of spare-time education was decentralised under a directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council. According to another directive, districts, provinces, cities, autonomous districts, and counties were responsible for taking measures to establish a satisfactory educational system. Since 1958, local educational plans have been drawn up along these lines, and new full-time and spare-time schools have been established and old ones consolidated or reorganised according to the principle that education should be combined

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with productive labour. Steps have also been taken to develop spare-time education in accordance with the educational plan as a whole.

Spare-time education is provided not only by central and local government agencies but also by factories and communes. The Party and the State Council decided to set up a Committee for Spare-Time Education as an advisory organ concerning spare-time education activity throughout the nation, in January 1960. The Committee consists of officials connected with education, culture, science, economics and military affairs, and officials from trade unions, the Young Communist League, the women's organisation, etc.

On the establishment of the Committee, the Party and the State Council asserted that spare-time education was an important means of training cadres, and that higher and secondary spare-time education now needed to be extended further, and that even after junior secondary education had been developed in the years ahead, it should continue to exist on a large scale (*People's Daily*, February 23, 1960).

A national meeting on spare-time education was convened jointly by the Ministry of Education and the national trade union organisation in July 1960. At this meeting Lin Feng, the head of the Committee for Spare-time Education, proposed that in the next two or three years illiteracy should be eradicated throughout the country and advocated the further development of spare-time education. According to the report of the Minister of Education to the National People's Congress in April 1960, 19 million workers under forty-five years of age, over 50 per cent. of all workers in that age group, were receiving spare-time education of some kind. Of those 19 million workers, 4.6 million were attending literacy classes, 8.8 million were receiving spare-time elementary education, 5 million spare-time secondary and 160,000 spare-time higher education. It is also reported that 130 million peasants are studying in their spare time, and that even spare-time education beyond the secondary level is being extended to them (*People's Daily*, April 9, 1960). The recent growth of spare-time education for peasants is due in large degree to the introduction of the communes.

In the early days of the communes, the organisations for spare-time study for peasants and cadres—"Red and Expert" schools were the major ones—were greatly developed. But thereafter pressure of work prevented peasants and cadres from finding enough spare-time for study. Accordingly, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council published a directive to the effect that in 1959 spare-time education had to be extended in agricultural areas.

PRESENT STATUS

In 1958 the National People's Congress promulgated a decision authorising the use of the Roman alphabet for writing Chinese for certain purposes. This helped illiterates to learn how to read and write Chinese characters. One hundred million illiterates were given a basic knowledge of the language in the three years from 1958 to 1960 it is claimed, 70 million in the two years, 1958 and 1959, 30 million in the four months from January to April of 1960. Thus, by 1960, about 80 per cent. of all illiterate workers and adult labourers and 67 per cent. of all illiterate peasants were claimed to have become literate.

With the progress of the literacy campaign a new problem arose—the lapse back into illiteracy. But literacy training was made more effective after 1960 by a method which was pioneered in Wanjung County, Shansi Province, to overcome this problem. The method was this: the phonetic alphabet was taught first for fifteen to thirty hours; then the reading and writing of Chinese characters was taught with the phonetic spelling for 100 hours. Books in which the phonetic spelling for each Chinese character was shown were used.

According to the statistics of Wanjung County, as of October 1958, of 34,000 people who had already received literacy education, one-third had degenerated into illiteracy, and the other two-thirds were unable to read even newspapers. Thanks to the adoption of the new method, however, 20,000 people learnt to read and write 1,500 Chinese characters, which is the goal of the campaign, and most of them were reported to have advanced to spare-time senior elementary schools. This method is in principle to be employed in the districts where Mandarin Chinese is spoken, but nowadays it is being used even in districts where dialects are spoken.

As part of the literacy campaign, literacy schools are set up in agricultural areas. Literacy schools provide schooling usually in peasants' slack seasons. In the busy season, the school hours are very few or the schools are closed down. Those who have extricated themselves from illiteracy are encouraged to go on to spare-time elementary schools immediately. So far the literacy campaign has not expanded as originally planned, but in the most recent past it seems to have become more effective.

Spare-time universities include evening universities, correspondence universities, etc. Some of the spare-time universities are attached to the old full-time universities. But since 1958, more and more factories have provided systematic spare-time education covering all levels from elementary through higher education, independently or jointly. For example: the Peking Electric Tube Factory, the North China Radio Factory and

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
the Peking Telephone Factory have jointly established a spare-time technical college. As from 1960 the number of students in the spare-time technical college was 700. More than half of them were workers and peasants. The others were technicians graduated from secondary technical schools and cadres. The duration of the course is five years. Schooling is provided three days a week, four hours a day.

Spare-time universities aim to provide an education equivalent to that given in full-time four-year universities. The specialised courses at this one are: telegraphy; manufacturing of radios and their parts; manufacturing of electrical apparatus; machine production and semi-conductor production. Forty regular teachers who are also technologists at factories are given in-service training in Tsinghua University, Peking University and the Peking Technical College, and lecturers are also dispatched from Tsinghua University to give refresher courses (*People's Daily*, January 22, 1960).


Tsinghua Evening University will serve as an example of an evening university attached to a full-time university. This university was established in 1957. As of 1960, the number of students was 700. There were six specialised courses. The duration of the courses was five years. The students were reported to be government technicians, cadres and workers from Peking (the latter made up 16 per cent. of all the students). (*People's Daily*, January 12, 1960.)

The correspondence-university system is also being extended. As a striking example, the Peking Television College was opened in 1960. Schooling is mainly conducted by means of correspondence. Television is used as a supplementary method of instruction. The number of students enrolled is 6,000. It has two types of course, regular and preparatory. The regular course admits graduates of senior secondary schools and is attended by people from factories, mines and government agencies, soldiers and students. The regular courses are divided into three sub-courses, mathematics, physics and chemistry. The students must devote eight hours to their studies every week, four hours as home-work and four hours for schooling by radio. Peking University, Peking Teachers' University and Peking Teachers' Training College provide the teaching staff (*People's Daily*, March 10, 1960).

(Hai-lu-feng area is shaded)



Hai-lu-feng area



CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY

Hai-lu-feng—The First Chinese Soviet Government (Part I)

By SHINKICHI ETO

MANY of the books dealing with the history of the Chinese Communist movement have mentioned the Hai-lu-feng Soviet as the earliest Soviet in China but as yet, with the exception of several Communist articles from the Chinese mainland, there is no study that deals with the details of the history of this Soviet or its relation to the development of the Communist movement in China.

In Hai-feng, in Kwangtung Province, there originated in the early twenties a [peasant movement] which was [led by Communist leaders] and which was the first instance of Communist use of peasant discontent in China. The movement was centred in the Hai-feng *hsien* and in the adjoining Lu-feng *hsien* and from there expanded into several neighbouring *hsiens*. It led to the establishment, in 1927 and 1928, of a Communist-led government which lasted for several months and which is popularly called the Hai-lu-feng Soviet. The following study is a description of this Hai-lu-feng Soviet and its relations to the agrarian strategy and tactics of the Chinese Communist Party.* (Maps p. 160.)

HAI-LU-FENG AND CH'EN CHIUNG-MING

Ch'en Chiung-ming's Conquest of Canton

One of the most important political leaders in Kwangtung Province in the 1920s was Ch'en Chiung-ming who in 1920, after occupying Canton, had made himself governor of the province and Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung army, and who ruled the eastern and central parts

* This article is based on a study which I published in Japanese in the *Kindai Chūgoku Kenkyū* (Studies of Modern China), Tokyo, No. 2, December 1958, pp. 1-97, under the title "Chūgoku Saisho no Kyōsan Seiken, Kai-riku-hō So-i-ai-shi." This study was revised during my stay at the Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, in Seattle for the present publication. I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Frank Holober and by the members of the Far Eastern and Russian Institute, particularly by Professors Franz Michael, George Taylor and Marius Jansen, Miss Shirley Simmons and Messrs. Kang Hee-woong, Samuel Solberg and Paul Friedland.

of the province for much of the time during that period. Ch'en Chiung-ming was himself born in Hai-feng in 1875 and retained a close relationship with his home district. He was one of the early members of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary movement and in April 1911 participated in an abortive military attempt by Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min to capture Canton. Then, in the autumn of 1911, immediately after the Double-Tenth (Oct. 10) Uprising in Wuhan which led to the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty, he and Hu led a revolutionary uprising in Kwangtung Province. They were successful in occupying Canton, and Ch'en was appointed by the revolutionary government to be Deputy Military Governor of Kwangtung Province. In the following year he was made Military Governor. After the failure of the anti-Yuan Shih-k'ai campaign in 1913¹ he was forced to exile himself and went to Singapore, Colombo and Paris. Kwangtung Province was occupied and ruled by Lung Chi-kuang, who belonged to Yuan's Pei-yang clique.

In the time of another anti-Yuan campaign in 1915² Ch'en Chiung-ming succeeded in expelling Lung from Canton with the aid of troops from Yunan and Kwangsi. Ch'en was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwangtung Force Aiding Fukien Province. While his troops were stationed at Changchou in Fukien Province, Canton was occupied by the troops of Lu Jung-t'ing and others who belonged to the Kwangsi clique. It was only in 1920 that Ch'en Chiung-ming, campaigning under the slogan "Kwangtung must be Ruled by Kwangtung People," was able to drive the Kwangsi clique from the province and to re-establish his government in Canton.³

*Hai-feng, under the Rule of Ch'en Chiung-ming**

In comparison to Lung Chi-kuang, who collected his military funds from gambling places and opium dens, Ch'en stood out as a governor

¹ The unsuccessful attempt by Li Lieh-chün, Huang Hsing, and other groups to upset Yuan Shih-k'ai's régime, which took place in the summer of 1913 and was suppressed by Yuan's troops within a few months.

² This movement took place at the end of 1915, and forced Yuan to give up his plans to become emperor.

³ Sonoda Kazuki, *Shina shin jin-koku-ki (The Who's Who of Modern China, classified by province)* (Mukden: Osakayagō Shoten, 1927), pp. 257, 456-457, 480-485. Li Shui-hsien, "A Preliminary Study on the Relation between Ch'en Chiung-ming, Narkomindel and C.C.P." *Chung-kuo hsten-tai-shih ts'ung-kan* (Memoirs on Contemporary History of China), Vol. 2, ed. by Wu Hsiang-hsiang (Taipei: Cheng-Chung Shu-chü, 1960), p. 423 et seq.

⁴ The only source material available which shows the general situation of Hai-feng under Ch'en Chiung-ming is P'eng P'ai's "Hai-feng nung-min yün-tung" (Peasant Movement in Hai-feng). Originally this was contributed to the departmental periodical of the Peasants Department, Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party, *Chung-kuo nung-min* (Chinese Peasants), Vol. 1 (Jan. 1926), 3 (Mar. 1926), 4 (Apr. 1926). It was revised and published in book form in October 1926, and finally a third version was reprinted in *Ti-t-tz'u kuo-nel ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i te nung-min yün-tung (The Peasant Movement During the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War)* (Peking: K'o-hsueh Ch'u-pan-she, 1953). The argument of this section is my

who at least tried to introduce reforms, but he did not attempt to abolish the traditional landlordism, and received some support from the landlords. As the basis of his administration he tried to maintain the tradition of government through personal appointees and loyalties. During this time the following were the main aspects of the situation in Hai-feng:

1. The police power in Hai-feng was of an extremely limited nature. There were approximately thirty policemen augmented by an irregular constabulary of like size, who were to maintain order in this area.⁵ No troops were located in the town of Hai-feng in 1922, but a garrison of 400 men under the command of Chung Ching-t'ang,⁶ which was, of course, available for use in the event of an emergency, was stationed eighteen miles to the south at Shan-wei.⁷ These troops could be brought in at the request of the Hai-feng *hsien* government or of the local landlords, so that there was a tie-in between these local landlords and the military leaders—the landlords paid a tax to the military leaders for the support of the troops and the military leaders maintained order for the landlords. Yet, order could not have been maintained in this way if there had not been in the villages a traditional acceptance of authority. The very fact of the small size of the police force indicates that there was no threat to authority.

2. Several large landowners employed a group of young men. The existence of such a private quasi-police of the landlords does also not signify that there was any expectation of a tenant uprising. The fact that the landlords were able to maintain their control with small private forces indicates, in the author's view, a passive acceptance on the part of the tenants of the whole system. The resistance of the tenants was so weak that the few henchmen employed by the landlords could intimidate them easily at times simply by a well-placed blow. The tenants did not have sufficient consciousness of their mutual interest to organise against the landlords. There still existed the traditional clan organisations, the traditional conflict between the Hakka and the Punti and the Red Flag and Black Flag Organisations.⁸ Control of such organisations

hypothesis based upon P'eng P'ai's own article. In the subsequent footnotes, references to this article will be based on the Jen-min Ch'u-p'an-she version.

⁵ P'eng P'ai, "Hai-feng nung-min yun-tung," p. 98.

⁶ Chung is a maternal relative of Ch'en (Li Shui-shen, *op. cit.*, p. 424).

⁷ Chung I-mou, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou" ("The Eight-year Struggle of the Peasants in Hai-lu-feng"), *Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao* (Source Materials for Modern History) (Peking: 1955), No. 4, p. 186.

⁸ Ho Yang-ling, *Nung-min yun-tung* (Peasant Movements) (Nanking (?): 1928), Chapter IV, pp. 6-9. The only reference that I have been able to obtain up to this time about the Red Flag-Black Flag organisations is P'eng's article. He says: "Formerly every village and every clan in Hai-feng belonged to either the Black Flag or the Red Flag, and sometimes the *hsieh-tou* resulted in terrible slaughter. One who belonged to the Red Flag would not hesitate to kill even his own father-in-law or brother-in-law if they belonged to the Black Flag." P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

remained in the hands of the traditional leaders. The Hsieh-tou, or armed battles,⁹ which frequently took place between these organisations, served as an outlet for the tenants' frustrations.

3. Population pressure, which elsewhere often contributed to social crisis, was mitigated in these districts by migration abroad.¹⁰

4. The low rate of income of an individual was compensated to some extent by the fact that the whole family was working. The women of the peasant families, especially the Hakka, did not practise footbinding. They could, therefore, participate in manual labour outside the home.¹¹

Thus in Hai-feng, under the rule of Ch'en Chiung-ming, the stability of the traditional social order seemed firm, but conditions existed under the rule of the landlords that could easily have led to an attack against this order if new ideas and leadership were introduced. In such a case it would have been very difficult for the small police forces to control any mass movement. The exploitation by the landlords and their use of physical violence in collecting the rent were always resented and were to become the target of an attack, once an organisation with new ideas and leadership came into existence among the peasants.

At the same time in Hai-feng, as well as in other parts of South China, the peasant became more impoverished. Many land-owning farmers were reduced to the status of tenants because of the devastation of cultivated land and the increased taxation caused by civil war. "There are now," wrote P'eng P'ai, a prominent leader of the Hai-lu-feng soviet movement, whose activities will be discussed later, "only two or three landed farmers in the village, where twenty years ago there were ten such farmers."¹² As a rule, conscious dissatisfaction with the existing order is brought on by the impoverishment of those who possessed a relatively good standard of living rather than the simple existence of poverty.

The rapid rise and fall of warlords and the confused civil war must have caused large scale social mobility in the whole of China. While some families became impoverished, others made new fortunes. As Hai-feng was the home of Ch'en Chiung-ming, there were so many parvenues in this district that a common saying went: "There are as many commanders-in-chief as dogs, and a multitude of magistrates are walking the streets."¹³ Such rapid social change must have accelerated

⁹ *Hsieh-tou* means "armed conflict" and refers to private battles between clans or cliques in South China.

¹⁰ Statistics of migration from Hai-feng are found in P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹¹ Nym Wales, *Red Dust* (Stanford Un.: 1952), p. 199. As the Hakka women ordinarily did not bind their feet, this Hakko custom might have influenced the other peasants to give up the practice of foot-binding, if, indeed, they had ever followed this custom.

¹² P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹³ Chung I-mou, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

the decline of the social prestige of the traditional leaders. The relatives of Ch'en and other upstarts who became new landlords exploited the tenant farmers much more ruthlessly than the old landlords, who had practised paternal benevolence. This attitude naturally brought about the collapse of the traditional value system and increased the bitterness of the tenant farmers towards the landlords.

Ch'en Chiung-ming attempted to initiate some reforms. In particular he established a number of schools: Hai-feng Middle School, Lu-an Normal School, the Sericulture School, the Engineering School and several *hsien* higher primary schools.¹⁴ All these were in Hai-feng, a town with a population of only seven or eight thousand people.¹⁵ These schools, small as they were, became hotbeds of young revolutionary intellectuals. The majority of the students came from the families of landlords, wealthy merchants and traditional gentry and their curricula must have included the traditional Confucian studies. But this was the time of the May Fourth Movement and of *Sturm und Drang* in China. It is said that the students were fond of reading the journals *Hsin-ch'ing-nien* (*The New Youth*), *Hsin-ch'ao* (*The New Current*) and *Chuang-ts'ao* (*Creativeness*), which spread the fervour for reform, even in such a remote part of the country as Hai-feng.¹⁶ The students began to transfer their loyalty from the old order to the ideal of a new society.

Ch'en Chiung-ming's Split with Sun Yat-sen

Sun Yat-sen, having established his government in Canton, took office as *Fei-ch'ang Tsung-t'ung* (Emergency Governor-General) in May 1921 and at the same time Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had been appointed by Sun as the governor of Kwangtung Province, invaded Kwangsi Province with his army and by his success at the same time reached the height of his own power. Sun Yat-sen proclaimed the Northern Expedition from his general headquarters at Kweilin in February 1922, but Ch'en Chiung-ming objected, probably because he did not want to be separated from his local position of power. Since Ch'en Chiung-ming refused to take part in the Expedition, making the claim of provincial autonomy as his excuse, he was deprived of the governorship of Kwangtung Province by

¹⁴ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung* (Peasant Movements in Hai-lu-feng) (Canton: Kwangchou Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1957), pp. 9-10.

¹⁵ We might picture the town of Hai-feng in the twenties as being much the same as the following description of it in about 1911: "This town exists as the seat of a *hsien* office. It produces peanuts, sugarcane, rice and so forth, as does Lu-feng. Although they say that the population of this town is 30,000, actually it seems to be only 7,000 or 8,000. The number of houses may be less than a thousand. The busiest street is Tung-men-chieh (East Gate Street), which is mostly paved with stone and about a quarter of a mile long. It looks clean by Chinese standards. But commercial stores are few and the majority of people seem to be peasants." *Shina shobetsu zenshi* (A Description of China's Provinces) (Tokyo: Tōa Dōbun-kai, 1917), I, p. 246.

¹⁶ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung*, loc. cit.

Sun Yat-sen, who was eager to press the campaign against the Northern warlords. Ch'en retired to Hui-chou. When the armies of Sun Yat-sen's Northern Expedition invaded Kiangsi province, Ch'en Chiung-ming, bitter about Sun's treatment, carried out a *coup d'état* in collusion with Wu P'ei-fu, a northern warlord, against Sun in Canton. Sun was forced to flee to Shanghai. In December 1922, however, warlords Yang Hsi-min of Yunnan, and Shen Hung-ying and Liu Chên-huan of Kwangsi took up arms for Sun and defeated Ch'en Chiung-ming. Ch'en retreated to the Tung-chiang region (or Tungkiang, the Eastern River region of Kwangtung Province) and the following year Sun Yat-sen came back to Canton. Kwangtung Province thus became divided between Ch'en Chiung-ming, who continued to rule the Tung-chiang region, and Sun Yat-sen. Ch'en tried several times to recover Canton but failed. Ch'en's political prestige declined from the high point of the summer of 1921, when he had conquered Kwangsi Province, but he still remained firmly in control of Tung-chiang, which he ruled until he was defeated in 1925 by the Kuomintang troops during the first Eastern Expedition.

EARLY ACTIVITIES OF P'ENG P'AI

A Group of Intellectual Reformers in Hai-feng

Communist movements are always started by the activities of an intellectual group. This was so in Hai-feng *hsien* where members of the new intellectual élite wanted to change the existing order. The most prominent among these young intellectuals was P'eng P'ai.

P'eng was born probably on October 22, 1896.¹⁷ His child name was T'ien-ch'üan, while his given name was Han-yü. He himself changed his first name to P'ai when he was a middle school student. His father, P'eng Shou-yin, who lived in Ch'iao-tung-she to the east of the town of Hai-feng, was a large landlord receiving rents in rice amounting to more

¹⁷ Hou Feng, "Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung te ling-tao-che P'eng P'ai" ("P'eng P'ai, the Leader of the Peasant Movement in Hai-lu-feng"), *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao* (Red Flags Fluttering) (Peking: Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Ch'u-p'an-she, Dec. 1957), Vol. V, p. 32. October 22, 1896, was the sixteenth day of the ninth month, 1896 in the lunar calendar. The registration files of Waseda University in Tokyo show that he was born on "the sixteenth day of the ninth month, the twenty-eighth year of Meiji." The lunar calendar was in use in the Ch'ing Dynasty. P'eng might not have converted the lunar date into the solar date when he reported the date of his birth at Waseda University. It is nearly certain that he was born on the sixteenth day of the ninth month according to the lunar calendar. But as to the year of his birth, Mr. Hou mentions 1896, while Waseda University the twenty-eighth year of Meiji, or 1895. A third source is Gaimushō, Jōhōbu (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau) ed., *Kaitai gendai Shina jinmei-kan* (A Revised Who's Who in Modern China) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1928), p. 57. It says "P'eng is thirty-three years old now." Supposing that he was in his thirty-third year in 1928, he should have been born in 1896. Still another rather unreliable source gives the date also as 1895: *Who's Who*, p. 70, in *Shina mondai jiten* (A Dictionary of Chinese Problems) (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1942).

than a thousand *tan* per year.¹⁸ His tenant farmers together with their families amounted to over fifteen hundred people. "My family," wrote P'eng P'ai, "consists of less than thirty persons, including all the old, the young, the male and the female. Each person has fifty peasants as slaves."¹⁹

In 1912 he married Ts'ai Su-p'ing. Although he did not belong to the Hakka he insisted on unbinding her feet, and the two of them walked on the streets of Hai-feng hand-in-hand, without regard for the astonishment of their fellow townsmen. His rebellious spirit thus displayed itself even in boyhood. Later, Ts'ai Su-p'ing was arrested by the Kuomintang troops and executed about one month after she gave birth to her third son.²⁰

P'eng P'ai went to Tokyo where he registered on September 30, 1918, at the College of Political Science and Economics of Waseda University. He graduated from this college on July 10, 1921.²¹ These were the years when Socialist movements developed with great rapidity among Japanese students. Waseda University was an important centre of one of these movements. The *Minjin Dōmei-kai* (People's Alliance), the first publicly-organised Socialist association of Waseda students, held its first formal meeting on February 11, 1919. The leading students were Masamichi Takatsu, Iwao Wada, Inejirō Asanuma, Ryūichi Inamura and Shōichi Miyake, who led the movement with the advice of two professors, Seigo Takahashi, Shinjirō Kitazawa, and one graduate, Ikuo Oyama. In October, Shinjirō Kitazawa, Iwao Wada, Inejirō Asanuma, Ryūichi Inamura and Shōichi Miyake split off from the group and organised the *Kensetsu-sha Dōmei* (Reformers' Alliance).²² Reportedly P'eng P'ai was converted to Socialism at this time and participated in the *Kensetsu-sha Dōmei*, and also became close to Masamichi Takatsu.²³ These Socialist movements at Waseda were characterised by the fact that they paid particular attention to agrarian problems and devoted themselves to organise agricultural co-operatives and peasant unions, while the other Socialist movements gave priority to organising urban workers. Today,

¹⁸ *Tan* is a unit of dry measure. A *tan* in Kwangtung Province is approximately equivalent to three U.S. bushels. Tōa Dōbunkai, *op. cit.*, p. 1216.

¹⁹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁰ Hou Feng, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²¹ From registration files of Waseda University.

²² Kikukawa Tadao, *Gakusei shakai undo-shi* (History of Student Socialist Movements), revised ed. (Tokyo: Umiguchi Shoten, 1947), pp. 54, 68.

²³ Kuwajima Kazuo, *Chu-nan-shi chihlo kyosanto oyobi kyosanto no kodo jokyo ni kansuru chosa hokoku-sho* (Report of an Investigation Concerning Activities of the Communist Party and Communist Bandits in Central and South China) (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1930), p. 213. In 1958, in reply to a question from the author, Mr. Takatsu, ex-Representative of the Japanese Socialist Party in the Diet, answered "I remember his name P'eng P'ai, quite well. But I cannot identify him now, as there were so many Korean and Chinese comrades in our group."

there are still a number of Waseda men among the major leaders of the Japanese agrarian movement. There is no doubt that P'eng was deeply influenced by this trend.

While he was in Tokyo in 1919 the news from the Peace Conference at Versailles, where the Chinese demands concerning Shantung were rejected, provoked in China the famous May Fourth Movement. Although the Tokyo police suppressed it, the Chinese students in Tokyo also dared to organise a demonstration parade on May 7.²⁴ Twenty-three Chinese were arrested and twenty-seven wounded according to Chinese student sources.²⁵ P'eng P'ai is said to have received wounds in the scalp, arms and legs.²⁶

After his graduation P'eng returned home and contributed an article, "Appealing to My Countrymen," to the first issue of *Hsin Hai-feng* (New Hai-feng), the organ of the General Federation of Students in Hai-feng hsien, edited by Cheng Chih-yün. In the article he boldly attacked the private property system from the Marxist point of view, and advocated the necessity of a social revolution to destroy the law, the government and the state which he considered were the instruments of the ruling class.²⁷ Having collected a number of books on Socialism in Japan, Shanghai and Canton, he brought them to Hai-feng and, with up-to-date information and advanced ideas, he deeply influenced the young people in his home district. He organised an intellectual group called the Association for Studying Socialism. Members of the Association such as Cheng Chih-yün, Li Lao-kung, P'eng Yüan-chang, Ch'en K'uei-ya, Ch'en Shun-i, Lin Tao-wen and Yang Wang, as well as Li Kuo-chen and Lin Su who had returned from Japan, were to become loyal comrades of Peng's Bolshevik movement.²⁸

P'eng P'ai's Organisation of a Peasant Movement

P'eng P'ai himself explained the story of his organisation of a peasant movement as follows:

"I became the Chief of the Bureau of Education in Hai-feng hsien in 1921, conceiving a fanciful plan to accomplish a social revolution through education. I assembled all the students and many boys and

²⁴ The Yuan Shih-k'ai government submitted to a major part of the Twenty-One Demands on May 7, 1915. From that time, the Chinese considered May 7 as one of the memorial days of national humiliation.

²⁵ Wang Kung-pi, "Tung-yu hui-han-lu (hsüan-lu)" ("A Part of the Report of Activities in Japan"), *Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao* (1955) No. 2, pp. 108-123.

²⁶ Fang Hui, "P'eng P'ai lieh-shih yü i-chiu-i-chiu-nien wu yüeh ch'i-jih Chung-kuo liu-jih hsueh-sheng Tung-ching shih-wei yü-hsing yun-tung." ("P'eng P'ai the Patriot and a Demonstration Parade of Chinese Students in Tokyo on May 7, 1919"), *Li-shih yen-chiu* (Historical Studies), No. 2, 1954.

²⁷ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung*, pp. 14-20.

²⁸ Chung I-mou "Hai-lu-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," p. 180; *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung*, p. 9.

girls of wealthy families at the town of Hai-feng, and organised a parade on May First. This had never taken place in the history of Hai-feng. With no workers and no peasants, the parade marched along the town streets: the students of the First Higher Primary School put up a red flag on which the word 'Bolshevisation' was written. How primitive! The gentry in Hai-feng spread such false rumours as that we were intending to share not only property but also wives, and attacked us. Being importuned by them, Ch'en Chiung-ming finally dismissed me. The principals and the teachers in Hai-feng, whose thoughts were relatively progressive, resigned one after another.

"Meanwhile, we had had an ideological campaign against the *Lu-an Jih-pao* (*Lu-an Daily*), the organ of Ch'en Chiung-ming. Comrade Li Ch'un-tao and I published several issues of *Ch'ih-hsin Chou-k'an* (*Sincere Mind Weekly*), arguing on behalf of the defenceless workers and peasants. But actually we were backed by neither workers nor peasants, and our childish activities were not known by either urban workers or rural peasants. One day, my seventh brother was reading aloud . . . our article appealing to the peasants which was published in an issue of *Ch'ih-hsin Chou-k'an*. My mother happened to listen . . . and as soon as he read through it . . . she wept and said with tears, 'The family whose ancestor did not accumulate virtue has a son who brings bankruptcy. . . . If we adopt your idea, we shall become bankrupt, won't we?' I tried to soothe her anger, and finally succeeded. Meanwhile, I hit on the idea that the peasants would be pleased in their hearts if they could read our article just as my mother had deplored it. And also, I began to believe that the peasants could be organised for an uprising. . . . One day in May, I started to organise the peasants, and first went to a village called Ch'ih-shan-yueh."²⁹

All the documents concerning P'eng P'ai's peasant movement agree on 1921 as the year when he began his peasant movement, but there are some differences as to which part of 1921. Hou Feng says, "... some time in the early autumn of 1921."³⁰ Chung I-mou, "... the sixth month of the lunar calendar, or July."³¹ While Hou Feng and Chung I-mou both must have read P'eng P'ai's above-cited "Hai-feng nung-min yun-tung," they did not mention the reason why they changed the date.

The present author, however, sets the date as May of 1922 for the following reasons: (1) P'eng P'ai himself showed that he began his peasant movement in May or June of 1922 in a table, which previous scholars have apparently overlooked, attached to his article "Hai-feng nung-min yun-tung," entitled "A Table Showing the Membership of Peasant Unions in the Hai-lu-feng District and Reasons for Its Increase and Decrease."³² (2) Chung I-mou cited in his book a chronology which was published in the anniversary issue of Ch'en Chiung-ming's organ, *Lu-an Jih-k'an*.³³ The chronology is as follows:

²⁹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

³⁰ Hou Feng, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³¹ Chung I-mou, "Hai-feng nung-min te pa-nien chan-tou," p. 181.

³² P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

³³ The *Lu-an Jih-k'an* and the *Lu-an Jih-pao*, mentioned above, must be the same paper.

The tenth year of the Republic, or 1921, August 2: a group of students petitioned that P'eng P'ai should be appointed Chief of the *Ch'üan-hsüeh-so* (Office for Promoting Study) (The *Ch'üan-hsüeh-so* changed its name to *Chiao-yü-chü* or the Bureau of Education).

October 1: official announcement of the appointment of P'eng P'ai to be Chief of the Bureau of Education, and his inauguration.

The eleventh year of the Republic, or 1922, May 4: the students' parade of a large scale celebrating May First.⁸⁴

May 5: The Magistrate, Weng Kuei-ch'ing accepted P'eng's resignation from the position of Chief of the Bureau of Education.⁸⁵

Although Chung I-mou is inclined to refute this document, it should be regarded as an important source. (3) The registration files of Waseda University dated P'eng's graduation as July 10, 1921, and recorded that he passed the final examination in self-government and in six other classes. It is therefore reasonable to assume that he was still in Tokyo, at least until the time of the graduation ceremonies. (4) If one carefully reads P'eng P'ai's article, one can find that he apparently dated only his appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Education as 1921. It does not exclude the "1922" hypothesis.

Thus we can make a chronology concerning his initial activity as follows:

July or August, 1921: P'eng returned home. Somewhere in China, en route to Hai-feng, he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party.⁸⁶ He wrote his "Appealing to My Countrymen" in these months. October 1, 1921: He was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Education. He appointed his comrades, one after another, to important teaching positions.⁸⁷

May 1, 1922: The May First parade.

May 9, 1922: He resigned.

May, 1922: He started to organise the peasants.

The Development of the Peasant Union

At the beginning of his activity in the rural villages, P'eng talked to the peasants, gave speeches and tried to persuade them to organise themselves. The traditional attitude was so strong that he could get only five

⁸⁴ There is a confusion about this date between the May 4 demonstration and the May 1 one.

⁸⁵ Chung I-mou, *Hai-lu-feng nung-min yun-tung*, pp. 124-125.

⁸⁶ "In 1920 or 1921, Comrade P'eng P'ai became one of the most active leaders of the Communist organisation. He was active as an agitator among workers in Canton for a short while after he became a Communist." Yü Te, "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih ch'uan-lieh" ("A Short Biography of Comrade P'eng P'ai"), Hua Ying-shen ed., *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang lieh-shih ch'uan* (Biographies of Martyrs of the Chinese Communist Party) (Hongkong: 1949), p. 46. Another source indicates that he was a member of the Communist Party from 1920 on. See the editor's note in Peng-pai [sic] "Memoirs of a Chinese Communist," *Living Age*, Vol. 344, No. 4399, April 1933, p. 117. He did not go out of the Hai-lu-feng district after his return home from Japan until the fall of 1923 when he made a trip to Hong Kong. If Yü Te's description is correct, he must have become a Communist on his way from Tokyo to Hai-feng in 1921.

⁸⁷ Chung I-mou, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

peasants interested in the beginning. Nevertheless, these five peasants were a bridgehead. Their demonstration of the usefulness of unity in small daily troubles brought an increase in the membership of the peasant union.

In September 1922, the peasant union of the village of Ch'ih-shan-yüeh was inaugurated with a membership of over five hundred. On January 1, 1923, the Federation of Peasant Unions in Hai-feng *hsien* was inaugurated with a membership of twenty thousand, so that P'eng estimated that, as the average family consisted of five persons, the people controlled by the unions amounted to around one hundred thousand.³⁸

As a result of the increase in membership, the unions became so powerful that they could control the food markets in the town—the potato market, the cane sugar market and many others—in spite of the opposition of those formerly in control.³⁹ They also succeeded in stopping the *Hsieh-tou* between the Red Flag and the Black Flag Clans, established a peasant school and tried to improve farming, develop reforestation, arbitrate judicial cases and form a medical mutual aid organisation. These activities of the peasant unions naturally drew the attention of the local authorities to them. Still the peasant union was not strong enough to compete with the official administration and the private forces of the landlords. The union distinguished between those slogans used among members and those used towards the outside: the latter were “improvements in farming,” “education of farmers,” and “charities”; the former held out such attractions to the peasant as “reduction of rent,” “abolition of miscellaneous additional rent payments,” and “paying no commission-fee to the police.”⁴⁰ As to the reduction of rent, they were prudent enough to conceal their plans on this point for five years.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the peasant unions could not avoid conflict with the landowners as long as they tried to protect tenant farmer interests. The first clash took place when a landowner attempted to raise his rents. The *hsien* government put into jail six tenant farmers who opposed this move. The peasant unions mobilised six thousand peasants into a demonstration and thus frightened the judges, who finally released the prisoners.

³⁸ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, pp. 61–67.

³⁹ P'eng P'ai explained that these markets were formerly controlled by “gentry, local rascals and temple curates.” *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 69. These slogans used among members clearly show that the peasant union stuck to protecting the interests of tenant farmers and did not concern itself with the interests of small landed farmers. The present author regrets being unable to find source materials which could provide answers to the questions about the union's attitude toward small local merchants and landed farmers.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 65–69.

This success brought fame to the unions and raised their prestige, and their membership increased even in the adjoining *hsiens* of Tzu-chin, Wu-hua and Hui-yang. The Federation of Peasant Unions in Hai-feng *hsien* developed into the Federation of Peasant Unions in Hui-chou Prefecture and within two months, by May 1923, it grew into the Provincial Peasant Union of Kwangtung. At that time *hsien* peasant unions already were established in Hai-feng and Lu-feng, and were being organised in Tzu-chin and Hui-yang. Although not as yet organised in Hui-lai and P'u-ning, peasants from these two *hsiens* were already participating in peasant unions.⁴²

Besides P'eng P'ai, many other intellectuals played active roles in the peasant movement. Among these were Li Yüeh-t'ing, a principal of a middle school, and Yang Ssu-chen, a principal of a higher primary school, who made speeches at the inauguration meeting of the Peasant Union of Ch'ih-shan-yüeh. There were at least six intellectuals, including Chairman P'eng P'ai, among the thirteen members of the Executive Committee of the Provincial Peasant Union at the time of its inauguration.⁴³

Such a remarkable development of the peasant movement must have caused strong feelings of uneasiness among the gentry and local officials. They hesitated, however, to suppress the union because the peasants had been careful to avoid conflicts with landlords, and because there were many students and teachers with high social prestige locally among the leaders of the peasant movement. If such a movement had been organised by the peasants themselves, their landlords would have suppressed it ruthlessly at the very beginning. In addition, the *hsien* authorities would have instructed the police to arrest the leaders before the movement grew to such a size that the relatively weak police organisation could not arrest them. Regardless, however, it would have been difficult to arrest the foreign-educated P'eng P'ai, who was the son of a major landlord. It would also have been difficult to arrest the other teachers and students, most of whom came from the upper or middle classes.

At the beginning of the peasant movement, Weng Kuei-ch'ing, the Magistrate of Hai-feng *hsien*, looked on with folded arms. His successor, Lü T'ieh-ch'a also dared not criticise the movement. The students, with the collaboration of the peasant unions, led a movement against the appointment of the succeeding Magistrate Ch'iu Ching-yün. They nominated an intellectual union leader as their candidate but did not get him appointed. Instead, Ch'en Chiung-ming appointed Wang

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 75-80.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 79.

Tso-hsin as the next magistrate.⁴⁴ While the magistrates did not intervene in the early activities of the unions, P'eng P'ai and other leaders skilfully manipulated the discontented peasants and succeeded in rapidly developing the power of the peasant unions to such an extent that the small police power in the town of Hai-feng could no longer suppress it.

The August 16 (Fifth Day of the Seventh Month) Incident

In the summer of 1923 the Hai-feng district suffered from a heavy typhoon. The Peasant Union passed a resolution to claim a 70 per cent. reduction of rent, with a slogan "*Chih tuo san-ch'eng chiao-na*" ("at most to pay 30 per cent. rent").⁴⁵ The first effort of the movement to gain reduction of rent by taking advantage of the damage from the typhoon resulted in an attempt by the local officials to use all their power to suppress the union. As a result a certain number of intellectuals began to drop out of the movement. The Magistrate Wang Tso-hsin attempted in vain to disperse the people who assembled in the General Meeting of the Peasant Union in Hai-feng *hsien* on August 15 (the fourth day of the seventh month), 1923. Wang made this declaration: "The chief of the bandits, P'eng P'ai, is planning a revolt. The people in all the villages should not become involved in this. Do not cause suffering for yourselves because of this revolt."⁴⁶ The Magistrate ordered the police to check all peasants on the main streets; but the police were dispersed and Wang's declaration was ripped down by the peasants.

Shocked, the Magistrate assembled the police in the *hsien* office where they dug trenches and prepared fortifications against the coming attack of the peasants. Meanwhile, he also requested Chung Ching-t'ang in Shan-wei to reinforce the Hai-feng position.

The General Meeting gathered together over 20,000 peasants, who met with much optimism. That night Chung's troops entered the town, while at the same time the Magistrate had assembled leading "gentry," so-called, to consider ways of suppressing the peasant union. At dawn on August 16 (the fifth day of the seventh month), Chung Ching-t'ang's troops, the police and all available self-defence corps of the *hsien*, staged a surprise attack on the peasant union headquarters and arrested twenty-five leaders of the union, including the president, Yang Ch'i-shan.

At that time Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had been expelled from Canton by Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops, had his headquarters in Lao-lung. P'eng P'ai went to Lao-lung to petition Ch'en for the release of all those arrested, a reduction of rent and the re-establishment of the peasant

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 68, 78.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

union. Although Ch'en was a warlord who depended upon the landlords and more conservative elements for his support, he had been an associate of Sun Yat-sen and therefore was unable to refuse P'eng P'ai's petition categorically. He delayed making any decision as long as possible. P'eng became impatient and travelled to Swatow, Hai-feng and Hong Kong, but returned to Lao-lung and again pressed the petition on Ch'en. Ch'en still would not deal with the petition but he urged upon P'eng an appointment to his staff saying that he felt the need of such able men in his own headquarters. Soon Ch'en and his staff moved to Swatow and then to Hui-chou in order to prepare for an attack on Canton. P'eng P'ai found an excuse to stay at Swatow, where he planned and established a new peasant union.⁴⁷

While he was at Swatow, he fell in love with a student named Hsü Yü-ching, and a daughter was born from this illegitimate union.⁴⁸ Later, Hsü Yü-ching moved to Hai-feng and lived together with P'eng P'ai and his wife, Ts'ai Su-p'ing.⁴⁹ It is reported that Hsü Yü-ching moved to a secret soviet area near Swatow after P'eng P'ai's execution.⁵⁰

The news that a new peasant union had been established and the knowledge that Ch'en Chiung-ming at Hui-chou sent telegrams to P'eng P'ai urging him to come and join his general staff, combined with other rumours, made an impression on the Magistrate and the gentry at Hai-feng. Finally, Wang Tso-hsin released the imprisoned peasant leaders. P'eng P'ai and other leaders of the peasant union were highly pleased with this result of their long drawn-out struggle.

Ch'en's attitude towards the peasant movement was soon to be tested. In March of 1924 Ch'en returned to Hai-feng. Here he was importuned by the landlords and the Magistrate, Wang Tso-hsin, to suppress the peasant union on the basis that it was dangerous, especially because of its close relation to the Kuomintang-Communist government in Canton. In the end Ch'en made up his mind to carry out the suppression, principally because of his hostility to the Canton government. Ch'en advised the landlords and officials on March 16, "All right, you may disband

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86 *et seq.* This was a peasant union in "nothing but name," as P'eng himself indicated later. P'eng P'ai, "Kuan yü Hai-feng nung-min yun-tung te i-feng-hsin" ("A Letter Relating to the Peasant Movement in Hai-feng"), *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* (Guide Weekly) No. 70, 1924.

⁴⁸ Nym Wales, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁴⁹ Su Hui, "P'eng P'ai t'ung-chih ho t'a ling-tao te Hai-lu-feng nung-ming yün-tung" (Comrade P'eng P'ai and the Hai-lu-feng Peasant Movement under His Leadership), Wu-han-shih-chi-kuan Ma-k'o-ssu-Lieh-ning-chu-i yeh-chien-hsüeh-hsiao (Marx-Leninism Night School of the Wuhan City Departments) ed., *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'antang tsai chung-nan-ti-ch'ü ling-tao Ko-ming-tou-chêng te li-shih tzu-liao* (Historical Materials on the Revolutionary Struggles led by the Chinese Communist Party in Central and South China), Vol. 1 (Wuhan: Chung-nan Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1951), p. 174.

⁵⁰ Nym Wales, *loc. cit.*

the peasant union but don't use armed force at first."⁵¹ The peasant union had planned a mass meeting on March 17 to celebrate their reorganisation, and on the same day the Magistrate's order for their dissolution was issued.

Although Ch'en's power had decreased, the peasant union was still not strong enough to resist his opposition. The delegates of the peasants met and decided that P'eng P'ai and Li Lao-kung would leave Hai-feng while Cheng Chih-yün and P'eng Han-yün would remain to organise an underground movement. Li, who came from Chieh-sheng in Hai-feng *hsien*, entered the Whampoa Military Academy after he fled from Hai-feng to Canton with P'eng P'ai. Cheng had been a member of the Association for Studying Socialism and had also been the editor of the periodical, *New Hai-feng*, to which P'eng had contributed his article "Appealing to My Countrymen." P'eng Han-yün was P'eng P'ai's elder brother.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE PEASANT MOVEMENT, 1921-24

Relative Indifference

The prevailing interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in the young Chinese Communist Party tended to emphasise the role of urban workers and to de-emphasise the role of rural peasants. This attitude is obvious, not only in the official Party statements,⁵² but also in the articles of its organ *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* (*Guide Weekly*).

During the first year after its inception in September 1922, this journal published only three short articles by Lo Chang-lung on agrarian problems.⁵³ Lo had participated in Li Ta-chao's group when he was a student at the National Peking University. It was said that he was an experienced leader of urban workers' movements, but there is no evidence that he had any experience working with peasant groups. In 1931 he opposed both Li Li-san's group and the Russian trained students' group. He organised an Emergency Central Committee in opposition to the Central Committee of the Party which was directed by the Russian-trained students, and insisted upon immediate reorganisation of the Party structure. He

⁵¹ P'eng P'ai, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁵² Muramatsu Yūji, "Shoki no Chūgoku Kyōsantō to nōmin" ("The Chinese Communist Party in Its Beginning and the Peasant"), Kazankai ed., *Ajia, kako to genzai* (*Asia, Past and Present*) (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1955), p. 158 *et seq.*

⁵³ Lo Chang-lung, "Shantung min-chung te ko-ming ch'ao-liu" ("The Revolutionary Current of the People in Shantung"), No. 40, September 16, 1923, consisting of 11 lines; "Chianghsi Ma-chia-ts'un nung-min k'ang-shui yun-tung" ("A movement to Refuse to pay the Land Tax at Ma-chia-ts'un in Kiangsi"), No. 41, September 23 1923, about half a page; "Ch'en Chiung-ming ch'iang-tzu hsia te Hai-feng nung-min" (The Peasants of Hai-feng under the Cruel Suppression of Ch'en Chiung-ming), No. 43, October 17, 1927, eighteen lines.

was expelled from the Party on February 2, 1931, and arrested by the Nationalist government on April 8.⁸⁴ Therefore, there is probably no particular significance in the fact that Lo wrote concerning the agrarian problems at this period.

There seems, furthermore, to have been a major divergence of policy between the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and the Executive Committee of the Comintern concerning agrarian problems at this stage. The directive from the Comintern to the Third National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1923 concerning agrarian problems was as follows:

"1. The national revolution in China and the creation of an anti-imperialist front will necessarily be followed by an agrarian revolution of the peasantry against the remnants of feudalism. The revolution can be victorious only if it becomes possible to draw into the movement the basic masses of the Chinese population, *i.e.*, the peasants with small landholdings.

"2. Thus the peasant problem becomes the central point of the entire policy [of the Chinese Communist Party]. . . .

"3. Therefore, the Communist Party, which is the party of the working class, must aim at an alliance between the workers and the peasants. This task can be carried out only by means of continuous propaganda and by the actual application of such slogans of the agrarian revolution as: confiscation of landlords' land, confiscation of monastic and church land, and the passing of this land to the peasants without compensation; abolition of the practice of the starvation lease; abolition of the existing system of taxation, of the practice of the 'squeeze'; abolition of the customs barriers between provinces; destruction of the institution of tax-farmers [*otkupshchiki*], abolition of the mandarinat; creation of organs of peasant self-government to take charge of the confiscation of land, and so forth. . . ."⁸⁵

In the Japanese abstract of the resolutions of the Third National Congress we find the following items concerning the interests of the peasants:

- "1. Standardisation and reduction of rents.
2. Maximum rent law and the right of peasant unions to establish a justifiable rent.
3. Improvement of irrigation.

⁸⁴ Onodera Kikan, *Koku-kyō kōsō-shi shi-ryō* (Source Material on the History of the Kuomintang-Communist Struggle), mimeo. (Shanghai: Onodera Kikan, 1939), pp. 180-183, 462-464. According to its introduction, this book is a complete translation of *Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chih t'ou-shih* (A Perspective of the Chinese Communist Party), Kuomintang, Central Committee, ed. Onodera Kikan, the Organ of Onodera, was a Japanese military intelligence organisation led by Colonel Makoto Onodera, which operated for a short period in 1939.

⁸⁵ Xenia Jukoff Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927, A Documentary Survey* (Stanford Un.: 1957), pp. 344-345.

4. Improved seeds and fertilisers, and the right of the poor peasants to rent seeds and equipment from the state.
5. Minimum price laws on major agricultural products."⁵⁶

This divergence shows that the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party did not put as much emphasis on the peasant problems as the Comintern in 1923.⁵⁷

Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Peasant Movement

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the top leader and Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party in this period, had opposed in practice the radical peasant movement. In terms of abstract theory, he recognised the importance of the movement: "As the majority of the total population of China consists of peasants, naturally they are a great power to aid the national revolution. The national revolution will not be a thorough success as a people's revolution, if the peasant is not included in the force of the national revolution."⁵⁸ However, in practice, in 1923, he expressed as his opinion: "The Chinese Communist Party must develop large-scale rural Communist movements and local Communist movements as its most pressing task." A reader commented in a letter published in the party organ *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* in August 1923, "The vital weaknesses of the present Socialist movement are: the excess of urban orientation; the shortage of talented men in the local movement; the cowardice of intellectuals who fear to leap into the mass of the people. This is the major cause of the stagnation of our movement."

"It seems to me too romantic," Ch'en Tu-hsiu replied, "for you to insist upon a Communist movement in the rural districts, because the main force of the Communist movement must necessarily consist of industrial workers. In such a country of small farmers as China, over half the farmers are petit-bourgeois landed farmers who adhere firmly to private-property consciousness. How can they accept Communism? How can the Communist movement extend itself successfully in the mass of rural China where there are many landed farmers?"⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ken'ichi Hatano ed., *Shina Kyōsan Tōshi (A History of the Chinese Communist Party)* (Tokyo: Gaimushō Jōhōbu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public Information Bureau], 1932), pp. 46-49.

⁵⁷ The question of how the radical reforms proposed by the Comintern were modified into such an inoffensive and mild form by the Chinese Communist Party is an important one. The author has been unable to obtain any major pertinent source material.

⁵⁸ Cited from its Japanese version, "Shina kokumin kakumei to shakai kaikyū" ("The National Revolution in China and Her Social Classes"), Yamaguchi Shin'ichi tr., *Shina Kakumei ronbun-shu (A Collection of Articles about the Chinese Revolution)* (Tokyo: Marukusu Shobō, 1930), p. 13.

⁵⁹ *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, No. 34, August 1, 1923. Whether this opinion was Ch'en's own, or dictated by the Comintern, is a problem which cannot be answered accurately from available sources.

The result of the August 16 incident in Hai-feng⁶⁰ and other incidents in rural districts only served to reinforce Ch'en Tu-hsiu's conviction that the National Revolution in which the Chinese Communist Party actively collaborated with the Kuomintang and its troops, was the first step which the Party should take. In an article entitled "Peasants in Kwangtung and Peasants in Hunan," he argued⁶¹:

"Suffering from a natural disaster the peasants in Hai-feng, Kwangtung Province, claimed a reduction of rent. Although they did not infringe upon the laws at all, the troops of Ch'en Chiung-ming suddenly disbanded the peasant union which consisted of over 10,000 families. They arrested and imprisoned twenty-five members of the peasant union, and have not released them yet. If the troops of Sun Yat-sen could have marched to Hai-lu-feng before, such a false charge would not have occurred.

"In order to lower the price of rice the peasants in Heng-shan, Hunan Province, interfered with the shipping of rice. Although they did not infringe upon the law at all, Chao the Butcher,⁶² who himself was a big landlord, a rice merchant and also a warlord, suddenly dispersed 10,000 peasants in a meeting of the peasant union by the use of his many troops, killing, wounding and arresting many peasants, after the retreat of the T'an Yen-k'ai's National Revolutionary troops. If T'an's troops had not already retreated from Heng-shan such a false charge would not have occurred.

"Thus we must recognise the following tactics. All labour movements, peasant movements and student movements should follow the political movements, because all movements need political freedom. For instance, democratic government will not be secured until the political power of Ts'ao K'un and Wu P'ei-fu collapses. Where are the Railroad Workers' Union and the Federation of Student Unions able to exist except in Canton?"

In theory Ch'en accepted the potentialities of peasant revolution as expressed in the scheme of Marxism-Leninism, but in practice he believed that a radical peasant movement would only hinder the development of an integrated National Revolution. He did not believe that there was a balancing point between the moderate and radical peasant movements where the peasants could be mobilised to aid in the National Revolution. Because of his inclination to undervalue the peasant movement, he could not develop effective political tactics concerning the peasant movement to attain this goal. Since this was the attitude taken by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the Central Headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party itself did not take an active part in the peasant movement. While their comrade P'eng P'ai was struggling to maintain his peasant unions in the face of opposition from the landlord elements, there is no evidence that the leadership of the Party made any effort to aid him.

⁶⁰ See above, p. 173.

⁶¹ *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao*, No. 48, December 12, 1923.

⁶² Chao Heng-t'i, who was Governor of Hunan Province and belonged to the Wu P'ei-fu group.

THE HAI-LU-FENG SOVIET

THE PEASANTS' DEPARTMENT OF THE KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Staff

In February 1924, soon after the Kuomintang-Communist Alliance was inaugurated at the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang established the Peasants' Department.⁶³ "With no previous experience," its function at the beginning was merely to draw up a concrete plan on the basis of its own research.⁶⁴

The first Head of the Department was Lin Tsu-han, a Communist who had been associated with Sun Yat-sen and his party from the time of the Hsing-chung-hui. He resigned from the position about April as he was moving to Hankow. His successor was P'eng Su-ming, and following him as Acting Heads of the Department were Li Chang-ta and Huang Chü-su. After Huang, Liao Chung-k'ai, the Head of the Department of Workers and the leader of the left wing group of the Kuomintang, assumed the position in addition to his other duties. Following Liao's assassination in August of 1925, Ch'en Kung-po succeeded to the post and after him Lin Tsu-han again assumed the position. During the period of the Wuhan government, T'an P'ing-shan became the Head of the Department.⁶⁵ Regardless of the kaleidoscopic change of Heads, the Communist core of the Department remained the same.

"After Lin Tsu-han became the Head of the Department of Farmers," says Chiang Kai-shek, "he recommended one P'eng P'ai, a Communist as secretary. Later he himself resigned in order not to attract the attention of the Party members. P'eng P'ai stayed on as secretary despite repeated changes at the top. All training classes set up for farmers were controlled by Communist elements, and the students admitted were also either Communists or members of their front organisations. Similarly, the farmers' unions and 'farmers' volunteer corps' were manipulated by the Communists."⁶⁶

Tsou Lu, an anti-Communist who belonged to the Hsi-shan clique, the right wing of the Kuomintang Party, says, "P'eng P'ai, the Secretary . . . of the Department, was a Communist. . . . P'eng P'ai boldly avowed

⁶³ Lo Chi'-yüan, ed., "Pen-pu i-nien-lai kung-tso pao-kao kai-yao" ("Short Report about the Activities of our Department for This Year"), *Chung-kuo Nung-min*, No. 2, 1926. A mainland Chinese source indicates that the Chinese Communist Party took the initiative in establishing the Peasants' Department in the Central Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang. Chang Yu-i ed., *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh-shih tzu-liao* (*A Documentary History of Agriculture in Modern China*) (Peking: San-lien Shu-tien, 1957), I, p. 675.

⁶⁴ Lo Chi'-yüan, *op. cit.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Chiang Chung-cheng (Kai-shek), *Soviet Russia in China, A Summing Up at Seventy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 31.

that anyone who did not agree with him would not dare to remain as Head of the Department. Huang Chü-su became very angry upon hearing this and called upon the central Party headquarters to discharge P'eng P'ai, but in vain. Rather it was Huang Chü-su who was forced to resign, and Liao Chung-k'ai was appointed the Head in addition to his other position."⁶⁷

At the time the Peasants' Department was established, P'eng P'ai must still have been in Hai-feng devoting himself to the reorganisation of the peasant union. Although it was not unusual for China to appoint members of committees or heads of departments who were not in residence at the seat of government, it would seem impossible that they should appoint a secretary of a department who would not be present to attend to his work. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that P'eng P'ai was appointed when he fled from Hai-feng to Canton after March 18, 1924.

By October of 1925, Lo Ch'i-yüan was listed as secretary of the Department,⁶⁸ replacing P'eng P'ai. The major personnel of the Department of Farmers at the beginning of 1926 were⁶⁹:

Head: Ch'en Kung-po

Secretary: Lo Ch'i-yüan

Tsu-chih-kan-shih (Organisation Managers): Yüan Hsiao-hsien

P'eng P'ai

T'an Chih-t'ang

It is not clear what the duties of the Organisation Managers were. In the fifth article of the regulations of the Department, the third paragraph tells us, "the Tsu-chih-yuan (Organiser) is to organise peasant groups outside the Department, to supervise the activities of the peasant union leaders dispatched from Headquarters, to discipline the clerks and the leaders of peasant unions dispatched from Headquarters, to guide the development of peasant movements and to realise the objectives as set forth by the Peasants' Department."⁷⁰ This "Organiser" would seem to be the same as the "Organisation Manager." Another source states, "Lo Ch'i-yuan was appointed the Secretary, P'eng P'ai was Manager and the Leader Dispatched from Headquarters for the Tung-chiang Region (East River Region) and Yuan Hsiao-hsien was Manager and the Leader Dispatched from Headquarters for the Hsi-chiang Region (West River

⁶⁷ Tsou Lu, *Kuo-min-tang shih-kao* (A Draft History of the Kuomintang) (Shanghai: Shang-wu Yin-shu-kuan, 1929), I, p. 386.

⁶⁸ Lo Ch'i-yuan, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

Region). They were all Communists."⁷¹ We can assume that P'eng P'ai worked for several months in the office of the Department at Canton, and then moved to the position of Organisation Manager where he worked actively in the vanguard of the peasant movement in organising rural areas. There is one source that shows him to have been active in the peasant movement in Kuang-ning at the beginning of 1925.⁷²

Among the above-mentioned major personnel in the Department, Lo Ch'i-yüan, Yüan Hsiao-hsien and P'eng P'ai were called "the three superior leaders of the peasant movement."⁷³ The fact that these three persons took over the leadership of the peasant movement was reported, not only by such Kuomintang sources as are quoted above, but also by Communist sources.⁷⁴

The Plan for the First Step of the Peasant Movement

After several months inactivity, the Department of Farmers proposed the following "Plan for the First Step of the Peasant Movement," based upon the resolution of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang:

1. A base for the peasant movement shall be established in a place which is politically and strategically important and has easy communication with Canton.
2. Twenty Leaders of peasant unions shall be dispatched to start activities in certain *hsiens*.
3. A Peasant Movement Training Institute shall be established. The term shall be one month. The graduates shall be appointed as Leaders of the peasant movement.
4. The regulations of the Peasant Movement Training Institute shall be established later.
5. The Peasant Union of All Kwangtung Province shall be inaugurated in September 1924.
6. A song of the peasants shall be composed.
7. A design for a flag of the peasants shall be selected.⁷⁵

This plan passed the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on June 30, 1924. The Department immediately started to work. They enacted the Regulations of the Peasant Union,⁷⁶ and established the Peasant Union Training Institute in July. For the peasant self-defence corps they adopted General Principles of Organisation which passed the First National Congress in January 1924.

⁷¹ Fan Pai-ch'uan, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ch'eng-li ch'u-ch'i te nung-min yun-tung" ("Peasant Movements During the Establishment of the Chinese Communist Party"), *Shih-hsueh chou-k'an* (*Historical Studies Weekly*) of the *Ta Kung Pao* (Shanghai edition), April 3, 1952.

⁷² *Ti-t'z'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i te nung-min yun-tung* (*The Peasant Movement During the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*) (Peking: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953), p. 143 *et seq.*

⁷³ Onodera Kikan, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

⁷⁴ For instance, Chang Yu-i, *op. cit.*, I, p. 676.

⁷⁵ Lo Ch'i-yüan, *op. cit.*

⁷⁶ Ho Yang-ling, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 53-71.

The Peasant Movement Training Institute

The Peasants' Department concentrated on the Training Institute. The major persons who devoted themselves to organising the peasants in the rural districts and who became the core of the organisation as well as the communicators between the rural peasant organisations and the central headquarters of the Kuomintang in Canton, were graduates of this Institute. The rapid development of the peasant movement from the autumn of 1924 on, in the area under Kuomintang control, was mainly due to the activity of these subleaders.

The Institute continued for six terms. The students of the first and second terms consisted of those who belonged to the Kuomintang and would volunteer for the peasant movement. After the third term only the members of the peasant union or of tenant families qualified as students. Not only was no tuition fee charged but the student was supplied with a uniform, shoes, stationery and three *yüan* per month for pocket-money.

The first term lasted from July 3 to August 21, 1924. The Chu-jen (Chief Manager) of the Institute was P'eng P'ai. There were thirty-three graduates.

The second term ran from August 21 to October 30. The Chief Manager was Lo Ch'i-yüan. There were 142 graduates, all of them from Kwangtung Province.

The third term ran from January 1 to April 3, 1925. The Chief Manager was Yüan Hsiao-hsien. There were 114 graduates, all of them from Kwangtung Province.

The fourth term ran from May 1 to September 1. The Chief Manager was T'an Chih-t'ang. There were 51 graduates and auditors numbered 25, 64 from Kwangtung, 10 from Hunan and 2 from Kwangsi.

The fifth term ran from October 1 to December 8. The Chief Manager was probably Lo Ch'i-yüan.⁷⁷ There were 113 graduates, 41 from Kwangtung, 44 from Hunan, 7 from Shantung, 7 from Hupei, 6 from Kwangsi, 4 from Kiangsi, 2 from Anhwei and 2 from Fukien.

The sixth term ran from May 3 to October 5, 1926. The So-chang (Principal)⁷⁸ was Mao Tse-tung, and Hsiao Ch'u-nü was a full-time teacher. Among the fifteen teachers, seven were Communists: Lin Tsu-han, Ch'ang T'ai-lei, Hsiao Ch'u-nü, Teng Chung-hsia, Kao Yü-han, Yüan Hsiao-hsien and Lo Ch'i-yüan. There were 318 graduates, 2 from Kwangtung, 36 from Hunan, 23 from Shantung, 27 from Hupei, 40 from Kwangsi, 22 from Kiangsi, 15 from Anhwei, 16 from Fukien, 22 from Chihli, 29 from Honan, 4 from Jehö, 5 from Chahar, 8 from Suiyuan, 16 from Shensi, 25 from Szechwan, 10 from Kiangsu, 10 from Yunnan, 1 from Kweichow and 2 from Fengtien [in Manchuria].⁷⁹

⁷⁷ The present writer could not find any source material which shows this exactly.

⁷⁸ They were called "Chief Manager" until the fifth term. In the sixth term the head was called "Principal."

⁷⁹ "Nung-min-pu nung-min yun-tung wei-yuan-hui ti-i-tz'u hui-i-lu" (The Minutes of the First Committee for the Peasant Movement, Peasants' Department), *Chung-kuo Nung-min*, No. 4, 1926; *The Peasant Movement During the Period of the First Revolutionary Civil War*, p. 20 et seq.

It is clear that the Institute developed rapidly. Furthermore, we have to pay attention to the increasing diversification of the home provinces of the students, which suggests the spreading development of the peasant movement. The power of the Communists among the leaders of the Institute was overwhelming. It seems quite possible that no one except Communists was permitted to enter.⁸⁰

The second part of Dr. Eto's article will be published in our next issue.

⁸⁰ Tsou Lu, *op. cit.*, I, p. 386.

M. N. Roy and the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

By ROBERT C. NORTH

M. N. ROY was undoubtedly the most colourful of all non-Russian Communists in the era of Lenin and Stalin. A Hindu Brahmin by birth, an ardent Indian nationalist and revolutionary in his youth, and a convert to Marxism only after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, he rose rapidly within the Comintern hierarchy to become the most prominent Asian exponent and theoretician of Communism for Asia. During the twenties his concepts of revolution for the colonies and so-called semi-colonies of the world were incorporated into many of the most important decisions of the Communist International, and it is no exaggeration to state that he ranks with Lenin and Mao Tse-tung in the development of fundamental Communist theory for the underdeveloped, as contrasted with the industrialised, areas of the globe.

In 1927 the Communist International assigned Roy the task of trouble-shooting the alliance between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, which was suffering increasingly disruptive stress. As it turned out, his failure to achieve a satisfactory solution made him *persona non grata*—or more precisely, perhaps, a scapegoat—in the eyes of Stalin, and so it was that the China mission, which might have enhanced his already considerable prestige within the Comintern, actually brought about his political downfall.

Reaching China on the eve of the fatefully important Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Roy carried with him the Theses on the Chinese Situation, which had been adopted by the Seventh Extraordinary Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in December, 1926, and which he had helped to draft. In seeking to implement the Theses as he understood them, Roy found himself in sharp conflict with Michael Borodin, who had been serving as Communist adviser to the Kuomintang and to the Chinese Communist Party since late 1923. Until this moment, Moscow had been guided in its support of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance mainly by the reports that Borodin had been dispatching, but now Roy had come armed with his own radical viewpoint and with the Theses of the

Seventh Plenum, which emphasised the importance of strong Communist support of the agrarian revolution already surging over the Chinese countryside.

The flaw in the Comintern position was that support for the Kuomintang and support for the agrarian revolution were antagonistic, mutually exclusive policies. The Communists might have chosen one course or the other, but the attempt to do both could end only in trouble—as unfolding events were soon to demonstrate. The report which Roy submitted at the close of his mission goes a long way toward revealing how the Communist leaderships both in Moscow and in China were “internally conflicted” and how these mutually incompatible tendencies moved the various actors in the complicated plot toward almost inevitable disaster.

Until now there have been virtually no documents available for reconstructing either the proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party or the pertinent discussions and controversies immediately preceding and following its crucially significant sessions. Harold Isaacs, in his excellent and enduring volume *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*¹ records with considerable accuracy the course of events that distinguished the period, but it is clear that in attempting to present the viewpoints, the main lines of argument, and the nature of the clashes among the various protagonists, he did not have the advantage of access to the documents included in Roy's report.

Similarly in their standard work *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*,² Conrad Brandt, John K. Fairbank and Benjamin Schwartz were forced to rely upon largely secondary sources for their treatment of the Fifth Congress. On page 89 of that volume the authors state: “The following document is a Japanese summary of the political and agrarian platforms adopted by the Fifth Congress of the CCP, which convened in Hankow in late April and early May 1927. Although far from complete, this summary is presented here as a substitute for the original text, which is apparently unavailable in the United States.” The Fifth Congress is also discussed and quoted in P. Mif, *Kitaiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partia v kriticheskie dni*³ but only certain documents are included.

¹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).

² Brandt, Fairbank and Schwartz, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

³ P. Mif, *Kitaiskaia Kommunisticheskaia Partia v kriticheskie dni* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928).

Even the most reliable monographs dealing with the Chinese Communist movement and with analyses of the 1927 struggle between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists have been forced to rely upon substantially the same sources used by Isaacs and upon the Japanese summaries presented by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank. Indeed, there was nowhere else to go for evidence.

It was well known, however, that in the introduction to his book *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*⁴ M. N. Roy had stated that upon his return to Moscow from China "all the documents (stenographic reports of the proceedings of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of China, of all the meetings of its Central Committee during the period of my stay in China, etc.), were published in a book called *The Chinese Revolution*. It was published in Russian by the State Publishing Department." That book, according to Roy, was never published in any other language, while he himself, on request from Moscow, had sent the original manuscript back from his headquarters in Berlin to Russian Communist authorities. Up to the time of his death in 1954 it was Roy's belief that no copy of the volume was in existence outside Communist archives in Moscow. The present author, moreover, has no knowledge of a single western monograph or other written analysis of the period which quotes from the Roy materials or directly cites them.

How this volume, *Kitaiskaia revoliutsiia i Kommunisticheskii international*,⁵ came to be published in Moscow in the year 1929—at a time when Roy was no longer acceptable to Stalin and, indeed, was regularly referred to in Party literature as a renegade—remains a mystery. Bukharin was well-disposed toward Roy, however, and it is possible that the book was published under his aegis. A further question arises in that the volume, in contradiction to Roy's statement in *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China*, does not contain stenographic reports of all the meetings of the Central Committee or even the full proceedings of the Fifth Congress. What we find are speeches and articles by Roy and a collection of theses, manifestos, declarations and proclamations of the Congress. When he wrote his introduction to this later work Roy may have forgotten the precise contents of the earlier one, or someone in Moscow may have deleted the stenographic reports from the manuscript Roy submitted. At the time of this writing there are still no minutes of the Congress available either in Russian or in Chinese.

⁴ M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1946).

⁵ *Kitaiskaia revoliutsiia i Kommunisticheskii international* (Moskva, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1929). Cited hereafter as *Kitaiskaia revoliutsiia*.

Desirable as acquisition of the full proceedings would certainly be, this collection of documents, for all its inadequacies, provides material of exceptional value not only to the history of Sino-Soviet relations and of Chinese Communist Party development, but also for delineating basic Communist theory concerning revolutionary politics and government and especially the concepts of "revolution from above" and "revolution from below" in the colonial and so-called semi-colonial areas of Asia, Africa and South America.

It is important to remember, in this connection, that in the course of his career Roy had already served revolutionary causes, not only in his native India and throughout eastern and south-eastern Asia, but also in the United States and in Mexico where, in collaboration with Borodin, he had played a role in the establishment of the Mexican Communist movement. It is against this almost incredible background of experience and in view of the powerful influence of his ideas about agrarian revolution and about the functioning of a Communist-dominated revolutionary government in the underdeveloped areas—an influence that persisted long after he had been denounced by the Stalinist leadership in Moscow—that these documents emerge as a valuable source for better understanding of the various Communist movements in underdeveloped areas of the globe today.

The basic contradiction revealed in these documents between the tactics of "revolution from above" and "revolution from below" has plagued Communist policy-makers since the debates between Roy and Lenin in 1920, and recent controversies between Moscow and Peking suggest that the issue has yet to be resolved. In 1926 the question was whether primary emphasis should be placed upon tactical collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek, the "bourgeois nationalist," or upon development of the Chinese Communist movement as an aggressive, independent force. A few months later—during the period covered by this volume—the issues lay between emphasis on tactical collaboration with the "left militarists" and the "petty bourgeois leadership" of Wuhan on the one hand and large-scale agrarian revolution on the other. Today the problem facing leaders in Moscow and Peking is how much reliance should be placed upon men like Nasser, Nkrumah, and Castro at the expense of local Communist parties—and for how long.

From the viewpoint of Communist leaders today—as in the time of Roy's mission to China—the problem is not to decide whether to support nationalist revolutionary movements, but to agree upon priorities of initiative and relative allocations of men, money and other resources between the local Communist parties and the Nasser, Nkrumah and Castro governments—or the parliamentary democratic

government of India. The decision reached by a Soviet or Chinese Communist leader depends upon his assessment of the strength, potential strength and popular support for the nationalist movement in comparison with the local Communist party and also upon his calculation of the point where the nationalist leaders will balk at Communist policies and pressures and "go over to the imperialists." In this connection it is worth comparing, over recent years, the Soviet and Chinese Communist attitudes toward the Indian Communist Party, on the one hand, and the Government of India on the other.

There has been a tendency, in analysing the controversy between the "revolution from above" and the "revolution from below" viewpoints to oversimplify the lines of cleavage and to dichotomise categorically between those who blindly followed Moscow and those who knew better but were frustrated by Stalin's stubbornness and inflexibility. In *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*,⁶ for example, Trotsky describes Ch'en Tu-hsiu as "bound hand and foot by the false leadership of the representatives of the Comintern."

Ch'en Tu-hsiu himself, in subsequent years, regularly asserted that he had been opposed to collaboration with the Kuomintang all along. According to Benjamin Schwartz, "After Chiang Kai-shek's April [1927] *coup d'état* in Shanghai, Ch'en claims to have been just as averse to the alliance with the 'Left Kuomintang' as he had previously been to the alliance with Chiang Kai-shek."⁷ Similarly, in the *Bulletin Oppozitsii*, Ch'en—in a "Letter to All Members of the Chinese Communist Party" dated December 10, 1929—declares that twice on the occasion of the Changsha *coup* of May 21, 1927, he proposed that the Chinese Communists break with Kuomintang. "I approached Borodin for advice. He said: 'I fully agree with you, but I know that Moscow will never permit it'."⁸

The documents of Roy's report suggest, by contrast, that there was a sharp difference of opinion between the two Comintern representatives, Borodin and Roy, and also that Ch'en Tu-hsiu—at the time—may have been closer to the Borodin viewpoint than he subsequently led others to believe.

The further statement has been made that none of the Comintern representatives in China at the time—Borodin, Roy, Mif, Lozofsky, Browder, Doriot—questioned Comintern directives or "spoke up for

⁶ Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), pp. 77-78.

⁷ Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 60.

⁸ Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "Letter to All Members of the Chinese Communist Party," *Bulletin Oppozitsii*, Nos. 15-16, September-October 1930, pp. 19-23.

any different course." According to Harold Isaacs (p. 218), "Roy later claimed that he had fought hard to get the Chinese Communist Party to pursue a bolder revolutionary course even if it meant a break with the Kuomintang. His own reports published at the time, however, failed to back him up in this claim." Isaacs also quotes Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai to the effect that Roy failed, after the defection of Chiang Kai-shek, "to point out the possibility of new betrayals."⁹

The allusion to Roy's own reports refers, apparently, to the single article "Le V^e Congrès du Partie Communiste de Chine" published in *Imprecor* (French edition), July 13, 1927.

The documents of *Kitaiskaia revoliutsiia i Kommunisticheskii international* do not reveal Roy as more accurate or prophetic in his judgment than anyone else associated with the debacle. The truth of the matter seems to be that everyone—Trotsky not excluded—was a better prophet after the fact than beforehand. What the documents do suggest is that Roy argued consistently for agrarian revolution and a substantially "different course"—up to the point, during the Fifth Congress, where revolution "from above" clashed head-on with revolution "from below." Actually, Roy continued to argue in favour of agrarian revolution. Either he did not perceive that a single concession to the Left Kuomintang on the confiscation of land had placed effective support for the peasantry entirely out of the question, or, more probably, he was overruled by Borodin, backed, in turn, by Stalin.

In China the immediate broad objective—initially shared by the Comintern and by the Chinese nationalists and Communists alike—was to overthrow the legal, so-called war-lord régime in Peking and establish a revolutionary government. Since the Communists had no army of their own at that time, they must either rely on the various forces associated with the nationalists, or somehow develop an army of their own out of the dissatisfied peasantry.

Borodin maintained that the Communists could not possibly establish a firm base in China without a dictatorship of the proletariat, and consequently it was necessary to rely upon nationalist forces. Thus the Northern Expedition against Peking was initially undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists in alliance, but later, after Chiang had broken away to form the Right Kuomintang, it became necessary to rely upon the forces of T'ang Sheng-chih, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and other militarists associated with the Left Kuomintang or believed to be sympathetic to it. This policy required that the agrarian programme should be deferred lest it antagonise the military officers and nationalist leaders and thus destroy the "revolutionary bloc" before the

⁹ Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 218.

Peking régime could be overthrown. In the words of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "the extension of the revolution must take place before it is deepened."¹⁰

Subsequent to Chiang Kai-shek's defection in early April 1927, Borodin—with the support of Ch'en Tu-hsiu—was urging that the Communists and the Left Kuomintang should launch immediately a second Northern Expedition—to take the place of the one they had been pursuing in collaboration with Chiang—and postpone the agrarian revolution until after Peking had been captured. Roy disagreed.¹¹ It was not that he was opposed to the Northern Expedition in principle, he reported back to Moscow, but in practice an immediate campaign against the north was "fraught with grave danger."¹²

The plan for a second Northern Expedition was built upon the assumption that two of the "left"—but non-Communist—militarists, Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, would support a dual purpose campaign launched against the northern warlords who held Peking and also against Chiang Kai-shek. In actuality, according to Roy, the generals "with the help of whom we must reach Peking" were of doubtful revolutionary conviction and would probably turn into new Chiang Kai-sheks. "We are jumping from the frying pan into the fire," he warned. "Right now we have only to cope with Chiang Kai-shek. But we are running from him into unknown territories where, in all probability, we will have to encounter many more like him."¹³

Borodin—according to Roy—was proposing that the revolution withdraw from the provinces where there exists an organised proletariat with political experience, where a partial success has been achieved already, and go to regions where the reaction is stronger. In the circumstance of an immediate campaign to the north, Roy predicted, the petty bourgeois leadership in Wuhan—under pressure of militarists and others—would "turn to flight and abandon the masses." Under these circumstances the importance of the so-called left militarists should not be overestimated.¹⁴

"Comrade Borodin thinks that the principal factor in the revolution is not the masses," Roy complained, "but the Communist ability to manoeuvre with the petty bourgeoisie and with the various military

¹⁰ M. N. Roy, "The Base and the Social Forces of the Revolution," *Kittaiskai revoliutsiia*, p. 32.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23; see also Ts'ai Ho-sen, "A History of Opportunism in the Chinese Communist Party," *Problemy Kitaia*, I, p. 24.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

elements."¹⁵ The agrarian revolution, Roy insisted, must be pushed immediately.

Two courses lay before the Chinese Communist Party, as Roy saw the situation: either to support the peasant demands on land, or to retard the development of the agrarian revolution "for the sake of good relations with the petty bourgeoisie."¹⁶ Already the petty bourgeoisie was betraying the national revolution, according to Roy, and if the Chinese Communist Party were to delay the agrarian revolution and support the plan for an immediate campaign against the north, it would, in effect, be supporting this betrayal.

The single great motive force in the Chinese conflict, Roy reported back to Moscow, was the agrarian revolution—to which as landowners the so-called "left militarists" and most of the Left Kuomintang officers would be unalterably opposed. "The Chinese revolution will either win as an agrarian revolution," he asserted, "or it will not win at all."¹⁷ In opposition to Borodin and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Roy then proposed to the Kremlin an organisation, concentration and consolidation of revolutionary forces by (1) pressing the agrarian revolution; (2) establishing peasant power in the villages; and (3) creating a truly revolutionary army of peasants who would usurp the power of their more "reactionary," land-owning officers.¹⁸ On this basis, he argued, it would be feasible to defend Wuhan by concentrating military forces on the border between Hupeh and Honan—while developing the agrarian revolution in these two provinces. At the same time a new political penetration of Kiangsi and Kwangtung provinces (where "reactionary" forces had been accumulating strength) could be reinforced by suitable military action. Then, step by step, Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi could be brought under the Wuhan government. Once this broad base had been firmly established and the revolutionary power strengthened it would be time for a new northern campaign against Peking.

Did Communist support for the agrarian revolution mean renouncing collaboration with Wuhan altogether? Roy thought not.

"The petty bourgeois left, onto whose wagon Comrade Borodin wants to harness the Communist Party," Roy admitted, "has neither the daring nor, simply, the desire to start an agrarian revolution."¹⁹ But it was also "a well-known fact" that the petty bourgeoisie "never represents an independent political force," but joins either the bourgeoisie or

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁶ M. N. Roy, "The Proletariat and the Petty Bourgeoisie," *Kitaiskaja revoliutsiia*, p. 64.

¹⁷ M. N. Roy, "The Base and the Social Force of the Revolution," *Kitaiskaja revoliutsiia*, p. 27.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

the proletariat. In China where the petty bourgeoisie was "an oppressed class," it could be counted upon, at the moment of crucial choice, to join with the proletariat—provided only that the location of its "true interests" could be revealed for them. The proletariat would gain the support of the petty bourgeois, Roy thought, in the course of "freeing it from feudal bourgeois elements." As the position of the peasantry improved, trade on the countryside would flourish and the petty bourgeoisie would gain. In the meantime—and here Roy was guilty of a grievous miscalculation—the petty bourgeoisie left wing power in Wuhan could not "exist another day" without the support of the Communist Party and the working class of China.²⁰

On April 16 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a resolution to defer the Northern Expedition in order first to build a firm revolutionary base, *then* to "defeat Chiang Kai-shek and the bourgeoisie"²¹ and annihilate the northern warlord armies. Two days later the Central Committee reversed itself, however, and supported the Left Wing Kuomintang's decision on the immediate dispatch of troops to the north.²²

Within a few days the issue was reopened before the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party—and debated again at great length. Present, in addition to Roy, Borodin and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, were other leading Chinese Communists and also—for some of the sessions—the Left Kuomintang leader Wang Ching-wei. As discussions developed, the central argument cut through to the very heart of the problem, namely, the class forces at work in the revolutionary struggle.

Borodin—supported by Ch'en Tu-hsiu—proposed that the Communists, in collaborating with the Left Kuomintang, should not only rely upon non-Communist "revolutionary" militarists, but should—for the time being—recognise also the [Left] Kuomintang's "hegemony" in the revolution. Roy also favoured support for the Left Kuomintang, but opposed the granting of so much initiative to its leaders.

Built upon the basis of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, according to Roy, the revolutionary state would enter a phase of non-capitalist development including the nationalisation of land, heavy industry, transport and public utilities. It would then be the task of the proletariat—working inside the three-class coalition—to lead the state toward socialism by means of class struggle. Indeed, the agrarian reforms of the state would themselves give rise to an agrarian revolution "which only the proletariat" could carry to its conclusion. "The

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28

²¹ "Resolution on the Continuation of the Northern Campaign," *Kittaiskita revolutsiia*, pp. 194-195.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

present Wuhan government," he asserted, "will not, on its own initiative, decide to nationalise land, railroads and factories. But the objective conditions of the revolutionary struggle will force it to do so. The subjective factor here will again be the proletariat which not only supports this programme objectively, but must also put it into practice."²³

During the prolonged interchange with Wang Ching-wei, however, Roy—wittingly or unwittingly—capitulated on an absolutely crucial point. Previously he had been placing consistently heavy emphasis on the agrarian revolution—including the confiscation of land. Just before his debate with Wang Ching-wei, indeed, he had asserted that the agrarian question could not be resolved "as long as private ownership of land is not abolished."²⁴ Yet he now assured Wang that "Inasmuch as the revolution, in its present stage, will be led by a coalition of classes—and the proletariat is prepared to lead the revolution in collaboration with other classes—the proletariat cannot put forward a programme for the immediate abolition of private property."²⁵

Here, at this crucial point, the tactics of revolution "from above" and revolution "from below" had clashed head-on. One or the other had to be subordinated. Subsequently there was talk in Party councils of differentiated, or "political" confiscation—the confining of confiscations to land belonging to "large" owners and the exempting of property belonging to Left Kuomintang officers. During debates within the Agrarian Commission, according to one of the Chinese Communists present, Roy "did not object to this measure," even "severely criticised" a counter-proposal from certain of the Russian advisers.²⁶

The concession was fatefully expensive. From this point onward Roy's arguments about the need for independent action and support for the peasantry were, in any practical sense, wholly meaningless.

In its subsequent resolutions the Fifth Congress called for a "radical solution of the agrarian problem" through "a fundamental redistribution" and "nationalisation" of land and the seizure of village political power by the peasantry. At the same time, however, the Congress exempted from land confiscation the small owners and "officers of the revolutionary army."²⁷

This basic compromise unmistakably shaped the course of events to come. Communist tactics had renounced "revolution from below" in

²³ M. N. Roy, "Non Capitalist Development and Socialism: Democratic Dictatorship and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Kitaikaia revoliutsiia*, p. 93.

²⁴ M. N. Roy, "The Perspectives and Character of the Chinese Revolution," *Kitaikaia revoliutsiia*, p. 82.

²⁵ M. N. Roy, "The National Revolution and Socialism," *Kitaikaia revoliutsiia*, p. 84.

²⁶ Ts'ai Ho-sen, *Problemy Kitai*, I, p. 32.

²⁷ "Resolution on the Agrarian Question," *Kitaikaia revoliutsiia*, p. 111.

favour of "revolution from above," and henceforth the Chinese Communists were dependent upon—and at the mercy of—the "left militarists." When the peasants almost immediately began rising on their own initiative, the Communist Party found itself joining the Left Kuomintang in deploring the excesses, and, in fact, "putting down" the rebellion. Power steadily accumulated in the hands of the "left militarists"—until they no longer valued the Communists even for the Russian arms that Borodin was in a position to distribute. In short order both Roy and Borodin found themselves expelled from Wuhan and on their way back to Soviet Russia.

In all this confusion the essential fact was not that the Chinese Communists were forced to submit themselves—against their better judgment—to a single, dogmatic and uniquely mistaken line from Moscow. Unquestionably the major responsibility was Stalin's, and Roy—in compromising his position on the confiscation of land—was undoubtedly submitting to a decision taken in Moscow. We must keep in mind, however, that Stalin was thousands of miles away and dependent upon the undoubtedly conflicting information sent from China by Borodin, Roy, Voitinsky and other Comintern representatives. The evidence suggests—not that he imposed a consistent "Stalinist" line—but rather that he hesitated over conflicting advice and made out of it what he could.

In view of these considerations, the essential and overwhelmingly disruptive fact seems to be precisely the opposite: that virtually everyone "spoke up for a different course," that virtually everyone "contended," that hardly anyone agreed with anyone else, and that the misperceptions, the errors, and the contradictory decisions were by no means attributable only to Stalin, but were widely shared by both the Chinese and the Russian Communists. Scarcely any one of them really understood what was taking place; none foresaw clearly and sufficiently in advance the difficulties inherent in harmonising revolution "from above" with revolution "from below."

Among even the bitterest critics of Communism there is frequently an inclination to endow Communist leaders with a kind of omniscience and with a monolithic command of independent decision and power which, in fact, they may enjoy rarely. The documents of Roy's mission suggest that the 1927 Communist debacle in China was not the outcome of a "simple repetition of the [misguided] formula laid down in Moscow"—but the upshot of a proliferation of formulas, the consequence of a bewildering babble of proposals and counter-proposals.

The wonder is that the Communists ever succeeded in China at all. Indeed, one may rightfully question whether they could have succeeded if during the subsequent decade the Soviet Russians had not withdrawn

sufficiently to allow Mao Tse-tung—with his own army, his own police force and his own political institutions—to work out his own special mixture of so many revolutionary parts “from below” and so many others “from above.” However that may be, the major importance of the Roy documents is not for what they reveal about who was relatively more or less at fault. The documents are significant, rather, for their delineation of a central contradiction in Communist tactical theory, their exposure of a major weakness in the Communist system, and their revelation of the disruptive consequences that can emerge from uncertainties over how much of a revolution should be fought “from above” and how much “from below.”*

* This article will be included in a book by Xenia J. Eudin and the present author to be published by the University of California.

The Hong Kong University Symposium

If the sage outside University Hall was right in saying that he who knows keeps silent and he who talks is unlikely to know, his words of wisdom cannot have been meant to apply to the seven days' symposium on economic and social problems of the Far East which was held last September at Hong Kong University. Nearly a quarter million words had been submitted in advance in some fifty papers and an equal number of words must have been added by discussants and other contributors. Most of what was said was relevant, some of it original, much of it exciting. In brief, the symposium was a complete success.

When Professor Schurmann suggested in his report on the Third Sovietological Conference held in Kawaguchi (Japan) in 1960 that "more meetings of this sort might be planned for the future,"¹ the symposium was in fact in full preparation. It was held during the Golden Jubilee of Hong Kong University. Originally it was to concern itself exclusively with Hong Kong's great neighbour Mainland China, but in deference to the Crown Colony's precarious position and its Government's wishes the title of the symposium was broadened to embrace economic and social aspects of the Far East as a whole. Even so, China provided the natural focus of all discussions; developments as far apart as Australia and Malaya were darkened by the ubiquitous shadow of China.

The symposium was attended by some eighty participants, in numbers originating fairly evenly from the Chinese and European communities of Hong Kong, other countries of Asia as well as the United States and Europe (not to forget a few from Australia). The Chinese and Japanese participation was not only large in numbers but high in quality. Even if the Americans and Europeans were at times more vocal than their Asian colleagues, the concern of the latter was as serious and their comment no less astute. If the meeting at Kawaguchi was dominated by the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy which had come into the open at the time, the conference at Hong Kong was not focused on anything quite so dramatic or topical. Just the same, the renewed outburst of the Sino-Soviet conflict which occurred a month later during the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress was anticipated by some of the participants.

¹ *The China Quarterly*, No. 4, October-December 1960, pp. 102-113.

Being concerned primarily with economic and social affairs, the symposium perhaps lacked some of the political undercurrents of other conferences of this kind, but this is not to say that it was without punch. The academic decorum which the participants owed to the place and to the occasion was preserved throughout; but the ubiquitous conflict of two opposing philosophies could never be banned for long from the conference table.

The symposium dealt principally with the three topics of economic, social and political change in China and their impact on the Far East; a brief session on legal and cultural aspects was added. The papers submitted to the conference were taken in five sessions, two of which were devoted to economics, the subject which attracted the greatest amount of attention and which had been studied most fully. In the firm hands of competent chairmen and organisers the flow of contributions was kept to the topics under discussion and to a tight time schedule without discussants or other contributors being harassed at any time. The main tribute for an elegantly smooth week of work must go to Dr. Szczepanik, the organiser of the symposium who completed his preparations whilst Professor Kirby, the convener and head of the Department of Economics and Political Science, was abroad.

It would be impossible in the space available to do justice to more than a small selection of papers presented at the conference, but perhaps some of the principal subjects may be mentioned briefly. The high rates of economic growth in China as well as the erratic nature of Chinese industrial development were examined carefully, by more than one contributor, in the light of the theory of economic growth as presented by such scholars as Ragnar Nurkse, Arthur Lewis, Albert Hirschman, and W. W. Rostow. Development by fits and starts was perhaps the most appropriate description of a not unimpressive performance. Even where mistakes had been made on a gigantic scale, as in the Great Leap Forward, the dispersal of industries and the training of villagers in industrial skills might remain assets of an experiment costly in human and economic terms.

It was of course fully realised that Chinese official claims had to be scrutinised most carefully before they could be accepted by impartial observers. In particular, time was devoted to an analysis of agricultural statistics which have been criticised most severely by the Chinese leaders themselves. As in the case of the Soviet Union, industrial output in physical terms is probably the only reliable check on the country's rate of progress. Compound indices are as suspect as agricultural data.

Papers on such aspects of China's domestic economy as industrialisation, wholesale and retail trade, transport, monetary policy and capital accumulation showed how much is known of China's internal affairs

to those who take the trouble to trace the appropriate primary sources. In this context it was acknowledged that the translation services of the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong Kong have provided scholars all over the world with invaluable source material. In spite of the secretive attitude of Chinese Government departments it was found possible even to hazard an estimate of China's balance of payments. The exchange position, though tight, will allow for the purchase of Canadian and Australian grain at least up to the end of 1961. Thereafter it will be a matter of mobilising additional financial resources through increased exports to South East Asia, silver sales and remittances from overseas Chinese.

The impact of China's economic development on the outside world is felt most acutely in the spheres of international trade and foreign aid. Several participants probed into these aspects of China's activities both within the bloc and among Asian countries outside the bloc. Comparative studies of some of the economies of South East Asia and the Far East, such as Hong Kong, Indonesia and the Philippines, highlighted similarities and differences.

A conference of this kind would fail in its undertaking if it did not devote itself to a comparative study of the two Communist giants. China, the fundamentalist in the Communist camp, has often chosen its own road in the recent past. This subject was particularly topical in 1960 when contradictions had led to the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and Soviet aid had become a trickle. At Hong Kong the long-term aspects of the Soviet and Chinese models, of planning strategy and economic practices, and their applicability in other countries of Asia were given special attention. By comparison the question of Sino-Soviet relations was treated as a side issue, although this subject exercised the minds of at least some of the participants.

The political session was introduced with a thoughtful paper on the state of tension that exists in Communist society due to conflicts between the "ego ideal" and the "reality principle." Conflicts were discerned also between ideology and national interest and between tradition and transition in China's policy in Asia. A study on the dynamics of totalitarianism led to a comparison with Japan during the darkest period of its history. Again, there were contributions on the internal aspects of Chinese politics, such as the instruments of control within the Chinese Communist Party and the workings of the United Front organisations. One of the contributors attributed important trends in current Chinese Communist thought to the influence of the group of leading Chinese personalities who spent the most formative years of their lives as students in France. The impact of China's policy abroad,

particularly on neighbouring Japan, provided material for more than one contribution to the political session.

The session concerned with social aspects revealed as many changes as those that have occurred in the economic sphere. The communes, the most important monument of Communist engineering, are as important for their social effects as for their economic ones. The payment of wages to individual working members of the communes rather than to heads of families is likely to have had as disrupting an effect on traditional social patterns as the equalisation effect of land distribution during the early phases of agrarian reform must have had on marriages. The changes in the relations between members of families were built into the social reforms so as to dislocate existing institutional arrangements. Other aspects of social engineering were touched upon, but the field was admitted to be wide open to further research by demographers, anthropologists and sociologists.

The overseas Chinese provide an area more accessible than Mainland China for further studies. Several papers gave accounts of the achievements of Chinese communities in South East Asia, of difficulties encountered and of attitudes towards the people among whom the Chinese live. A most scholarly analysis was presented of Chinese-Malay relations in plural societies such as Singapore and Malaya. For purposes of comparison, social changes were considered in territories neighbouring on China, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan.

The symposium was concluded with a thought provoking exposé on the structural problems of modernisation as they have occurred in Japan and China in the course of their efforts to move forward from medieval backwardness to twentieth-century modernity. The process of high modernisation, in which Japan has been particularly successful, has not progressed very far even in the Soviet Union. In China, it is in its infancy and there is no certainty that it will be concluded satisfactorily. China's position remains far from secure. At current rates of capital formation it has yet to be demonstrated that industrial progress surpasses the rate of growth of population.

Different participants will have gained satisfaction from different parts of the symposium. The most fruitful sessions were probably those where views clashed and questions raised remained unanswered, demanding further research. Four points seemed to stand out in this respect. First of all, there was the question of the degree of similarity or otherwise between the Soviet and Chinese variants of Communist rule. Sinologists do not always see eye to eye with Sovietologists on this issue, the former emphasising the specifically Chinese in Mao's version against the latter's insistence that the evidence of basic doctrinal consensus outweighs the occasional disagreements on matters of tactics.

Likewise, Asians tend to emphasise the aspects of oriental tradition whereas Europeans are impressed by the degree to which the Chinese have adapted, if not adopted the Soviet pattern in spite of being faced with problems greatly different from those of Russia in the comparable phase of her development in the late twenties.

Scholars of different faculties are bound to see different aspects of the same phenomena. There can be only few who are equally at home in Chinese and Russian affairs. Conferences of Sinologists and Sovietologists agreeing in broad outline on the principles of academic approach provide thus one of the essential safeguards against misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Although it would be an over-simplification to treat the Chinese solution merely as a variant of its Soviet forerunner, it was generally agreed that in essentials the Chinese way of dealing with problems of structural change has been remarkably reminiscent of the Soviet pattern. Ample evidence in support of this argument is available in the sphere of economic planning and industrial development. At the same time it has to be remembered that the commune, like the Great Leap Forward, is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon.

Putting the same problem in a political rather than economic context, the question may be rephrased: "Are the Chinese Communists rather than Chinese, or are they Chinese first and foremost?" Here again the contributions to the discussion provided evidence in support of either side of the case; a final answer has to await the verdict of history. The Chinese model unquestionably reflects traits of a special type. Certain subtleties of Chinese practice have survived; "face" is still believed to be an important factor in official as in personal relations. At the same time the Marxist concept plays a decisive role in shaping Chinese policies. Marxism-Leninism on the one hand and traditionalism-nationalism on the other hand interact in both harmony and conflict.

A third question, currently perhaps of somewhat academic interest, concerned the size of Soviet assistance in China's programme of industrialisation and modernisation. Russia's loan agreements were limited to relatively modest sums offered in the early stages of Chinese reconstruction and planning. Since then assistance has been given primarily in the form of short-term trade credits. Even so, China succeeded in accumulating by the end of 1955 a trade deficit with the Soviet Union of the order of \$1,000 million, a not insubstantial advance, even if it is recognised that all Soviet aid, whether long or short term, has to be repaid from current Chinese production. Given at a particularly significant period of China's development, Russia's financial and technical assistance, though far from lavish, facilitated a process which

might otherwise never have got off the ground. China remains dependent on foreign aid. To interpret Soviet Russia's contributions to China's development in any other way might cause dangerous illusions among developing countries, as if rapid industrialisation were possible as the result of rigid controls of domestic resources and without substantial foreign assistance in essential industrial sectors and at crucial periods of time.

The most burning question of all concerned the suitability of the Chinese model for other areas of Asia. Here the discussion was once again directed towards sifting the available evidence rather than finding an agreed answer. Several participants confirmed the existence of a widespread belief in developing countries that individual pieces might be borrowed from the "tool box" of Communist China, whilst others might be rejected. This was not a view generally thought to be acceptable. Some participants considered it a dangerous illusion which might open the way to Communist methods spreading to areas which have not exploited the possibilities of structural change open to them. The developing countries will have to draw their own lessons from the record of China's successes and failures, and it cannot be the task of an academic conference to offer advice for which it has not been asked. There was a general consensus among participants, however, that the question as to whether the Chinese model is in any way relevant to other countries will be of prime importance for the future of Asia.

The discussion which was opened in Loke Yew Hall as Hong Kong University prepared for its golden jubilee celebrations will thus continue to be topical and relevant in the years to come. This view seemed to be shared by the publisher of Hong Kong University Press who announced during the closing session of the symposium that a selection of papers would go to print before the end of the year. Side by side with the proceedings of the Kawaguchi conference² the volume should prove useful to Sinologists and Sovietologists alike.

² *Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations*. Edited by Kurt L. London. To be published by Praeger, New York.

Comment

"Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute"

THERE are certain points in Professor L. C. Green's article on the legal aspects of the Sino-Indian border dispute in the July-September 1960 issue of *The China Quarterly* which require comment.

Professor Green starts by examining the legal status of Tibet, and lays down a general proposition that in international law the status of any entity depends not on what it considers itself to possess but on the extent to which the existing subjects of international law are prepared to recognise it as possessing international personality. This, however, is not the general understanding of the position. Effectiveness is the essential and sufficient test of statehood. If the authorities are able to exercise, and do exercise, the power they claim, it is adequate to give them the status of a government. *De facto* control over the administrative agencies, support of a substantial body of public opinion and absence of resistance to authority which would indicate the acquiescence, if not formal approval, of the people, are the criteria for statehood. The fact that a state has not been recognised by other states does not affect the existence of the state which is independent of any question of recognition.

It is indeed most surprising to see Professor Green put forward this argument, for he himself has elsewhere associated himself with a correct statement of the position. "The source of rights and duties of an entity in international law is the fact of its actual supremacy within a specified area of territory over a specified portion of humanity, which enables it to exert physical pressure on all those who may choose to disregard its rights. This fact is the basis of international law."¹

The status of Tibet in international law at any particular time depended, therefore, not on recognition by other states, but on whether the Government of Tibet at that time exercised independent authority. Long before the Simla Convention of 1914, Sino-Tibetan relations had virtually ceased to exist. In 1887 Li Hung-chang told the British envoy in Peking that Chinese influence in Tibet was only nominal; and in 1892 Captain Bower, who crossed the Tibetan plateau, reported that the Chinese in Tibet do "not deserve the name of a Government."² In 1911 the Chinese army and representatives were evicted from almost

¹ T. C. Chen, *The International Law of Recognition* (edited by L. C. Green) (London: 1951), p. 3.

² A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia* (London: 1960), pp. 184 and 206.

the whole country by the Tibetans on their own. Thereafter, the Tibetans issued a declaration of independence and resisted all Chinese attempts to re-establish their authority within Tibet. The whole correspondence between the British and the Chinese Governments of the early years of the twentieth century shows that the British Government were seeking to help the Chinese Government, who were anxious to re-establish their connections with Tibet. It is this *de facto* independence of Tibet which is relevant, and not the attitude of the British Government, on which Professor Green dwells at great length.

However, even the history of British relations with Tibet cannot sustain the interpretation which Professor Green seeks to give. At the end of the nineteenth century the British Government, concerned with the possible entry of Russian influence into this area, were anxious to strengthen Chinese influence in Tibet. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 were, therefore, concluded, as Professor Green points out, without Tibetan participation. But what Professor Green fails to mention is that the provisions of neither the 1890 Convention nor the 1893 Regulations could be enforced because of Tibetan defiance of agreements which did not have their concurrence. White, Political Officer in Sikkim, reported from Yatung that the "Tibetans repudiate the treaty and assert that it was signed by the British Government and the Chinese, and therefore they have nothing to do with it."³ There could be no greater proof that Tibet at that time was not subject to Chinese authority. Lord Salisbury commented on May 15, 1899, "if the Chinese ever had any authority in Tibet, they certainly have none now."⁴

The provisions could only be implemented after they had been renegotiated in 1904 with Tibet. Curzon had decided to deal directly with the Tibetans, particularly after he had heard that the Dalai Lama had established contact with the Tsar.⁵ By the 1904 Convention, the Government of Tibet "engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognise the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, as defined in Article 1 of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly." In fact, all the articles of the 1904 Convention were based on the clear understanding that any treaty concluded by China on behalf of Tibet was not binding on the latter and would not be implemented by her. The statement of Sir Charles Bell, quoted by Professor Green, that the Convention of 1904 was not final is nowhere

³ Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 242.

⁵ See Curzon to Lord George Hamilton, May 24, 1899, *Hamilton correspondence*, India Office Library D510/1, folio 405 *et seq.*; also P. Fleming, *Bayonets to Lhasa* (London: 1961), pp. 39 and 43.

borne out by the treaty. On the contrary, that the Chinese Government recognised the need for a direct engagement between Britain and Tibet is borne out by the fact that the Chinese Amban in Tibet assisted the British Government in concluding this agreement.

The Convention of 1906 between Britain and China, confirming the provisions of the 1904 Convention, was not necessary for the validity of the latter. It was in order to support Chinese claims to Tibet that the British Government signed the 1906 Convention. That agreement, however, specifically acknowledged that Tibet had refused to recognise the validity of, or to carry into full effect, the provisions of the 1890 Convention and the 1893 Regulations and, therefore, a separate agreement had had to be signed in 1904 with Tibet.

Realising that no agreement to which Tibet was not a party could be operative in that country, but yet anxious for her own reasons to strengthen Chinese authority in Tibet, Britain from 1908 onwards fostered tripartite negotiations and agreements.

In dealing with the Simla Convention of 1914, Professor Green seeks to explain away Tibetan presence by even making the astonishing suggestion that the Tibetan delegate might have been present merely as an expert. Mr. Hugh Richardson in *The China Quarterly* of January-March 1961 has already commented on this; but further amplification may be useful. The Simla Conference met to discuss relations both between China and Tibet and between Tibet and India. It was the Chinese Government which stated on August 7, 1913, that the Chinese plenipotentiary would proceed to India "to open negotiations for a treaty jointly" with the Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries. The British representative at Peking informed the Chinese Government on August 25, 1913, "that His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the Chinese Government's acceptance of the principle of the equality of status of the representatives and of the tripartite character of the negotiations." In accordance with the normal procedure at international conferences the three plenipotentiaries exchanged credentials; and the Chinese representative, far from protesting, accepted the credentials of the Tibetan plenipotentiary issued by the Dalai Lama. This stated that the Tibetan delegate had authority to decide all matters that might be beneficial to Tibet. The Simla Conference was in fact a meeting of equals to settle outstanding issues and, in the words of the credentials of the British plenipotentiary, to "regulate the relations between the several governments."

During and after the conference, the Chinese Government never disputed the equal status of the Tibetan plenipotentiary. On April 27, 1914, the Chinese representative initialled the Convention, the preamble of which mentioned the Dalai Lama as a party along with the British

Emperor and the President of the Chinese Republic. At no time did the Chinese Government mention the equal status of Tibet as one of their reasons for refusing to accept the Simla Convention of 1914.

It is true that China never ratified the Simla Convention and, therefore, it never came into force. But the "McMahon Line" was formalised, independently of the Simla Convention, by a direct exchange of letters between the British and the Tibetan representatives. The Simla Convention, and the map attached to it, are of significance in showing that China recognised the treaty-making powers of Tibet and that China was aware of the formalisation of the "McMahon Line" by India and Tibet.

After 1914 Tibet had frequently direct dealings with the Indian Government. Between 1921 and 1924, the Tibetan Government corresponded with the Indian Government on certain frontier disputes; and in 1926 there was an Indo-Tibetan inquiry to investigate certain Tibetan claims. As the recent Report of the Officials of India and China on the Boundary Question reveals, the Chinese side cited this correspondence and inquiry, thereby recognising the authority of Tibet in the past to have foreign relations on her own.

The basic fact is that Tibet, though not a *de jure* sovereign state, had the right to conclude treaties, and exercised it on many occasions. It is not necessary for states to be sovereign in order to be international persons. As Oppenheim has stated, states which are not sovereign "often enjoy in many respects the rights, and fulfil in other points the duties, of International Persons. They frequently send and receive diplomatic envoys, or at least consuls. They often conclude commercial or other treaties."⁶

Tibet had, in the past, entered into a number of treaties which were not only considered valid by the parties concerned but were in actual operation for decades and, in some cases, centuries. The treaties of 1684 and 1842 between Tibet on the one hand and Ladakh and Kashmir on the other had confirmed Tibet's traditional boundaries in the west and regulated trade relations. These treaties were in actual operation up to our own times. Similarly, the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856 was in force for a hundred years, until abrogated by the Sino-Nepalese treaty of 1956. Article 3 of the 1956 treaty between China and Nepal reads: "All treaties and documents which existed in the past between China and Nepal including those between the Tibet region of China and Nepal are hereby abrogated." This shows that Tibet was in a position to sign treaties and that even the People's Government of

⁶ *International Law*, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 119.

China recognised such treaties as valid. Abrogation of a treaty presupposes validity till the time of abrogation. The 1956 treaty contains the clearest recognition that Tibet had the power in the past to conclude valid treaties on her own with foreign states without the participation of China. It also shows that Tibet was, for all practical purposes, a sovereign state in 1856; for by Article 7 of the 1856 treaty, she granted extra-territorial rights to Nepal. In international law, the grant of such rights of extra-territoriality is a clear exercise of sovereign rights. Unless a state has complete and unrestricted control of its territory it cannot grant such rights.

It is not also correct to say, as Professor Green does, that an agreement signed and accepted "by one state and another under suzerainty" has no general validity in international law. It is sufficient if the suzerain state is aware of, and permits, or is unable to prevent, the enjoyment and exercise of such treaty-making powers. No general rules can, therefore, be laid down; the position depends on the facts of each case.⁷ Examples of vassal states concluding international agreements with third states are numerous; and only some are mentioned here. In 1805 the United States signed a treaty with Tripoli without consulting the suzerain, Turkey; and this treaty was generally accepted as valid and binding. Egypt, while still a vassal of Turkey in the nineteenth century, concluded commercial and postal treaties with foreign governments. So, too, did Bulgaria. At the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, she signed and ratified, without her suzerain, Turkey, participating, the conventions and declarations adopted at the Conference. These conventions involved obligations of a law-making character, which have played an important role in international relations. Bulgaria also ratified the declaration forbidding the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, even though Turkey did not do so.

So, in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, Tibet had independent and direct relations with her neighbours as far as her border interests were concerned, without China exercising any control. Even if Tibet had been a vassal in 1914, the validity of the 1914 agreement on the Indo-Tibetan boundary and its binding nature on Tibet, and on China since 1950, cannot be affected. The prevalence today of Chinese authority in Tibet and Tibet's lack of treaty-making powers cannot be projected backwards; nor can it in international law affect the status and treaty-making powers of Tibet in 1914.

Professor Green has also mentioned Bhutan in connection with the "McMahon Line." However, the "McMahon Line" has nothing to do with the northern boundary of Bhutan with Tibet. The "McMahon

⁷ Hackworth, *A Digest of International Law*, Vol. I, 1940, p. 75.

Line" started at the trijunction of Bhutan, India and Tibet. Such a grave mistake of fact suggests that Professor Green is not sufficiently familiar with the subject he has written about. So Professor Green is incorrect when he says: "The Chinese view of the situation involved a complete denial of the validity of the border, at least in so far as it was based on the McMahon Line." The boundary between Bhutan and Tibet is a traditional and customary one along the crest of the Himalayan range; and the Chinese Government have recognised this boundary explicitly. They stated in their note to the Government of India of December 26, 1959: "Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineation on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called 'McMahon Line.' But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries."⁸ The area referred to is the south-east corner of Bhutan and not anywhere near the northern boundary of Bhutan with Tibet. This area has always been part of the Tashigong Dzong of Bhutan.

Finally, Professor Green seeks to draw a parallel between the Chinese occupation of Indian territory and the Kashmir problem. But the two issues are basically different. As even the United Nations has recognised, Kashmir has legally acceded to India. The parallel is more between Pakistan and China, for both are aggressors in illegal occupation of Indian territory.

S. G.

"The Chinese in Latin America"

As I do not read either Russian or Chinese, the sources of my article on "The Chinese in Latin America" (*The China Quarterly*, January-March 1961) were compulsorily limited to documentation in Spanish, French and English and to my personal experience. My purpose in writing the article was to draw the attention of experts to the activity of the CPR in Latin America. I am happy to have succeeded with Mr. Daniel Tretiak.

I suspect, however, that without intending it, I have written my article in Chinese. For Mr. Tretiak makes me say things that I cannot find in my text. Apart from the details referring to the year of the tour of the Peking Opera and to the post of Ch'u T'u-nan, the other corrections of facts that Mr. Tretiak makes to my article show us his knowledge of the Chinese and strengthen my belief for the need to study more closely Chinese activities in Latin America. But these "corrections" correct nothing.

⁸ *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China, November 1959—March 1960*, White Paper III (Delhi: Government of India, 1960), p. 79.

One example will suffice to illustrate the two different methods of treating the same subject. As a journalist, I took the extreme liberty of pointing out that the attitude of the Latin Americans facing the Chinese "is not racialist in origin." Mr. Tretiak reads the fact in the following fashion: "To assert that there are not racial differences. . . ."

In any case, it would be much more useful to leave these chinoiseriess on one side and to study seriously a subject that our two articles only evade.

VICTOR ALBA

Book Reviews

Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959. By CHAO KUO-CHÜN. [London: Asia Publishing House, 1960, XII + 399 pp. 55s.]

AGRARIAN policies are normally a subject for specialist rather than general review. China's farm and food policies have undergone such dramatic changes, however, that successes as much as failures have hit the headlines of the world press more than once in recent years. The general reader has thus an interest in knowing the true position. Unhappily reporting has been such at times that there is dire need for an objective account of the history of Chinese Communist thought that has directed the farming community in its day-to-day business.

Professor Chao Kuo-chün's book goes a long way towards providing documentation and interpretation of a complex subject. It is all the more to be regretted therefore that he has provided hopes for the future rather than historical facts when assessing the most recent phase of China's agrarian policy. The Chinese leaders proved him wrong in his analysis of the communes and "the great leap forward" before his book reached its readers. In the first part of his book Professor Chao has mastered admirably the facts and has analysed them *sine ira et studio*. The second part was written after a visit to China during which he seems to have been greatly impressed by what he saw of the process of social engineering in the communes. In his final analysis he abandons unhappily his own judgment in favour of such observers as Professors Bettelheim and Needham. As his concern is deep and genuine, one may feel sure that Professor Chao will be anxious to re-assess the situation when the communes can be seen in their proper perspective.

The history of Chinese land reform and its aftermath are too well known to require a detailed account, but it may be worth recording briefly as described by Professor Chao¹ following his historical review of Chinese land policy prior to the nation-wide seizure of power by the Communists in 1949. It was carried out in a spirit of excess rather than evolution. This should not have been a surprise to anybody. The tenancy system in China, though perhaps not as unjust as described by some, left much to be desired. Social and economic polarisation in the villages had reached extreme forms, and rents and interest rates were iniquitously high. Communist agitators fanned smoldering resentment and grievance

¹ Pp. 94 *et seq.*

into open antagonism and demand for recompense. Mao was all in favour of "a little terror."² The reform was to be carried out in four stages: in the first phase the villagers were to be roused to action. Where discontent was not vocal, it was to be created. "Struggle meetings" were organised at which landlords were identified, accused, often beaten up and sometimes executed on the spot. This frequently preceded the second phase during which the class status of all villagers was to be determined. Thereafter, during the third phase, land and property were confiscated, without compensation, and redistributed. In the final phase old titles were destroyed and new landholding certificates issued.

In the course of the reform nearly 50 million hectares (125 million acres) were taken from four million large owners and were redistributed to nearly fifty million small-holders, landless peasants and farm labourers. Thus at the expense of 4 per cent. of the farming community, the status of half the village population was raised from that of poor peasants and labourers to that of middle peasants. Equally, if not more important was the classification which formed the basis of confiscation and redistribution. The grouping was as crude as the statistics on which it rested. Yet it served its purpose of dividing the village against itself. Wrong classification might have meant death (at the top of the scale) or at least exclusion from land distribution (at the middle layer). Landlords tried to prove that they were rich peasants; rich peasants that they were middle peasants; and middle peasants that they were poor peasants. Confusion and demoralisation must have reached stupendous proportions. In the outcome the poor half of the rural community raised to the status of middle peasants became, for the first time in generations, the proud holders of land and title deeds, expecting to be in control, from now onwards, of output and disposal of crops and animal produce.

The magnitude of the debacle that followed can only be grasped if this phase of Communist agrarian policy is understood in its full significance. Where the landlord is annihilated, the state has to take over his functions, *i.e.*, to collect and sell the surplus, to impose levies and to provide credit. These functions did not fall unexpectedly upon the Communist authorities. In fact, Liu Shao-ch'i, the Party's theoretician, had anticipated this when he spoke in June 1950 to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Consultative Council. Explaining the reasons for the agrarian reform law he said: "The basic aim of agrarian reform is not purely one of relieving peasants. It is designed to set free the rural productive forces from the shackles of the feudal land ownership system of the landlord class so as to develop agricultural production and thus pave the way for New China's industrialisation."³ Similarly Lenin

² Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), Vol. I, p. 39.

³ Liu Shao-ch'i, *The Agrarian Reform Law* (Peking: 1950).

had spoken of the subsidies of the peasants which were required for building a powerful heavy industry and Preobrazhensky had favoured the feudal exploitation of the peasantry to finance Soviet Russia's rapid industrialisation.

The familiar road from land reform to collectivisation could thus be anticipated. Those seeing in Mao an agrarian reformer rather than a professional revolutionary denied the logic of this reasoning and saw confirmation of their view in the manner—"mild as rain, gentle as a breeze"—in which the Chinese peasants were induced to join the Mutual Aid Teams and lower stages of Agricultural Producer Co-operatives. The Soviet model was rejected emphatically as not applicable. "Unlike the Soviet collective farms," said Kao Kang in 1952, "our mutual aid and co-operative organisations are still built on the foundation of private ownership."⁴ The National Constitution provided (in article 7) the promotion of producers' co-operatives as the chief means for the transformation of individual farming to collective ownership, and full collectivisation was introduced after Mao's report "On the Co-operativisation of Agriculture" in July 1955. A year later collectives outnumbered lower stage co-operatives and mutual aid teams had disappeared. By the end of 1957 collectivisation was almost complete. In the Soviet Union this stage was reached two decades earlier and the state of collectivisation achieved has remained basically unimpaired to this day, although the amalgamation of collectives, the abolition of machine tractor stations and the extension of state farming must have introduced a sense of uncertainty and insecurity into the countryside. In China the peasants were given no more than a few months to get accustomed to life in the collectives before they were exposed to yet another experiment in village organisation.

Teng Tzu-hui, a member of the Party's Central Committee and the author of a book on "Some Basic Problems of Land Reform" had warned in 1955: "Individual peasants cannot be directly controlled by the state."⁵ As neither mutual aid teams nor collectives had succeeded in gaining control of the peasants and their produce, they were to give up all their individual rights and to work and live in communes under the control by day and night of Party cadres. The protagonists of the "Hundred Flowers" had been defeated by the Hundred-per-Centers. According to the Central Committee resolution, the People's Communes were created "in compliance with the enthusiastic demands of the mass of the peasants."⁶ However that may have been, between the summer of 1958 and the end of the year some 750,000 collectives were merged

⁴ Kao Kang, Speech at the North-East Rural Construction Conference, 1952.

⁵ In the *Hsin-hua Yueh-K'an*, November 1955.

⁶ Central Committee Resolution on People's Communes, December 1958.

into 26,000 communes and over 100,000 peasant households were reported to have abandoned their individual way of living for life in the communes. Where collectives tried to supervise approximately 150 families, communes were charged with controlling 5,000 households. For administrative purposes the commune and the hsiang were first treated as a single unit, but eventually each commune covered on average three hsiang. The vastness of the experiment cannot be described better than in the words of Chao Kuo-chün who, when writing on China's land reform, said: "Seldom were so many people so deeply affected by any movement within so short a period. Institutions and values that had prevailed in China for centuries were swept away or transformed during this stupendous political-social-economic revolution."⁷ These remarks hold good for the introduction of the communes as much as for the earlier stages of China's agrarian revolution.

Much has been written about the multi-purpose, multi-functional character of the communes and of their specific task in the wider setting of the Chinese Communist Second Five-Year Plan and the "Great Leap Forward."⁸ Undoubtedly surplus labour was to be mobilised for the dual task of raising industrial production without falling behind in farming. Unquestionably the mobilisation of the maximum number of militia men was another of the many aspects of the operation. Surely the effective deployment of the limited number of Party cadres could be secured in larger rather than smaller units. But the overriding consideration must have been the need to mould the mind of the people at long last to the requirements of the Party. Rectification campaigns, "three-" and "five-anti" campaigns and finally the brief period of the Hundred Flowers cannot have left any doubt as to the degree of the dissatisfaction among the population. The communes were assigned the task of effecting fundamental changes in social structure, personal relations, value and loyalties. The complex equilibrium of interests and influences had been destroyed without being replaced by a new stable relationship. The status in society assigned by the Communist Party was "fraught with social, economic and political consequences."⁹ The commune was thus, first and foremost, an experiment, perhaps the greatest in history, in social engineering.

One cannot but agree with Professor Chao that "the adjustment of agrarian programmes with changed or changing political conditions . . . reflects . . . the realistic and flexible nature of its approaches,"¹⁰ and that "the strength of the CCP leadership . . . lies . . . in knowing when to

⁷ Chao, p. 94.

⁸ *The Chinese Communes*, Supplement to *Soviet Survey*, London, 1959.

⁹ C. K. Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1959), p. 143.

¹⁰ Chao, p. 248.

change to a more realistic path in achieving the original goal.”¹¹ The author is on less firm ground when maintaining that “a basic reason [for achieving victory in the revolutionary movement] is because the CCP has come to understand well the needs and problems of the peasants.”¹² It was rather the deep understanding of the use of revolutionary tactics in the face of opposition that made it possible for the Communist leadership not only to gain control during the stage of popular reforms, but also to maintain it during periods of unpopular measures, such as the introduction of the collectives and communes.

The flow of refugees from urban and rural areas of southern China to Hong Kong does not seem to bear out the picture which Professor Chao paints of the new peasantry when he writes of a dynamic spirit of self-confidence and self-reliance. “The last but not least important aspect in the rural development in China today is the coming into being of a new type of Chinese peasants freed from traditional superstitious beliefs and inferiority complex,” he says: “Liberated from landlord-gentry dominance as well as magico religious inhibitions, a positive, communal and enterprising spirit is becoming increasingly evident among the Chinese villagers.”¹³ Unhappily rural reality in China is grimmer than this to-day. The author’s account is likely to be closer to present conditions when he records that male full-time and part-time labour has increased by 50 and 112 per cent. respectively and that female full-time and part-time labour by as much as 184 and 650 per cent. respectively. In spite of this very substantial rise in labour input, “due to the high rate of involuntary saving in the agricultural sector to support industrialisation, the per capita increase in purchasing power among the peasantry during the first 5-year plan period was small.”¹⁴ Contrary to the author’s belief that it may have been raised substantially in the Second Five-Year Plan period, it probably declined.

The world is watching further developments with curiosity. Particular interest is being displayed in other countries of Asia whose political leaders are groping with the problem of finding a model applicable to their specific conditions. The developing countries will have to draw their own lessons from China’s past record. At the moment it seems doubtful that many will draw conclusions such as those of Chao Kuochün when he sums up his analysis in these words: “The institutional environment and value systems in each country differ, and the Chinese agrarian experiment cannot and should not be translated in toto. However, there are elements such as the organisational skills and social

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 242.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 241.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 254.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 271.

engineering techniques developed by the CCP which could be of reference value to nations faced with similar problems as traditional China did (*sic*)."¹⁵ Unless totalitarian rule is set up elsewhere in Asia, the solutions for indigenous problems are not likely to be borrowed from China, but are more likely to be of a native brand.

W. K.

Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China. By LEO A. ORLEANS. [Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961. 260 pp. \$2.00.]

Education in China. By K. E. PRIESTLEY. [Hong Kong: Dragonfly Books, 1961. 70 pp. Illustrations. \$2.50 H.K.]

No field of inquiry regarding Communist China is potentially more rewarding, in terms of providing better clues to the régime's prospects for attaining its long-range political and economic goals, than the study of the educational system which has evolved under Communist control. This particular aspect of developments on the mainland was largely neglected until recent years, when a research programme initiated by the U.S. Office of Education and the efforts of a small number of individual scholars began to make appreciable strides toward filling the void. The appearance of the two volumes under review here constitutes a very significant further addition to our knowledge of this crucial element in contemporary Chinese life.

The more important of the two books is the study undertaken for the U.S. National Science Foundation by Mr. Leo A. Orleans, a demographer working at the Library of Congress. Mr. Orleans' previous research has centred on problems concerning China's population. In the present work he examines the professional manpower resources available in Communist China. In so doing, he devotes considerable attention to the nature of the educational system which is called upon to produce the needed scientific and technical personnel. The book begins with a short author's preface which includes a discussion of the extraordinary difficulties involved in working with Communist Chinese materials and then proceeds to a brief review of the régime's policies on education, a description of the main levels in the educational system, and a separate discussion on the quality of educational work. It concludes with special chapters on science and technology and on professional manpower, a discussion of the population and labour force, and 78 pages of appendices covering materials related to the general subject of the book.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 290.

BOOK REVIEWS

By great effort, illustrated particularly in the constructing of numerous statistical tables from data gathered painstakingly from a multitude of scattered sources, Mr. Orleans has compiled a work which is the most important single contribution so far to our knowledge in this field. It answers some of the outstanding questions and provides data to help answer others.

Yet, as the author acknowledges, "great gaps of knowledge continue to exist and the whole subject remains a relatively virgin area for research and analysis." Two points will suffice to indicate the magnitude of the gaps still remaining. One problem concerns the number of higher educational institutions in the country. During the first eight years of the régime the reported figures for full-time institutions fluctuated relatively narrowly around the 200 mark, reaching a total of some 230 institutions in 1957. But since that memorable day in the late summer of 1958 when the régime suddenly announced that, as a result of one "great leap forward," there were 1,065 such institutions and 23,500 spare-time and part-time "universities," the entire picture has remained unclear. Although the reported total figure for regular colleges and universities dropped off substantially the following year to the level of 840 institutions, no list of such institutions has become available during the past three years, and it is impossible to ascertain what proportion of them may actually be makeshift operations of a part-time or spare-time nature which would hardly warrant the name "university" in any generally-recognised sense. This basic question still survives Mr. Orleans' probing. Another problem concerns the prevalence of educational attainments beyond the first or Bachelor's degree. Although this level of education is of prime importance in evaluating professional manpower, Mr. Orleans has found it impossible to estimate how many advanced-degree holders there are in China now or to clarify the present status of graduate education in the country.

While this reviewer has great respect for the way in which Mr. Orleans has grappled with data that is often extremely exasperating, he finds some points in the book in need of clarification. For example, it is misleading to refer to the *min-pai* schools as "private schools" (pp. 21-22), a designation which the author has presumably borrowed from various misguided translations. Also, the important distinction between full-time, part-time, and spare-time schools at all levels (with its acknowledged qualitative implications) is not always accurately maintained in the text; the agricultural middle schools, for instance, are described (pp. 14, 99) as "spare-time" schools, whereas they are actually part-time (half-time) institutions. In addition, this reviewer would differ with Mr. Orleans in his reading of some of the important enrolment

statistics in *The Great Ten Years*, upon which the author relies heavily. Mr. Orleans suggests (pp. 36-37) that the two million students in agricultural "and other industrial" middle schools reported in that source are *included within* the 8½ million "general" middle school students tabulated for 1958-59 in the same compilation. This reviewer's reading of *The Great Ten Years* and other relevant data would indicate otherwise: The Chinese claim is that there were 2 million part-time agricultural and industrial middle-school students *in addition to* the 8½ million general middle school students—or a total of 10,520,000 students in the full-time general middle schools and the part-time middle schools in 1958-59. Similarly, Mr. Orleans suggests (pp. 66-67) that the 150,000 students enrolled in spare-time classes at the higher education level in 1958-59, reported in *The Great Ten Years*, are *included within* the 660,000 figure reported for higher education enrolment in that year in another table in the same source. Again, the Chinese claim, as this reviewer understands it, is that there were 150,000 spare-time students *in addition to* 660,000 full-time students.

In general, the reader would be well advised to peruse carefully the explanatory notes and textual material accompanying all statistical tables, although this will not be easy reading in many cases, in order to appreciate the necessary interpretation of the official statistics (e.g., to adjust for double-counting of graduates) and to become aware of the qualitative limitations of the data which the author is careful to point out.

Mr. Orleans makes it abundantly clear throughout the book that he has a low regard for the quality of contemporary Chinese education. He is impressed with the régime's achievements in broadening educational opportunity, but highly critical of the standards prevailing in current educational work. This reviewer would be inclined to agree on both counts. But it must be acknowledged that any really definitive treatment of the qualitative aspects of Chinese education and scientific research must await not only more and better data from Peking but also the opportunity for a thorough on-the-spot survey of Chinese institutions by a qualified independent observer.

The volume by K. E. Priestley, Professor of Education at the University of Hong Kong, is much less ambitious than Mr. Orleans' work. In seventy small pages divided into more than twenty short sections it brings the general reader a 15,000-word account of the highlights of recent educational developments on the mainland. The author's discussion of the permeation of education with politics and the intensive introduction of labour into the schools are particularly perceptive. In general, his low opinion of the qualitative aspect of education on the mainland parallels that of Mr. Orleans. Of special note is Professor

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Priestley's reporting of the Peking régime's policies toward overseas Chinese students and the recent decline in the number of students returning to the mainland to continue their education—points not within the scope of Mr. Orleans' book. The factors behind this shift in trends would make a valuable topic for deeper investigation, particularly if the inquiry could be conducted from the special vantage point of an area such as Hong Kong.

While the Orleans book is heavy with statistical matter, the material of this kind included in the Priestley volume is meagre and sometimes (e.g., p. 37) rather haphazardly presented. But the textual material is written generally in easily readable style, and adeptly captures the flavour of the educational atmosphere in Communist China today. A special feature of the book is a pictorial supplement consisting of twenty-five pages of NCNA photos of students in Chinese schools, with the author's own comments occasionally interjected into the official captions.

The books by Mr. Orleans and Professor Priestley carry us two further steps on the long journey toward a real understanding of the educational system in Communist China. It is to be hoped that these works and the continuing research programmes now in progress in the U.S. government and elsewhere will stimulate greater efforts to fill the remaining gaps and to keep abreast of the constantly changing developments in this critical field.

ROBERT D. BARENDSEN.

Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. [New Delhi: 1961. 555 pp. Rs.3.]

AFTER the frontier incidents of 1959 had caused tension between India and China which diplomatic exchanges failed to resolve, it was agreed at the meeting between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai in Delhi, in April 1960, that a conference of officials of the two countries should examine all available evidence with regard to their common frontier. The officials met alternately in Delhi and Peking and then finally in Rangoon, where they concluded their labours in December 1960. There was no agreed report, but each side drew up its own report, and both are printed in full in the volume which has now been published by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. This publication is indispensable for anyone taking a serious interest in the subject; its only defect is in the inadequacy of the maps provided, for a matter of controversy which is so essentially geographical cannot be properly understood without

plentiful cartography and it would have been better to bring out a volume at a higher price, but furnished with more and better maps.

A reading of the two reports reveals at once a profound difference between the approach of the two sides which goes to the heart of the matter politically. Although the officials were directed simply to study the evidence on the historical background to the frontier disputes, without going into the current political aspects, the Chinese insisted on carrying their anti-imperialist fervour into the discussion of the evidence itself. Much of the evidence introduced by the Indian side to establish the location of the traditional boundaries of Ladakh and Assam consisted either of reports by British officials from the period of the British Raj or of European travellers and explorers, some of them British, but others unconnected with British authority in India and in some cases preceding it—such as Desideri, who travelled through Tibet in the early years of the eighteenth century.

The Chinese attitude was that since all British were imperialists, no credence could be given to any statement from an English pen, and that indeed all Europeans were liars, unless they happened to have written something favourable to the Chinese case. India was accused of trying to perpetuate claims founded on the aggressions of British imperialism and supporting them with British or other non-Asian testimony. The Indian commissioners show considerable embarrassment in their report at being constantly driven by the Chinese into the position of appearing to endorse acts or policies of the former British rulers of India. They would probably have preferred to base their claims entirely on pre-British Indian records, and even the *Mahabharata* was called in to sustain the Indian case, but unfortunately most of the evidence from Indian sources earlier than the nineteenth century was geographically too vague to be of much use for the purpose, and there was no escape from the necessity of putting the disreputable British into the witness-box.

Psychologically the advantage which the Chinese gain from this situation for a controversy with India is obvious. But for a critic who does not start from the assumption that every Englishman in India in the nineteenth century was engaged in a conspiracy to defraud China of border territories rightfully belonging to her, all this evidence must carry some weight. When, for example, a British army officer from another part of India comes to hunt in Ladakh and mentions casually in a book of sporting reminiscences that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was at the Lanak La, it is testimony with regard to the customary frontier which cannot be entirely ignored.

The Chinese case consists of two distinct contentions—first, that the frontier between India and China has never been delimited by international agreement, and second, that the “traditional, customary frontier” (which historically until recent times was a border not between “India” and “China,” but between an independent Tibet and other independent states such as Ladakh and Assam) was located along the frontier now claimed by China and not along that claimed by India. The Chinese attitude towards the traditional boundary is ambiguous; they are ready to appeal to history whenever they can, but if the historic claim cannot be sufficiently substantiated—as it usually cannot—they can always fall back on the argument that the frontier has never been formally delimited by agreement between India and China, that the line claimed by India is invalidated by the mere fact that China does not now accept it, and that the whole of it is open to negotiation. The Indian contention is that the frontier is established by custom and tradition and is not negotiable at all in depth—the extent of Chinese claims within the frontier claimed by India amounts to some 50,000 square miles—though in parts it still requires exact demarcation.

The Chinese made great play with the fact that several British maps of the nineteenth century mark the northern and eastern borders of Kashmir and the northern border of Assam as “undefined” or “undemarcated.” But the failure to claim an exact line cartographically did not mean that large areas were in doubt. In Ladakh, which had been incorporated in Kashmir before Kashmir itself (in 1846) came under British paramountcy, the border zone consisted of largely uninhabited mountain tracts, where there was no contact of neighbouring peoples; nevertheless, in areas now claimed by China, substantial evidence was advanced from the Indian side to show seasonal use by Ladakhis for pasture, hunting or salt-mining and administration by Kashmir police patrols.

In what is now the Indian North-East Frontier Agency the situation was somewhat different; between Tibet and Assam, on the south side of the Himalayan watershed, there are a number of tribes in the hills, speaking languages similar to Tibetan, who were formerly independent, though the Ahom kings of Assam used to claim supremacy over them and enforced it when they were strong enough. In this region British nineteenth-century maps usually show a boundary which marked the limit of British administration in Assam; this did not imply that the territory beyond it belonged to Tibet or to China, but merely that it was held by unadministered tribes. As time went on, the area of Indian government administration was extended further, and it has been consolidated since the transfer of power in India.

The Chinese, however, now claim the whole region down to the edge of the Assam lowlands. They have been quite unsuccessful in producing evidence to prove that they or the Tibetans ever exercised secular control over it; their case has rested almost entirely on a purely ecclesiastical jurisdiction by one of the great monasteries of Lhasa over a section of the tribes who are Buddhist. But in the Himalayas, as in medieval Europe, there is a clear distinction to be drawn between the spiritual and temporal powers of a dominant priesthood; Peter's Pence have never made Catholic kingdoms part of the Papal States. In any case, it is the height of irony that the Chinese Communists, who have adopted the most ruthless measures of coercion to break the power of the Lama hierarchy in Tibet, should advance the payment of religious dues by Buddhists in Tawang as an argument for Chinese sovereignty.

The Chinese claim to sovereignty over the whole territory of the Indian North-east Frontier Agency—as distinct from one or two small districts on the edge of Tibet—is so flimsy that one cannot help wondering what has been Peking's motive for making it, especially as its scope has been enlarged by several thousand square miles even since the controversy over the frontier began. It has been suggested that its purpose has been really to provide a bargaining counter for negotiation over Ladakh, that cession of north-eastern Ladakh is what the Chinese really want and that they hope to purchase it by giving up deliberately inflated claims on the border of Assam.

But there has been no sign so far that the Chinese are less serious about the Assam border than about Ladakh. There have been, on the other hand, indications in Chinese semi-official statements that the urge behind the Chinese claims is not the desire to recover historic rights—which for the most part never existed—or even a practical need—though the construction of the military road across the Aksai Chin has been of very great importance for China—but an adoptive ethnic irredentism. Just as Italy in 1939 annexed Albania and then immediately took over the Albanian irredentist claims against Greece, so now China, having gained effective control of Tibet, aspires to incorporate all the Himalayan peoples who speak Tibetan dialects or languages of the Tibetan family from Ladakh eastwards to the extremity of Assam. The line claimed by China as the traditional boundary of China (*i.e.*, Tibet) towards Assam never was any such thing, but it is roughly the ethnic boundary between the Tibetan-type languages of the hill peoples and the Assamese speech of the lowlands.

That this is the principle behind the Chinese claims is confirmed by two other features of the Report under consideration. In the first place, the Chinese argued with great vehemence that Ladakh was not independent, but a part of Tibet until the nineteenth century; the Indian side

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had little difficulty in demonstrating that this was historically untrue. But even if the Chinese had been better able to sustain their argument, it would not have assisted the purpose of proving a location for a traditional frontier between Ladakh and Tibet which was the issue actually under debate.

Secondly, the Chinese representatives, in spite of strong Indian protests, steadily refused to discuss the frontiers of Sikkim and Bhutan as part of the frontier between India and China. Since both Sikkim and Bhutan have entrusted India with the conduct of their foreign relations, this refusal on the part of China to recognise that India has the right to represent them on frontier questions can only mean that China intends to retain a free hand for raising the question of their status at some future time. It seems, therefore, that even now the full extent of Chinese aims in the Himalayan region has not been disclosed. The Chinese People's Republic was in no hurry to advance territorial claims at all until it had consolidated its position internally and internationally; thus when the Indian Government first made complaints about the circulation of maps in China showing tracts of Indian territory as Chinese, Peking made the excuse that these maps had been published under the Kuomintang, without giving any indication that it officially claimed the territories in question. Now these claims are being pressed, and later on, if political conditions become more favourable to Chinese pressure on India, open claims to Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan can also be advanced.

G. F. HUDSON.

Cities of Mainland China: 1953 and 1958. By MORRIS B. ULLMAN.
[Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1961. 46 pp. Folding Map. Free.]

DESPITE the fact that the results of the 1953 "modern census" of mainland China revealed an urban population of 77.3 million, despite a fairly steady flow of population figures for individual cities, and despite the publication of several suggested criteria for defining "what is urban," we still do not know precisely what the reported figures refer to. There has been an increasing trend (particularly since 1958) for the cities of China to absorb within their boundaries large rural and suburban areas. Thus, for example, the area of Lanchow increased from 406 sq. km. in 1953 to 660 sq. km. in 1959; the area of Urumchi increased from 80 sq. km. in 1949 to 694 sq. km. in 1958; the absorption of surrounding *hsien* by such cities as Shanghai is well known by now.

Unfortunately, however, it is an exception, not a rule, for the reported population of a particular municipality to be broken down between the

urban and the rural population or for the population to be discussed in relation to the size of the area which contains it. These gaps, of course, create very difficult problems in any attempt to analyse the growth of either the total urban population or of a particular urban area. It is therefore appropriate that in his monograph, *Cities of Mainland China*, Mr. Ullman restricts himself chiefly to the presentation of reported statistics, including only a few relevant aspects of the urban administrative system and only as much interpretation and commentary as is necessary to aid the reader in understanding the figures.

The appendices, which take up almost two-thirds of the monograph, provide a number of useful and interesting tables and compilations. Table 1 presents the 1953 populations (or population range) of all urban places with 20,000 inhabitants or more and a tabular indication of their principal economic functions. These same cities and towns are pinpointed on an enclosed map (based on a Chinese 1955 wall map) and in Table 2 are listed in alphabetical order, giving their Chinese characters, province, and geographic co-ordinates. Appendix B lists alternate names for some 90 urban places. Appendix D lists known administrative and boundary changes of municipalities, while Appendix E presents a useful glossary of Chinese terms, using both romanisation and Chinese characters.

There are several seeming contradictions in the report that should be brought to the attention of the reader. The author rightly warns against an uncritical acceptance of some of the official birth and death rates released by the State Statistical Bureau for some of the large cities (p. 14). However, he proceeds to accept the level implied by these rates in his conclusion that, because of a high natural increase in most urban areas ("usually in excess of 3 per cent. per year"), the factor of migration had been of only secondary importance in the growth of the urban population. Both the assumed natural increase and the conclusion that this natural increase contributed "substantially more to urban growth than did migration" would be difficult to justify and to accept.

On the same page, the author asserts that "any attempt to observe the growth of China's cities in a longer historical perspective than that afforded by the current official figures runs into serious problems due to the fact that data from different sources and periods are not comparable." It is difficult to disagree with this statement. The next paragraph, however, and an accompanying table give a detailed analysis of the urban growth within the various urban size classes between 1938 and 1958. Similarly, Table 3 of the appendix presents populations for urban places classified as municipalities for the years 1938, 1948, 1953 and 1958. Although this invites comparisons and conclusions on the rates of growth of individual cities, the 1938 and 1948 figures are nothing more than

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estimates based on prior estimates (for example, interpolations and extrapolations of populations for various dates between 1922 and 1937) and should not be compared either with the Communist data or with each other.

Despite these and other minor inconsistencies, this carefully documented monograph will find many grateful users who require a handy reference work for information on the populations and some of the characteristics of China's cities.

LEO A. ORLEANS.

Communist China, 1949-59, Volume I. [Hongkong: Union Research Institute, 1961. 264 pp. 30s.]

ONE of the most important centres for research on China in recent years has been Hongkong. In addition to the work done at Hongkong University and by the U.S. agencies there, there exist in the colony a number of independent research organisations engaged in the study of developments on the mainland. Although some of these approach their task from a standpoint so partisan as to vitiate a good deal of their work, others produce competent studies of considerable interest and objectivity. Among these is the Union Research Institute.

The Institute has now published a composite volume of a number of studies on developments in China under the title *Communist China, 1949-59*. This is the first of two volumes, the second of which is to appear later. The authors are all Chinese. The subjects covered include four on various aspects of economic development, one on the Communist Party, one on political and legal affairs, one on military affairs and one on propaganda. All are based on a comprehensive and detailed study of Communist sources, and they are documented with copious references to Chinese mainland publications.

Although the general conclusions of the articles are uniformly unfavourable to the régime and its institutions, the judgments passed are for the most part not extreme and many of their comments are sensible. The main interest of the volume will in any case for most people probably lie in the facts it records, rather than the conclusions which are drawn from them. A great deal of most of the essays consists of a detailed historical account of developments within the field covered. One of the most valuable features of the volume is the wealth of tables of statistics, often on somewhat out-of-the-way subjects—such as those recording the main meetings of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the CCP and the resolutions adopted there, the major Party purges at provincial and higher levels, the theoretical publications published by Party committees at local levels, the organisational system

of the People's Liberation Army, the list of hydro-electric power projects by region, and the list of all the autonomous regions, *chous* and *hsiens*. And there is a great deal of other detailed information of a useful kind to be gleaned from the volume. Particularly interesting are the articles on "The Petroleum and Electric Power Industries" and on "Military Affairs of Communist China."

It is perhaps a pity that some of the authors could not have asked an English friend to read through the articles to suggest a few stylistic amendments before publication: at present some of them contain a good many of those picturesque, but somewhat bizarre, turns of phrase, almost inevitable among those writing in a language not their own; these, though insignificant in themselves, seem in an illogical way to detract from the authority which the articles might otherwise, and certainly deserve to, enjoy.

But these are superficial faults. In general the volume may be recommended as a significant contribution to our knowledge of developments on the Chinese mainland.

EVAN LUARD.

The Overseas Chinese. By LOIS MITCHISON. [London: The Bodley Head, 1961. 93 pp. 10s. 6d.]; *Die Überseechinesen in Südostasien.* By EDUARD J. SOLICH. Hamburg: Instituts für Asienkunde, 1960. 92 pp.]

THESE two short books are designed to serve those members of the general reading public concerned with world politics. The problems, place, power and future of the overseas Chinese are lucidly discussed and intelligently appraised. Of the several brief handbooks on the Chinese in South-East Asia to appear in English since the war, the volume by Miss Mitchison is clearly the best. She writes in a literate, journalistic style; and she has not only studied her subject but has thought about it. Eduard Solich has produced the first book of its kind in German; he has thereby provided his compatriots with a new chance to learn about an area and a people no longer remote.

Miss Mitchison compresses yet illuminates a remarkable amount of history. About half her paragraphs cover the record of Chinese emigration and settlement abroad before 1941. The rest of the volume dissects the dilemma of overseas Chinese still drawn by the magnetism of their ancestral culture while pushed or pulled toward local assimilation. The vigour of Communist China generates added pressures: the expatriates, generally bourgeois in outlook, may be repelled by the Maoist revolution but they cannot withhold admiration for China's might. The authoress adroitly recreates this climate of uncertainty now enveloping the Chinese

communities of South-East Asia. Readers are thus made thoughtfully aware of the insecurity, political and psychological, suffered by the Chinese 5 per cent. of South-East Asia's population.

Only two errors of consequence prevent Miss Mitchison's work from being judged uniformly excellent. It is unfortunately untrue that by twenty years ago great numbers of Chinese born abroad had become indistinguishable from indigenous South-East Asians. The region was not, as the book under review argues, a hospitable melting pot in the American style. A second misinterpretation must also be singled out for correction. The writer maintains that a Southern Chinese sense of cultural inferiority *vis-à-vis* Northerners eased the pain of emigration for people from Kwangtung and Fukien. This reviewer has no evidence, documentary or personal, to show that a Southerner is any less smugly provincial than a man from north of the Yangtze.

The German presentation is more traditional in style and approach than the book just discussed. Solich properly decided to convey the maximum amount of factual information permitted by his format. Since he was obliged to assume that his readers would be quite unfamiliar with the overseas Chinese problem, Solich wrote a textbook rather than an essay. Three and a half decades in the Far East have provided the author with a broad perspective and with a command of Chinese. Both gifts were put to productive use in the composition of his book. The mainland Chinese press has been tapped as a source on recent Peking policies. For the most part, earlier periods are surveyed through the eyes of British and American writers.

Both these books are valuable. Miss Mitchison has taken a fresh look at the overseas Chinese and effectively presents her analysis. Eduard Solich has published a careful record to benefit speakers of German previously denied access to works in other languages.

LEA E. WILLIAMS.

Russian works on China 1918-1960 in American libraries. By YUAN TUNG-LI. [New Haven: Far Eastern Publications, Yale University, 1961. xiv + 162 pp.]

THIS bibliography provides a useful list of Russian works on China in American libraries. Yuan Tung-li correctly estimates the importance of Soviet literature for the study of China. Soviet works provide not only a guide to the development of Soviet thought about and policy towards China; they often include serious monographic work. The growing importance of Soviet studies of China should encourage American libraries to expand their collections in this field and American

specialists on China to study Russian. Yuan's book can serve both libraries and individuals as a useful guide to purchasing.

For the scholar, however, the book presents several serious drawbacks. There is no annotation or evaluation of any of the items. Since titles are often misleading, it is impossible to determine which works represent serious scholarship and which are simply propaganda tracts. Bibliographical work should be undertaken with the assumption that it is an educational, rather than a mechanical, process. Nor is there any indication in the bibliography of the location of the individual items. A simple system such as that used by the Library of Congress would have made the work more useful as a finding list. As it is, recourse may be had to the Library of Congress's Cyrillic Union Catalogue. Perhaps this bibliography's greatest drawback is that no periodical literature is included in the body of the work, although section VII lists periodicals dealing with China. The scholar approaching Soviet literature on China should be aware that some of the most valuable materials are to be found in periodicals. For such materials, reference may be had to both editions of Skachkov's *Bibliografiya Kitaya* (1932 and 1960). For a partial continuing list of American acquisitions of Russian works on China, including periodical literature, the scholar may use the *Monthly Index of Russian Accessions*, published by the Library of Congress.

For the individual, this bibliography can serve as a quick finding list for titles on his research subject. It should be borne in mind, however, that books and microfilm can be obtained directly from the Soviet Union. There are also bookstores in Paris, London, and New York through which Soviet publications can be obtained. The researcher is not limited to the libraries in the United States.

MARK MANCALL.

Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

1. Internal Political and Economic Developments

The Economy

Reports of floods and drought throughout the country continued to come in during the third quarter. In Anhwei drought during the summer was followed by heavy rains and waterlogging during September.¹ In Hunan, floods were followed by drought.² Hupeh's drought conditions were reported to be worse than during the "severe drought disasters" of 1959 and 1960.³ In the areas of Kiangsu worst-hit by drought, the peasants were mobilised to replant late autumn crops "to produce at least something to stave off famine."⁴ Shantung had a flood disaster,⁵ and there were torrential rains in central and eastern Heilungkiang.⁶ In its anniversary day editorial (see below), the *People's Daily* revealed that the total effect of these calamities had been "a reduction of agricultural output." The reduction in crop production had in turn affected industrial production dependent on agricultural raw materials and so reduced the supply of consumer goods. The need to devote every effort to consolidating agriculture was emphasised.

The Need to "Strive for New Victories"

In agriculture, we have engaged in the large-scale construction of water conservancy works, enlarged the area of irrigated farmland, increased by many times the amount of agricultural machinery, and accumulated considerable experience in applying the "eight-point charter" for higher agricultural production. All this has provided extremely favourable conditions for the development of agriculture. In industry, the production capacity of our basic industry has shown a manifold increase, the technical forces have been rapidly augmented, some new branches of industry have started to come into being, the rate of self-sufficiency in industrial equipment and important materials has been greatly raised, the geographical distribution of industry has become more rational, more physical resources have been located, many effective innovations and discoveries have been made in industrial technology, and scientific and technological research has made tremendous progress. In all, fourteen out of the seventeen main targets for industrial production set in China's second Five-Year Plan (1958-62-NCNA) were fulfilled or overfulfilled in 1959 and 1960. . . .

¹ See B.B.C.'s *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB), Part 3, FE/W118, 119, 122, 129.

² SWB, Part 3, FE/W118, 119, 120, 121, 125.

³ SWB, Part 3, FE/W120.

⁵ SWB, Part 3, FE/W121.

⁴ SWB, Part 3, FE/W125.

⁶ SWB, Part 3, FE/W124.

These achievements in our Socialist revolution and Socialist construction demonstrate that we have made a big stride forward along the road of making our homeland a Socialist Power with modern industry, modern agriculture and modern science and culture. The great practical experience in the three years has testified to the absolute correctness of the Party's general line in building Socialism, the big leap forward policy for China's Socialist construction, and the road of the people's communes.

While achieving great successes, we have encountered certain difficulties in the economy in our march forward and there have been certain shortcomings in our work. The grave, natural calamities which occurred for three successive years, between 1959 and 1961, in particular, have resulted in a reduction of agricultural output. Agriculture is the foundation for the expansion of the national economy. The reduction in the output of grain, industrial crops and subsidiary rural products has affected the production of both light industry and heavy industry, and consequently commodity supplies and the people's livelihood.

However, the Chinese people, who won their victory in the past 100 years of struggle against imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism by overcoming great difficulties, will know that it is impossible not to encounter difficulties or have shortcomings in the course of this historically unprecedented Socialist construction of such a big country as ours, which has a population of 650 million and is very backward economically and culturally. We Chinese people are heroic and industrious. We were never frightened by the difficulties of the past and we shall never be disheartened by difficulties of the present. This is because we are stronger, not weaker, than in the past. This is because the material foundation we laid during the past three years will play an ever greater role in the future, and the rich experience we accumulated during the past three years will help us to overcome all difficulties, to hold aloft the great banner of the general line, the great leap forward, and the people's commune, and to strive for new victories.

The present difficulties in our national economy are temporary ones arising in the course of our advance. The tremendous achievements of our national economic construction and the general rise in the political consciousness of the masses of the people in the past three years have provided favourable conditions for us to overcome these difficulties. We have fulfilled ahead of schedule the major targets for industrial production set in the second five-year plan; therefore, we can make full use of the last two years of the second five-year plan to carry out in our national economy the policy propounded in January this year by the ninth plenary session of the eighth Central Committee of the CCP—that is, the policy of readjusting, consolidating, filling out, and raising standards; to concentrate our strength on making readjustments to overcome the new discrepancy in the balance of the national economy which appeared during its great expansion; to consolidate the successes already won; to overcome the difficulties created by the natural calamities; to strive to restore and develop our agricultural production; to enable the backward departments and backward links in production to catch up; to make full use of the production power of new industries; and to create good conditions for future expansion of the national economy during the third five-year plan.

In the past year, under the leadership of the Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the people throughout the country have made immense efforts to

overcome the temporary difficulties. We have already adopted concrete measures in various fields to overcome difficulties and improve our work, and such measures have already produced initial results. Our difficulties have been, primarily, the result of the severe, natural calamities which have occurred in the past three consecutive years. It is therefore necessary to begin with agriculture in order to cope with these difficulties.

On the basis of the experience of the past three years, we have adopted and are carrying out policies concerning the people's communes and farm production. Agriculture and grain production are being developed in a big way by the whole Party and the whole people. The agricultural front has been greatly reinforced both in manpower and materials. The people's communes have become firmer than ever and the enthusiasm of the masses of peasants has increased enormously. Consequently, despite the severe drought which has occurred in quite a number of places in the country this year and reduced the summer yields, the autumn harvest may be slightly better than last year's. At present, the urgent task of the rural people's communes are: to mobilise and organise the broad masses of commune members to do a careful job in autumn harvest, reaping all available agricultural products; to implement thoroughly the Party's policies and do a good job in autumn distribution and in the procurement for the State; to mobilise further the enthusiasm of the broad masses of peasants; to do a good job in autumn ploughing and planting; to do a good job in making preparations for next year's production and to lay a good foundation for next year's bumper harvest.

In industry, in view of the fact that agriculture has suffered from severe natural calamities for three years in a row, that the capacity of the equipment of our basic industries has increased greatly, and that the major industrial targets of the second five-year plan were fulfilled ahead of schedule, we have appropriately reduced the scope of capital construction, readjusted the rate of industrial development, and turned our main energy to strengthening the weak links, improving the quality of products, increasing their variety, lowering the costs of production and raising labour productivity.

Our present tasks in the sphere of industry are: first, to strengthen the assistance of industry to agriculture, step up the production of means of production for agriculture and facilitate the further improvement of agriculture; secondly, to strengthen the production of the light industry and handicrafts and increase the market supply of daily necessities, and, especially, to strengthen the production of light industrial products using chemical products as raw materials and the production of traditional handicraft products; and, thirdly, to increase the production capacity of the mining and lumber industries and to enable, as quickly as possible, the raw material producing industries to adapt themselves still better to the needs of processing industries. Efforts must be made to ensure the production of coal, both in quality and quantity, and that of rolled steel in variety and quality, so as to activate further the entire industrial production. If we can do a good job on all these tasks we shall be able better to co-ordinate, under new terms, the proportional relationship between industry and agriculture, between heavy industry and light industry, and between the departments within the heavy industry, in preparation for the next stage of the development of the national economy.

We have all the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of the above-mentioned tasks. Our most fundamental guarantees are the wise leadership of the great, glorious and proven CCP and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and the rich and varied experiences in socialist construction already acquired by our cadres and masses. In the past three years, the general line for building Socialism mapped out by our Party has not only been proved to be fully suited to the conditions of our country and effective in practice, but it has also been enriched and developed to a greater extent.

In practice, we have already found many concrete policies necessary for the execution of the general line. The Party's policies concerning the people's commune mainly centre on the three-level collective ownership system which is based on the production brigade's collective ownership system; on the principle of distribution according to work performed and the principle of exchange at par; on the system of guaranteed production, guaranteed work and guaranteed cost, and the system of reward for overfulfilment; and on the further perfection of the people's commune.

The Party's policy of considering agriculture as the basis for national economy and industry as the leader in national economy and the Party's policy of equally emphasising agriculture and industry, heavy industry and light industry, large, small and medium enterprises, as well as native and Western methods of production, while giving priority to heavy industry, are unswerving policies for our socialist construction. The Party's stepping up of leadership in all works, its insistence on the mass line, its integration of centralisation of leadership, with the utilisation of the enthusiasm of the masses, its integration of politics-in-command with materialistic encouragement, and its integration of political work with economic and technical work are all experiences proved to be effective in the great leap forward. We must do a good job in summarising these experiences and apply them to improve and elevate our work.

A realistic work style, the conducting of investigations and studies, and the work style of integrating the emancipation of thoughts and respect for science, which have always been urged by the Party, have been proved to be the key to the discovery and solution of problems encountered in our work, the key to making the policies more suitable for the actual conditions, and the key to incessant progress in our work. We have already begun to grasp the skill for Socialist construction, but we still have not grasped it completely. We must continue to learn humbly. By serious study of fundamental Marxist-Leninist theory on Socialist revolution and Socialist construction, by study of policies put forward by the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory, taking into account the practical conditions of China, by study of the experiences in Socialist construction of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries, we will surely be able to recognise more fully and master the objective laws of China's Socialist construction and carry out our Socialist construction with greater, quicker, better and more economical results. . . .

As the Chinese people celebrate this year's National Day they look forward to the future with full confidence. We firmly believe that, under the leadership of the CCP Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, under the guidance of the three red banners of general line, great leap forward and people's commune, under the favourable international conditions, relying on our diligence and our excellent tradition of building the nation with hard

struggles and austerity, and after a period of struggle, the Party and the people of China will definitely succeed in overcoming the temporary difficulties brought about by natural calamities, in solidifying and developing the great achievements of the three years of great leap forward and in winning new victories. May we Communist Party members, people of all nationalities, members of all democratic parties, workers, peasants, intellectuals and cadres march forward heroically with one heart.

[From *People's Daily* editorial, October 1, as translated in B.B.C. *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 3, FE/759/C2/1-5.]

"Red and Expert"

From an overwhelming emphasis on political correctness (i.e., "redness") in scholarship during the "Great Leap Forward," the pendulum seems to be swinging now towards expertise—presumably because the régime knows it must call on every scrap of technical and managerial talent to help restore the momentum of the economy. An article in the *People's Daily* on July 7 rejected the idea that studying hard was "individualism." Marshal Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister, put the matter more plainly when addressing graduating university students in Peking on August 10. He said:

At present we should stress specialised studies because failure to do so will keep our country perpetually backward in science and culture. In the early years of the liberation, it was completely necessary for the Party and the Government to stress political study. In the past several years, thanks to the correct leadership of the Party, our institutes of higher education have made outstanding achievements in political teaching. . . . Today there is a need for us . . . to train a large number of specialists. . . . This is our greatest political mission . . .

To make efforts in the study of his special field is the political task of the student . . . the students . . . should devote most of their time and efforts to specialised studies. Of course these students should also study politics to equip themselves with a certain degree of political consciousness . . .

The fact that some students belonged formerly to families of the exploiting class will not handicap them from becoming revolutionaries. . . . Students who have been freed from the classification of Rightists should be looked upon as our own comrades . . .⁷

Deaths

Mei Lan-fang, the renowned exponent of Peking opera, died on August 8 of a heart attack at the age of 67. In a funeral oration, Marshal Ch'en Yi declared that Mei had turned Peking opera "from a plaything of the royal family and the upper classes into an art serving the broad masses of the people."

Four days later the overseas Chinese leader Tan Kah Kee died in Peking aged 88. He had long been the main advertisement for the

⁷ *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*, Sept. 1. Translated in *SWB*, Part 3, FE/W126.

régime's claim to treat even the richest of the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie with understanding and moderation. Among the many posts Tan occupied was the chairmanship of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.

2. Foreign Relations

China and Africa

Kwame Nkrumah's six-day visit to China from August 14-19 was the main development in Sino-African relations. President Nkrumah was received by the major Chinese leaders and signed a treaty of friendship with Chou En-lai. More important, perhaps, was the Sino-Ghanaian Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation under which China granted Ghana a 20-year interest-free loan of £ (Ghanaian) 7 million and agreed to supply experts, technicians and complete sets of equipment and to train Ghanaian skilled workers and technicians. A trade and payments agreement fixed the annual volume of exports on each side at £ (Ghanaian) 4 million. An agreement on cultural co-operation covering science, the arts, medicine and public health was also signed. In a joint communiqué, Ghana.

expressed its support for the restoration of China's legitimate rights and position in the United Nations, and for the struggle waged by the Chinese Government and people in defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and condemned the imperialist plot to create "two Chinas."⁸

A Chinese "economic construction" exhibition in Accra closed on September 29; 330,000 people, including President Nkrumah and cabinet ministers, are claimed to have visited it during the 51 days it was open.

Others visitors to China from Africa included a Mali economic delegation and a 71-member Ethiopian song and dance troupe. On July 15, Liu Ch'ang-sheng, Chairman of the Chinese-African People's Friendship Association reported on his four-month tour of West Africa which had included, in the end, eight states. (See "Quarterly Chronicle" in issue six.)

The one obvious setback suffered by Peking was the withdrawal of its embassy in Stanleyville as a result of Gizenga's agreement to join forces with the Central Congolese Government in Leopoldville. The latter recognises Formosa.

China and the U.N. seat

In an editorial on September 22, the *People's Daily* attacked the American-backed proposal put forward by New Zealand that Chinese

⁸ *Peking Review*, No. 34, 1961.

representation in the U.N. was an "important question" and therefore required a two-thirds majority vote. The paper said that according to para. 2 of Article 18 of the U.N. Charter, "important questions" were those concerning the admission of new members, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership and the expulsion of members. Since China had always been a member of the organisation, this para did not cover the present case which, the paper argued, was one of restoring to China its "long-existing lawful rights." The "driving out" of the Nationalist representative was not expelling a member or depriving one of privileges, but simply a case of ejecting a usurper. The paper went on to list a number of cases—Cuba, Iraq, Egypt—where changes of régime had occurred as a result of revolution or *coup d'état*, but no question had been raised as to the right of the new régime to take its country's seat.

China and Latin America

China's courting of Latin America continued this quarter with the visit to Peking of President Dorticos of Cuba and Vice-President Goulart of Brazil. In view of the latter's sudden accession later to the Presidency, his visit should be accounted a major diplomatic success for the Communist régime.

President Dorticos arrived on September 22 and stood between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i at the October 1 celebrations. On the conclusion of his visit it was announced that Liu had agreed to visit Cuba at an appropriate time.

Vice-President Goulart, who was in China in August, concluded a trade and payments agreement.

Other Visits

A National People's Congress delegation led by Kuo Mo-jo visited Indonesia and Burma. Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery visited China and was received by Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. He reaffirmed his support for one China, under the Communist government, with Formosa as part of it.

Sino-Soviet Trade

The unprecedented visit to Peking of a Soviet trade official half-way through the trade year in August and the phrasing of the resulting communiqué indicated that the treaty, which had taken so long to conclude earlier in the year (see "Quarterly Chronicle" in issue six), had not been working very well but that both partners wanted to make further efforts to solve difficulties.

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

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